diff options
author | Russell King <rmk@dyn-67.arm.linux.org.uk> | 2009-03-28 21:29:51 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk> | 2009-03-28 21:29:51 +0100 |
commit | ed40d0c472b136682b2fcba05f89762859c7374f (patch) | |
tree | 076b83a26bcd63d6158463735dd34c10bbc591dc /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
parent | [ARM] 5434/1: ARM: OMAP: Fix mailbox compile for 24xx (diff) | |
parent | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6 (diff) | |
download | linux-ed40d0c472b136682b2fcba05f89762859c7374f.tar.xz linux-ed40d0c472b136682b2fcba05f89762859c7374f.zip |
Merge branch 'origin' into devel
Conflicts:
sound/soc/pxa/pxa2xx-i2s.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 308 |
1 files changed, 107 insertions, 201 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 00815973d412..7c52ba243c64 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux" #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX -#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4 +#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version; extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm); @@ -353,6 +353,7 @@ enum { Opt_fscontext = 2, Opt_defcontext = 3, Opt_rootcontext = 4, + Opt_labelsupport = 5, }; static const match_table_t tokens = { @@ -360,6 +361,7 @@ static const match_table_t tokens = { {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, + {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR}, {Opt_error, NULL}, }; @@ -431,7 +433,7 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) } } - sbsec->initialized = 1; + sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP); if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", @@ -441,6 +443,12 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]); + if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT || + sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE || + sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) + sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP; + /* Initialize the root inode. */ rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); @@ -487,23 +495,22 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, security_init_mnt_opts(opts); - if (!sbsec->initialized) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return -EINVAL; if (!ss_initialized) return -EINVAL; - /* - * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount - * settings this is going to need a mask - */ - tmp = sbsec->flags; + tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { if (tmp & 0x01) opts->num_mnt_opts++; tmp >>= 1; } + /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) + opts->num_mnt_opts++; opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!opts->mnt_opts) { @@ -549,6 +556,10 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) { + opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; + opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP; + } BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); @@ -562,8 +573,10 @@ out_free: static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) { + char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; + /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ - if (sbsec->initialized) + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || (old_sid != new_sid)) return 1; @@ -571,8 +584,8 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, /* check if we were passed the same options twice, * aka someone passed context=a,context=b */ - if (!sbsec->initialized) - if (sbsec->flags & flag) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) + if (mnt_flags & flag) return 1; return 0; } @@ -626,7 +639,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options * will be used for both mounts) */ - if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) && (num_opts == 0)) goto out; @@ -637,6 +650,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, */ for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { u32 sid; + + if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP) + continue; rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid); if (rc) { @@ -690,19 +706,19 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, } } - if (sbsec->initialized) { + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ - if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts) + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts) goto out_double_mount; rc = 0; goto out; } if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) - sbsec->proc = 1; + sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC; /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */ - rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); + rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid); if (rc) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); @@ -806,10 +822,10 @@ static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, } /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ - BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized); + BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */ - if (newsbsec->initialized) + if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) return; mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); @@ -917,7 +933,8 @@ static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, goto out_err; } break; - + case Opt_labelsupport: + break; default: rc = -EINVAL; printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); @@ -999,7 +1016,12 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, char *prefix; for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { - char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); + char *has_comma; + + if (opts->mnt_opts[i]) + has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); + else + has_comma = NULL; switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { case CONTEXT_MNT: @@ -1014,6 +1036,10 @@ static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; break; + case SE_SBLABELSUPP: + seq_putc(m, ','); + seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); + continue; default: BUG(); }; @@ -1209,7 +1235,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent goto out_unlock; sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; - if (!sbsec->initialized) { + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, after the initial policy is loaded and the security server is ready to handle calls. */ @@ -1237,19 +1263,26 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent dentry = d_find_alias(inode); } if (!dentry) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s " - "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id, - inode->i_ino); + /* + * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed + * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we + * may find inodes that have no dentry on the + * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these + * will get fixed up the next time we go through + * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could + * be used again by userspace. + */ goto out_unlock; } len = INITCONTEXTLEN; - context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); goto out_unlock; } + context[len] = '\0'; rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); if (rc == -ERANGE) { @@ -1262,12 +1295,13 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent } kfree(context); len = rc; - context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS); + context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); if (!context) { rc = -ENOMEM; dput(dentry); goto out_unlock; } + context[len] = '\0'; rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, context, len); @@ -1289,10 +1323,19 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent sbsec->def_sid, GFP_NOFS); if (rc) { - printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " - "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", - __func__, context, -rc, - inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); + char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; + unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; + + if (rc == -EINVAL) { + if (printk_ratelimit()) + printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " + "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " + "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); + } else { + printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " + "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); + } kfree(context); /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ rc = 0; @@ -1326,7 +1369,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ isec->sid = sbsec->sid; - if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { + if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode); if (proci->pde) { isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); @@ -1587,7 +1630,7 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir, if (rc) return rc; - if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { + if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1801,6 +1844,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN; else if (S_ISDIR(mode)) av |= DIR__OPEN; + else if (S_ISSOCK(mode)) + av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN; else printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with " "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode); @@ -1815,7 +1860,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child, { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode); + rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1832,7 +1877,7 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent); + rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1848,7 +1893,7 @@ static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, if (error) return error; - return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); + return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted); } static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, @@ -1858,7 +1903,7 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, { int error; - error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old, + error = cap_capset(new, old, effective, inheritable, permitted); if (error) return error; @@ -1866,12 +1911,22 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); } +/* + * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, + * which was removed). + * + * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux + * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not + * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of + * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. + */ + static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap, int audit) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); + rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1997,7 +2052,7 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type); + rc = cap_syslog(type); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2028,10 +2083,6 