diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-05-03 17:50:52 +0200 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-05-03 17:50:52 +0200 |
commit | 0302e28dee643932ee7b3c112ebccdbb9f8ec32c (patch) | |
tree | 405d4cb3f772ef069ed7f291adc4b74a4e73346e /security/selinux | |
parent | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jik... (diff) | |
parent | tpm: Fix reference count to main device (diff) | |
download | linux-0302e28dee643932ee7b3c112ebccdbb9f8ec32c.tar.xz linux-0302e28dee643932ee7b3c112ebccdbb9f8ec32c.zip |
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Highlights:
IMA:
- provide ">" and "<" operators for fowner/uid/euid rules
KEYS:
- add a system blacklist keyring
- add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, exposes keyring link restriction
functionality to userland via keyctl()
LSM:
- harden LSM API with __ro_after_init
- add prlmit security hook, implement for SELinux
- revive security_task_alloc hook
TPM:
- implement contextual TPM command 'spaces'"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (98 commits)
tpm: Fix reference count to main device
tpm_tis: convert to using locality callbacks
tpm: fix handling of the TPM 2.0 event logs
tpm_crb: remove a cruft constant
keys: select CONFIG_CRYPTO when selecting DH / KDF
apparmor: Make path_max parameter readonly
apparmor: fix parameters so that the permission test is bypassed at boot
apparmor: fix invalid reference to index variable of iterator line 836
apparmor: use SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK
security/apparmor/lsm.c: set debug messages
apparmor: fix boolreturn.cocci warnings
Smack: Use GFP_KERNEL for smk_netlbl_mls().
smack: fix double free in smack_parse_opts_str()
KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DH
KEYS: Keyring asymmetric key restrict method with chaining
KEYS: Restrict asymmetric key linkage using a specific keychain
KEYS: Add a lookup_restriction function for the asymmetric key type
KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
KEYS: Consistent ordering for __key_link_begin and restrict check
KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_type
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/Kconfig | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 26 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 14 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 59 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 6 |
10 files changed, 81 insertions, 62 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig index ea7e3efbe0f7..8af7a690eb40 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE bool "NSA SELinux runtime disable" depends on SECURITY_SELINUX + select SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS default n help This option enables writing to a selinuxfs node 'disable', which @@ -50,6 +51,11 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE portability across platforms where boot parameters are difficult to employ. + NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init' + kernel hardening feature for security hooks. Please consider + using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this + option. + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 0c2ac318aa7f..e67a526d1f30 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3920,6 +3920,21 @@ static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL); } +int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, + unsigned int flags) +{ + u32 av = 0; + + if (!flags) + return 0; + if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_WRITE) + av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT; + if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ) + av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT; + return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred), + SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL); +} + static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim) { @@ -4352,10 +4367,18 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in u32 sid, node_perm; if (family == PF_INET) { + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; } else { + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto out; + } addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; @@ -6108,7 +6131,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #endif -static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { +static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), @@ -6206,6 +6229,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prlimit, selinux_task_prlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index d429c4a1c551..1e0cc9b5de20 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { "getattr", "setexec", "setfscreate", "noatsecure", "siginh", "setrlimit", "rlimitinh", "dyntransition", "setcurrent", "execmem", "execstack", "execheap", "setkeycreate", - "setsockcreate", NULL } }, + "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } }, { "system", { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } }, diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 8e67bb4c9cab..5aeaf30b7a13 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct nlmsg_perm { u32 perm; }; -static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = { { RTM_NEWLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { RTM_DELLINK, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = { RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; -static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = { { TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { DCCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, @@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = { SOCK_DESTROY, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, }; -static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = { { XFRM_MSG_NEWSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { XFRM_MSG_DELSA, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, @@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_xfrm_perms[] = { XFRM_MSG_MAPPING, NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; -static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = +static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = { { AUDIT_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { AUDIT_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_audit_perms[] = }; -static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize) +static int nlmsg_perm(u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm, const struct nlmsg_perm *tab, size_t tabsize) { int i, err = -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index cb3fd98fb05a..ce7171884223 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1456,10 +1456,10 @@ static int sel_avc_stats_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v) { struct avc_cache_stats *st = v; - if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) - seq_printf(seq, "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims " - "frees\n"); - else { + if (v == SEQ_START_TOKEN) { + seq_puts(seq, + "lookups hits misses allocations reclaims frees\n"); + } else { unsigned int lookups = st->lookups; unsigned int misses = st->misses; unsigned int hits = lookups - misses; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c index 34afeadd9e73..771c96afe1d5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c @@ -176,8 +176,9 @@ void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p) { kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct); - p->bool_val_to_struct = - kmalloc(p->p_bools.nprim * sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum *), GFP_KERNEL); + p->bool_val_to_struct = kmalloc_array(p->p_bools.nprim, + sizeof(*p->bool_val_to_struct), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!p->bool_val_to_struct) return -ENOMEM; return 0; @@ -226,7 +227,7 @@ int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) u32 len; int rc; - booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_bool_datum), GFP_KERNEL); + booldatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*booldatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!booldatum) return -ENOMEM; @@ -331,7 +332,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum goto err; } - list = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_av_list), GFP_KERNEL); + list = kzalloc(sizeof(*list), GFP_KERNEL); if (!list) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto err; @@ -420,7 +421,7 @@ static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp) goto err; rc = -ENOMEM; - expr = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_expr), GFP_KERNEL); + expr = kzalloc(sizeof(*expr), GFP_KERNEL); if (!expr) goto err; @@ -471,7 +472,7 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp) for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { rc = -ENOMEM; - node = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cond_node), GFP_KERNEL); + node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL); if (!node) goto err; @@ -663,5 +664,4 @@ void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, (node->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) services_compute_xperms_drivers(xperms, node); } - return; } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 2cc496149842..3858706a29fb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -17,15 +17,15 @@ struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void * u32 i; p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); - if (p == NULL) + if (!p) return p; p->size = size; p->nel = 0; p->hash_value = hash_value; p->keycmp = keycmp; - p->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(p->htable)) * size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (p->htable == NULL) { + p->htable = kmalloc_array(size, sizeof(*p->htable), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!p->htable) { kfree(p); return NULL; } @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum) return -EEXIST; newnode = kzalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_KERNEL); - if (newnode == NULL) + if (!newnode) return -ENOMEM; newnode->key = key; newnode->datum = datum; @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key) while (cur && h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) > 0) cur = cur->next; - if (cur == NULL || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0)) + if (!cur || (h->keycmp(h, key, cur->key) != 0)) return NULL; return cur->datum; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 9c92f29a38ea..0080122760ad 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -178,10 +178,9 @@ static int roles_init(struct policydb *p) int rc; struct role_datum *role; - rc = -ENOMEM; role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL); if (!role) - goto out; + return -ENOMEM; rc = -EINVAL; role->value = ++p->p_roles.nprim; @@ -540,23 +539,23 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p) #endif rc = -ENOMEM; - p->class_val_to_struct = - kzalloc(p->p_classes.nprim * sizeof(*(p->class_val_to_struct)), - GFP_KERNEL); + p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim, + sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!p->class_val_to_struct) goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; - p->role_val_to_struct = - kzalloc(p->p_roles.nprim * sizeof(*(p->role_val_to_struct)), - GFP_KERNEL); + p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim, + sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!p->role_val_to_struct) goto out; rc = -ENOMEM; - p->user_val_to_struct = - kzalloc(p->p_users.nprim * sizeof(*(p->user_val_to_struct)), - GFP_KERNEL); + p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim, + sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct), + GFP_KERNEL); if (!p->user_val_to_struct) goto out; @@ -880,8 +879,6 @@ void policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) ebitmap_destroy(&p->filename_trans_ttypes); ebitmap_destroy(&p->policycaps); ebitmap_destroy(&p->permissive_map); - - return; } /* @@ -1120,10 +1117,9 @@ static int perm_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) __le32 buf[2]; u32 len; - rc = -ENOMEM; perdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*perdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!perdatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); if (rc) @@ -1154,10 +1150,9 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) u32 len, nel; int i, rc; - rc = -ENOMEM; comdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*comdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!comdatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); if (rc) @@ -1320,10 +1315,9 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) u32 len, len2, ncons, nel; int i, rc; - rc = -ENOMEM; cladatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*cladatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!cladatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)*6); if (rc) @@ -1414,10 +1408,9 @@ static int role_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) __le32 buf[3]; u32 len; - rc = -ENOMEM; role = kzalloc(sizeof(*role), GFP_KERNEL); if (!role) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) to_read = 3; @@ -1471,10 +1464,9 @@ static int type_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) __le32 buf[4]; u32 len; - rc = -ENOMEM; typdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*typdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!typdatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) to_read = 4; @@ -1546,10 +1538,9 @@ static int user_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) __le32 buf[3]; u32 len; - rc = -ENOMEM; usrdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*usrdatum), GFP_KERNEL); if (!usrdatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; if (p->policyvers >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) to_read = 3; @@ -1597,10 +1588,9 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) __le32 buf[2]; u32 len; - rc = -ENOMEM; levdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*levdatum), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!levdatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); if (rc) @@ -1614,7 +1604,7 @@ static int sens_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) goto bad; rc = -ENOMEM; - levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(struct mls_level), GFP_ATOMIC); + levdatum->level = kmalloc(sizeof(*levdatum->level), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!levdatum->level) goto bad; @@ -1639,10 +1629,9 @@ static int cat_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp) __le32 buf[3]; u32 len; - rc = -ENOMEM; catdatum = kzalloc(sizeof(*catdatum), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!catdatum) - goto bad; + return -ENOMEM; rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof buf); if (rc) @@ -1854,7 +1843,7 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc) - goto out; + return rc; nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { @@ -1931,7 +1920,6 @@ static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { - ft = NULL; otype = NULL; name = NULL; @@ -2008,7 +1996,7 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32)); if (rc) - goto out; + return rc; nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]); for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) { @@ -2100,9 +2088,10 @@ static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp) } rc = 0; out: - if (newgenfs) + if (newgenfs) { kfree(newgenfs->fstype); - kfree(newgenfs); + kfree(newgenfs); + } ocontext_destroy(newc, OCON_FSUSE); return rc; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index b4aa491a0a23..60d9b0252321 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol, } k = 0; - while (p_in->perms && p_in->perms[k]) { + while (p_in->perms[k]) { /* An empty permission string skips ahead */ if (!*p_in->perms[k]) { k++; diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 5840a35155fc..f6915f257486 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) { int i; - s->htable = kmalloc(sizeof(*(s->htable)) * SIDTAB_SIZE, GFP_ATOMIC); + s->htable = kmalloc_array(SIDTAB_SIZE, sizeof(*s->htable), GFP_ATOMIC); if (!s->htable) return -ENOMEM; for (i = 0; i < SIDTAB_SIZE; i++) @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context) } newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (newnode == NULL) { + if (!newnode) { rc = -ENOMEM; goto out; } @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force) if (force && cur && sid == cur->sid && cur->context.len) return &cur->context; - if (cur == NULL || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) { + if (!cur || sid != cur->sid || cur->context.len) { /* Remap invalid SIDs to the unlabeled SID. */ sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid); |