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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-07-05 20:26:35 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2017-07-05 20:26:35 +0200
commite24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31 (patch)
tree14fcec8728916092a9f6dbeb0f2b8d5c5a4e5c9a /security/selinux
parentMerge branch 'stable-4.13' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/audit (diff)
parentapparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers (diff)
downloadlinux-e24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31.tar.xz
linux-e24dd9ee5399747b71c1d982a484fc7601795f31.zip
Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security layer updates from James Morris: - a major update for AppArmor. From JJ: * several bug fixes and cleanups * the patch to add symlink support to securityfs that was floated on the list earlier and the apparmorfs changes that make use of securityfs symlinks * it introduces the domain labeling base code that Ubuntu has been carrying for several years, with several cleanups applied. And it converts the current mediation over to using the domain labeling base, which brings domain stacking support with it. This finally will bring the base upstream code in line with Ubuntu and provide a base to upstream the new feature work that Ubuntu carries. * This does _not_ contain any of the newer apparmor mediation features/controls (mount, signals, network, keys, ...) that Ubuntu is currently carrying, all of which will be RFC'd on top of this. - Notable also is the Infiniband work in SELinux, and the new file:map permission. From Paul: "While we're down to 21 patches for v4.13 (it was 31 for v4.12), the diffstat jumps up tremendously with over 2k of line changes. Almost all of these changes are the SELinux/IB work done by Daniel Jurgens; some other noteworthy changes include a NFS v4.2 labeling fix, a new file:map permission, and reporting of policy capabilities on policy load" There's also now genfscon labeling support for tracefs, which was lost in v4.1 with the separation from debugfs. - Smack incorporates a safer socket check in file_receive, and adds a cap_capable call in privilege check. - TPM as usual has a bunch of fixes and enhancements. - Multiple calls to security_add_hooks() can now be made for the same LSM, to allow LSMs to have hook declarations across multiple files. - IMA now supports different "ima_appraise=" modes (eg. log, fix) from the boot command line. * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (126 commits) apparmor: put back designators in struct initialisers seccomp: Switch from atomic_t to recount_t seccomp: Adjust selftests to avoid double-join seccomp: Clean up core dump logic IMA: update IMA policy documentation to include pcr= option ima: Log the same audit cause whenever a file has no signature ima: Simplify policy_func_show. integrity: Small code improvements ima: fix get_binary_runtime_size() ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse template data ima: use ima_parse_buf() to parse measurements headers ima: introduce ima_parse_buf() ima: Add cgroups2 to the defaults list ima: use memdup_user_nul ima: fix up #endif comments IMA: Correct Kconfig dependencies for hash selection ima: define is_ima_appraise_enabled() ima: define Kconfig IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM option ima: define a set of appraisal rules requiring file signatures ima: extend the "ima_policy" boot command line to support multiple policies ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c212
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ibpkey.c245
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h31
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/objsec.h11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h9
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c26
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c127
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h27
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c108
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c27
14 files changed, 743 insertions, 106 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 3411c33e2a44..ff5895ede96f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
- netnode.o netport.o exports.o \
+ netnode.o netport.o ibpkey.o exports.o \
ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 819fd6858b49..33fd061305c4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
* Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
* Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -90,6 +91,7 @@
#include "netif.h"
#include "netnode.h"
#include "netport.h"
+#include "ibpkey.h"
#include "xfrm.h"
#include "netlabel.h"
#include "audit.h"
@@ -171,6 +173,16 @@ static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
return 0;
}
+static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event)
+{
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
+ sel_ib_pkey_flush();
+ call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/*
* initialise the security for the init task
*/
@@ -398,18 +410,6 @@ static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
kfree(sbsec);
}
-/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
-
-static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
- "uses xattr",
- "uses transition SIDs",
- "uses task SIDs",
- "uses genfs_contexts",
- "not configured for labeling",
- "uses mountpoint labeling",
- "uses native labeling",
-};
-
static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
{
return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
@@ -524,13 +524,17 @@ static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
}
}
- if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
- printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
- sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
-
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
+
+ /*
+ * Explicitly set or clear SBLABEL_MNT. It's not sufficient to simply
+ * leave the flag untouched because sb_clone_mnt_opts might be handing
+ * us a superblock that needs the flag to be cleared.
