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author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> | 2017-09-18 20:37:03 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2017-09-25 16:19:57 +0200 |
commit | 237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3 (patch) | |
tree | bc95e55675ae062350f77c9f6d8f8d0816b83207 /security/keys/keyring.c | |
parent | KEYS: fix writing past end of user-supplied buffer in keyring_read() (diff) | |
download | linux-237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3.tar.xz linux-237bbd29f7a049d310d907f4b2716a7feef9abf3.zip |
KEYS: prevent creating a different user's keyrings
It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys/keyring.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/keyring.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index 94f038967c17..4fa82a8a9c0e 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -1097,15 +1097,15 @@ found: /* * Find a keyring with the specified name. * - * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they - * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is - * skipped). Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been - * revoked are skipped. + * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a + * user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true, + * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session + * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller. * * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being * incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found. */ -struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) +struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring) { struct key *keyring; int bucket; @@ -1133,10 +1133,15 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0) continue; - if (!skip_perm_check && - key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0), - KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) - continue; + if (uid_keyring) { + if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING, + &keyring->flags)) + continue; + } else { + if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0), + KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) + continue; + } /* we've got a match but we might end up racing with * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead' |