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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-01-09 21:57:46 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2024-01-09 21:57:46 +0100 |
commit | 063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac (patch) | |
tree | 9910f131597a3f5c2060c988f5bd65484cfe365b /security/security.c | |
parent | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/... (diff) | |
parent | lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook (diff) | |
download | linux-063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac.tar.xz linux-063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac.zip |
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore:
- Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and
lsm_set_self_attr().
The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and
third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these
syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under
/proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple,
simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current
/proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM
was allowed to be active at a given time.
We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the
existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and
even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel
API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had
established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls.
Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly
unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he
is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more
difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM
community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to
continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as
pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g.
syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain.
My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing
out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to
support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step
forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our
reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic
for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api
folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of
their concerns.
- Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit
ioctls on 64-bit systems problem.
This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which
provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually
cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while
Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this
patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes.
- Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled
at boot.
While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something
users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and
then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via
NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense.
Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take
this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like
the best fit.
- Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about
our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc.
I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated
MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been
working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if
they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role;
hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to
look after it.
- Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits)
lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook
lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx
calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass()
selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test
MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM
MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry
mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts
mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses
lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static
lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user()
lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx()
lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr()
lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr()
lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation
lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA
LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls
SELinux: Add selfattr hooks
AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks
Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 273 |
1 files changed, 261 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 2a7fc7881cbc..8b55ef346a62 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -35,6 +35,24 @@ #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info) /* + * How many LSMs are built into the kernel as determined at + * build time. Used to determine fixed array sizes. + * The capability module is accounted for by CONFIG_SECURITY + */ +#define LSM_CONFIG_COUNT ( \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) ? 1 : 0)) + +/* * These are descriptions of the reasons that can be passed to the * security_locked_down() LSM hook. Placing this array here allows * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing @@ -245,6 +263,12 @@ static void __init initialize_lsm(struct lsm_info *lsm) } } +/* + * Current index to use while initializing the lsm id list. + */ +u32 lsm_active_cnt __ro_after_init; +const struct lsm_id *lsm_idlist[LSM_CONFIG_COUNT]; + /* Populate ordered LSMs list from comma-separated LSM name list. */ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) { @@ -513,17 +537,29 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. * @hooks: the hooks to add * @count: the number of hooks to add - * @lsm: the name of the security module + * @lsmid: the identification information for the security module * * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. */ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, - const char *lsm) + const struct lsm_id *lsmid) { int i; + /* + * A security module may call security_add_hooks() more + * than once during initialization, and LSM initialization + * is serialized. Landlock is one such case. + * Look at the previous entry, if there is one, for duplication. + */ + if (lsm_active_cnt == 0 || lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt - 1] != lsmid) { + if (lsm_active_cnt >= LSM_CONFIG_COUNT) + panic("%s Too many LSMs registered.\n", __func__); + lsm_idlist[lsm_active_cnt++] = lsmid; + } + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { - hooks[i].lsm = lsm; + hooks[i].lsmid = lsmid; hlist_add_tail_rcu(&hooks[i].list, hooks[i].head); } @@ -532,7 +568,7 @@ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, * and fix this up afterwards. */ if (slab_is_available()) { - if (lsm_append(lsm, &lsm_names) < 0) + if (lsm_append(lsmid->name, &lsm_names) < 0) panic("%s - Cannot get early memory.