+ */
if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
+ else
+ sbsec->flags &= ~SBLABEL_MNT;
/* Initialize the root inode. */
rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
@@ -809,6 +813,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS;
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
@@ -963,8 +968,11 @@ mismatch:
}
static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
- struct super_block *newsb)
+ struct super_block *newsb,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
{
+ int rc = 0;
const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
@@ -979,6 +987,13 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
if (!ss_initialized)
return 0;
+ /*
+ * Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
+ * place the results is not allowed.
+ */
+ if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
@@ -994,6 +1009,18 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
+ if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
+ !(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
+ rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !set_context) {
+ newsbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
+ *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ }
+
if (set_context) {
u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
@@ -1013,8 +1040,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
}
sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
+out:
mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
- return 0;
+ return rc;
}
static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
@@ -2062,8 +2090,9 @@ static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
{
u32 av = file_to_av(file);
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
+ if (selinux_policycap_openperm && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
av |= FILE__OPEN;
return av;
@@ -3058,6 +3087,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
__u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
@@ -3073,8 +3103,10 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
- if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)
- && !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
+ if (selinux_policycap_openperm &&
+ inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
+ (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
+ !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
av |= FILE__OPEN;
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
@@ -3106,6 +3138,18 @@ static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
}
+static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit)
+{
+ const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ int cap_audit = audit ? SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT : SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT;
+
+ if (cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit))
+ return false;
+ if (cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, cap_audit, true))
+ return false;
+ return true;
+}
+
static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
@@ -3137,7 +3181,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (rc == -EINVAL) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;
const char *str;
@@ -3263,13 +3307,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
- if (!error)
- error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
- SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT, true);
isec = inode_security(inode);
- if (!error)
+ if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
&size);
else
@@ -3549,6 +3588,18 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (file) {
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE;
+ ad.u.file = file;
+ rc = inode_has_perm(current_cred(), file_inode(file),
+ FILE__MAP, &ad);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
@@ -3709,7 +3760,8 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
/* task security operations */
-static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
+ unsigned long clone_flags)
{
u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -5917,7 +5969,7 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
}
error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;
@@ -6127,7 +6179,70 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
*_buffer = context;
return rc;
}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+ struct lsm_ibpkey_audit ibpkey;
+
+ err = sel_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_val, &sid);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBPKEY;
+ ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+ ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
+ ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
+ return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
+ INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
+ u8 port_num)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data ad;
+ int err;
+ u32 sid = 0;
+ struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
+ struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
+
+ err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IBENDPORT;
+ strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
+ ibendport.port = port_num;
+ ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
+ return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
+ INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
+}
+
+static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec)
+{
+ struct ib_security_struct *sec;
+ sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!sec)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ sec->sid = current_sid();
+
+ *ib_sec = sec;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec)
+{
+ kfree(ib_sec);
+}
#endif
static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -6212,7 +6327,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open),
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, selinux_task_alloc),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare),
@@ -6314,7 +6429,13 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open),
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet,
+ selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_alloc_security, selinux_ib_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security),
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone),
@@ -6378,6 +6499,9 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
+ if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
+ panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
+
if (selinux_enforcing)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
else
@@ -6447,6 +6571,23 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
#endif /* IPV6 */
};
+static int __net_init selinux_nf_register(struct net *net)
+{
+ return nf_register_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static void __net_exit selinux_nf_unregister(struct net *net)
+{
+ nf_unregister_net_hooks(net, selinux_nf_ops,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+}
+
+static struct pernet_operations selinux_net_ops = {
+ .init = selinux_nf_register,
+ .exit = selinux_nf_unregister,
+};
+
static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
{
int err;
@@ -6456,13 +6597,12 @@ static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
- err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+ err = register_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
if (err)
- panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
+ panic("SELinux: register_pernet_subsys: error %d\n", err);
return 0;
}
-
__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
@@ -6470,7 +6610,7 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
{
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
- nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
+ unregister_pernet_subsys(&selinux_net_ops);
}
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e3614ee5f1c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+/*
+ * Pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of Infinband PKEYs to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ * This code is heavily based on the "netif" and "netport" concept originally
+ * developed by
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> and
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ * (see security/selinux/netif.c and security/selinux/netport.c for more
+ * information)
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+
+#include "ibpkey.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE 256
+#define SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT 16
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt {
+ int size;
+ struct list_head list;
+};
+
+struct sel_ib_pkey {
+ struct pkey_security_struct psec;
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(sel_ib_pkey_list);
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sel_ib_pkey_lock);
+static struct sel_ib_pkey_bkt sel_ib_pkey_hash[SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE];
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_hashfn - Hashing function for the pkey table
+ * @pkey: pkey number
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the hashing function for the pkey table, it returns the bucket
+ * number for the given pkey.
