Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux

Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore:
 "A bigger than usual pull request for SELinux, 13 patches (lucky!)
  along with a scary looking diffstat.

  Although if you look a bit closer, excluding the usual minor
  tweaks/fixes, there are really only two significant changes in this
  pull request: the addition of proper SELinux access controls for SCTP
  and the encapsulation of a lot of internal SELinux state.

  The SCTP changes are the result of a multi-month effort (maybe even a
  year or longer?) between the SELinux folks and the SCTP folks to add
  proper SELinux controls. A special thanks go to Richard for seeing
  this through and keeping the effort moving forward.

  The state encapsulation work is a bit of janitorial work that came out
  of some early work on SELinux namespacing. The question of namespacing
  is still an open one, but I believe there is some real value in the
  encapsulation work so we've split that out and are now sending that up
  to you"

* tag 'selinux-pr-20180403' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
  selinux: wrap AVC state
  selinux: wrap selinuxfs state
  selinux: fix handling of uninitialized selinux state in get_bools/classes
  selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentation
  selinux: Fix ltp test connect-syscall failure
  selinux: rename the {is,set}_enforcing() functions
  selinux: wrap global selinux state
  selinux: fix typo in selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone declaration
  selinux: Add SCTP support
  sctp: Add LSM hooks
  sctp: Add ip option support
  security: Add support for SCTP security hooks
  netlabel: If PF_INET6, check sk_buff ip header version

28 files changed, 2311 insertions, 1224 deletions

diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 02d734e69955..af53d2834e20 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1473,6 +1473,7 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established);
 
 int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid)
 {
@@ -1528,6 +1529,27 @@ int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
 
+int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, ep, skb);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request);
+
+int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+			       struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(sctp_bind_connect, 0, sk, optname,
+			     address, addrlen);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect);
+
+void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+			    struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	call_void_hook(sctp_sk_clone, ep, sk, newsk);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone);
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 2380b8d72cec..f3aedf077509 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -82,14 +82,42 @@ struct avc_callback_node {
 	struct avc_callback_node *next;
 };
 
-/* Exported via selinufs */
-unsigned int avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct avc_cache_stats, avc_cache_stats) = { 0 };
 #endif
 
-static struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+struct selinux_avc {
+	unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+	struct avc_cache avc_cache;
+};
+
+static struct selinux_avc selinux_avc;
+
+void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	selinux_avc.avc_cache_threshold = AVC_DEF_CACHE_THRESHOLD;
+	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
+		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots[i]);
+		spin_lock_init(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
+	}
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
+	atomic_set(&selinux_avc.avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
+	*avc = &selinux_avc;
+}
+
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc)
+{
+	return avc->avc_cache_threshold;
+}
+
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     unsigned int cache_threshold)
+{
+	avc->avc_cache_threshold = cache_threshold;
+}
+
 static struct avc_callback_node *avc_callbacks;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_node_cachep;
 static struct kmem_cache *avc_xperms_data_cachep;
@@ -143,13 +171,14 @@ static void avc_dump_av(struct audit_buffer *ab, u16 tclass, u32 av)
  * @tsid: target security identifier
  * @tclass: target security class
  */
-static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	int rc;
 	char *scontext;
 	u32 scontext_len;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(state, ssid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, "ssid=%d", ssid);
 	else {
@@ -157,7 +186,7 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
 		kfree(scontext);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(state, tsid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
 	if (rc)
 		audit_log_format(ab, " tsid=%d", tsid);
 	else {
@@ -176,15 +205,6 @@ static void avc_dump_query(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcla
  */
 void __init avc_init(void)
 {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
-		spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
-	}
-	atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
-	atomic_set(&avc_cache.lru_hint, 0);
-
 	avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node),
 					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node",
@@ -199,7 +219,7 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
 					0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
 
-int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
+int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page)
 {
 	int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
 	struct avc_node *node;
@@ -210,7 +230,7 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 	slots_used = 0;
 	max_chain_len = 0;
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
 		if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
 			slots_used++;
 			chain_len = 0;
@@ -225,7 +245,7 @@ int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)
 
 	return scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "entries: %d\nbuckets used: %d/%d\n"
 			 "longest chain: %d\n",
-			 atomic_read(&avc_cache.active_nodes),
+			 atomic_read(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes),
 			 slots_used, AVC_CACHE_SLOTS, max_chain_len);
 }
 
@@ -462,11 +482,12 @@ static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested,
 	return audited;
 }
 
-static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-				u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
-				struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
-				u8 perm, int result,
-				struct common_audit_data *ad)
+static inline int avc_xperms_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   u32 requested, struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+				   u8 perm, int result,
+				   struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	u32 audited, denied;
 
@@ -474,7 +495,7 @@ static inline int avc_xperms_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			requested, avd, xpd, perm, result, &denied);
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
-	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
 			audited, denied, result, ad, 0);
 }
 
@@ -486,29 +507,30 @@ static void avc_node_free(struct rcu_head *rhead)
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
 }
 
-static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
+static void avc_node_delete(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
 {
 	hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
 	call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
-	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
 
-static void avc_node_kill(struct avc_node *node)
+static void avc_node_kill(struct selinux_avc *avc, struct avc_node *node)
 {
 	avc_xperms_free(node->ae.xp_node);
 	kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(frees);
-	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
 
-static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
+static void avc_node_replace(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
 {
 	hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
 	call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
-	atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
+	atomic_dec(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes);
 }
 
-static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
+static inline int avc_reclaim_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	int hvalue, try, ecx;
@@ -517,16 +539,17 @@ static inline int avc_reclaim_node(void)
 	spinlock_t *lock;
 
 	for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
-		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+		hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.lru_hint) &
+			(AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
 		if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
 			continue;
 
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list) {
-			avc_node_delete(node);
+			avc_node_delete(avc, node);
 			avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
 			ecx++;
 			if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
@@ -542,7 +565,7 @@ out:
 	return ecx;
 }
 
-static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
+static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(struct selinux_avc *avc)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
@@ -553,8 +576,9 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
 	INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
 
-	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
-		avc_reclaim_node();
+	if (atomic_inc_return(&avc->avc_cache.active_nodes) >
+	    avc->avc_cache_threshold)
+		avc_reclaim_node(avc);
 
 out:
 	return node;
@@ -568,14 +592,15 @@ static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tcl
 	memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
 }
 
-static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+					       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
-	head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
 	hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, head, list) {
 		if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
 		    tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
@@ -600,12 +625,13 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
  * then this function returns the avc_node.
  * Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 
 	avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
-	node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	node = avc_search_node(avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
 
 	if (node)
 		return node;
@@ -614,7 +640,8 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
-static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
+static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   int seqno, int is_insert)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 	static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(notif_lock);
@@ -622,14 +649,14 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&notif_lock, flag);
 	if (is_insert) {
-		if (seqno < avc_cache.latest_notif) {
+		if (seqno < avc->avc_cache.latest_notif) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: avc:  seqno %d < latest_notif %d\n",
-			       seqno, avc_cache.latest_notif);
+			       seqno, avc->avc_cache.latest_notif);
 			ret = -EAGAIN;
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (seqno > avc_cache.latest_notif)
-			avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
+		if (seqno > avc->avc_cache.latest_notif)
+			avc->avc_cache.latest_notif = seqno;
 	}
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&notif_lock, flag);
 
@@ -654,18 +681,19 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(int seqno, int is_insert)
  * the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
  * avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
  */
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-				struct av_decision *avd,
-				struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+				   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				   struct av_decision *avd,
+				   struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
 	int hvalue;
 	unsigned long flag;
 
-	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
+	if (avc_latest_notif_update(avc, avd->seqno, 1))
 		goto out;
 
-	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
 	if (node) {
 		struct hlist_head *head;
 		spinlock_t *lock;
@@ -678,15 +706,15 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
 			return NULL;
 		}
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		hlist_for_each_entry(pos, head, list) {
 			if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
 			    pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
 			    pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
-				avc_node_replace(node, pos);
+				avc_node_replace(avc, node, pos);
 				goto found;
 			}
 		}
@@ -724,9 +752,10 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
 	audit_log_format(ab, " ");
-	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
-			   ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
+	avc_dump_query(ab, ad->selinux_audit_data->state,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->ssid,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->tsid,
+		       ad->selinux_audit_data->tclass);
 	if (ad->selinux_audit_data->denied) {
 		audit_log_format(ab, " permissive=%u",
 				 ad->selinux_audit_data->result ? 0 : 1);
@@ -734,10 +763,11 @@ static void avc_audit_post_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
 }
 
