diff options
| author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-03 18:25:15 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-06 00:52:54 +0100 |
| commit | c7eba4a97563fd8b431787f7ad623444f2da80c6 (patch) | |
| tree | 12041949c45c2f394d6a96041c39e07ad6df720b /security | |
| parent | capabilities: reverse arguments to security_capable (diff) | |
| download | linux-c7eba4a97563fd8b431787f7ad623444f2da80c6.tar.xz linux-c7eba4a97563fd8b431787f7ad623444f2da80c6.zip | |
capabilities: introduce security_capable_noaudit
Exactly like security_capable except don't audit any denials. This is for
places where the kernel may make decisions about what to do if a task has a
given capability, but which failing that capability is not a sign of a
security policy violation. An example is checking if a task has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN to lower it's likelyhood of being killed by the oom killer.
This check is not a security violation if it is denied.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b9e57f4fc44a..b7edaae77d1d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -160,6 +160,12 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); } +int security_capable_noaudit(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, + int cap) +{ + return security_ops->capable(cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); +} + int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap) { |