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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-12-15 05:36:37 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2014-12-15 05:36:37 +0100 |
commit | 67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95 (patch) | |
tree | 975a0f546a604beda30d4ede34f8e9cca9a88b71 /security/integrity/evm | |
parent | Merge tag 'char-misc-3.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/g... (diff) | |
parent | Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next (diff) | |
download | linux-67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95.tar.xz linux-67e2c3883828b39548cee2091b36656787775d95.zip |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"In terms of changes, there's general maintenance to the Smack,
SELinux, and integrity code.
The IMA code adds a new kconfig option, IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT,
which allows IMA appraisal to require signatures. Support for reading
keys from rootfs before init is call is also added"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: Remove security_ops extern
security: smack: fix out-of-bounds access in smk_parse_smack()
VFS: refactor vfs_read()
ima: require signature based appraisal
integrity: provide a hook to load keys when rootfs is ready
ima: load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: provide a function to load x509 certificate from the kernel
integrity: define a new function integrity_read_file()
Security: smack: replace kzalloc with kmem_cache for inode_smack
Smack: Lock mode for the floor and hat labels
ima: added support for new kernel cmdline parameter ima_template_fmt
ima: allocate field pointers array on demand in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: don't allocate a copy of template_fmt in template_desc_init_fields()
ima: display template format in meas. list if template name length is zero
ima: added error messages to template-related functions
ima: use atomic bit operations to protect policy update interface
ima: ignore empty and with whitespaces policy lines
ima: no need to allocate entry for comment
ima: report policy load status
ima: use path names cache
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 11 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index c5ee1a7c5e8a..f589c9a05da2 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -162,9 +162,14 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (!rc) { - /* we probably want to replace rsa with hmac here */ - evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len); + /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and + * not immutable + */ + if (!IS_RDONLY(dentry->d_inode) && + !IS_IMMUTABLE(dentry->d_inode)) + evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, + xattr_value, + xattr_value_len); } break; default: |