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authorStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>2009-09-30 19:37:50 +0200
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2009-10-07 12:56:42 +0200
commitc6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c (patch)
tree1a5475b4370655a22670fd6eb35e54d8b131b362 /security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
parentTPM: fix pcrread (diff)
downloadlinux-c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c.tar.xz
linux-c6d3aaa4e35c71a32a86ececacd4eea7ecfc316c.zip
selinux: dynamic class/perm discovery
Modify SELinux to dynamically discover class and permission values upon policy load, based on the dynamic object class/perm discovery logic from libselinux. A mapping is created between kernel-private class and permission indices used outside the security server and the policy values used within the security server. The mappings are only applied upon kernel-internal computations; similar mappings for the private indices of userspace object managers is handled on a per-object manager basis by the userspace AVC. The interfaces for compute_av and transition_sid are split for kernel vs. userspace; the userspace functions are distinguished by a _user suffix. The kernel-private class indices are no longer tied to the policy values and thus do not need to skip indices for userspace classes; thus the kernel class index values are compressed. The flask.h definitions were regenerated by deleting the userspace classes from refpolicy's definitions and then regenerating the headers. Going forward, we can just maintain the flask.h, av_permissions.h, and classmap.h definitions separately from policy as they are no longer tied to the policy values. The next patch introduces a utility to automate generation of flask.h and av_permissions.h from the classmap.h definitions. The older kernel class and permission string tables are removed and replaced by a single security class mapping table that is walked at policy load to generate the mapping. The old kernel class validation logic is completely replaced by the mapping logic. The handle unknown logic is reworked. reject_unknown=1 is handled when the mappings are computed at policy load time, similar to the old handling by the class validation logic. allow_unknown=1 is handled when computing and mapping decisions - if the permission was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then it is automatically added to the allowed vector. If the class was not able to be mapped (i.e. undefined, mapped to zero), then all permissions are allowed for it if allow_unknown=1. avc_audit leverages the new security class mapping table to lookup the class and permission names from the kernel-private indices. The mdp program is updated to use the new table when generating the class definitions and allow rules for a minimal boot policy for the kernel. It should be noted that this policy will not include any userspace classes, nor will its policy index values for the kernel classes correspond with the ones in refpolicy (they will instead match the kernel-private indices). Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h44
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
index 0546d616ccac..fef2582b734d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h
@@ -423,28 +423,6 @@
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
#define UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
-#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL
#define PROCESS__FORK 0x00000001UL
#define PROCESS__TRANSITION 0x00000002UL
#define PROCESS__SIGCHLD 0x00000004UL
@@ -868,3 +846,25 @@
#define PEER__RECV 0x00000001UL
#define KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE 0x00000001UL
#define KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS 0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CREATE 0x00000008UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETATTR 0x00000010UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETATTR 0x00000020UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LOCK 0x00000040UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM 0x00000080UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO 0x00000100UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__APPEND 0x00000200UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__BIND 0x00000400UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__CONNECT 0x00000800UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__LISTEN 0x00001000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__ACCEPT 0x00002000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__GETOPT 0x00004000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SETOPT 0x00008000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SHUTDOWN 0x00010000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECVFROM 0x00020000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SENDTO 0x00040000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__RECV_MSG 0x00080000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__SEND_MSG 0x00100000UL
+#define TUN_SOCKET__NAME_BIND 0x00200000UL