diff options
| author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2012-10-15 23:02:07 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> | 2012-12-14 03:35:24 +0100 |
| commit | 2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839 (patch) | |
| tree | b8190d17aa5d59508f8c979ce0160f21bef89500 /security/security.c | |
| parent | module: add flags arg to sys_finit_module() (diff) | |
| download | linux-2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839.tar.xz linux-2e72d51b4ac32989496870cd8171b3682fea1839.zip | |
security: introduce kernel_module_from_file hook
Now that kernel module origins can be reasoned about, provide a hook to
the LSMs to make policy decisions about the module file. This will let
Chrome OS enforce that loadable kernel modules can only come from its
read-only hash-verified root filesystem. Other LSMs can, for example,
read extended attributes for signatures, etc.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 8dcd4ae10a5f..ce88630de15d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -820,6 +820,11 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } +int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file) +{ + return security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file); +} + int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { |