diff options
author | Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> | 2015-10-31 16:53:44 +0100 |
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committer | Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> | 2015-12-20 14:27:13 +0100 |
commit | 5beb0c435bdde35a09376566b0e28f7df87c9f68 (patch) | |
tree | 3f8c2bc84de7a77c3fed187f3bd15011e2b33e5b /security | |
parent | keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chips (diff) | |
download | linux-5beb0c435bdde35a09376566b0e28f7df87c9f68.tar.xz linux-5beb0c435bdde35a09376566b0e28f7df87c9f68.zip |
keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy
TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially
combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data
can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use
authorization policies to seal trusted keys.
Two following new options have been added for trusted keys:
* 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing.
* 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing.
If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this
will result an error because the state of the option would become
mixed.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 26 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index 8f1300cab38e..e15baf722ae3 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -713,6 +713,8 @@ enum { Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, Opt_hash, + Opt_policydigest, + Opt_policyhandle, }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { @@ -726,6 +728,8 @@ static const match_table_t key_tokens = { {Opt_pcrlock, "pcrlock=%s"}, {Opt_migratable, "migratable=%s"}, {Opt_hash, "hash=%s"}, + {Opt_policydigest, "policydigest=%s"}, + {Opt_policyhandle, "policyhandle=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -748,6 +752,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return tpm2; opt->hash = tpm2 ? HASH_ALGO_SHA256 : HASH_ALGO_SHA1; + opt->digest_len = hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; while ((p = strsep(&c, " \t"))) { if (*p == '\0' || *p == ' ' || *p == '\t') @@ -802,9 +807,13 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, opt->pcrlock = lock; break; case Opt_hash: + if (test_bit(Opt_policydigest, &token_mask)) + return -EINVAL; for (i = 0; i < HASH_ALGO__LAST; i++) { if (!strcmp(args[0].from, hash_algo_name[i])) { opt->hash = i; + opt->digest_len = + hash_digest_size[opt->hash]; break; } } @@ -815,6 +824,23 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return -EINVAL; } break; + case Opt_policydigest: + if (!tpm2 || + strlen(args[0].from) != (2 * opt->digest_len)) + return -EINVAL; + res = hex2bin(opt->policydigest, args[0].from, + opt->digest_len); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + break; + case Opt_policyhandle: + if (!tpm2) + return -EINVAL; + res = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 16, &handle); + if (res < 0) + return -EINVAL; + opt->policyhandle = handle; + break; default: return -EINVAL; } |