+ *
+ */
+static unsigned int sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(u16 pkey)
+{
+ return (pkey & (SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE - 1));
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_find - Search for a pkey record
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey_num
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Search the pkey table and return the matching record. If an entry
+ * can not be found in the table return NULL.
+ *
+ */
+static struct sel_ib_pkey *sel_ib_pkey_find(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+ idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey_num);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pkey, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+ if (pkey->psec.pkey == pkey_num &&
+ pkey->psec.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ return pkey;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_insert - Insert a new pkey into the table
+ * @pkey: the new pkey record
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Add a new pkey record to the hash table.
+ *
+ */
+static void sel_ib_pkey_insert(struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+
+ /* we need to impose a limit on the growth of the hash table so check
+ * this bucket to make sure it is within the specified bounds
+ */
+ idx = sel_ib_pkey_hashfn(pkey->psec.pkey);
+ list_add_rcu(&pkey->list, &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list);
+ if (sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size == SEL_PKEY_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) {
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *tail;
+
+ tail = list_entry(
+ rcu_dereference_protected(
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list.prev,
+ lockdep_is_held(&sel_ib_pkey_lock)),
+ struct sel_ib_pkey, list);
+ list_del_rcu(&tail->list);
+ kfree_rcu(tail, rcu);
+ } else {
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size++;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow - Lookup the SID of a pkey using the policy
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a pkey by querying the security
+ * policy. The result is added to the pkey table to speedup future
+ * queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *new = NULL;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+ if (pkey) {
+ *sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* If this memory allocation fails still return 0. The SID
+ * is valid, it just won't be added to the cache.
+ */
+ new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!new)
+ goto out;
+
+ new->psec.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
+ new->psec.pkey = pkey_num;
+ new->psec.sid = *sid;
+ sel_ib_pkey_insert(new);
+
+out:
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_sid - Lookup the SID of a PKEY
+ * @subnet_prefix: subnet_prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @sid: pkey SID
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This function determines the SID of a PKEY using the fastest method
+ * possible. First the pkey table is queried, but if an entry can't be found
+ * then the policy is queried and the result is added to the table to speedup
+ * future queries. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ pkey = sel_ib_pkey_find(subnet_prefix, pkey_num);
+ if (pkey) {
+ *sid = pkey->psec.sid;
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+}
+
+/**
+ * sel_ib_pkey_flush - Flush the entire pkey table
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Remove all entries from the pkey table
+ *
+ */
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void)
+{
+ unsigned int idx;
+ struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey, *pkey_tmp;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; idx++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(pkey, pkey_tmp,
+ &sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list, list) {
+ list_del_rcu(&pkey->list);
+ kfree_rcu(pkey, rcu);
+ }
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].size = 0;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&sel_ib_pkey_lock, flags);
+}
+
+static __init int sel_ib_pkey_init(void)
+{
+ int iter;
+
+ if (!selinux_enabled)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (iter = 0; iter < SEL_PKEY_HASH_SIZE; iter++) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].list);
+ sel_ib_pkey_hash[iter].size = 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+subsys_initcall(sel_ib_pkey_init);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 1e0cc9b5de20..b9fe3434b036 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#include <linux/capability.h>
#define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \
- "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append"
+ "getattr", "setattr", "lock", "relabelfrom", "relabelto", "append", "map"
#define COMMON_FILE_PERMS COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS, "unlink", "link", \
"rename", "execute", "quotaon", "mounton", "audit_access", \
@@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "smc_socket",
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "infiniband_pkey",
+ { "access", NULL } },
+ { "infiniband_endport",
+ { "manage_subnet", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b17a19e348e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/include/ibpkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * pkey table
+ *
+ * SELinux must keep a mapping of pkeys to labels/SIDs. This
+ * mapping is maintained as part of the normal policy but a fast cache is
+ * needed to reduce the lookup overhead.