 /* This is the slow part of avc audit with big stack footprint */
-noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
-		struct common_audit_data *a,
-		unsigned flags)
+noinline int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+			    u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
+			    struct common_audit_data *a,
+			    unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct common_audit_data stack_data;
 	struct selinux_audit_data sad;
@@ -765,6 +795,7 @@ noinline int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 	sad.audited = audited;
 	sad.denied = denied;
 	sad.result = result;
+	sad.state = state;
 
 	a->selinux_audit_data = &sad;
 
@@ -813,10 +844,11 @@ out:
  * otherwise, this function updates the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
  * will release later by RCU.
  */
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
-			u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
-			struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
-			u32 flags)
+static int avc_update_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			   u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
+			   u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 seqno,
+			   struct extended_perms_decision *xpd,
+			   u32 flags)
 {
 	int hvalue, rc = 0;
 	unsigned long flag;
@@ -824,7 +856,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	spinlock_t *lock;
 
-	node = avc_alloc_node();
+	node = avc_alloc_node(avc);
 	if (!node) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
@@ -833,8 +865,8 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 	/* Lock the target slot */
 	hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
 
-	head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
-	lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+	head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+	lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
 
 	spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 
@@ -850,7 +882,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 
 	if (!orig) {
 		rc = -ENOENT;
-		avc_node_kill(node);
+		avc_node_kill(avc, node);
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
@@ -894,7 +926,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
 		avc_add_xperms_decision(node, xpd);
 		break;
 	}
-	avc_node_replace(node, orig);
+	avc_node_replace(avc, node, orig);
 out_unlock:
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 out:
@@ -904,7 +936,7 @@ out:
 /**
  * avc_flush - Flush the cache
  */
-static void avc_flush(void)
+static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
 {
 	struct hlist_head *head;
 	struct avc_node *node;
@@ -913,8 +945,8 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
-		head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
-		lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+		head = &avc->avc_cache.slots[i];
+		lock = &avc->avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
 
 		spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
 		/*
@@ -923,7 +955,7 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
 		 */
 		rcu_read_lock();
 		hlist_for_each_entry(node, head, list)
-			avc_node_delete(node);
+			avc_node_delete(avc, node);
 		rcu_read_unlock();
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
 	}
@@ -933,12 +965,12 @@ static void avc_flush(void)
  * avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
  * @seqno: policy sequence number
  */
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
+int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno)
 {
 	struct avc_callback_node *c;
 	int rc = 0, tmprc;
 
-	avc_flush();
+	avc_flush(avc);
 
 	for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
 		if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
@@ -950,7 +982,7 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
 		}
 	}
 
-	avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
+	avc_latest_notif_update(avc, seqno, 0);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -963,30 +995,34 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
  * Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just
  * results in a bigger stack frame.
  */
-static noinline struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
-			 struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
+static noinline
+struct avc_node *avc_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+				struct avc_xperms_node *xp_node)
 {
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&xp_node->xpd_head);
-	security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
+	security_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node->xp);
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	return avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
+	return avc_insert(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, xp_node);
 }
 
-static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-				u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned flags,
-				struct av_decision *avd)
+static noinline int avc_denied(struct selinux_state *state,
+			       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			       u8 driver, u8 xperm, unsigned int flags,
+			       struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing && !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
+	if (enforcing_enabled(state) &&
+	    !(avd->flags & AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver, xperm, ssid,
-				tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
+	avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, driver,
+			xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd->seqno, NULL, flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -997,8 +1033,9 @@ static noinline int avc_denied(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * as-is the case with ioctls, then multiple may be chained together and the
  * driver field is used to specify which set contains the permission.
  */
-int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
+int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 xperm, struct common_audit_data *ad)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct av_decision avd;
@@ -1017,9 +1054,9 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
-	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (unlikely(!node)) {
-		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
+		node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd, xp_node);
 	} else {
 		memcpy(&avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(avd));
 		xp_node = node->ae.xp_node;
@@ -1043,11 +1080,12 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			goto decision;
 		}
 		rcu_read_unlock();
-		security_compute_xperms_decision(ssid, tsid, tclass, driver,
-						&local_xpd);
+		security_compute_xperms_decision(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+						 driver, &local_xpd);
 		rcu_read_lock();
-		avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested, driver, xperm,
-				ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno, &local_xpd, 0);
+		avc_update_node(state->avc, AVC_CALLBACK_ADD_XPERMS, requested,
+				driver, xperm, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd.seqno,
+				&local_xpd, 0);
 	} else {
 		avc_quick_copy_xperms_decision(xperm, &local_xpd, xpd);
 	}
@@ -1059,12 +1097,12 @@ int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 decision:
 	denied = requested & ~(avd.allowed);
 	if (unlikely(denied))
-		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, driver, xperm,
-				AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
+		rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+				driver, xperm, AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, &avd);
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 
-	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
+	rc2 = avc_xperms_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,
 			&avd, xpd, xperm, rc, ad);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
@@ -1091,10 +1129,11 @@ decision:
  * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but
  * should be released for the auditing.
  */
-inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-			 unsigned flags,
-			 struct av_decision *avd)
+inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+				u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+				unsigned int flags,
+				struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	struct avc_node *node;
 	struct avc_xperms_node xp_node;
@@ -1105,15 +1144,16 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
 
-	node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
+	node = avc_lookup(state->avc, ssid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (unlikely(!node))
-		node = avc_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
+		node = avc_compute_av(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd, &xp_node);
 	else
 		memcpy(avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*avd));
 
 	denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
 	if (unlikely(denied))
-		rc = avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, flags, avd);
+		rc = avc_denied(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0,
+				flags, avd);
 
 	rcu_read_unlock();
 	return rc;
@@ -1135,39 +1175,43 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
  * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or
  * another -errno upon other errors.
  */
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		 u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc, rc2;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
 
-	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc, auditdata, 0);
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+			auditdata, 0);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-		       u32 requested, struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
 		       int flags)
 {
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	int rc, rc2;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,
+				  &avd);
 
-	rc2 = avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
+	rc2 = avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &avd, rc,
 			auditdata, flags);
 	if (rc2)
 		return rc2;
 	return rc;
 }
 
-u32 avc_policy_seqno(void)
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return avc_cache.latest_notif;
+	return state->avc->avc_cache.latest_notif;
 }
 
 void avc_disable(void)
@@ -1184,7 +1228,7 @@ void avc_disable(void)
 	 * the cache and get that memory back.
 	 */
 	if (avc_node_cachep) {
-		avc_flush();
+		avc_flush(selinux_state.avc);
 		/* kmem_cache_destroy(avc_node_cachep); */
 	}
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 925e546b5a87..0314fc766134 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/udp.h>
 #include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/sctp.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
 #include <linux/quota.h>
 #include <linux/un.h>		/* for Unix socket types */
 #include <net/af_unix.h>	/* for Unix socket types */
@@ -98,20 +100,24 @@
 #include "audit.h"
 #include "avc_ss.h"
 
+struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
 /* SECMARK reference count */
 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-int selinux_enforcing;
+static int selinux_enforcing_boot;
 
 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 {
 	unsigned long enforcing;
 	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
-		selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
+		selinux_enforcing_boot = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 	return 1;
 }
 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
+#else
+#define selinux_enforcing_boot 1
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
@@ -129,6 +135,19 @@ __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 #endif
 
+static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
+	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
+
+static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
+{
+	unsigned long checkreqprot;
+
+	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+		selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
+
 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
 
@@ -145,7 +164,8 @@ static struct kmem_cache *file_security_cache;
  */
 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -160,7 +180,8 @@ static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
  */
 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
 {
-	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
+	return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork() ||
+		netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
 }
 
 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
@@ -264,7 +285,8 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode,
 
 	might_sleep_if(may_sleep);
 
-	if (ss_initialized && isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
+	if (selinux_state.initialized &&
+	    isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) {
 		if (!may_sleep)
 			return -ECHILD;
 
@@ -446,12 +468,14 @@ static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -462,12 +486,14 @@ static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 {
 	const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 	int rc;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			  FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -486,7 +512,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
 		!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs") ||
-		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel &&
+		(selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel() &&
 		 (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup") ||
 		  !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "cgroup2")));
 }
@@ -586,7 +612,7 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 	if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
@@ -617,21 +643,25 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 
 	i = 0;
 	if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state,
+					     sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 		opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 	}
 	if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sbsec->def_sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
@@ -641,7 +671,8 @@ static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 		struct dentry *root = sbsec->sb->s_root;
 		struct inode_security_struct *isec = backing_inode_security(root);
 
