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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-19 03:02:35 +0200
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2008-04-19 03:02:35 +0200
commit334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321 (patch)
treed3c0f68e4b9f8e3d2ccc39e7dfe5de0534a5fad9 /security
parentx86 PAT: fix mmap() of holes (diff)
parent[NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices (diff)
downloadlinux-334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321.tar.xz
linux-334d094504c2fe1c44211ecb49146ae6bca8c321.zip
Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits) [NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices [IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add(). [NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found [PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init(). [INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call. [INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call. SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked. [netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg. tc35815: Statistics cleanup natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms [TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code [TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table [TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16 ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16 sb1000.c: make const arrays static sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c14
-rw-r--r--security/security.c21
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netif.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c39
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c2
7 files changed, 45 insertions, 48 deletions
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index 78d8f92310a4..480366f9c41d 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -876,22 +876,23 @@ static inline void dummy_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+static int dummy_xfrm_policy_alloc_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline int dummy_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
+static inline int dummy_xfrm_policy_clone_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
return 0;
}
-static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+static void dummy_xfrm_policy_free_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
}
-static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+static int dummy_xfrm_policy_delete_security(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
return 0;
}
@@ -911,7 +912,8 @@ static int dummy_xfrm_state_delete_security(struct xfrm_state *x)
return 0;
}
-static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
+static int dummy_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx,
+ u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9beecac933b4..54affd0ce6ad 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1014,26 +1014,27 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
-int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
+int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(xp, sec_ctx);
+ return security_ops->xfrm_policy_alloc_security(ctxp, sec_ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc);
-int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
+int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old, new);
+ return security_ops->xfrm_policy_clone_security(old_ctx, new_ctxp);
}
-void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(xp);
+ security_ops->xfrm_policy_free_security(ctx);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free);
-int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(xp);
+ return security_ops->xfrm_policy_delete_security(ctx);
}
int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx)
@@ -1065,9 +1066,9 @@ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x)
security_ops->xfrm_state_free_security(x);
}
-int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
- return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(xp, fl_secid, dir);
+ return security_ops->xfrm_policy_lookup(ctx, fl_secid, dir);
}
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 36b0510efa7b..289e24b39e3e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -7,16 +7,17 @@
#ifndef _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
#define _SELINUX_XFRM_H_
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new);
-void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp);
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx);
int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, u32 secid);
void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index 013d3117a86b..9c8a82aa8baf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static int sel_netif_netdev_notifier_handler(struct notifier_block *this,
{
struct net_device *dev = ptr;
- if (dev->nd_net != &init_net)
+ if (dev_net(dev) != &init_net)
return NOTIFY_DONE;
if (event == NETDEV_DOWN)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index d75050819b06..33425b1ac8d6 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2674,7 +2674,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
goto netlbl_sid_to_secattr_failure;
secattr->domain = kstrdup(policydb.p_type_val_to_name[ctx->type - 1],
GFP_ATOMIC);
- secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN;
+ secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY;
mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
if (rc != 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 7e158205d081..874d17c83c61 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -77,20 +77,18 @@ static inline int selinux_authorizable_xfrm(struct xfrm_state *x)
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes that a flow can use
* a xfrm policy rule.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
{
int rc;
u32 sel_sid;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx;
/* Context sid is either set to label or ANY_ASSOC */
- if ((ctx = xp->security)) {
+ if (ctx) {
if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
return -EINVAL;
sel_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
- }
- else
+ } else
/*
* All flows should be treated as polmatch'ing an
* otherwise applicable "non-labeled" policy. This
@@ -103,7 +101,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_policy *xp, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
NULL);
if (rc == -EACCES)
- rc = -ESRCH;
+ return -ESRCH;
return rc;
}
@@ -287,15 +285,14 @@ out2:
* LSM hook implementation that allocs and transfers uctx spec to
* xfrm_policy.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
+ struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *uctx)
{
int err;
- BUG_ON(!xp);
BUG_ON(!uctx);
- err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(&xp->security, uctx, 0);
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sec_ctx_alloc(ctxp, uctx, 0);
if (err == 0)
atomic_inc(&selinux_xfrm_refcount);
@@ -307,32 +304,29 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_policy *xp,
* LSM hook implementation that copies security data structure from old to
* new for policy cloning.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_policy *old, struct xfrm_policy *new)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx,
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp)
{
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, *new_ctx;
-
- old_ctx = old->security;
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *new_ctx;
if (old_ctx) {
- new_ctx = new->security = kmalloc(sizeof(*new_ctx) +
- old_ctx->ctx_len,
- GFP_KERNEL);
-
+ new_ctx = kmalloc(sizeof(*old_ctx) + old_ctx->ctx_len,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new_ctx)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(new_ctx, old_ctx, sizeof(*new_ctx));
memcpy(new_ctx->ctx_str, old_ctx->ctx_str, new_ctx->ctx_len);
+ *new_ctxp = new_ctx;
}
return 0;
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_policy security information.
+ * LSM hook implementation that frees xfrm_sec_ctx security information.
*/
-void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
if (ctx)
kfree(ctx);
}
@@ -340,10 +334,9 @@ void selinux_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
/*
* LSM hook implementation that authorizes deletion of labeled policies.
*/
-int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_policy *xp)
+int selinux_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
- struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = xp->security;
int rc = 0;
if (ctx) {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 732ba27923c4..e2d6f7cd9254 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1275,7 +1275,7 @@ static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
switch (smack_net_nltype) {
case NETLBL_NLTYPE_CIPSOV4:
- nlsp->domain = kstrdup(smack, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ nlsp->domain = smack;
nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);