+ *
+ */
+
+/*
+ * (c) Mellanox Technologies, 2016
+ *
+ * This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of version 2 of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+#define _SELINUX_IB_PKEY_H
+
+void sel_ib_pkey_flush(void);
+
+int sel_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey, u32 *sid);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index c03cdcd12a3b..6ebc61e370ff 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
*
* Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
@@ -139,6 +140,16 @@ struct key_security_struct {
u32 sid; /* SID of key */
};
+struct ib_security_struct {
+ u32 sid; /* SID of the queue pair or MAD agent */
+};
+
+struct pkey_security_struct {
+ u64 subnet_prefix; /* Port subnet prefix */
+ u16 pkey; /* PKey number */
+ u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */
+};
+
extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index f979c35e037e..e91f08c16c0b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -36,10 +36,11 @@
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE 28
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES 29
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL 30
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND 31
/* Range of policy versions we understand*/
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MIN POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE
-#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL
+#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND
/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f
@@ -76,6 +77,8 @@ enum {
};
#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
+extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+
extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
@@ -178,6 +181,10 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+
int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 50062e70140d..9010a3632d6f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -41,15 +41,6 @@
#include "objsec.h"
#include "conditional.h"
-/* Policy capability filenames */
-static char *policycap_names[] = {
- "network_peer_controls",
- "open_perms",
- "extended_socket_class",
- "always_check_network",
- "cgroup_seclabel"
-};
-
unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
@@ -163,6 +154,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
avc_ss_reset(0);
selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
+ if (!selinux_enforcing)
+ call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
}
length = count;
out:
@@ -1750,9 +1743,9 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(void)
sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
- if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(policycap_names))
+ if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
- policycap_names[iter]);
+ selinux_policycap_names[iter]);
else
dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 9db4709a6877..ad38299164c3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
#define BITS_PER_U64 (sizeof(u64) * 8)
+static struct kmem_cache *ebitmap_node_cachep;
+
int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2)
{
struct ebitmap_node *n1, *n2;
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src)
n = src->node;
prev = NULL;
while (n) {
- new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new) {
ebitmap_destroy(dst);
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
if (e_iter == NULL ||
offset >= e_iter->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
e_prev = e_iter;
- e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ e_iter = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (e_iter == NULL)
goto netlbl_import_failure;
e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
@@ -288,7 +290,7 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
prev->next = n->next;
else
e->node = n->next;
- kfree(n);
+ kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, n);
}
return 0;
}
@@ -299,7 +301,7 @@ int ebitmap_set_bit(struct ebitmap *e, unsigned long bit, int value)
if (!value)
return 0;
- new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ new = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -332,7 +334,7 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e)
while (n) {
temp = n;
n = n->next;
- kfree(temp);
+ kmem_cache_free(ebitmap_node_cachep, temp);
}
e->highbit = 0;
@@ -400,7 +402,7 @@ int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
if (!n || startbit >= n->startbit + EBITMAP_SIZE) {
struct ebitmap_node *tmp;
- tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(*tmp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ tmp = kmem_cache_zalloc(ebitmap_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmp) {
printk(KERN_ERR
"SELinux: ebitmap: out of memory\n");
@@ -519,3 +521,15 @@ int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
}
return 0;
}
+
+void ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+{
+ ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
+ sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
+ 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
+}
+
+void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void)
+{
+ kmem_cache_destroy(ebitmap_node_cachep);
+}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index 9637b8c71085..6d5a9ac4251f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -130,6 +130,9 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