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+					     &context, &len);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 		opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
@@ -704,7 +735,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 
 	mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized) {
 		if (!num_opts) {
 			/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 			   after the initial policy is loaded and the security
@@ -750,7 +781,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
-		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -826,7 +859,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
 		 * filesystem type.
 		 */
-		rc = security_fs_use(sb);
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, sb);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING
 				"%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
@@ -851,7 +884,9 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 		}
 		if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
-			rc = security_transition_sid(current_sid(), current_sid(),
+			rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state,
+						     current_sid(),
+						     current_sid(),
 						     SECCLASS_FILE, NULL,
 						     &sbsec->mntpoint_sid);
 			if (rc)
@@ -987,7 +1022,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 	 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 	 * mount options.  thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
 	 */
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized)
 		return 0;
 
 	/*
@@ -1014,7 +1049,7 @@ static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 
 	if (newsbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE &&
 		!(kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS) && !set_context) {
-		rc = security_fs_use(newsb);
+		rc = security_fs_use(&selinux_state, newsb);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -1297,7 +1332,7 @@ static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
 
 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
 {
-	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
+	int extsockclass = selinux_policycap_extsockclass();
 
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_UNIX:
@@ -1471,7 +1506,8 @@ static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
 				path++;
 			}
 		}
-		rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid);
+		rc = security_genfs_sid(&selinux_state, sb->s_type->name,
+					path, tclass, sid);
 	}
 	free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
 	return rc;
@@ -1589,7 +1625,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 			sid = sbsec->def_sid;
 			rc = 0;
 		} else {
-			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
+			rc = security_context_to_sid_default(&selinux_state,
+							     context, rc, &sid,
 							     sbsec->def_sid,
 							     GFP_NOFS);
 			if (rc) {
@@ -1622,7 +1659,8 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
 		sid = sbsec->sid;
 
 		/* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(task_sid, sid, sclass, NULL, &sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, task_sid, sid,
+					     sclass, NULL, &sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		break;
@@ -1740,9 +1778,11 @@ static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
 	if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
-		int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
+		int rc2 = avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad, 0);
 		if (rc2)
 			return rc2;
 	}
@@ -1768,7 +1808,8 @@ static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	sid = cred_sid(cred);
 	isec = inode->i_security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
 }
 
 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
@@ -1841,7 +1882,8 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	ad.u.file = file;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FD,
 				  FD__USE,
 				  &ad);
@@ -1883,7 +1925,8 @@ selinux_determine_inode_label(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 		*_new_isid = tsec->create_sid;
 	} else {
 		const struct inode_security_struct *dsec = inode_security(dir);
-		return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
+		return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
+					       dsec->sid, tclass,
 					       name, _new_isid);
 	}
 
@@ -1910,7 +1953,8 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
 			  &ad);
 	if (rc)
@@ -1921,11 +1965,13 @@ static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    newsid, sbsec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
@@ -1954,7 +2000,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 
 	av = DIR__SEARCH;
 	av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1974,7 +2021,8 @@ static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -1998,16 +2046,19 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
 
 	ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
 			  DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, old_isec->sid,
 			  old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, old_isec->sid,
 				  old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
@@ -2017,13 +2068,15 @@ static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
 	av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
 	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
 		av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
 		new_isec = backing_inode_security(new_dentry);
 		new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, new_isec->sid,
 				  new_isec->sclass,
 				  (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
 		if (rc)
@@ -2043,7 +2096,8 @@ static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
 	sbsec = sb->s_security;
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
 }
 
 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
@@ -2106,7 +2160,8 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
 	u32 av = file_to_av(file);
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm && inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
+	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
 		av |= FILE__OPEN;
 
 	return av;
@@ -2119,7 +2174,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
 	u32 mysid = current_sid();
 	u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
 			    BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2132,13 +2188,15 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
 	int rc;
 
 	if (mysid != fromsid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
 				  BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
 			    NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2148,7 +2206,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
 	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
 	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
 			    NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2167,7 +2226,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FD,
 				  FD__USE,
 				  &ad);
@@ -2185,7 +2245,8 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
 		return 0;
 
 	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
 			    &ad);
 }
 
@@ -2196,21 +2257,25 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
 	u32 csid = task_sid(child);
 
 	if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
-		return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, csid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    task_sid(parent), current_sid(), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(target), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETCAP, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2219,7 +2284,8 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
 			  const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
 			  const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    cred_sid(old), cred_sid(new), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETCAP, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2279,18 +2345,21 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type)
 	switch (type) {
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL:	/* Read last kernel messages */
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER:	/* Return size of the log buffer */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ, NULL);
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF:	/* Disable logging to console */
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON:	/* Enable logging to console */
 	/* Set level of messages printed to console */
 	case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE,
 				    NULL);
 	}
 	/* All other syslog types */
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 			    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -2351,13 +2420,14 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	 * policy allows the corresponding permission between
 	 * the old and new contexts.
 	 */
-	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition) {
+	if (selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition()) {
 		av = 0;
 		if (nnp)
 			av |= PROCESS2__NNP_TRANSITION;
 		if (nosuid)
 			av |= PROCESS2__NOSUID_TRANSITION;
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_PROCESS2, av, NULL);
 		if (!rc)
 			return 0;
@@ -2368,7 +2438,8 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
 	 * i.e. SIDs that are guaranteed to only be allowed a subset
 	 * of the permissions of the current SID.
 	 */
-	rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
+	rc = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					 new_tsec->sid);
 	if (!rc)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -2420,8 +2491,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 			return rc;
 	} else {
 		/* Check for a default transition on this program. */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
-					     SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, old_tsec->sid,
+					     isec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
 					     &new_tsec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
@@ -2439,25 +2510,29 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	ad.u.file = bprm->file;
 
 	if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	} else {
 		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
-		rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 
 		/* Check for shared state */
 		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
 					  NULL);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2469,7 +2544,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) {
 			u32 ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
 			if (ptsid != 0) {
-				rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
+				rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+						  ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
 						  SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 						  PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 				if (rc)
@@ -2483,7 +2559,8 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 		/* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
 		   the noatsecure permission is granted between
 		   the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__NOATSECURE,
 				  NULL);
 		bprm->secureexec |= !!rc;
@@ -2575,7 +2652,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
 	 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
 	 */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			  PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
 	if (rc) {
 		/* protect against do_prlimit() */
@@ -2615,7 +2693,8 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
 	 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
 	 */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
 	if (rc) {
 		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS)) {
 			memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
@@ -2779,7 +2858,9 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 
 		if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
 			continue;
-		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(mount_options[i], &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state,
+						 mount_options[i], &sid,
+						 GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (rc) {
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid"
 			       "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
@@ -2904,7 +2985,8 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
+				       ctxlen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
@@ -2958,14 +3040,15 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 		isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
 	}
 
-	if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
+	if (!selinux_state.initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	if (name)
 		*name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
 
 	if (value && len) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
+						   &context, &clen);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 		*value = context;
@@ -3040,7 +3123,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	if (IS_ERR(isec))
 		return PTR_ERR(isec);
 
-	return avc_has_perm_flags(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
+	return avc_has_perm_flags(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, FILE__READ, &ad,
 				  rcu ? MAY_NOT_BLOCK : 0);
 }
 
@@ -3056,7 +3140,8 @@ static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
 	ad.u.inode = inode;
 
-	rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
+	rc = slow_avc_audit(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
 			    audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
@@ -3094,7 +3179,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	if (IS_ERR(isec))
 		return PTR_ERR(isec);
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
 	audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
 				     from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
 				     &denied);
@@ -3126,7 +3212,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
 			ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
 		return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
 
-	if (selinux_policycap_openperm &&
+	if (selinux_policycap_openperm() &&
 	    inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC &&
 	    (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) &&
 	    !(ia_valid & ATTR_FILE))
@@ -3183,12 +3269,14 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 	ad.u.dentry = dentry;
 
 	isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL) {
 		if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
 			struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -3213,22 +3301,25 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 
 			return rc;
 		}
-		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+		rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value,
+						   size, &newsid);
 	}
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
 			  FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
-					  isec->sclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition(&selinux_state, isec->sid, newsid,
+					  sid, isec->sclass);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(newsid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    newsid,
 			    sbsec->sid,
 			    SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 			    FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
@@ -3249,7 +3340,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		return;
 	}
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid_force(&selinux_state, value, size,
+					   &newsid);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
 		       "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
@@ -3324,10 +3416,12 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void
 	 */
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (has_cap_mac_admin(false))
-		error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
+		error = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state,
+						      isec->sid, &context,
 						      &size);
 	else
-		error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
+		error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, isec->sid,
+						&context, &size);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	error = size;
@@ -3353,7 +3447,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	if (!value || !size)
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size, &newsid,
+				     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -3442,7 +3537,7 @@ static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
 
