selinux: wrap cgroup seclabel support with its own policy capability

commit 1ea0ce40690dff38935538e8dab7b12683ded0d3 ("selinux: allow
changing labels for cgroupfs") broke the Android init program,
which looks up security contexts whenever creating directories
and attempts to assign them via setfscreatecon().
When creating subdirectories in cgroup mounts, this would previously
be ignored since cgroup did not support userspace setting of security
contexts.  However, after the commit, SELinux would attempt to honor
the requested context on cgroup directories and fail due to permission
denial.  Avoid breaking existing userspace/policy by wrapping this change
with a conditional on a new cgroup_seclabel policy capability.  This
preserves existing behavior until/unless a new policy explicitly enables
this capability.

Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index a70fcee9824b..b4aa491a0a23 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
 int selinux_policycap_openperm;
 int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
 int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
+int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
 
 static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
 
@@ -1993,6 +1994,9 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
 					  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
 	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
 						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
+	selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
+		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
+				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
 }
 
 static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);