+void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 0080122760ad..aa6500abb178 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@
*
* Added support for the policy capability bitmap
*
+ * Update: Mellanox Techonologies
+ *
+ * Added Infiniband support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Techonologies
* Copyright (C) 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
* Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
@@ -76,81 +81,86 @@ static struct policydb_compat_info policydb_compat[] = {
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BASE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 3,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOOL,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 1,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 3,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_IPV6,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM - 2,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_MLS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_RANGETRANS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_POLCAP,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_PERMISSIVE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_NEW_OBJECT_DEFAULTS,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_DEFAULT_TYPE,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
- .ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
},
{
.version = POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL,
.sym_num = SYM_NUM,
+ .ocon_num = OCON_NUM - 2,
+ },
+ {
+ .version = POLICYDB_VERSION_INFINIBAND,
+ .sym_num = SYM_NUM,
.ocon_num = OCON_NUM,
},
};
@@ -538,34 +548,30 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
symtab_hash_eval(p->symtab);
#endif
- rc = -ENOMEM;
p->class_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_classes.nprim,
sizeof(*p->class_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->class_val_to_struct)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
p->role_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_roles.nprim,
sizeof(*p->role_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->role_val_to_struct)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
p->user_val_to_struct = kcalloc(p->p_users.nprim,
sizeof(*p->user_val_to_struct),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->user_val_to_struct)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
/* Yes, I want the sizeof the pointer, not the structure */
- rc = -ENOMEM;
p->type_val_to_struct_array = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct type_datum *),
p->p_types.nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!p->type_val_to_struct_array)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->type_val_to_struct_array, 0,
p->p_types.nprim, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
@@ -577,12 +583,11 @@ static int policydb_index(struct policydb *p)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
p->sym_val_to_name[i] = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(char *),
p->symtab[i].nprim,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!p->sym_val_to_name[i])
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
rc = flex_array_prealloc(p->sym_val_to_name[i],
0, p->symtab[i].nprim,
@@ -2211,6 +2216,51 @@ static int ocontext_read(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
goto out;
break;
}
+ case OCON_IBPKEY:
+ rc = next_entry(nodebuf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix = be64_to_cpu(*((__be64 *)nodebuf));
+
+ if (nodebuf[2] > 0xffff ||
+ nodebuf[3] > 0xffff) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey = le32_to_cpu(nodebuf[2]);
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey = le32_to_cpu(nodebuf[3]);
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+ p,
+ fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ rc = str_read(&c->u.ibendport.dev_name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (buf[1] > 0xff || buf[1] == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ c->u.ibendport.port = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = context_read_and_validate(&c->context[0],
+ p,
+ fp);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ break;
}
}
}
@@ -3140,6 +3190,33 @@ static int ocontext_write(struct policydb *p, struct policydb_compat_info *info,
if (rc)
return rc;
break;
+ case OCON_IBPKEY:
+ *((__be64 *)nodebuf) = cpu_to_be64(c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix);
+
+ nodebuf[2] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey);
+ nodebuf[3] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey);
+
+ rc = put_entry(nodebuf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
+ case OCON_IBENDPORT:
+ len = strlen(c->u.ibendport.dev_name);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(c->u.ibendport.port);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(c->u.ibendport.dev_name, 1, len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ rc = context_write(p, &c->context[0], fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ break;
}
}
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 725d5945a97e..5d23eed35fa7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -187,6 +187,15 @@ struct ocontext {
u32 addr[4];
u32 mask[4];
} node6; /* IPv6 node information */
+ struct {
+ u64 subnet_prefix;
+ u16 low_pkey;
+ u16 high_pkey;
+ } ibpkey;
+ struct {