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
 	if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
-	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
+	    fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state))
 		/* No change since file_open check. */
 		return 0;
 
@@ -3482,7 +3577,8 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 	ad.u.op->path = file->f_path;
 
 	if (ssid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  ssid, fsec->sid,
 				SECCLASS_FD,
 				FD__USE,
 				&ad);
@@ -3494,8 +3590,9 @@ static int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
 		return 0;
 
 	isec = inode_security(inode);
-	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
-			requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
+	rc = avc_has_extended_perms(&selinux_state,
+				    ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
+				    requested, driver, xperm, &ad);
 out:
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -3563,7 +3660,8 @@ static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared
 		 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
 		 * This has an additional check.
 		 */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				  PROCESS__EXECMEM, NULL);
 		if (rc)
 			goto error;
@@ -3593,7 +3691,8 @@ static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
 
 	if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
 		u32 sid = current_sid();
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
 				  MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
 	}
 
@@ -3615,7 +3714,7 @@ static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			return rc;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 	return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
@@ -3629,7 +3728,7 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 	u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
 
-	if (selinux_checkreqprot)
+	if (selinux_state.checkreqprot)
 		prot = reqprot;
 
 	if (default_noexec &&
@@ -3637,13 +3736,15 @@ static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
 		int rc = 0;
 		if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
 		    vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					  PROCESS__EXECHEAP, NULL);
 		} else if (!vma->vm_file &&
 			   ((vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
 			     vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) ||
 			    vma_is_stack_for_current(vma))) {
-			rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					  sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					  PROCESS__EXECSTACK, NULL);
 		} else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
 			/*
@@ -3735,7 +3836,8 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	else
 		perm = signal_to_av(signum);
 
-	return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    fsec->fown_sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3761,7 +3863,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 	 * struct as its SID.
 	 */
 	fsec->isid = isec->sid;
-	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
+	fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(&selinux_state);
 	/*
 	 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
 	 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
@@ -3780,7 +3882,8 @@ static int selinux_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task,
 {
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__FORK, NULL);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3854,7 +3957,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, secid,
 			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
 			   KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
 			   NULL);
@@ -3878,7 +3982,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, isec->sid,
 			   SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
 			   KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
 			   NULL);
@@ -3895,7 +4000,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
 	ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
 			    SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -3909,7 +4015,8 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 
 	/* init_module */
 	if (file == NULL)
-		return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    sid, sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
 					SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, NULL);
 
 	/* finit_module */
@@ -3919,13 +4026,15 @@ static int selinux_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
 
 	fsec = file->f_security;
 	if (sid != fsec->sid) {
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, fsec->sid, SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, &ad);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
 
 	isec = inode_security(file_inode(file));
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
 				SYSTEM__MODULE_LOAD, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -3947,19 +4056,22 @@ static int selinux_kernel_read_file(struct file *file,
 
 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETPGID, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETPGID, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3970,19 +4082,22 @@ static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -3997,7 +4112,8 @@ static int selinux_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcre
 		av |= PROCESS__SETRLIMIT;
 	if (flags & LSM_PRLIMIT_READ)
 		av |= PROCESS__GETRLIMIT;
-	return avc_has_perm(cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    cred_sid(cred), cred_sid(tcred),
 			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, av, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -4011,7 +4127,8 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 	   later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
 	   upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
 	if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p),
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), task_sid(p),
 				    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT, NULL);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -4019,19 +4136,22 @@ static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
 
 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__GETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
 {
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 			    PROCESS__SETSCHED, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -4046,7 +4166,8 @@ static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
 		perm = signal_to_av(sig);
 	if (!secid)
 		secid = current_sid();
-	return avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    secid, task_sid(p), SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
@@ -4134,6 +4255,23 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		break;
 	}
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
+			break;
+
+		offset += ihlen;
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -4207,6 +4345,19 @@ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		break;
 	}
 
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IP_SCTP)
+	case IPPROTO_SCTP: {
+		struct sctphdr _sctph, *sh;
+
+		sh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_sctph), &_sctph);
+		if (sh == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		ad->u.net->sport = sh->source;
+		ad->u.net->dport = sh->dest;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	/* includes fragments */
 	default:
 		break;
@@ -4287,7 +4438,8 @@ static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 	if (unlikely(err))
 		return -EACCES;
 
-	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
+	err = security_net_peersid_resolve(&selinux_state, nlbl_sid,
+					   nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING
 		       "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
@@ -4315,7 +4467,8 @@ static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
 	int err = 0;
 
 	if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
-		err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
+		err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sk_sid, skb_sid,
+					    conn_sid);
 	else
 		*conn_sid = sk_sid;
 
@@ -4332,8 +4485,8 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
-				       socksid);
+	return security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
+				       secclass, NULL, socksid);
 }
 
 static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
@@ -4349,7 +4502,8 @@ static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = sk;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
@@ -4369,7 +4523,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
@@ -4396,6 +4551,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
 		sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
 		sksec->sclass = sclass;
 		sksec->sid = sid;
+		/* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */
+		if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+			sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET;
+
 		err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
 	}
 
@@ -4416,11 +4575,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	/*
-	 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
-	 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
-	 * check the first address now.
-	 */
+	/* If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. */
 	family = sk->sk_family;
 	if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
 		char *addrp;
@@ -4432,22 +4587,35 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, node_perm;
 
-		if (family == PF_INET) {
-			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
-				err = -EINVAL;
-				goto out;
-			}
+		/*
+		 * sctp_bindx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple binding addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		switch (address->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				return -EINVAL;
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
-		} else {
-			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) {
-				err = -EINVAL;
-				goto out;
-			}
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+				return -EINVAL;
 			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
 			addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 */
+			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			else
+				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 		}
 
 		if (snum) {
@@ -4465,7 +4633,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 				ad.u.net = &net;
 				ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 				ad.u.net->family = family;
-				err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+				err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+						   sksec->sid, sid,
 						   sksec->sclass,
 						   SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
 				if (err)
@@ -4486,6 +4655,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 			node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
 
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			node_perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
+			break;
+
 		default:
 			node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
 			break;
@@ -4500,12 +4673,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
 		ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = family;
 
-		if (family == PF_INET)
+		if (address->sa_family == AF_INET)
 			ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
 		else
 			ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
 
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->sid, sid,
 				   sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
@@ -4514,7 +4688,11 @@ out:
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+/* This supports connect(2) and SCTP connect services such as sctp_connectx(3)
+ * and sctp_sendmsg(3) as described in Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.txt
+ */
+static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock,
+					 struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
 {
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
@@ -4525,10 +4703,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		return err;
 
 	/*
-	 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
+	 * If a TCP, DCCP or SCTP socket, check name_connect permission
+	 * for the port.
 	 */
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
-	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET) {
 		struct common_audit_data ad;
 		struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
 		struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
@@ -4536,38 +4716,75 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
 		unsigned short snum;
 		u32 sid, perm;
 
-		if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+		/* sctp_connectx(3) calls via selinux_sctp_bind_connect()
+		 * that validates multiple connect addresses. Because of this
+		 * need to check address->sa_family as it is possible to have
+		 * sk->sk_family = PF_INET6 with addr->sa_family = AF_INET.
+		 */
+		switch (address->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
 			addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
 			if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
 				return -EINVAL;
 			snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
-		} else {
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
 			addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
 			if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Note that SCTP services expect -EINVAL, whereas
+			 * others expect -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+			 */
+			if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
+				return -EINVAL;
+			else
+				return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
 		}
 
 		err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
 		if (err)
-			goto out;
+			return err;
 
-		perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
-		       TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+		switch (sksec->sclass) {
+		case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
+			perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		case SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET:
+			perm = SCTP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
+			break;
+		}
 
 		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
 		ad.u.net = &net;
 		ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
 		ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
 		if (err)
-			goto out;
+			return err;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
+	return 0;
+}
 
-out:
-	return err;
+/* Supports connect(2), see comments in selinux_socket_connect_helper() */
+static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+				  struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+	err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, address, addrlen);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
 }
 
 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
@@ -4660,7 +4877,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = other;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
 			   sksec_other->sclass,
 			   UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
 	if (err)
@@ -4668,8 +4886,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
 
 	/* server child socket */
 	sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
-	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
-				    &sksec_new->sid);
+	err = security_sid_mls_copy(&selinux_state, sksec_other->sid,
+				    sksec_sock->sid, &sksec_new->sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4691,7 +4909,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
 	ad.u.net = &net;
 	ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
 			    &ad);
 }
 
