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author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> | 2020-07-09 08:19:11 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-07-20 19:28:16 +0200 |
commit | 4834177e633258fbf3c5754b1220f01c705b79eb (patch) | |
tree | d8f8a405c63d42026c4b3dbec336d232e820284f /security/integrity/ima/ima.h | |
parent | ima: Use the common function to detect LSM conditionals in a rule (diff) | |
download | linux-4834177e633258fbf3c5754b1220f01c705b79eb.tar.xz linux-4834177e633258fbf3c5754b1220f01c705b79eb.zip |
ima: Support additional conditionals in the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function
Take the properties of the kexec kernel's inode and the current task
ownership into consideration when matching a KEXEC_CMDLINE operation to
the rules in the IMA policy. This allows for some uniformity when
writing IMA policy rules for KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK, KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK,
and KEXEC_CMDLINE operations.
Prior to this patch, it was not possible to write a set of rules like
this:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK obj_type=foo_t
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE
The inode information associated with the kernel being loaded by a
kexec_kernel_load(2) syscall can now be included in the decision to
measure or not
Additonally, the uid, euid, and subj_* conditionals can also now be
used in KEXEC_CMDLINE rules. There was no technical reason as to why
those conditionals weren't being considered previously other than
ima_match_rules() didn't have a valid inode to use so it immediately
bailed out for KEXEC_CMDLINE operations rather than going through the
full list of conditional comparisons.
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/ima/ima.h')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index ea7e77536f3c..576ae2c6d418 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value, int xattr_len, const struct modsig *modsig, int pcr, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); -void process_buffer_measurement(const void *buf, int size, +void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, int pcr, const char *keyring); void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, |