diff options
| author | Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> | 2019-08-20 02:17:41 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2019-08-20 06:54:15 +0200 |
| commit | 9b9d8dda1ed72e9bd560ab0ca93d322a9440510e (patch) | |
| tree | aa5a6719f76556e20ce1ca6e286d10660f1746f5 /security/lockdown/lockdown.c | |
| parent | lockdown: Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down (diff) | |
| download | linux-9b9d8dda1ed72e9bd560ab0ca93d322a9440510e.tar.xz linux-9b9d8dda1ed72e9bd560ab0ca93d322a9440510e.zip | |
lockdown: Restrict /dev/{mem,kmem,port} when the kernel is locked down
Allowing users to read and write to core kernel memory makes it possible
for the kernel to be subverted, avoiding module loading restrictions, and
also to steal cryptographic information.
Disallow /dev/mem and /dev/kmem from being opened this when the kernel has
been locked down to prevent this.
Also disallow /dev/port from being opened to prevent raw ioport access and
thus DMA from being used to accomplish the same thing.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index d8e42125a5dd..240ecaa10a1d 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static enum lockdown_reason kernel_locked_down; static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", + [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; |