diff options
author | Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com> | 2020-07-09 08:19:04 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-07-17 03:53:55 +0200 |
commit | db2045f5892a9db7354442bf77f9b03b50ff9ee1 (patch) | |
tree | 071449c083f538a668b58ba87788dbe2139abd36 /security/integrity | |
parent | ima: Fail rule parsing when buffer hook functions have an invalid action (diff) | |
download | linux-db2045f5892a9db7354442bf77f9b03b50ff9ee1.tar.xz linux-db2045f5892a9db7354442bf77f9b03b50ff9ee1.zip |
ima: Fail rule parsing when the KEXEC_CMDLINE hook is combined with an invalid cond
The KEXEC_CMDLINE hook function only supports the pcr conditional. Make
this clear at policy load so that IMA policy authors don't assume that
other conditionals are supported.
Since KEXEC_CMDLINE's inception, ima_match_rules() has always returned
true on any loaded KEXEC_CMDLINE rule without any consideration for
other conditionals present in the rule. Make it clear that pcr is the
only supported KEXEC_CMDLINE conditional by returning an error during
policy load.
An example of why this is a problem can be explained with the following
rule:
dont_measure func=KEXEC_CMDLINE obj_type=foo_t
An IMA policy author would have assumed that rule is valid because the
parser accepted it but the result was that measurements for all
KEXEC_CMDLINE operations would be disabled.
Fixes: b0935123a183 ("IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments")
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 40c28f1a6a5a..1c64bd6f1728 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -343,6 +343,17 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) return 0; } +static bool ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + if (entry->lsm[i].args_p) + return true; + + return false; +} + /* * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect @@ -998,6 +1009,16 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) /* Validation of these hook functions is in ima_parse_rule() */ break; case KEXEC_CMDLINE: + if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) + return false; + + if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC | IMA_PCR)) + return false; + + if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond(entry)) + return false; + + break; case KEY_CHECK: if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE | DONT_MEASURE)) return false; |