diff options
author | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2017-06-10 01:55:04 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2017-06-11 02:11:46 +0200 |
commit | 93c98a484c4900f0d2c65c16466d45f90ea5b175 (patch) | |
tree | dc4795a3e0c86eed799ccc33666a613bbede06e4 /security/apparmor/domain.c | |
parent | apparmor: support v7 transition format compatible with label_parse (diff) | |
download | linux-93c98a484c4900f0d2c65c16466d45f90ea5b175.tar.xz linux-93c98a484c4900f0d2c65c16466d45f90ea5b175.zip |
apparmor: move exec domain mediation to using labels
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor/domain.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/domain.c | 850 |
1 files changed, 592 insertions, 258 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 896bca01828e..cb8509373ea3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -87,42 +87,236 @@ out: return error; } +/**** TODO: dedup to aa_label_match - needs perm and dfa, merging + * specifically this is an exact copy of aa_label_match except + * aa_compute_perms is replaced with aa_compute_fperms + * and policy.dfa with file.dfa + ****/ +/* match a profile and its associated ns component if needed + * Assumes visibility test has already been done. + * If a subns profile is not to be matched should be prescreened with + * visibility test. + */ +static inline unsigned int match_component(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_profile *tp, + bool stack, unsigned int state) +{ + const char *ns_name; + + if (stack) + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, "&"); + if (profile->ns == tp->ns) + return aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); + + /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ + ns_name = aa_ns_name(profile->ns, tp->ns, true); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, ns_name); + state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); + return aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, tp->base.hname); +} + +/** + * label_compound_match - find perms for full compound label + * @profile: profile to find perms for + * @label: label to check access permissions for + * @stack: whether this is a stacking request + * @start: state to start match in + * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns + * @request: permissions to request + * @perms: perms struct to set + * + * Returns: 0 on success else ERROR + * + * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for A//&B//&C + * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission + * check to be stacked. + */ +static int label_compound_match(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *label, bool stack, + unsigned int state, bool subns, u32 request, + struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + struct aa_profile *tp; + struct label_it i; + struct path_cond cond = { }; + + /* find first subcomponent that is visible */ + label_for_each(i, label, tp) { + if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) + continue; + state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, state); + if (!state) + goto fail; + goto next; + } + + /* no component visible */ + *perms = allperms; + return 0; + +next: + label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { + if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) + continue; + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, state, "//&"); + state = match_component(profile, tp, false, state); + if (!state) + goto fail; + } + *perms = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, perms); + if ((perms->allow & request) != request) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; + +fail: + *perms = nullperms; + return -EACCES; +} + +/** + * label_components_match - find perms for all subcomponents of a label + * @profile: profile to find perms for + * @label: label to check access permissions for + * @stack: whether this is a stacking request + * @start: state to start match in + * @subns: whether to do permission checks on components in a subns + * @request: permissions to request + * @perms: an initialized perms struct to add accumulation to + * + * Returns: 0 on success else ERROR + * + * For the label A//&B//&C this does the perm match for each of A and B and C + * @perms should be preinitialized with allperms OR a previous permission + * check to be stacked. + */ +static int label_components_match(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *label, bool stack, + unsigned int start, bool subns, u32 request, + struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + struct aa_profile *tp; + struct label_it i; + struct aa_perms tmp; + struct path_cond cond = { }; + unsigned int state = 0; + + /* find first subcomponent to test */ + label_for_each(i, label, tp) { + if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) + continue; + state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start); + if (!state) + goto fail; + goto next; + } + + /* no subcomponents visible - no change in perms */ + return 0; + +next: + tmp = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); + aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); + label_for_each_cont(i, label, tp) { + if (!aa_ns_visible(profile->ns, tp->ns, subns)) + continue; + state = match_component(profile, tp, stack, start); + if (!state) + goto fail; + tmp = aa_compute_fperms(profile->file.dfa, state, &cond); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &tmp); + aa_perms_accum(perms, &tmp); + } + + if ((perms->allow & request) != request) + return -EACCES; + + return 0; + +fail: + *perms = nullperms; + return -EACCES; +} + +/** + * label_match - do a multi-component label match + * @profile: profile to match against (NOT NULL) + * @label: label to match (NOT NULL) + * @stack: whether this is a stacking request + * @state: state to start in + * @subns: whether to match subns components + * @request: permission request + * @perms: Returns computed perms (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: the state the match finished in, may be the none matching state + */ +static int label_match(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *label, + bool stack, unsigned int state, bool subns, u32 request, + struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + int error; + + *perms = nullperms; + error = label_compound_match(profile, label, stack, state, subns, + request, perms); + if (!error) + return error; + + *perms = allperms; + return label_components_match(profile, label, stack, state, subns, + request, perms); +} + +/******* end TODO: dedup *****/ + /** * change_profile_perms - find permissions for change_profile * @profile: the current profile (NOT NULL) - * @ns: the namespace being switched to (NOT NULL) - * @name: the name of the profile to change to (NOT NULL) + * @target: label to transition to (NOT NULL) + * @stack: whether this is a stacking request * @request: requested perms * @start: state to start matching in * + * * Returns: permission set + * + * currently only matches full label A//&B//&C or individual components A, B, C + * not arbitrary combinations. Eg. A//&B, C */ -static struct aa_perms change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct aa_ns *ns, - const char *name, u32 request, - unsigned int start) +static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *target, bool stack, + u32 request, unsigned int start, + struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { + perms->allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC; + perms->audit = perms->quiet = perms->kill = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* TODO: add profile in ns screening */ + return label_match(profile, target, stack, start, true, request, perms); +} + +static struct aa_perms change_profile_perms_wrapper(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_profile *target, + u32 request, + unsigned int start) { struct aa_perms perms; - struct path_cond cond = { }; - unsigned int state; if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC; perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0; return perms; - } else if (!profile->file.dfa) { - return nullperms; - } else if ((ns == profile->ns)) { - /* try matching against rules with out namespace prepended */ - aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, start, name, &cond, &perms); - if (COMBINED_PERM_MASK(perms) & request) - return perms; } - /* try matching with namespace name and then profile */ - state = aa_dfa_match(profile->file.dfa, start, ns->base.name); - state = aa_dfa_match_len(profile->file.dfa, state, ":", 1); - aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); + if (change_profile_perms(profile, &target->label, false, request, + start, &perms)) + return nullperms; return perms; } @@ -173,10 +367,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) * - * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found + * Returns: label or NULL if no match found */ -static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, - struct list_head *list, const char *name) +static struct aa_label *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list, + const char *name) { struct aa_profile *profile; @@ -184,49 +378,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list)); rcu_read_unlock(); - return profile; -} - -/** - * separate_fqname - separate the namespace and profile names - * @fqname: the fqname name to split (NOT NULL) - * @ns_name: the namespace name if it exists (NOT NULL) - * - * This is the xtable equivalent routine of aa_split_fqname. It finds the - * split in an xtable fqname which contains an embedded \0 instead of a : - * if a namespace is specified. This is done so the xtable is constant and - * isn't re-split on every lookup. - * - * Either the profile or namespace name may be optional but if the namespace - * is specified the profile name termination must be present. This results - * in the following possible encodings: - * profile_name\0 - * :ns_name\0profile_name\0 - * :ns_name\0\0 - * - * NOTE: the xtable fqname is pre-validated at load time in unpack_trans_table - * - * Returns: profile name if it is specified else NULL - */ -static const char *separate_fqname(const char *fqname, const char **ns_name) -{ - const char *name; - - if (fqname[0] == ':') { - /* In this case there is guaranteed to be two \0 terminators - * in the string. They are verified at load time by - * by unpack_trans_table - */ - *ns_name = fqname + 1; /* skip : */ - name = *ns_name + strlen(*ns_name) + 1; - if (!