@@ -4706,7 +4925,8 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
 	err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   peer_sid, if_sid,
 			   SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -4714,7 +4934,8 @@ static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
 	err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    peer_sid, node_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
@@ -4737,7 +4958,8 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return err;
 
 	if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
@@ -4774,7 +4996,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -4802,7 +5024,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
 			return err;
 		}
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
 				   PEER__RECV, &ad);
 		if (err) {
 			selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
@@ -4811,7 +5034,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	if (secmark_active) {
-		err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
 				   PACKET__RECV, &ad);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
@@ -4830,12 +5054,14 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *op
 	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
 	if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
-	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
+	    sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET)
 		peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
 	if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
 		return -ENOPROTOOPT;
 
-	err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
+	err = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, peer_sid, &scontext,
+				      &scontext_len);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
@@ -4943,6 +5169,172 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
 	sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
 }
 
+/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming
+ * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association
+ * already present).
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				      struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct common_audit_data ad;
+	struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
+	u8 peerlbl_active;
+	u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	u32 conn_sid;
+	int err = 0;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
+
+	if (peerlbl_active) {
+		/* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are
+		 * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve().
+		 */
+		err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, ep->base.sk->sk_family,
+					      &peer_sid);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
+			peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
+	}
+
+	if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) {
+		sksec->sctp_assoc_state = SCTP_ASSOC_SET;
+
+		/* Here as first association on socket. As the peer SID
+		 * was allowed by peer recv (and the netif/node checks),
+		 * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary
+		 * peer SID for getpeercon(3).
+		 */
+		sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid;
+	} else if  (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) {
+		/* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce
+		 * consistency among the peer SIDs.
+		 */
+		ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
+		ad.u.net = &net;
+		ad.u.net->sk = ep->base.sk;
+		err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass,
+				   SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store
+	 * the information in ep. This will be used by SCTP TCP type
+	 * sockets and peeled off connections as they cause a new
+	 * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then
+	 * plug this into the new socket.
+	 */
+	err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	ep->secid = conn_sid;
+	ep->peer_secid = peer_sid;
+
+	/* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */
+	return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(ep, skb);
+}
+
+/* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting
+ * based on their @optname.
+ */
+static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname,
+				     struct sockaddr *address,
+				     int addrlen)
+{
+	int len, err = 0, walk_size = 0;
+	void *addr_buf;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct socket *sock;
+
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Process one or more addresses that may be IPv4 or IPv6 */
+	sock = sk->sk_socket;
+	addr_buf = address;
+
+	while (walk_size < addrlen) {
+		addr = addr_buf;
+		switch (addr->sa_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		}
+
+		err = -EINVAL;
+		switch (optname) {
+		/* Bind checks */
+		case SCTP_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SET_PEER_PRIMARY_ADDR:
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_BINDX_ADD:
+			err = selinux_socket_bind(sock, addr, len);
+			break;
+		/* Connect checks */
+		case SCTP_SOCKOPT_CONNECTX:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
+		case SCTP_PARAM_ADD_IP:
+		case SCTP_SENDMSG_CONNECT:
+			err = selinux_socket_connect_helper(sock, addr, len);
+			if (err)
+				return err;
+
+			/* As selinux_sctp_bind_connect() is called by the
+			 * SCTP protocol layer, the socket is already locked,
+			 * therefore selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked() is
+			 * is called here. The situations handled are:
+			 * sctp_connectx(3), sctp_sendmsg(3), sendmsg(2),
+			 * whenever a new IP address is added or when a new
+			 * primary address is selected.
+			 * Note that an SCTP connect(2) call happens before
+			 * the SCTP protocol layer and is handled via
+			 * selinux_socket_connect().
+			 */
+			err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
+		addr_buf += len;
+		walk_size += len;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3). */
+static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sock *sk,
+				  struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	/* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call
+	 * the non-sctp clone version.
+	 */
+	if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass())
+		return selinux_sk_clone_security(sk, newsk);
+
+	newsksec->sid = ep->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = ep->peer_secid;
+	newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
+	selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(sk, newsk);
+}
+
 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				     struct request_sock *req)
 {
@@ -5001,7 +5393,9 @@ static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
 	__tsec = current_security();
 	tsid = __tsec->sid;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO,
+			    NULL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
@@ -5049,7 +5443,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
 	 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
 	 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
 			    NULL);
 }
 
@@ -5057,7 +5452,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
 	struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
 			    TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -5085,11 +5481,13 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
 	u32 sid = current_sid();
 	int err;
 
-	err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
 			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
-	err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
+	err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
 			   TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -5120,7 +5518,8 @@ static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			       sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type,
 			       secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name,
 			       task_pid_nr(current), current->comm);
-			if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
+			if (!enforcing_enabled(&selinux_state) ||
+			    security_get_allow_unknown(&selinux_state))
 				err = 0;
 		}
 
@@ -5150,7 +5549,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	u8 netlbl_active;
 	u8 peerlbl_active;
 
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return NF_ACCEPT;
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -5179,7 +5578,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	}
 
 	if (secmark_active)
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP;
 
@@ -5291,7 +5691,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
-		if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
@@ -5319,7 +5720,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
 	 * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
 	 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
-	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
+	if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
 		return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
 
 	secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
@@ -5414,7 +5815,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return NF_DROP;
 
 	if (secmark_active)
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, skb->secmark,
 				 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
@@ -5424,13 +5826,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
 
 		if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, if_sid,
 				 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 
 		if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
 			return NF_DROP;
-		if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
+		if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				 peer_sid, node_sid,
 				 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
 			return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
 	}
@@ -5518,7 +5922,8 @@ static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
 }
 
 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
@@ -5548,7 +5953,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 			  MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc) {
 		ipc_free_security(msq);
@@ -5573,7 +5979,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 			    MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -5586,7 +5993,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd)
 	case IPC_INFO:
 	case MSG_INFO:
 		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case MSG_STAT:
@@ -5625,8 +6033,8 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
 		 * Compute new sid based on current process and
 		 * message queue this message will be stored in
 		 */
-		rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
-					     NULL, &msec->sid);
+		rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, sid, isec->sid,
+					     SECCLASS_MSG, NULL, &msec->sid);
 		if (rc)
 			return rc;
 	}
@@ -5635,15 +6043,18 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
 
 	/* Can this process write to the queue? */
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 			  MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
 		/* Can this process send the message */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
 				  MSG__SEND, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
 		/* Can the message be put in the queue? */
-		rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
 				  MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
 
 	return rc;
@@ -5665,10 +6076,12 @@ static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *m
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = msq->key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid,
 			  SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
 	if (!rc)
-		rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
+		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				  sid, msec->sid,
 				  SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -5690,7 +6103,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
 			  SHM__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc) {
 		ipc_free_security(shp);
@@ -5715,7 +6129,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = shp->key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
 			    SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -5729,7 +6144,8 @@ static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd)
 	case IPC_INFO:
 	case SHM_INFO:
 		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case IPC_STAT:
 	case SHM_STAT:
@@ -5783,7 +6199,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
 			  SEM__CREATE, &ad);
 	if (rc) {
 		ipc_free_security(sma);
@@ -5808,7 +6225,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg)
 	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
 	ad.u.ipc_id = sma->key;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
 			    SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
 }
 
@@ -5822,7 +6240,8 @@ static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd)
 	case IPC_INFO:
 	case SEM_INFO:
 		/* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
-		return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
+		return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				    current_sid(), SECINITSID_KERNEL,
 				    SECCLASS_SYSTEM, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO, NULL);
 	case GETPID:
 	case GETNCNT:
@@ -5908,7 +6327,8 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	__tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
 
 	if (current != p) {
-		error = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     current_sid(), __tsec->sid,
 				     SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__GETATTR, NULL);
 		if (error)
 			goto bad;
@@ -5935,7 +6355,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
 	if (!sid)
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
+	error = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, sid, value, &len);
 	if (error)
 		return error;
 	return len;
@@ -5957,19 +6377,24 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 	 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
 	 */
 	if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
 	else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
 	else
 		error = -EINVAL;
@@ -5982,7 +6407,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 			str[size-1] = 0;
 			size--;
 		}
-		error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+		error = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, value, size,
+						&sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 			if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
 				struct audit_buffer *ab;
@@ -6001,8 +6427,9 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 
 				return error;
 			}
-			error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
-							      &sid);
+			error = security_context_to_sid_force(
+						      &selinux_state,
+						      value, size, &sid);
 		}
 		if (error)
 			return error;
@@ -6024,7 +6451,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 	} else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
 		tsec->create_sid = sid;
 	} else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
-		error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     mysid, sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE,
 				     NULL);
 		if (error)
 			goto abort_change;
@@ -6039,13 +6467,15 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 		/* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
 		error = -EPERM;
 		if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
-			error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
+			error = security_bounded_transition(&selinux_state,
+							    tsec->sid, sid);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
 		}
 
