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author | Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> | 2020-04-27 12:31:28 +0200 |
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committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> | 2020-05-08 03:36:31 +0200 |
commit | 2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac (patch) | |
tree | af17628b7796dcda714f14b8120a0d8124d90548 /security | |
parent | evm: Check also if *tfm is an error pointer in init_desc() (diff) | |
download | linux-2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac.tar.xz linux-2e3a34e9f409ebe83d1af7cd2f49fca7af97dfac.zip |
ima: Fix return value of ima_write_policy()
This patch fixes the return value of ima_write_policy() when a new policy
is directly passed to IMA and the current policy requires appraisal of the
file containing the policy. Currently, if appraisal is not in ENFORCE mode,
ima_write_policy() returns 0 and leads user space applications to an
endless loop. Fix this issue by denying the operation regardless of the
appraisal mode.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.10.x
Fixes: 19f8a84713edc ("ima: measure and appraise the IMA policy itself")
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Struczynski <krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index a71e822a6e92..3efc8308ad26 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -338,8 +338,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL, "policy_update", "signed policy required", 1, 0); - if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) - result = -EACCES; + result = -EACCES; } else { result = ima_parse_add_rule(data); } |