summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/security/integrity
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorRoberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>2020-04-27 12:31:28 +0200
committerMimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>2020-05-08 03:36:31 +0200
commit2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac (patch)
treeaf17628b7796dcda714f14b8120a0d8124d90548 /security/integrity
parentevm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc() (diff)
downloadlinux-2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac.tar.xz
linux-2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac.zip
ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()
This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode, ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the appraisal mode. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x Fixes: 19f8a84713edc ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself") Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c3
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index a71e822a6e92..3efc8308ad26 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
"policy_update", "signed policy required",
1, 0);
- if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)
- result = -EACCES;
+ result = -EACCES;
} else {
result = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
}