 		/* Check permissions for the transition. */
-		error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+		error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				     tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 				     PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
 		if (error)
 			goto abort_change;
@@ -6054,7 +6484,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
 		   Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
 		ptsid = ptrace_parent_sid();
 		if (ptsid != 0) {
-			error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
+			error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+					     ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
 					     PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 			if (error)
 				goto abort_change;
@@ -6081,12 +6512,14 @@ static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
 
 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
+	return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid,
+				       secdata, seclen);
 }
 
 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	return security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, secdata, seclen,
+				       secid, GFP_KERNEL);
 }
 
 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
@@ -6178,7 +6611,8 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
 	key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
 	ksec = key->security;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
 }
 
 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
@@ -6188,7 +6622,8 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
 	unsigned len;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, ksec->sid,
+				     &context, &len);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = len;
 	*_buffer = context;
@@ -6213,7 +6648,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_pkey_access(void *ib_sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_val)
 	ibpkey.subnet_prefix = subnet_prefix;
 	ibpkey.pkey = pkey_val;
 	ad.u.ibpkey = &ibpkey;
-	return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sec->sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_PKEY,
 			    INFINIBAND_PKEY__ACCESS, &ad);
 }
@@ -6227,7 +6663,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
 	struct ib_security_struct *sec = ib_sec;
 	struct lsm_ibendport_audit ibendport;
 
-	err = security_ib_endport_sid(dev_name, port_num, &sid);
+	err = security_ib_endport_sid(&selinux_state, dev_name, port_num,
+				      &sid);
 
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -6236,7 +6673,8 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name,
 	strncpy(ibendport.dev_name, dev_name, sizeof(ibendport.dev_name));
 	ibendport.port = port_num;
 	ad.u.ibendport = &ibendport;
-	return avc_has_perm(sec->sid, sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sec->sid, sid,
 			    SECCLASS_INFINIBAND_ENDPORT,
 			    INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad);
 }
@@ -6269,11 +6707,13 @@ static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr,
 
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case BPF_MAP_CREATE:
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE,
 				   NULL);
 		break;
 	case BPF_PROG_LOAD:
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD,
 				   NULL);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -6313,14 +6753,16 @@ static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid)
 	if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) {
 		map = file->private_data;
 		bpfsec = map->security;
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 				   bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	} else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) {
 		prog = file->private_data;
 		bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
-		ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+		ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				   sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 				   BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
@@ -6334,7 +6776,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
 	bpfsec = map->security;
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 			    bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL);
 }
 
@@ -6344,7 +6787,8 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog)
 	struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec;
 
 	bpfsec = prog->aux->security;
-	return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF,
 			    BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL);
 }
 
@@ -6563,6 +7007,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established),
@@ -6638,6 +7085,12 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
 
+	memset(&selinux_state, 0, sizeof(selinux_state));
+	enforcing_set(&selinux_state, selinux_enforcing_boot);
+	selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
+	selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
+	selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
+
 	/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
 	cred_init_security();
 
@@ -6651,6 +7104,12 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 					    0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 	avc_init();
 
+	avtab_cache_init();
+
+	ebitmap_cache_init();
+
+	hashtab_cache_init();
+
 	security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
 
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
@@ -6659,7 +7118,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
 	if (avc_add_callback(selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
 		panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC LSM notifier callback\n");
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing)
+	if (selinux_enforcing_boot)
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
 	else
 		printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
@@ -6780,23 +7239,22 @@ static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
-static int selinux_disabled;
-
-int selinux_disable(void)
+int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	if (ss_initialized) {
+	if (state->initialized) {
 		/* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (selinux_disabled) {
+	if (state->disabled) {
 		/* Only do this once. */
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	state->disabled = 1;
+
 	printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
 
-	selinux_disabled = 1;
 	selinux_enabled = 0;
 
 	security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks));
diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
index e3614ee5f1c0..0a4b89d48297 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c
@@ -152,7 +152,8 @@ static int sel_ib_pkey_sid_slow(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *sid)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(subnet_prefix, pkey_num, sid);
+	ret = security_ib_pkey_sid(&selinux_state, subnet_prefix, pkey_num,
+				   sid);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
index 57d61cf36500..ef899bcfd2cb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h
@@ -20,12 +20,6 @@
 #include "av_permissions.h"
 #include "security.h"
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
-extern int selinux_enforcing;
-#else
-#define selinux_enforcing 1
-#endif
-
 /*
  * An entry in the AVC.
  */
@@ -58,6 +52,7 @@ struct selinux_audit_data {
 	u32 audited;
 	u32 denied;
 	int result;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -102,7 +97,8 @@ static inline u32 avc_audit_required(u32 requested,
 	return audited;
 }
 
-int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int slow_avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+		   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 		   u32 requested, u32 audited, u32 denied, int result,
 		   struct common_audit_data *a,
 		   unsigned flags);
@@ -127,7 +123,8 @@ int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
  * be performed under a lock, to allow the lock to be released
  * before calling the auditing code.
  */
-static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+static inline int avc_audit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			    u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			    struct av_decision *avd,
 			    int result,
@@ -138,31 +135,35 @@ static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 	audited = avc_audit_required(requested, avd, result, 0, &denied);
 	if (likely(!audited))
 		return 0;
-	return slow_avc_audit(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+	return slow_avc_audit(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
 			      requested, audited, denied, result,
 			      a, flags);
 }
 
 #define AVC_STRICT 1 /* Ignore permissive mode. */
 #define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2	/* update extended permissions */
-int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 			 unsigned flags,
 			 struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_has_perm(struct selinux_state *state,
+		 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		 u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 		 struct common_audit_data *auditdata);
-int avc_has_perm_flags(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+int avc_has_perm_flags(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 		       u16 tclass, u32 requested,
 		       struct common_audit_data *auditdata,
 		       int flags);
 
-int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
-		u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
+int avc_has_extended_perms(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,
+			   u8 driver, u8 perm, struct common_audit_data *ad);
 
 
-u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
+u32 avc_policy_seqno(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT		1
 #define AVC_CALLBACK_TRY_REVOKE		2
@@ -177,8 +178,11 @@ u32 avc_policy_seqno(void);
 int avc_add_callback(int (*callback)(u32 event), u32 events);
 
 /* Exported to selinuxfs */
-int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page);
-extern unsigned int avc_cache_threshold;
+struct selinux_avc;
+int avc_get_hash_stats(struct selinux_avc *avc, char *page);
+unsigned int avc_get_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc);
+void avc_set_cache_threshold(struct selinux_avc *avc,
+			     unsigned int cache_threshold);
 
 /* Attempt to free avc node cache */
 void avc_disable(void);
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
index 3bcc72769b87..88c384c5c09e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
 
 #include "flask.h"
 
-int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno);
+struct selinux_avc;
+int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno);
 
 /* Class/perm mapping support */
 struct security_class_mapping {
@@ -19,11 +20,5 @@ struct security_class_mapping {
 
 extern struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[];
 
-/*
- * The security server must be initialized before
- * any labeling or access decisions can be provided.
- */
-extern int ss_initialized;
-
 #endif /* _SELINUX_AVC_SS_H_ */
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index acdee7795297..7f0372426494 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
 	  { COMMON_CAP2_PERMS, NULL } },
 	{ "sctp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
-	    "node_bind", NULL } },
+	    "node_bind", "name_connect", "association", NULL } },
 	{ "icmp_socket",
 	  { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS,
 	    "node_bind", NULL } },
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
index ff4fddca9050..0e30eca02c48 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -13,10 +13,15 @@
 #ifndef _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
 #define _SELINUX_CONDITIONAL_H_
 
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+#include "security.h"
 
-int security_set_bools(int len, int *values);
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values);
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int index);
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int len, int *values);
+
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index);
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index e77a5e307955..8671de09c363 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/request_sock.h>
+#include <net/sctp/structs.h>
 
 #include "avc.h"
 #include "objsec.h"
@@ -52,9 +53,11 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 				 u16 family,
 				 u32 sid);
-
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family);
 void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family);
 int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 				struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 				     int level,
 				     int optname);
 int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr);
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr);
 
 #else
 static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
@@ -113,6 +118,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_conn_setsid(struct sock *sk,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+						    struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req,
 						   u16 family)
 {
@@ -122,6 +132,11 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 {
 	return;
 }
+static inline void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	return;
+}
 static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk,
 						    u16 family)
 {
@@ -145,6 +160,11 @@ static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk,
 {
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+						       struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
 
