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| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-02-25 19:28:04 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2014-07-25 20:47:45 +0200 |
| commit | 13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05 (patch) | |
| tree | ee922f8fbd1dd96c0aee0fd6274d94271f55217c /security/capability.c | |
| parent | CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes (diff) | |
| download | linux-13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05.tar.xz linux-13752fe2d7f2d41c2fd92a5d1b1c6e38c4de0c05.zip | |
security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/capability.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/capability.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c index e76373de3129..a74fde6a7468 100644 --- a/security/capability.c +++ b/security/capability.c @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ static int cap_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return 0; } +static int cap_kernel_fw_from_file(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size) +{ + return 0; +} + static int cap_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { return 0; @@ -1015,6 +1020,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops) set_to_cap_if_null(ops, cred_transfer); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_act_as); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_create_files_as); + set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_fw_from_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_request); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, kernel_module_from_file); set_to_cap_if_null(ops, task_fix_setuid); |