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. * - * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0 - * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if - * the capability is granted. - * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ @@ -2058,7 +2109,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm); + rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm); if (rc) return rc; @@ -2156,11 +2207,6 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } -static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -{ - return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm); -} - static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); @@ -2180,7 +2226,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); } - return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm)); + return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm)); } extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount; @@ -2290,8 +2336,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; int rc, i; - secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm); - new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) return; @@ -2337,8 +2381,6 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) int rc, i; unsigned long flags; - secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm); - osid = tsec->osid; sid = tsec->sid; @@ -2400,7 +2442,8 @@ static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || - match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len)); + match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || + match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len)); } static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) @@ -2513,11 +2556,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, void *data) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data); - if (rc) - return rc; if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb, @@ -2530,11 +2568,6 @@ static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name, static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags); - if (rc) - return rc; return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); @@ -2570,7 +2603,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, sid = tsec->sid; newsid = tsec->create_sid; - if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { + if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) { rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), &newsid); @@ -2585,14 +2618,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, } /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ - if (sbsec->initialized) { + if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = 1; } - if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) + if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (name) { @@ -2622,21 +2655,11 @@ static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int ma static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); - if (rc) - return rc; return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); } static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry); - if (rc) - return rc; return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); } @@ -2657,12 +2680,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev); - if (rc) - return rc; - return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); } @@ -2682,22 +2699,13 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata); - if (rc) - return rc; return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ); } static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask); - if (rc) - return rc; if (!mask) { /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ @@ -2711,11 +2719,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr); - if (rc) - return rc; if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) return 0; @@ -2769,7 +2772,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; - if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) + if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode)) @@ -2931,16 +2934,6 @@ static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t return len; } -static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry); -} - -static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) -{ - return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry); -} - static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; @@ -3078,18 +3071,13 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot); - if (rc) - return rc; if (selinux_checkreqprot) prot = reqprot; #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { - rc = 0; + int rc = 0; if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); @@ -3239,12 +3227,6 @@ static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) { - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags); - if (rc) - return rc; - return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK); } @@ -3278,14 +3260,6 @@ static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, } /* - * commit new credentials - */ -static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) -{ - secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old); -} - -/* * set the security data for a kernel service * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled */ @@ -3329,29 +3303,6 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) return 0; } -static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags) -{ - /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and - since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux - identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control - this operation. However, SELinux does control the use - of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the - capable hook. */ - return 0; -} - -static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, - int flags) -{ - return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags); -} - -static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags) -{ - /* See the comment for setuid above. */ - return 0; -} - static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); @@ -3372,17 +3323,11 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) *secid = task_sid(p); } -static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info) -{ - /* See the comment for setuid above. */ - return 0; -} - static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice); + rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3393,7 +3338,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio); + rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3408,11 +3353,6 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource; - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim); - if (rc) - return rc; /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can @@ -3428,7 +3368,7 @@ static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct s { int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); + rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp); if (rc) return rc; @@ -3451,10 +3391,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, u32 perm; int rc; - rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (!sig) perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ else @@ -3467,18 +3403,6 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, return rc; } -static int selinux_task_prctl(int option, - unsigned long arg2, - unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, - unsigned long arg5) -{ - /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require - any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify - the state of the current process. */ - return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); -} - static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) { return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD); @@ -4047,10 +3971,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct avc_audit_data ad; int err; - err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk); - if (err) - return err; - isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security; @@ -4844,7 +4764,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err; - err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb); + err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb); if (err) return err; @@ -4859,7 +4779,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability) int err; struct avc_audit_data ad; - err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability); + err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability); if (err) return err; @@ -5167,11 +5087,6 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { u32 perms; - int rc; - - rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg); - if (rc) - return rc; if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) perms = SHM__READ; @@ -5581,7 +5496,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv, .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds, - .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security, .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds, .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds, .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec, @@ -5623,8 +5537,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity, .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity, .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity, - .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv, - .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv, .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid, .file_permission = selinux_file_permission, @@ -5644,17 +5556,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_create = selinux_task_create, .cred_free = selinux_cred_free, .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare, - .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit, .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as, .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as, - .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid, - .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid, - .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid, .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid, .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid, .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid, .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid, - .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups, .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice, .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio, .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio, @@ -5664,7 +5571,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = { .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory, .task_kill = selinux_task_kill, .task_wait = selinux_task_wait, - .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl, .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode, .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission, |