+ char *dev_name;
+ u8 port;
+ } ibendport;
} u;
union {
u32 sclass; /* security class for genfs */
@@ -215,14 +224,16 @@ struct genfs {
#define SYM_NUM 8
/* object context array indices */
-#define OCON_ISID 0 /* initial SIDs */
-#define OCON_FS 1 /* unlabeled file systems */
-#define OCON_PORT 2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
-#define OCON_NETIF 3 /* network interfaces */
-#define OCON_NODE 4 /* nodes */
-#define OCON_FSUSE 5 /* fs_use */
-#define OCON_NODE6 6 /* IPv6 nodes */
-#define OCON_NUM 7
+#define OCON_ISID 0 /* initial SIDs */
+#define OCON_FS 1 /* unlabeled file systems */
+#define OCON_PORT 2 /* TCP and UDP port numbers */
+#define OCON_NETIF 3 /* network interfaces */
+#define OCON_NODE 4 /* nodes */
+#define OCON_FSUSE 5 /* fs_use */
+#define OCON_NODE6 6 /* IPv6 nodes */
+#define OCON_IBPKEY 7 /* Infiniband PKeys */
+#define OCON_IBENDPORT 8 /* Infiniband end ports */
+#define OCON_NUM 9
/* The policy database */
struct policydb {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 60d9b0252321..2f02fa67ec2e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -70,6 +70,15 @@
#include "ebitmap.h"
#include "audit.h"
+/* Policy capability names */
+char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
+ "network_peer_controls",
+ "open_perms",
+ "extended_socket_class",
+ "always_check_network",
+ "cgroup_seclabel"
+};
+
int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
int selinux_policycap_openperm;
int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
@@ -1986,6 +1995,9 @@ bad:
static void security_load_policycaps(void)
{
+ unsigned int i;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
+
selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
@@ -1997,6 +2009,17 @@ static void security_load_policycaps(void)
selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
+ pr_info("SELinux: policy capability %s=%d\n",
+ selinux_policycap_names[i],
+ ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
+
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
+ if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
+ pr_info("SELinux: unknown policy capability %u\n",
+ i);
+ }
}
static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
@@ -2031,9 +2054,11 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (!ss_initialized) {
avtab_cache_init();
+ ebitmap_cache_init();
rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
if (rc) {
avtab_cache_destroy();
+ ebitmap_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
@@ -2044,6 +2069,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
+ ebitmap_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
@@ -2051,6 +2077,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
if (rc) {
policydb_destroy(&policydb);
avtab_cache_destroy();
+ ebitmap_cache_destroy();
goto out;
}
@@ -2210,6 +2237,87 @@ out:
}
/**
+ * security_pkey_sid - Obtain the SID for a pkey.
+ * @subnet_prefix: Subnet Prefix
+ * @pkey_num: pkey number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
+ c->u.ibpkey.subnet_prefix == subnet_prefix)
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
+ * @dev_name: device name
+ * @port: port number
+ * @out_sid: security identifier
+ */
+int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ struct ocontext *c;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+
+ c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+ while (c) {
+ if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
+ !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
+ dev_name,
+ IB_DEVICE_NAME_MAX))
+ break;
+
+ c = c->next;
+ }
+
+ if (c) {
+ if (!c->sid[0]) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+ &c->context[0],
+ &c->sid[0]);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ } else
+ *out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+
+out:
+ read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
* security_netif_sid - Obtain the SID for a network interface.
* @name: interface name
* @if_sid: interface SID
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
index f6915f257486..c5f436b15d19 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c
@@ -32,13 +32,11 @@ int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s)
int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
{
- int hvalue, rc = 0;
+ int hvalue;
struct sidtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
- if (!s) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!s)
+ return -ENOMEM;
hvalue = SIDTAB_HASH(sid);
prev = NULL;
@@ -48,21 +46,17 @@ int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
cur = cur->next;
}
- if (cur && sid == cur->sid) {
- rc = -EEXIST;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (cur && sid == cur->sid)
+ return -EEXIST;
newnode = kmalloc(sizeof(*newnode), GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!newnode) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (!newnode)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
newnode->sid = sid;
if (context_cpy(&newnode->context, context)) {
kfree(newnode);
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
if (prev) {
@@ -78,8 +72,7 @@ int sidtab_insert(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, struct context *context)
s->nel++;
if (sid >= s->next_sid)
s->next_sid = sid + 1;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return 0;
}
static struct context *sidtab_search_core(struct sidtab *s, u32 sid, int force)