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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-14 18:51:25 +0100 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-01-14 18:51:25 +0100 |
commit | 40548c6b6c134275c750eb372dc2cf8ee1bbc3d4 (patch) | |
tree | 3bfc6943c3b43f1e345ddb7c88996e7b2f121fcd /security | |
parent | Merge tag 'usb-4.15-rc8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gre... (diff) | |
parent | x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI (diff) | |
download | linux-40548c6b6c134275c750eb372dc2cf8ee1bbc3d4.tar.xz linux-40548c6b6c134275c750eb372dc2cf8ee1bbc3d4.zip |
Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"This contains:
- a PTI bugfix to avoid setting reserved CR3 bits when PCID is
disabled. This seems to cause issues on a virtual machine at least
and is incorrect according to the AMD manual.
- a PTI bugfix which disables the perf BTS facility if PTI is
enabled. The BTS AUX buffer is not globally visible and causes the
CPU to fault when the mapping disappears on switching CR3 to user
space. A full fix which restores BTS on PTI is non trivial and will
be worked on.
- PTI bugfixes for EFI and trusted boot which make sure that the user
space visible page table entries have the NX bit cleared
- removal of dead code in the PTI pagetable setup functions
- add PTI documentation
- add a selftest for vsyscall to verify that the kernel actually
implements what it advertises.
- a sysfs interface to expose vulnerability and mitigation
information so there is a coherent way for users to retrieve the
status.
- the initial spectre_v2 mitigations, aka retpoline:
+ The necessary ASM thunk and compiler support
+ The ASM variants of retpoline and the conversion of affected ASM
code
+ Make LFENCE serializing on AMD so it can be used as speculation
trap
+ The RSB fill after vmexit
- initial objtool support for retpoline
As I said in the status mail this is the most of the set of patches
which should go into 4.15 except two straight forward patches still on
hold:
- the retpoline add on of LFENCE which waits for ACKs
- the RSB fill after context switch
Both should be ready to go early next week and with that we'll have
covered the major holes of spectre_v2 and go back to normality"
* 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (28 commits)
x86,perf: Disable intel_bts when PTI
security/Kconfig: Correct the Documentation reference for PTI
x86/pti: Fix !PCID and sanitize defines
selftests/x86: Add test_vsyscall
x86/retpoline: Fill return stack buffer on vmexit
x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry assembler indirect jumps
x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps
x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigation
x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
objtool: Allow alternatives to be ignored
objtool: Detect jumps to retpoline thunks
x86/pti: Make unpoison of pgd for trusted boot work for real
x86/alternatives: Fix optimize_nops() checking
sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentation
x86/cpu/AMD: Use LFENCE_RDTSC in preference to MFENCE_RDTSC
...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 3d4debd0257e..b0cb9a5f9448 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped into userspace. - See Documentation/x86/pagetable-isolation.txt for more details. + See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details. config SECURITY_INFINIBAND bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" |