\n", __func__); } } @@ -734,6 +770,54 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) return 0; } +/** + * lsm_fill_user_ctx - Fill a user space lsm_ctx structure + * @uctx: a userspace LSM context to be filled + * @uctx_len: available uctx size (input), used uctx size (output) + * @val: the new LSM context value + * @val_len: the size of the new LSM context value + * @id: LSM id + * @flags: LSM defined flags + * + * Fill all of the fields in a userspace lsm_ctx structure. + * + * Returns 0 on success, -E2BIG if userspace buffer is not large enough, + * -EFAULT on a copyout error, -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. + */ +int lsm_fill_user_ctx(struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, size_t *uctx_len, + void *val, size_t val_len, + u64 id, u64 flags) +{ + struct lsm_ctx *nctx = NULL; + size_t nctx_len; + int rc = 0; + + nctx_len = ALIGN(struct_size(nctx, ctx, val_len), sizeof(void *)); + if (nctx_len > *uctx_len) { + rc = -E2BIG; + goto out; + } + + nctx = kzalloc(nctx_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (nctx == NULL) { + rc = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + nctx->id = id; + nctx->flags = flags; + nctx->len = nctx_len; + nctx->ctx_len = val_len; + memcpy(nctx->ctx, val, val_len); + + if (copy_to_user(uctx, nctx, nctx_len)) + rc = -EFAULT; + +out: + kfree(nctx); + *uctx_len = nctx_len; + return rc; +} + /* * The default value of the LSM hook is defined in linux/lsm_hook_defs.h and * can be accessed with: @@ -2642,6 +2726,24 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl); +/** + * security_file_ioctl_compat() - Check if an ioctl is allowed in compat mode + * @file: associated file + * @cmd: ioctl cmd + * @arg: ioctl arguments + * + * Compat version of security_file_ioctl() that correctly handles 32-bit + * processes running on 64-bit kernels. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, + unsigned long arg) +{ + return call_int_hook(file_ioctl_compat, 0, file, cmd, arg); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_file_ioctl_compat); + static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) { /* @@ -3794,10 +3896,158 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); +/* + * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c + */ + +/** + * security_getselfattr - Read an LSM attribute of the current process. + * @attr: which attribute to return + * @uctx: the user-space destination for the information, or NULL + * @size: pointer to the size of space available to receive the data + * @flags: special handling options. LSM_FLAG_SINGLE indicates that only + * attributes associated with the LSM identified in the passed @ctx be + * reported. + * + * A NULL value for @uctx can be used to get both the number of attributes + * and the size of the data. + * + * Returns the number of attributes found on success, negative value + * on error. @size is reset to the total size of the data. + * If @size is insufficient to contain the data -E2BIG is returned. + */ +int security_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, + size_t __user *size, u32 flags) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + struct lsm_ctx lctx = { .id = LSM_ID_UNDEF, }; + u8 __user *base = (u8 __user *)uctx; + size_t total = 0; + size_t entrysize; + size_t left; + bool toobig = false; + bool single = false; + int count = 0; + int rc; + + if (attr == LSM_ATTR_UNDEF) + return -EINVAL; + if (size == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + if (get_user(left, size)) + return -EFAULT; + + if (flags) { + /* + * Only flag supported is LSM_FLAG_SINGLE + */ + if (flags != LSM_FLAG_SINGLE || !uctx) + return -EINVAL; + if (copy_from_user(&lctx, uctx, sizeof(lctx))) + return -EFAULT; + /* + * If the LSM ID isn't specified it is an error. + */ + if (lctx.id == LSM_ID_UNDEF) + return -EINVAL; + single = true; + } + + /* + * In the usual case gather all the data from the LSMs. + * In the single case only get the data from the LSM specified. + */ + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getselfattr, list) { + if (single && lctx.id != hp->lsmid->id) + continue; + entrysize = left; + if (base) + uctx = (struct lsm_ctx __user *)(base + total); + rc = hp->hook.getselfattr(attr, uctx, &entrysize, flags); + if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) { + rc = 0; + continue; + } + if (rc == -E2BIG) { + rc = 0; + left = 0; + toobig = true; + } else if (rc < 0) + return rc; + else + left -= entrysize; + + total += entrysize; + count += rc; + if (single) + break; + } + if (put_user(total, size)) + return -EFAULT; + if (toobig) + return -E2BIG; + if (count == 0) + return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getselfattr); + return count; +} + +/* + * Please keep this in sync with it's counterpart in security/lsm_syscalls.c + */ + +/** + * security_setselfattr - Set an LSM attribute on the current process. + * @attr: which attribute to set + * @uctx: the user-space source for the information + * @size: the size of the data + * @flags: reserved for future use, must be 0 + * + * Set an LSM attribute for the current process. The LSM, attribute + * and new value are included in @uctx. + * + * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if the input is inconsistent, -EFAULT + * if the user buffer is inaccessible, E2BIG if size is too big, or an + * LSM specific failure. + */ +int security_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *uctx, + size_t size, u32 flags) +{ + struct security_hook_list *hp; + struct lsm_ctx *lctx; + int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setselfattr); + + if (flags) + return -EINVAL; + if (size < sizeof(*lctx)) + return -EINVAL; + if (size > PAGE_SIZE) + return -E2BIG; + + lctx = memdup_user(uctx, size); + if (IS_ERR(lctx)) + return PTR_ERR(lctx); + + if (size < lctx->len || size < lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx) || + lctx->len < lctx->ctx_len + sizeof(*lctx)) { + rc = -EINVAL; + goto free_out; + } + + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setselfattr, list) + if ((hp->lsmid->id) == lctx->id) { + rc = hp->hook.setselfattr(attr, lctx, size, flags); + break; + } + +free_out: + kfree(lctx); + return rc; +} + /** * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task * @p: the task - * @lsm: LSM name + * @lsmid: LSM identification * @name: attribute name * @value: attribute value * @@ -3805,13 +4055,13 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); * * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. */ -int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, - const char *name, char **value) +int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, int lsmid, const char *name, + char **value) { struct security_hook_list *hp; hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.getprocattr, list) { - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id) continue; return hp->hook.getprocattr(p, name, value); } @@ -3820,7 +4070,7 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, /** * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task - * @lsm: LSM name + * @lsmid: LSM identification * @name: attribute name * @value: attribute value * @size: attribute value size @@ -3830,13 +4080,12 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, * * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. */ -int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, - size_t size) +int security_setprocattr(int lsmid, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { struct security_hook_list *hp; hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { - if (lsm != NULL && strcmp(lsm, hp->lsm)) + if (lsmid != 0 && lsmid != hp->lsmid->id) continue; return hp->hook.setprocattr(name, value, size); } |