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| author | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2020-07-13 19:06:48 +0200 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> | 2020-07-21 15:24:52 +0200 |
| commit | be619f7f063a49c656f620a46af4f8ea3e759e91 (patch) | |
| tree | be0f257b8da82e9e2eb9bdaa2574a48221e7b516 /security | |
| parent | exec: Factor bprm_stack_limits out of prepare_arg_pages (diff) | |
| download | linux-be619f7f063a49c656f620a46af4f8ea3e759e91.tar.xz linux-be619f7f063a49c656f620a46af4f8ea3e759e91.zip | |
exec: Implement kernel_execve
To allow the kernel not to play games with set_fs to call exec
implement kernel_execve. The function kernel_execve takes pointers
into kernel memory and copies the values pointed to onto the new
userspace stack.
The calls with arguments from kernel space of do_execve are replaced
with calls to kernel_execve.
The calls do_execve and do_execveat are made static as there are now
no callers outside of exec.
The comments that mention do_execve are updated to refer to
kernel_execve or execve depending on the circumstances. In addition
to correcting the comments, this makes it easy to grep for do_execve
and verify it is not used.
Inspired-by: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200627072704.2447163-1-hch@lst.de
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87wo365ikj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/common.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/domain.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 4 |
3 files changed, 5 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 050473df5809..85246b9df7ca 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ struct tomoyo_request_info { struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj; /* * For holding parameters specific to execve() request. - * NULL if not dealing do_execve(). + * NULL if not dealing execve(). */ struct tomoyo_execve *ee; struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c index 7869d6a9980b..53b3e1f5f227 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -767,7 +767,7 @@ retry: /* * Check for domain transition preference if "file execute" matched. - * If preference is given, make do_execve() fail if domain transition + * If preference is given, make execve() fail if domain transition * has failed, for domain transition preference should be used with * destination domain defined. */ @@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ force_reset_domain: snprintf(ee->tmp, TOMOYO_EXEC_TMPSIZE - 1, "<%s>", candidate->name); /* - * Make do_execve() fail if domain transition across namespaces + * Make execve() fail if domain transition across namespaces * has failed. */ reject_on_transition_failure = true; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index f9adddc42ac8..1f3cd432d830 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) struct tomoyo_task *s = tomoyo_task(current); /* - * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve() + * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to execve() * using current domain. */ if (!s->old_domain_info) { @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, */ static int tomoyo_file_open(struct file *f) { - /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */ + /* Don't check read permission here if called from execve(). */ if (current->in_execve) return 0; return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, |