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author | Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com> | 2014-08-07 18:52:43 +0200 |
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committer | Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> | 2014-08-08 23:51:07 +0200 |
commit | b862e561bad6372872f5bf98d95f4131d265b110 (patch) | |
tree | 86df1aa1baae0401ede16a22748bef65ca345ea3 /security/smack/smack_lsm.c | |
parent | Smack: fix behavior of smack_inode_listsecurity (diff) | |
download | linux-b862e561bad6372872f5bf98d95f4131d265b110.tar.xz linux-b862e561bad6372872f5bf98d95f4131d265b110.zip |
Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panic
Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them.
This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels:
# attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file
And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp:
# python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog
The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack()
which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero
it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this
function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack/smack_lsm.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index b11ab23b328b..afa5ad0e7f72 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, rc = -EPERM; if (rc == 0 && check_import) { - skp = smk_import_entry(value, size); + skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL; if (skp == NULL || (check_star && (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web))) rc = -EINVAL; |