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authorJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2021-11-23 08:28:32 +0100
committerJohn Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>2022-07-19 13:14:22 +0200
commiteac931254d99c5aeb12ace02366dd338c4371164 (patch)
treef8c5e750b969503b2887974203facea5da0174c9 /security/apparmor
parentapparmor: extend policydb permission set by making use of the xbits (diff)
downloadlinux-eac931254d99c5aeb12ace02366dd338c4371164.tar.xz
linux-eac931254d99c5aeb12ace02366dd338c4371164.zip
apparmor: move ptrace mediation to more logical task.{h,c}
AppArmor split out task oriented controls to their own logical file a while ago. Ptrace mediation is better grouped with task than ipc, so move it. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/apparmor')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/ipc.h18
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/task.h18
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/ipc.c110
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/task.c114
5 files changed, 133 insertions, 128 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index d5838249cda5..d066ccc219e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "include/policy_ns.h"
#include "include/resource.h"
#include "include/policy_unpack.h"
+#include "include/task.h"
/*
* The apparmor filesystem interface used for policy load and introspection
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
index 9cafd80f7731..a1ac6ffb95e9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h
@@ -13,24 +13,6 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
-struct aa_profile;
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE MAY_WRITE
-#define AA_PTRACE_READ MAY_READ
-#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED AA_MAY_APPEND
-#define AA_MAY_BE_READ AA_MAY_CREATE
-#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT 2
-
-#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
- AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
-#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
-
-#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
- "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
- "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
-
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
- u32 request);
int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig);
#endif /* __AA_IPC_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/task.h b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
index f13d12373b25..13437d62c70f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/task.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/task.h
@@ -77,4 +77,22 @@ static inline void aa_clear_task_ctx_trans(struct aa_task_ctx *ctx)
ctx->token = 0;
}
+#define AA_PTRACE_TRACE MAY_WRITE
+#define AA_PTRACE_READ MAY_READ
+#define AA_MAY_BE_TRACED AA_MAY_APPEND
+#define AA_MAY_BE_READ AA_MAY_CREATE
+#define PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT 2
+
+#define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \
+ AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED)
+#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+
+#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \
+ "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \
+ "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost"
+
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+ u32 request);
+
+
#endif /* __AA_TASK_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
index fe36d112aad9..3dbbc59d440d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
*/
#include <linux/gfp.h>
-#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/capability.h"
@@ -18,115 +17,6 @@
#include "include/ipc.h"
#include "include/sig_names.h"
-/**
- * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
- * @mask: permission mask to convert
- *
- * Returns: pointer to static string
- */
-static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
-{
- switch (mask) {
- case MAY_READ:
- return "read";
- case MAY_WRITE:
- return "trace";
- case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
- return "readby";
- case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
- return "tracedby";
- }
- return "";
-}
-
-/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
-static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
-{
- struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
-
- if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
- audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
-
- if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
- audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
- }
- }
- audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
- aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
- FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
-}
-
-/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
-/* TODO: conditionals */
-static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
- struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
- struct aa_perms perms = { };
-
- aad(sa)->peer = peer;
- aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
- &perms);
- aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
- return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
- struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
- if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
- !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return 0;
-
- return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
-}
-
-static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
- struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
- struct common_audit_data *sa)
-{
- if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
- return 0;
-
- if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
- return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
-
- /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
- if (&tracer->label == tracee)
- return 0;
-
- aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
- aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
- aad(sa)->request = 0;
- aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
- CAP_OPT_NONE);
-
- return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
-}
-
-/**
- * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
- * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
- * @tracee: task label to be traced
- * @request: permission request
- *
- * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
- */
-int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
- u32 request)
-{
- struct aa_profile *profile;
- u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
- DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
-
- return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
- profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
- profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
-}
-
static inline int map_signal_num(int sig)
{
diff --git a/security/apparmor/task.c b/security/apparmor/task.c
index d17130ee6795..503dc0877fb1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/task.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/task.c
@@ -12,7 +12,12 @@
* should return to the previous cred if it has not been modified.
*/
+#include <linux/gfp.h>
+#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+
+#include "include/audit.h"
#include "include/cred.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/task.h"
/**
@@ -177,3 +182,112 @@ int aa_restore_previous_label(u64 token)
return 0;
}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string
+ * @mask: permission mask to convert
+ *
+ * Returns: pointer to static string
+ */
+static const char *audit_ptrace_mask(u32 mask)
+{
+ switch (mask) {
+ case MAY_READ:
+ return "read";
+ case MAY_WRITE:
+ return "trace";
+ case AA_MAY_BE_READ:
+ return "readby";
+ case AA_MAY_BE_TRACED:
+ return "tracedby";
+ }
+ return "";
+}
+
+/* call back to audit ptrace fields */
+static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ if (aad(sa)->request & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask=\"%s\"",
+ audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->request));
+
+ if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask=\"%s\"",
+ audit_ptrace_mask(aad(sa)->denied));
+ }
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " peer=");
+ aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer,
+ FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC);
+}
+
+/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */
+/* TODO: conditionals */
+static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile,
+ struct aa_label *peer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ struct aa_perms perms = { };
+
+ aad(sa)->peer = peer;
+ aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request,
+ &perms);
+ aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms);
+ return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee,
+ struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) ||
+ !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return 0;
+
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa);
+}
+
+static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer,
+ struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request,
+ struct common_audit_data *sa)
+{
+ if (profile_unconfined(tracer))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE))
+ return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa);
+
+ /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */
+ if (&tracer->label == tracee)
+ return 0;
+
+ aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label;
+ aad(sa)->peer = tracee;
+ aad(sa)->request = 0;
+ aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+ CAP_OPT_NONE);
+
+ return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO, tracer, sa, audit_ptrace_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_may_ptrace - test if tracer task can trace the tracee
+ * @tracer: label of the task doing the tracing (NOT NULL)
+ * @tracee: task label to be traced
+ * @request: permission request
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error code if permission denied or error
+ */
+int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee,
+ u32 request)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT;
+ DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE);
+
+ return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile,
+ profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa),
+ profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa));
+}