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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-12-13 23:22:50 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-12-13 23:22:50 +0100 |
commit | 717e6eb49bdd98357d14c90d60a3409196b33cfc (patch) | |
tree | d524e136a8ffab9036fc1b2bfdfb02eeeb4ad327 /security/integrity | |
parent | Merge tag 'sysctl-6.2-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/m... (diff) | |
parent | ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm (diff) | |
download | linux-717e6eb49bdd98357d14c90d60a3409196b33cfc.tar.xz linux-717e6eb49bdd98357d14c90d60a3409196b33cfc.zip |
Merge tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Aside from the one cleanup, the other changes are bug fixes:
Cleanup:
- Include missing iMac Pro 2017 in list of Macs with T2 security chip
Bug fixes:
- Improper instantiation of "encrypted" keys with user provided data
- Not handling delay in updating LSM label based IMA policy rules
(-ESTALE)
- IMA and integrity memory leaks on error paths
- CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 hash algorithm renamed"
* tag 'integrity-v6.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Fix hash dependency to correct algorithm
ima: Fix misuse of dereference of pointer in template_desc_init_fields()
integrity: Fix memory leakage in keyring allocation error path
ima: Fix memory leak in __ima_inode_hash()
ima: Handle -ESTALE returned by ima_filter_rule_match()
ima: Simplify ima_lsm_copy_rule
ima: Fix a potential NULL pointer access in ima_restore_measurement_list
efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirk
KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/digsig.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 51 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 1 |
6 files changed, 54 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 8a82a6c7f48a..f2193c531f4a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) { struct key_restriction *restriction; key_perm_t perm; + int ret; perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH; @@ -154,7 +155,10 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE; out: - return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction); + ret = __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction); + if (ret) + kfree(restriction); + return ret; } static int __init integrity_add_key(const unsigned int id, const void *data, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig index 7249f16257c7..39caeca47444 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Kconfig @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ choice config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SM3 bool "SM3" - depends on CRYPTO_SM3=y + depends on CRYPTO_SM3_GENERIC=y endchoice config IMA_DEFAULT_HASH diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 0226899947d6..377300973e6c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -544,8 +544,13 @@ static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, rc = ima_collect_measurement(&tmp_iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo, NULL); - if (rc < 0) + if (rc < 0) { + /* ima_hash could be allocated in case of failure. */ + if (rc != -ENOMEM) + kfree(tmp_iint.ima_hash); + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } iint = &tmp_iint; mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 54c475f98ce1..20cffd32dc9e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -398,12 +398,6 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type; nentry->lsm[i].args_p = entry->lsm[i].args_p; - /* - * Remove the reference from entry so that the associated - * memory will not be freed during a later call to - * ima_lsm_free_rule(entry). - */ - entry->lsm[i].args_p = NULL; ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, @@ -417,6 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { + int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); @@ -431,7 +426,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * references and the entry itself. All other memory references will now * be owned by nentry. */ - ima_lsm_free_rule(entry); + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + ima_filter_rule_free(entry->lsm[i].rule); kfree(entry); return 0; @@ -549,6 +545,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, const char *func_data) { int i; + bool result = false; + struct ima_rule_entry *lsm_rule = rule; + bool rule_reinitialized = false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) @@ -612,35 +611,55 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, int rc = 0; u32 osid; - if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) { - if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p) + if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule) { + if (!lsm_rule->lsm[i].args_p) continue; else return false; } + +retry: switch (i) { case LSM_OBJ_USER: case LSM_OBJ_ROLE: case LSM_OBJ_TYPE: security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid); - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(osid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); break; case LSM_SUBJ_USER: case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE: case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE: - rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, rule->lsm[i].type, + rc = ima_filter_rule_match(secid, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); break; default: break; } - if (!rc) - return false; + + if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + if (lsm_rule) { + rule_reinitialized = true; + goto retry; + } + } + if (!rc) { + result = false; + goto out; + } } - return true; + result = true; + +out: + if (rule_reinitialized) { + for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) + ima_filter_rule_free(lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule); + kfree(lsm_rule); + } + return result; } /* diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index c25079faa208..04c49f05cb74 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -245,11 +245,11 @@ int template_desc_init_fields(const char *template_fmt, } if (fields && num_fields) { - *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); + *fields = kmalloc_array(i, sizeof(**fields), GFP_KERNEL); if (*fields == NULL) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(*fields)); + memcpy(*fields, found_fields, i * sizeof(**fields)); *num_fields = i; } @@ -340,8 +340,11 @@ static struct ima_template_desc *restore_template_fmt(char *template_name) template_desc->name = ""; template_desc->fmt = kstrdup(template_name, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!template_desc->fmt) + if (!template_desc->fmt) { + kfree(template_desc); + template_desc = NULL; goto out; + } spin_lock(&template_list); list_add_tail_rcu(&template_desc->list, &defined_templates); diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c index b78753d27d8e..d1fdd113450a 100644 --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id uefi_skip_cert[] = { { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "MacPro7,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,1") }, { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMac20,2") }, + { UEFI_QUIRK_SKIP_CERT("Apple Inc.", "iMacPro1,1") }, { } }; |