Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel

The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities.  If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.

FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)

 http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Erez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

2 files changed, 68 insertions, 36 deletions

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b06617b35b93..01ab47845dcf 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o 
+/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o and root_plug.o
  *
  *	This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  *	it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ int cap_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
 	/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
-	*effective = cap_t (target->cap_effective);
-	*inheritable = cap_t (target->cap_inheritable);
-	*permitted = cap_t (target->cap_permitted);
+	*effective = target->cap_effective;
+	*inheritable = target->cap_inheritable;
+	*permitted = target->cap_permitted;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -197,28 +197,51 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
 }
 
-static inline int cap_from_disk(__le32 *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm,
-				int size)
+static inline int cap_from_disk(struct vfs_cap_data *caps,
+				struct linux_binprm *bprm, unsigned size)
 {
 	__u32 magic_etc;
+	unsigned tocopy, i;
 
-	if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ)
+	if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps[0]);
+	magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 
 	switch ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)) {
-	case VFS_CAP_REVISION:
-		if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
-			bprm->cap_effective = true;
-		else
-			bprm->cap_effective = false;
-		bprm->cap_permitted = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps[1]));
-		bprm->cap_inheritable = to_cap_t(le32_to_cpu(caps[2]));
-		return 0;
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
+		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
+		break;
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
+		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
+		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
+
+	if (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) {
+		bprm->cap_effective = true;
+	} else {
+		bprm->cap_effective = false;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tocopy; ++i) {
+		bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
+			le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
+		bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] =
+			le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
+	}
+	while (i < VFS_CAP_U32) {
+		bprm->cap_permitted.cap[i] = 0;
+		bprm->cap_inheritable.cap[i] = 0;
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /* Locate any VFS capabilities: */
@@ -226,7 +249,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	struct dentry *dentry;
 	int rc = 0;
-	__le32 v1caps[XATTR_CAPS_SZ];
+	struct vfs_cap_data vcaps;
 	struct inode *inode;
 
 	if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) {
@@ -239,8 +262,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (!inode->i_op || !inode->i_op->getxattr)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &v1caps,
-							XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+	rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &vcaps,
+				   XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 	if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
 		/* no data, that's ok */
 		rc = 0;
@@ -249,7 +272,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	if (rc < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = cap_from_disk(v1caps, bprm, rc);
+	rc = cap_from_disk(&vcaps, bprm, rc);
 	if (rc)
 		printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
 			__FUNCTION__, rc, bprm->filename);
@@ -344,8 +367,10 @@ void cap_bprm_apply_creds (struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
 	 * capability rules */
 	if (!is_global_init(current)) {
 		current->cap_permitted = new_permitted;
-		current->cap_effective = bprm->cap_effective ?
-				new_permitted : 0;
+		if (bprm->cap_effective)
+			current->cap_effective = new_permitted;
+		else
+			cap_clear(current->cap_effective);
 	}
 
 	/* AUD: Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set */
@@ -467,13 +492,15 @@ int cap_task_post_setuid (uid_t old_ruid, uid_t old_euid, uid_t old_suid,
 
 			if (!issecure (SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
 				if (old_fsuid == 0 && current->fsuid != 0) {
-					cap_t (current->cap_effective) &=
-					    ~CAP_FS_MASK;
+					current->cap_effective =
+						cap_drop_fs_set(
+						    current->cap_effective);
 				}
 				if (old_fsuid != 0 && current->fsuid == 0) {
-					cap_t (current->cap_effective) |=
-					    (cap_t (current->cap_permitted) &
-					     CAP_FS_MASK);
+					current->cap_effective =
+						cap_raise_fs_set(
+						    current->cap_effective,
+						    current->cap_permitted);
 				}
 			}
 			break;
@@ -577,9 +604,9 @@ int cap_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 
 void cap_task_reparent_to_init (struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	p->cap_effective = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
-	p->cap_inheritable = CAP_INIT_INH_SET;
-	p->cap_permitted = CAP_FULL_SET;
+	cap_set_init_eff(p->cap_effective);
+	cap_clear(p->cap_inheritable);
+	cap_set_full(p->cap_permitted);
 	p->keep_capabilities = 0;
 	return;
 }
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index c505122e22db..649326bf64ea 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -36,14 +36,19 @@ static int dummy_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
 static int dummy_capget (struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t * effective,
 			 kernel_cap_t * inheritable, kernel_cap_t * permitted)
 {
-	*effective = *inheritable = *permitted = 0;
 	if (target->euid == 0) {
-		*permitted |= (~0 & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
-		*effective |= (~0 & ~CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SETPCAP) & ~CAP_FS_MASK);
+		cap_set_full(*permitted);
+		cap_set_init_eff(*effective);
+	} else {
+		cap_clear(*permitted);
+		cap_clear(*effective);
 	}
-	if (target->fsuid == 0) {
-		*permitted |= CAP_FS_MASK;
-		*effective |= CAP_FS_MASK;
+
+	cap_clear(*inheritable);
+
+	if (target->fsuid != 0) {
+		*permitted = cap_drop_fs_set(*permitted);
+		*effective = cap_drop_fs_set(*effective);
 	}
 	return 0;
 }