Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
 "In this update, Smack learns to love IPv6 and to mount a filesystem
  with a transmutable hierarchy (i.e.  security labels are inherited
  from parent directory upon creation rather than creating process).

  The rest of the changes are maintenance"

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/tpm_i2c_infineon: Remove unused header file
  tpm: tpm_i2c_infinion: Don't modify i2c_client->driver
  evm: audit integrity metadata failures
  integrity: move integrity_audit_msg()
  evm: calculate HMAC after initializing posix acl on tmpfs
  maintainers:  add Dmitry Kasatkin
  Smack: Fix the bug smackcipso can't set CIPSO correctly
  Smack: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference at smk_netlbl_mls()
  Smack: Add smkfstransmute mount option
  Smack: Improve access check performance
  Smack: Local IPv6 port based controls
  tpm: fix regression caused by section type conflict of tpm_dev_release() in ppc builds
  maintainers: Remove Kent from maintainers
  tpm: move TPM_DIGEST_SIZE defintion
  tpm_tis: missing platform_driver_unregister() on error in init_tis()
  security: clarify cap_inode_getsecctx description
  apparmor: no need to delay vfree()
  apparmor: fix fully qualified name parsing
  apparmor: fix setprocattr arg processing for onexec
  apparmor: localize getting the security context to a few macros
  ...

8 files changed, 50 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 4bb3a775a996..245c6d92065b 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -17,6 +17,21 @@ config INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
 	  This is useful for evm and module keyrings, when keys are
 	  usually only added from initramfs.
 
+config INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+	bool "Enables integrity auditing support "
+	depends on INTEGRITY && AUDIT
+	default y
+	help
+	  In addition to enabling integrity auditing support, this
+	  option adds a kernel parameter 'integrity_audit', which
+	  controls the level of integrity auditing messages.
+	  0 - basic integrity auditing messages (default)
+	  1 - additional integrity auditing messages
+
+	  Additional informational integrity auditing messages would
+	  be enabled by specifying 'integrity_audit=1' on the kernel
+	  command line.
+
 config INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
 	boolean "Enable asymmetric keys support"
 	depends on INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index ebb6409b3fcb..0f9cffb1f9ad 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 #
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY) += integrity.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index cdbde1762189..df0fa451a871 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
@@ -24,6 +25,9 @@
 
 int evm_initialized;
 
+static char *integrity_status_msg[] = {
+	"pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown"
+};
 char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)";
 char *evm_hash = "sha1";
 int evm_hmac_version = CONFIG_EVM_HMAC_VERSION;
@@ -262,9 +266,15 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 		if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 		    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 			return 0;
-		return -EPERM;
+		goto out;
 	}
 	evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry);
+out:
+	if (evm_status != INTEGRITY_PASS)
+		integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+				    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+				    integrity_status_msg[evm_status],
+				    -EPERM, 0);
 	return evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS ? 0 : -EPERM;
 }
 
@@ -357,6 +367,9 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
 	if ((evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) ||
 	    (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS))
 		return 0;
+	integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA, dentry->d_inode,
+			    dentry->d_name.name, "appraise_metadata",
+			    integrity_status_msg[evm_status], -EPERM, 0);
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
index d232c73647ae..39196abaff0d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
@@ -38,18 +38,6 @@ config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
 	  that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
 	  measurement list.  If unsure, use the default 10.
 
-config IMA_AUDIT
-	bool "Enables auditing support"
-	depends on IMA
-	depends on AUDIT
-	default y
-	help
-	  This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
-	  allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
-	  at boot.  If this option is selected, informational integrity
-	  auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
-	  the kernel command line.
-
 config IMA_LSM_RULES
 	bool
 	depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 3f2ca6bdc384..56dfee7cbf61 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -7,5 +7,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
 
 ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
 	 ima_policy.o
-ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT) += ima_audit.o
 ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) += ima_appraise.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index a41c9c18e5e0..b3dd616560f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -62,20 +62,6 @@ struct ima_queue_entry {
 };
 extern struct list_head ima_measurements;	/* list of all measurements */
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
-/* declarations */
-void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
-			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
-#else
-static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
-				       const unsigned char *fname,
-				       const char *op, const char *cause,
-				       int result, int info)
-{
-}
-#endif
-
 /* Internal IMA function definitions */
 int ima_init(void);
 void ima_cleanup(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 84c37c4db914..c42fb7a70dee 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -113,5 +113,19 @@ static inline int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+			 const char *cause, int result, int info);
+#else
+static inline void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+				       const unsigned char *fname,
+				       const char *op, const char *cause,
+				       int result, int info)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
 /* set during initialization */
 extern int iint_initialized;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index c586faae8fd6..d7efb30404aa 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -13,20 +13,20 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/gfp.h>
 #include <linux/audit.h>
-#include "ima.h"
+#include "integrity.h"
 
-static int ima_audit;
+static int integrity_audit_info;
 
 /* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
-static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+static int __init integrity_audit_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long audit;
 
 	if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit))
-		ima_audit = audit ? 1 : 0;
+		integrity_audit_info = audit ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
-__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+__setup("integrity_audit=", integrity_audit_setup);
 
 void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 			 const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
 {
 	struct audit_buffer *ab;
 
-	if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+	if (!integrity_audit_info && audit_info == 1)	/* Skip info messages */
 		return;
 
 	ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);