diff options
author | David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> | 2009-04-29 14:45:05 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2009-04-30 01:07:13 +0200 |
commit | 3bcac0263f0b45e67a64034ebcb69eb9abb742f4 (patch) | |
tree | 33f4db08edaa12e1c20df348e2fa28c7c2198ebe /security/selinux/hooks.c | |
parent | SELinux: drop secondary_ops->sysctl (diff) | |
download | linux-3bcac0263f0b45e67a64034ebcb69eb9abb742f4.tar.xz linux-3bcac0263f0b45e67a64034ebcb69eb9abb742f4.zip |
SELinux: Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve()
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit
hook. This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the
credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and
should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely
should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process
will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/hooks.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 |
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index dd19ba81201f..5a345115036c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -2394,11 +2394,12 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); - flush_signals(current); spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); - flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); - sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); - recalc_sigpending(); + if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) { + __flush_signals(current); + flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); + sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); + } spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); } |