 #endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
index 3d54468ce334..cc5e26b0161b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h
@@ -130,6 +130,10 @@ struct sk_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;			/* SID of this object */
 	u32 peer_sid;			/* SID of peer */
 	u16 sclass;			/* sock security class */
+	enum {				/* SCTP association state */
+		SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET = 0,
+		SCTP_ASSOC_SET,
+	} sctp_assoc_state;
 };
 
 struct tun_security_struct {
@@ -154,6 +158,4 @@ struct bpf_security_struct {
 	u32 sid;  /*SID of bpf obj creater*/
 };
 
-extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot;
-
 #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index 02f0412d42f2..23e762d529fa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #include <linux/dcache.h>
 #include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/refcount.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 #include "flask.h"
 
 #define SECSID_NULL			0x00000000 /* unspecified SID */
@@ -81,13 +83,6 @@ enum {
 
 extern char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
 
-extern int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
-extern int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-extern int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
-extern int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
-extern int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
-extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
-
 /*
  * type_datum properties
  * available at the kernel policy version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
@@ -98,13 +93,98 @@ extern int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
 /* limitation of boundary depth  */
 #define POLICYDB_BOUNDS_MAXDEPTH	4
 
-int security_mls_enabled(void);
+struct selinux_avc;
+struct selinux_ss;
+
+struct selinux_state {
+	bool disabled;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+	bool enforcing;
+#endif
+	bool checkreqprot;
+	bool initialized;
+	bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+	struct selinux_avc *avc;
+	struct selinux_ss *ss;
+};
+
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss);
+void selinux_avc_init(struct selinux_avc **avc);
+
+extern struct selinux_state selinux_state;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return state->enforcing;
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+	state->enforcing = value;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool enforcing_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
+{
+	return true;
+}
+
+static inline void enforcing_set(struct selinux_state *state, bool value)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM];
+}
 
-int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len);
-int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len);
-size_t security_policydb_len(void);
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS];
+}
 
-int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap);
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL];
+}
+
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
+{
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+	return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION];
+}
+
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void *data, size_t len);
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len);
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state);
+
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap);
 
 #define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
 struct av_decision {
@@ -141,76 +221,100 @@ struct extended_perms {
 /* definitions of av_decision.flags */
 #define AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE	0x0001
 
-void security_compute_av(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
 			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
-void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
-			 u8 driver, struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
 
-void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-			     u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			      u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd);
 
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_member_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_change_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
-	u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+			u16 tclass, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext,
-	u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+			    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
-int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len);
 
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 			    u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
-int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *out_sid, gfp_t gfp);
 
-int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *out_sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags);
 
-int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				  u32 *sid);
 
-int security_get_user_sids(u32 callsid, char *username,
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 callsid, char *username,
 			   u32 **sids, u32 *nel);
 
-int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid);
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid);
 
-int security_node_sid(u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
-	u32 *out_sid);
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain, void *addr, u32 addrlen,
+		      u32 *out_sid);
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 tclass);
 
-int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				      u16 tclass);
 
-int security_bounded_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 oldsid, u32 newsid);
 
-int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid);
 
-int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 xfrm_sid,
 				 u32 *peer_sid);
 
-int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses);
-int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
-int security_get_reject_unknown(void);
-int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses);
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms);
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR		1 /* use xattr */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS		2 /* use transition SIDs, e.g. devpts/tmpfs */
@@ -221,27 +325,31 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void);
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE		7 /* use native label support */
 #define SECURITY_FS_USE_MAX		7 /* Highest SECURITY_FS_USE_XXX */
 
-int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb);
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb);
 
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
-	u32 *sid);
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass,
+		       u32 *sid);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 				   u32 *sid);
 
-int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid,
 				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
-static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(
+static inline int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
 					    struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 					    u32 *sid)
 {
 	return -EIDRM;
 }
 
-static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid,
-					   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+					 u32 sid,
+					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOENT;
 }
@@ -252,7 +360,7 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
 /*
  * status notifier using mmap interface
  */
-extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void);
+extern struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state);
 
 #define SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION	1
 struct selinux_kernel_status {
@@ -266,10 +374,12 @@ struct selinux_kernel_status {
 	 */
 } __packed;
 
-extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing);
-extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno);
+extern void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int enforcing);
+extern void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+					     int seqno);
 extern void selinux_complete_init(void);
-extern int selinux_disable(void);
+extern int selinux_disable(struct selinux_state *state);
 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
 extern struct path selinux_null;
 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
@@ -277,5 +387,8 @@ extern void selnl_notify_setenforce(int val);
 extern void selnl_notify_policyload(u32 seqno);
 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
 
-#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
+extern void avtab_cache_init(void);
+extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
+extern void hashtab_cache_init(void);
 
+#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/netif.c b/security/selinux/netif.c
index e607b4473ef6..ac65f7417413 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netif.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netif.c
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ static int sel_netif_sid_slow(struct net *ns, int ifindex, u32 *sid)
 		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	ret = security_netif_sid(dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
+	ret = security_netif_sid(&selinux_state, dev->name, &new->nsec.sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
 	new->nsec.ns = ns;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 2c297b995b16..186e727b737b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(secattr, sid);
+	rc = security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(&selinux_state, secattr, sid);
 	if (rc == 0 &&
 	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
 	    (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
@@ -90,7 +90,8 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk)
 	secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (secattr == NULL)
 		return NULL;
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sksec->sid,
+					    secattr);
 	if (rc != 0) {
 		netlbl_secattr_free(secattr);
 		return NULL;
@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
 	if (sk != NULL) {
 		struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
 		if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB)
 			return 0;
 		secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(sk, sid);
@@ -256,7 +258,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (secattr == NULL) {
 		secattr = &secattr_storage;
 		netlbl_secattr_init(secattr);
-		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sid, secattr);
+		rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, sid,
+						    secattr);
 		if (rc != 0)
 			goto skbuff_setsid_return;
 	}
@@ -270,6 +273,62 @@ skbuff_setsid_return:
 }
 
 /**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request - Label an incoming sctp association.
+ * @ep: incoming association endpoint.
+ * @skb: the packet.
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * A new incoming connection is represented by @ep, ......
+ * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
+				     struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security;
+	struct sockaddr *addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+
+	if (ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET &&
+				ep->base.sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state,
+					    ep->secid, &secattr);
+	if (rc != 0)
+		goto assoc_request_return;
+
+	/* Move skb hdr address info to a struct sockaddr and then call
+	 * netlbl_conn_setattr().
+	 */
+	if (ip_hdr(skb)->version == 4) {
+		addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr4;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+	} else {
+		addr6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		addr6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr;
+		addr = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
+#endif
+	}
+
+	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(ep->base.sk, addr, &secattr);
+	if (rc == 0)
+		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED;
+
+assoc_request_return:
+	netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
  * selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
  * @req: incoming connection request socket
  *
@@ -289,7 +348,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
 		return 0;
 
 	netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
-	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(req->secid, &secattr);
+	rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(&selinux_state, req->secid,
+					    &secattr);
 	if (rc != 0)
 		goto inet_conn_request_return;
 	rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
@@ -319,6 +379,22 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
 }
 
 /**
+ * selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone - Copy state to the newly created sock
+ * @sk: current sock
+ * @newsk: the new sock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) or sctp_peeloff(3).
+ */
+void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
+
+	newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state;
+}
+
+/**
  * selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
  * @sock: the socket to label
  * @family: protocol family
@@ -402,7 +478,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
 		perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__RECVFROM;
 	}
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  sksec->sid, nlbl_sid, sksec->sclass, perm, ad);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		return 0;
 
@@ -469,7 +546,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
 }
 
 /**
- * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper - Help label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
  * @sk: the socket to label
  * @addr: the destination address
  *
@@ -478,18 +556,13 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
  * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,
+						struct sockaddr *addr)
 {
 	int rc;
 	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
 	struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
 
-	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
-	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
-		return 0;
-
-	lock_sock(sk);
-
 	/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
 	 * is set to AF_UNSPEC, if that is what is happening we want to reset
 	 * the socket */
@@ -497,18 +570,61 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
 		netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_REQSKB;
 		rc = 0;
-		goto socket_connect_return;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
 	if (secattr == NULL) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		goto socket_connect_return;
+		return rc;
 	}
 	rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr);
 	if (rc == 0)
 		sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED;
 
