Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs

Pull vfs changes from Al Viro.
 "A lot of misc stuff.  The obvious groups:
   * Miklos' atomic_open series; kills the damn abuse of
     ->d_revalidate() by NFS, which was the major stumbling block for
     all work in that area.
   * ripping security_file_mmap() and dealing with deadlocks in the
     area; sanitizing the neighborhood of vm_mmap()/vm_munmap() in
     general.
   * ->encode_fh() switched to saner API; insane fake dentry in
     mm/cleancache.c gone.
   * assorted annotations in fs (endianness, __user)
   * parts of Artem's ->s_dirty work (jff2 and reiserfs parts)
   * ->update_time() work from Josef.
   * other bits and pieces all over the place.

  Normally it would've been in two or three pull requests, but
  signal.git stuff had eaten a lot of time during this cycle ;-/"

Fix up trivial conflicts in Documentation/filesystems/vfs.txt (the
'truncate_range' inode method was removed by the VM changes, the VFS
update adds an 'update_time()' method), and in fs/btrfs/ulist.[ch] (due
to sparse fix added twice, with other changes nearby).

* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (95 commits)
  nfs: don't open in ->d_revalidate
  vfs: retry last component if opening stale dentry
  vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): don't throw away file on error
  vfs: nameidata_to_filp(): inline __dentry_open()
  vfs: do_dentry_open(): don't put filp
  vfs: split __dentry_open()
  vfs: do_last() common post lookup
  vfs: do_last(): add audit_inode before open
  vfs: do_last(): only return EISDIR for O_CREAT
  vfs: do_last(): check LOOKUP_DIRECTORY
  vfs: do_last(): make ENOENT exit RCU safe
  vfs: make follow_link check RCU safe
  vfs: do_last(): use inode variable
  vfs: do_last(): inline walk_component()
  vfs: do_last(): make exit RCU safe
  vfs: split do_lookup()
  Btrfs: move over to use ->update_time
  fs: introduce inode operation ->update_time
  reiserfs: get rid of resierfs_sync_super
  reiserfs: mark the superblock as dirty a bit later
  ...

7 files changed, 80 insertions, 72 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 032daab449b0..8ea39aabe948 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -490,17 +490,9 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
 	return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
 }
 
-static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			      unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			      unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	int rc = 0;
-
-	/* do DAC check */
-	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
-	if (rc || addr_only)
-		return rc;
-
 	return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
 }
 
@@ -646,7 +638,8 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
 	.file_permission =		apparmor_file_permission,
 	.file_alloc_security =		apparmor_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		apparmor_file_free_security,
-	.file_mmap =			apparmor_file_mmap,
+	.mmap_file =			apparmor_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
 	.file_mprotect =		apparmor_file_mprotect,
 	.file_lock =			apparmor_file_lock,
 
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fca889676c5e..61095df8b89a 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
-	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
+	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
 	set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index e771cb1b2d79..6dbae4650abe 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -958,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 }
 
 /*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
  * @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
  *
  * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
  * CAP_SYS_RAWIO.  The other parameters to this function are unused by the
  * capability security module.  Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
  * -EPERM if not.
  */
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-		  unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -986,3 +979,9 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	}
 	return ret;
 }
+
+int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+		  unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5497a57fba01..3efc9b12aef4 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
@@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
 	return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-	int ret;
+	/*
+	 * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+	 * it to imply PROT_EXEC?  If not, nothing to talk about...
+	 */
+	if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+		return prot;
+	if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+		return prot;
+	/*
+	 * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+	 */
+	if (!file)
+		return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+	/*
+	 * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+	 * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+	 */
+	if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+		unsigned long caps = 0;
+		struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+		if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+			caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+		if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+			return prot;
+#endif
+		return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+	}
+	/* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+	return prot;
+}
 
-	ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+			unsigned long flags)
+{
+	int ret;
+	ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+					mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 	return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 }
 
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+	return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 			    unsigned long prot)
 {
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b68331..372ec6502aa8 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3083,9 +3083,7 @@ error:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-			     unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 {
 	int rc = 0;
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3104,10 +3102,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 	}
 
 	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
-	if (rc || addr_only)
-		return rc;
+	return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
 
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+			     unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
 	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
@@ -5570,7 +5570,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
 	.file_alloc_security =		selinux_file_alloc_security,
 	.file_free_security =		selinux_file_free_security,
 	.file_ioctl =			selinux_file_ioctl,
-	.file_mmap =			selinux_file_mmap,
+	.mmap_file =			selinux_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			selinux_mmap_addr,
 	.file_mprotect =		selinux_file_mprotect,
 	.file_lock =			selinux_file_lock,
 	.file_fcntl =			selinux_file_fcntl,
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4e93f9ef970b..3ad290251288 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1259,12 +1259,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 		if (!inode)
 			goto out;
 
-		ret = -EINVAL;
-		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
-		if (len < 0)
-			goto out;
-
 		ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+		len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
 		if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -1557,19 +1553,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
 static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	ssize_t rc, len;
-	char *page;
 	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
-	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!page)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
-	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
-	free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
-	return rc;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
@@ -1580,19 +1567,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
-	ssize_t rc, len;
-	char *page;
 	unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
-	page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!page)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-
-	len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
-	rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
-	free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
-	return rc;
+	char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+	ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
 }
 
 static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d583c0545808..ee0bb5735f35 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_file_mmap :
+ * smack_mmap_file :
  * Check permissions for a mmap operation.  The @file may be NULL, e.g.
  * if mapping anonymous memory.
  * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
@@ -1180,10 +1180,9 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
  * @flags contains the operational flags.
  * Return 0 if permission is granted.
  */
-static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
 			   unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
-			   unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
-			   unsigned long addr_only)
+			   unsigned long flags)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	struct smack_rule *srp;
@@ -1198,11 +1197,6 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
 	int tmay;
 	int rc;
 
-	/* do DAC check on address space usage */
-	rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
-	if (rc || addr_only)
-		return rc;
-
 	if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -3482,7 +3476,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
 	.file_ioctl = 			smack_file_ioctl,
 	.file_lock = 			smack_file_lock,
 	.file_fcntl = 			smack_file_fcntl,
-	.file_mmap =			smack_file_mmap,
+	.mmap_file =			smack_mmap_file,
+	.mmap_addr =			cap_mmap_addr,
 	.file_set_fowner = 		smack_file_set_fowner,
 	.file_send_sigiotask = 		smack_file_send_sigiotask,
 	.file_receive = 		smack_file_receive,