*name) - name = NULL; - } else { - *ns_name = NULL; - name = fqname; - } - - return name; + return profile ? &profile->label : NULL; } static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) @@ -238,295 +390,477 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) * x_table_lookup - lookup an x transition name via transition table * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) * @xindex: index into x transition table + * @name: returns: name tested to find label (NOT NULL) * - * Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) + * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) */ -static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex) +static struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, + const char **name) { - struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; - struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns; + struct aa_label *label = NULL; u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; int index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK; - const char *name; - /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */ - for (name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !new_profile && name; - name = next_name(xtype, name)) { - struct aa_ns *new_ns; - const char *xname = NULL; + AA_BUG(!name); - new_ns = NULL; + /* index is guaranteed to be in range, validated at load time */ + /* TODO: move lookup parsing to unpack time so this is a straight + * index into the resultant label + */ + for (*name = profile->file.trans.table[index]; !label && *name; + *name = next_name(xtype, *name)) { if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) { + struct aa_profile *new_profile; /* release by caller */ - new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, name); + new_profile = aa_find_child(profile, *name); + if (new_profile) + label = &new_profile->label; continue; - } else if (*name == ':') { - /* switching namespace */ - const char *ns_name; - xname = name = separate_fqname(name, &ns_name); - if (!xname) - /* no name so use profile name */ - xname = profile->base.hname; - if (*ns_name == '@') { - /* TODO: variable support */ - ; - } - /* released below */ - new_ns = aa_find_ns(ns, ns_name); - if (!new_ns) - continue; - } else if (*name == '@') { - /* TODO: variable support */ - continue; - } else { - /* basic namespace lookup */ - xname = name; } - - /* released by caller */ - new_profile = aa_lookup_profile(new_ns ? new_ns : ns, xname); - aa_put_ns(new_ns); + label = aa_label_parse(&profile->label, *name, GFP_ATOMIC, + true, false); + if (IS_ERR(label)) + label = NULL; } /* released by caller */ - return new_profile; + + return label; } /** - * x_to_profile - get target profile for a given xindex + * x_to_label - get target label for a given xindex * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL) * @name: name to lookup (NOT NULL) * @xindex: index into x transition table + * @lookupname: returns: name used in lookup if one was specified (NOT NULL) * - * find profile for a transition index + * find label for a transition index * - * Returns: refcounted profile or NULL if not found available + * Returns: refcounted label or NULL if not found available */ -static struct aa_profile *x_to_profile(struct aa_profile *profile, - const char *name, u32 xindex) +static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, + const char *name, u32 xindex, + const char **lookupname, + const char **info) { - struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; + struct aa_label *new = NULL; struct aa_ns *ns = profile->ns; u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; + const char *stack = NULL; switch (xtype) { case AA_X_NONE: /* fail exec unless ix || ux fallback - handled by caller */ - return NULL; + *lookupname = NULL; + break; + case AA_X_TABLE: + /* TODO: fix when perm mapping done at unload */ + stack = profile->file.trans.table[xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK]; + if (*stack != '&') { + /* released by caller */ + new = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex, lookupname); + stack = NULL; + break; + } + /* fall through to X_NAME */ case AA_X_NAME: if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) /* released by caller */ - new_profile = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, - name); + new = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, + name); else /* released by caller */ - new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, - name); - break; - case AA_X_TABLE: - /* released by caller */ - new_profile = x_table_lookup(profile, xindex); + new = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, + name); + *lookupname = name; break; } + if (!new) { + if (xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) { + /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do + * use the newest version + */ + *info = "ix fallback"; + /* no profile && no error */ + new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); + } else if (xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) { + new = aa_get_newest_label(ns_unconfined(profile->ns)); + *info = "ux fallback"; + } + } + + if (new && stack) { + /* base the stack on post domain transition */ + struct aa_label *base = new; + + new = aa_label_parse(base, stack, GFP_ATOMIC, true, false); + if (IS_ERR(new)) + new = NULL; + aa_put_label(base); + } + /* released by caller */ - return new_profile; + return new; } -/** - * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct - * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) - * - * Returns: %0 or error on failure - */ -int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, + const struct linux_binprm *bprm, + char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, + bool *secure_exec) { - struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_profile *profile, *new_profile = NULL; - struct aa_ns *ns; - char *buffer = NULL; - unsigned int state; + struct aa_label *new = NULL; + const char *info = NULL, *name = NULL, *target = NULL; + unsigned int state = profile->file.start; struct aa_perms perms = {}; - struct path_cond cond = { - file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, - file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode - }; - const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; + bool nonewprivs = false; int error = 0; - if (bprm->cred_prepared) - return 0; - - ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred); - AA_BUG(!ctx); - - label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label); - profile = labels_profile(label); - - /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ - get_buffers(buffer); - /* - * get the namespace from the replacement profile as replacement - * can change the namespace - */ - ns = profile->ns; - state = profile->file.start; + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!bprm); + AA_BUG(!buffer); error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, buffer, &name, &info, profile->disconnected); if (error) { if (profile_unconfined(profile) || - (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) + (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) { + AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error"); error = 0; + new = aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); + } name = bprm->filename; goto audit; } - /* Test for onexec first as onexec directives override other - * x transitions. - */ if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { - /* unconfined task */ - if (ctx->onexec) - /* change_profile on exec already been granted */ - new_profile = labels_profile(aa_get_label(ctx->onexec)); - else - new_profile = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, name); - if (!new_profile) - goto cleanup; - /* - * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed - * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results - * in a further reduction of permissions. - */ - goto apply; + new = find_attach(profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles, + name); + if (new) { + AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label"); + return new; + } + AA_DEBUG("unconfined exec no attachment"); + return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); } /* find exec permissions for name */ - state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, &cond, &perms); - if (ctx->onexec) { - struct aa_perms cp; - info = "change_profile onexec"; - new_profile = labels_profile(aa_get_newest_label(ctx->onexec)); - if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) - goto audit; - - /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec. - * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing - * exec\0change_profile - */ - state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state); - cp = change_profile_perms(profile, labels_ns(ctx->onexec), - labels_profile(ctx->onexec)->base.name, - AA_MAY_ONEXEC, state); - - if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) - goto audit; - goto apply; - } - + state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, name, cond, &perms); if (perms.allow & MAY_EXEC) { /* exec permission determine how to transition */ - new_profile = x_to_profile(profile, name, perms.xindex); - if (!new_profile) { - if (perms.xindex & AA_X_INHERIT) { - /* (p|c|n)ix - don't change profile but do - * use the newest version, which was picked - * up above when getting profile - */ - info = "ix fallback"; - new_profile = aa_get_profile(profile); - goto x_clear; - } else if (perms.xindex & AA_X_UNCONFINED) { - new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined); - info = "ux fallback"; - } else { - error = -EACCES; - info = "profile not found"; - /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ - perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; - } + new = x_to_label(profile, name, perms.xindex, &target, &info); + if (new && new->proxy == profile->label.proxy && info) { + /* hack ix fallback - improve how this is detected */ + goto audit; + } else if (!new) { + error = -EACCES; + info = "profile transition not found"; + /* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */ + perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; } } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { - /* no exec permission - are we in learning