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authorDarrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>2006-06-27 22:26:11 +0200
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@sunset.davemloft.net>2006-06-30 01:57:55 +0200
commitc7bdb545d23026b18be53289fd866d1ac07f5f8c (patch)
tree6d9a218871d88f7579dd53f14692df2529b6e712 /security/selinux/hooks.c
parent[NET]: Added GSO header verification (diff)
downloadlinux-c7bdb545d23026b18be53289fd866d1ac07f5f8c.tar.xz
linux-c7bdb545d23026b18be53289fd866d1ac07f5f8c.zip
[NETLINK]: Encapsulate eff_cap usage within security framework.
This patch encapsulates the usage of eff_cap (in netlink_skb_params) within the security framework by extending security_netlink_recv to include a required capability parameter and converting all direct usage of eff_caps outside of the lsm modules to use the interface. It also updates the SELinux implementation of the security_netlink_send and security_netlink_recv hooks to take advantage of the sid in the netlink_skb_params struct. This also enables SELinux to perform auditing of netlink capability checks. Please apply, for 2.6.18 if possible. Signed-off-by: Darrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c26
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 13 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 28832e689800..b6c378dd4f12 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3641,32 +3641,32 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute_last(unsigned int hooknum,
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct task_security_struct *tsec;
- struct av_decision avd;
int err;
err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
- tsec = current->security;
-
- avd.allowed = 0;
- avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, ~0, &avd);
- cap_mask(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, avd.allowed);
-
if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
return err;
}
-static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
{
- if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- return 0;
+ int err;
+ struct avc_audit_data ad;
+
+ err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
+ ad.u.cap = capability;
+
+ return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
+ SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
}
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,