mode */ - new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, false, name, - GFP_ATOMIC); + /* no exec permission - learning mode */ + struct aa_profile *new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, + false, name, + GFP_ATOMIC); if (!new_profile) { error = -ENOMEM; info = "could not create null profile"; - } else + } else { error = -EACCES; + new = &new_profile->label; + } perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE; } else /* fail exec */ error = -EACCES; - /* - * Policy has specified a domain transition, if no_new_privs then - * fail the exec. + if (!new) + goto audit; + + /* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and + * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail. + * + * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked + * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this + * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. */ - if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) { + if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && + !profile_unconfined(profile) && + !aa_label_is_subset(new, &profile->label)) { error = -EPERM; - goto cleanup; + info = "no new privs"; + nonewprivs = true; + perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC; + goto audit; + } + + if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { + if (DEBUG_ON) { + dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment variables" + " for %s profile=", name); + aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC); + dbg_printk("\n"); + } + *secure_exec = true; } - if (!new_profile) +audit: + aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, target, new, + cond->uid, info, error); + if (!new || nonewprivs) { + aa_put_label(new); + return ERR_PTR(error); + } + + return new; +} + +static int profile_onexec(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_label *onexec, + bool stack, const struct linux_binprm *bprm, + char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, + bool *secure_exec) +{ + unsigned int state = profile->file.start; + struct aa_perms perms = {}; + const char *xname = NULL, *info = "change_profile onexec"; + int error = -EACCES; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!onexec); + AA_BUG(!bprm); + AA_BUG(!buffer); + + if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { + /* change_profile on exec already granted */ + /* + * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed + * even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results + * in a further reduction of permissions. + */ + return 0; + } + + error = aa_path_name(&bprm->file->f_path, profile->path_flags, buffer, + &xname, &info, profile->disconnected); + if (error) { + if (profile_unconfined(profile) || + (profile->label.flags & FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR)) { + AA_DEBUG("name lookup ix on error"); + error = 0; + } + xname = bprm->filename; goto audit; + } + + /* find exec permissions for name */ + state = aa_str_perms(profile->file.dfa, state, xname, cond, &perms); + if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC)) { + info = "no change_onexec valid for executable"; + goto audit; + } + /* test if this exec can be paired with change_profile onexec. + * onexec permission is linked to exec with a standard pairing + * exec\0change_profile + */ + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->file.dfa, state); + error = change_profile_perms(profile, onexec, stack, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, + state, &perms); + if (error) { + perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC; + goto audit; + } + /* Policy has specified a domain transitions. if no_new_privs and + * confined and not transitioning to the current domain fail. + * + * NOTE: Domain transitions from unconfined and to stritly stacked + * subsets are allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this + * aways results in a further reduction of permissions. + */ + if ((bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) && + !profile_unconfined(profile) && + !aa_label_is_subset(onexec, &profile->label)) { + error = -EPERM; + info = "no new privs"; + perms.allow &= ~AA_MAY_ONEXEC; + goto audit; + } + + if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { + if (DEBUG_ON) { + dbg_printk("apparmor: scrubbing environment " + "variables for %s label=", xname); + aa_label_printk(onexec, GFP_ATOMIC); + dbg_printk("\n"); + } + *secure_exec = true; + } + +audit: + return aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, AA_MAY_ONEXEC, xname, + NULL, onexec, cond->uid, info, error); +} + +/* ensure none ns domain transitions are correctly applied with onexec */ + +static struct aa_label *handle_onexec(struct aa_label *label, + struct aa_label *onexec, bool stack, + const struct linux_binprm *bprm, + char *buffer, struct path_cond *cond, + bool *unsafe) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *new; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!onexec); + AA_BUG(!bprm); + AA_BUG(!buffer); + + if (!stack) { + error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, + bprm, buffer, cond, unsafe)); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, + aa_get_newest_label(onexec), + profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + cond, unsafe)); + + } else { + /* TODO: determine how much we want to losen this */ + error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + profile_onexec(profile, onexec, stack, bprm, + buffer, cond, unsafe)); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, + aa_label_merge(&profile->label, onexec, + GFP_ATOMIC), + profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + cond, unsafe)); + } + + if (new) + return new; + + /* TODO: get rid of GLOBAL_ROOT_UID */ + error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC, + AA_MAY_ONEXEC, bprm->filename, NULL, + onexec, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, + "failed to build target label", -ENOMEM)); + return ERR_PTR(error); +} + +/** + * apparmor_bprm_set_creds - set the new creds on the bprm struct + * @bprm: binprm for the exec (NOT NULL) + * + * Returns: %0 or error on failure + * + * TODO: once the other paths are done see if we can't refactor into a fn + */ +int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct aa_task_ctx *ctx; + struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL; + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + const char *info = NULL; + int error = 0; + bool unsafe = false; + struct path_cond cond = { + file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, + file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode + }; + + if (bprm->cred_prepared) + return 0; + + ctx = cred_ctx(bprm->cred); + AA_BUG(!ctx); + + label = aa_get_newest_label(ctx->label); + + /* buffer freed below, name is pointer into buffer */ + get_buffers(buffer); + /* Test for onexec first as onexec override other x transitions. */ + if (ctx->onexec) + new = handle_onexec(label, ctx->onexec, ctx->token, + bprm, buffer, &cond, &unsafe); + else + new = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, + profile_transition(profile, bprm, buffer, + &cond, &unsafe)); + + AA_BUG(!new); + if (IS_ERR(new)) { + error = PTR_ERR(new); + goto done; + } else if (!new) { + error = -ENOMEM; + goto done; + } + + /* TODO: Add ns level no_new_privs subset test */ if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { /* FIXME: currently don't mediate shared state */ ; } - if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) { - error = may_change_ptraced_domain(&new_profile->label, &info); + if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE)) { + /* TODO: test needs to be profile of label to new */ + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new, &info); if (error) goto audit; } - /* Determine if secure exec is needed. - * Can be at this point for the following reasons: - * 1. unconfined switching to confined - * 2. confined switching to different confinement - * 3. confined switching to unconfined - * - * Cases 2 and 3 are marked as requiring secure exec - * (unless policy specified "unsafe exec") - * - * bprm->unsafe is used to cache the AA_X_UNSAFE permission - * to avoid having to recompute in secureexec - */ - if (!(perms.xindex & AA_X_UNSAFE)) { - AA_DEBUG("scrubbing environment variables for %s profile=%s\n", - name, new_profile->base.hname); + if (unsafe) { + if (DEBUG_ON) { + dbg_printk("scrubbing environment variables for %s " + "label=", bprm->filename); + aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC); + dbg_printk("\n"); + } bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED; } -apply: - /* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */ - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; -x_clear: + if (label->proxy != new->proxy) { + /* when transitioning clear unsafe personality bits */ + if (DEBUG_ON) { + dbg_printk("apparmor: clearing unsafe personality " + "bits. %s label=", bprm->filename); + aa_label_printk(new, GFP_ATOMIC); + dbg_printk("\n"); + } + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + } aa_put_label(ctx->label); - /* transfer new profile reference will be released when ctx is freed */ - ctx->label = &new_profile->label; - new_profile = NULL; + /* transfer reference, released when ctx is freed */ + ctx->label = new; - /* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */ +done: + /* clear out temporary/transitional state from the context */ aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(ctx); -audit: - error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, name, - new_profile ? new_profile->base.hname : NULL, - new_profile ? &new_profile->label : NULL, - cond.uid, info, error); - -cleanup: - aa_put_profile(new_profile); aa_put_label(label); put_buffers(buffer); return error; + +audit: + error = fn_for_each(label, profile, + aa_audit_file(profile, &nullperms, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC, + bprm->filename, NULL, new, + file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid, info, + error)); + aa_put_label(new); + goto done; } /** @@ -778,8 +1112,8 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) } } - perms = change_profile_perms(profile, target->ns, target->base.hname, - request, profile->file.start); + perms = change_profile_perms_wrapper(profile, target, request, + profile->file.start); if (!(perms.allow & request)) { error = -EACCES; goto audit; |