-socket_connect_return:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked - Label a client-side socket on
+ * connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket that already has the socket locked
+ * with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk,
+					 struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
+
+	if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB &&
+	    sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED)
+		return 0;
+
+	return selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(sk, addr);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_socket_connect - Label a client-side socket on connect
+ * @sk: the socket to label
+ * @addr: the destination address
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Attempt to label a connected socket with NetLabel using the given address.
+ * Returns zero values on success, negative values on failure.
+ *
+ */
+int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr)
+{
+	int rc;
+
+	lock_sock(sk);
+	rc = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(sk, addr);
 	release_sock(sk);
+
 	return rc;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c
index da923f89d2a9..6dd89b89bc1f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netnode.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c
@@ -215,12 +215,12 @@ static int sel_netnode_sid_slow(void *addr, u16 family, u32 *sid)
 		goto out;
 	switch (family) {
 	case PF_INET:
-		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET,
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET,
 					addr, sizeof(struct in_addr), sid);
 		new->nsec.addr.ipv4 = *(__be32 *)addr;
 		break;
 	case PF_INET6:
-		ret = security_node_sid(PF_INET6,
+		ret = security_node_sid(&selinux_state, PF_INET6,
 					addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr), sid);
 		new->nsec.addr.ipv6 = *(struct in6_addr *)addr;
 		break;
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index 3311cc393cb4..9ed4c5064a5e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static int sel_netport_sid_slow(u8 protocol, u16 pnum, u32 *sid)
 	new = kzalloc(sizeof(*new), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (new == NULL)
 		goto out;
-	ret = security_port_sid(protocol, pnum, sid);
+	ret = security_port_sid(&selinux_state, protocol, pnum, sid);
 	if (ret != 0)
 		goto out;
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 00eed842c491..4be683eeba01 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 #include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
 #include <linux/mutex.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/string.h>
@@ -41,34 +42,6 @@
 #include "objsec.h"
 #include "conditional.h"
 
-unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
-
-static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
-{
-	unsigned long checkreqprot;
-	if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
-		selinux_checkreqprot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
-	return 1;
-}
-__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
-
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(sel_mutex);
-
-/* global data for booleans */
-static struct dentry *bool_dir;
-static int bool_num;
-static char **bool_pending_names;
-static int *bool_pending_values;
-
-/* global data for classes */
-static struct dentry *class_dir;
-static unsigned long last_class_ino;
-
-static char policy_opened;
-
-/* global data for policy capabilities */
-static struct dentry *policycap_dir;
-
 enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_ROOT_INO = 2,
 	SEL_LOAD,	/* load policy */
@@ -93,7 +66,51 @@ enum sel_inos {
 	SEL_INO_NEXT,	/* The next inode number to use */
 };
 
-static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+struct selinux_fs_info {
+	struct dentry *bool_dir;
+	unsigned int bool_num;
+	char **bool_pending_names;
+	unsigned int *bool_pending_values;
+	struct dentry *class_dir;
+	unsigned long last_class_ino;
+	bool policy_opened;
+	struct dentry *policycap_dir;
+	struct mutex mutex;
+	unsigned long last_ino;
+	struct selinux_state *state;
+	struct super_block *sb;
+};
+
+static int selinux_fs_info_create(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
+
+	fsi = kzalloc(sizeof(*fsi), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!fsi)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	mutex_init(&fsi->mutex);
+	fsi->last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
+	fsi->state = &selinux_state;
+	fsi->sb = sb;
+	sb->s_fs_info = fsi;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void selinux_fs_info_free(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	int i;
+
+	if (fsi) {
+		for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+			kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	}
+	kfree(sb->s_fs_info);
+	sb->s_fs_info = NULL;
+}
 
 #define SEL_INITCON_INO_OFFSET		0x01000000
 #define SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET		0x02000000
@@ -105,10 +122,12 @@ static unsigned long sel_last_ino = SEL_INO_NEXT - 1;
 static ssize_t sel_read_enforce(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", selinux_enforcing);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
+			   enforcing_enabled(fsi->state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -117,9 +136,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
-	int new_value;
+	int old_value, new_value;
 
 	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -138,23 +159,25 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_enforce(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 	new_value = !!new_value;
 
-	if (new_value != selinux_enforcing) {
-		length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	old_value = enforcing_enabled(state);
+	if (new_value != old_value) {
+		length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+				      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 				      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETENFORCE,
 				      NULL);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
 			"enforcing=%d old_enforcing=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
-			new_value, selinux_enforcing,
+			new_value, old_value,
 			from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 			audit_get_sessionid(current));
-		selinux_enforcing = new_value;
-		if (selinux_enforcing)
-			avc_ss_reset(0);
-		selnl_notify_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
-		selinux_status_update_setenforce(selinux_enforcing);
-		if (!selinux_enforcing)
+		enforcing_set(state, new_value);
+		if (new_value)
+			avc_ss_reset(state->avc, 0);
+		selnl_notify_setenforce(new_value);
+		selinux_status_update_setenforce(state, new_value);
+		if (!new_value)
 			call_lsm_notifier(LSM_POLICY_CHANGE, NULL);
 	}
 	length = count;
@@ -175,11 +198,14 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_enforce_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 	ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
 	int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
-		security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		security_get_reject_unknown(state) :
+		!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", handle_unknown);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
@@ -192,7 +218,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_handle_unknown_ops = {
 
 static int sel_open_handle_status(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
-	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page();
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct page    *status = selinux_kernel_status_page(fsi->state);
 
 	if (!status)
 		return -ENOMEM;
@@ -248,6 +275,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				 size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
@@ -268,7 +296,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (new_value) {
-		length = selinux_disable();
+		length = selinux_disable(fsi->state);
 		if (length)
 			goto out;
 		audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_MAC_STATUS,
@@ -307,9 +335,9 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policyvers_ops = {
 };
 
 /* declaration for sel_write_load */
-static int sel_make_bools(void);
-static int sel_make_classes(void);
-static int sel_make_policycap(void);
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi);
 
 /* declaration for sel_make_class_dirs */
 static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
@@ -318,11 +346,12 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
 static ssize_t sel_read_mls(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d",
-			   security_mls_enabled());
+			   security_mls_enabled(fsi->state));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -338,20 +367,23 @@ struct policy_load_memory {
 
 static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	struct policy_load_memory *plm = NULL;
 	int rc;
 
 	BUG_ON(filp->private_data);
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
 	rc = -EBUSY;
-	if (policy_opened)
+	if (fsi->policy_opened)
 		goto err;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
@@ -359,25 +391,25 @@ static int sel_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 	if (!plm)
 		goto err;
 
-	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len()) {
+	if (i_size_read(inode) != security_policydb_len(state)) {
 		inode_lock(inode);
-		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len());
+		i_size_write(inode, security_policydb_len(state));
 		inode_unlock(inode);
 	}
 
-	rc = security_read_policy(&plm->data, &plm->len);
+	rc = security_read_policy(state, &plm->data, &plm->len);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	policy_opened = 1;
+	fsi->policy_opened = 1;
 
 	filp->private_data = plm;
 
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	return 0;
 err:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	if (plm)
 		vfree(plm->data);
@@ -387,11 +419,12 @@ err:
 
 static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = inode->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
 
 	BUG_ON(!plm);
 
-	policy_opened = 0;
+	fsi->policy_opened = 0;
 
 	vfree(plm->data);
 	kfree(plm);
@@ -402,19 +435,21 @@ static int sel_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
 static ssize_t sel_read_policy(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 			       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	struct policy_load_memory *plm = filp->private_data;
 	int ret;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__READ_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, plm->data, plm->len);
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -468,16 +503,43 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policy_ops = {
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
 };
 
+static int sel_make_policy_nodes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = sel_make_bools(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_classes(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policycap(fsi);
+	if (ret) {
+		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	ssize_t length;
 	void *data = NULL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__LOAD_POLICY, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
@@ -500,29 +562,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_load_policy(data, count);
+	length = security_load_policy(fsi->state, data, count);
 	if (length) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: failed to load policy\n");
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	length = sel_make_bools();
-	if (length) {
-		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy booleans\n");
-		goto out1;
-	}
-
-	length = sel_make_classes();
-	if (length) {
-		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy classes\n");
-		goto out1;
-	}
-
-	length = sel_make_policycap();
-	if (length) {
-		pr_err("SELinux: failed to load policy capabilities\n");
+	length = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi);
+	if (length)
 		goto out1;
-	}
 
 	length = count;
 
@@ -532,7 +580,7 @@ out1:
 		from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 		audit_get_sessionid(current));
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	vfree(data);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -544,20 +592,23 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_load_ops = {
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_context(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *canon = NULL;
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__CHECK_CONTEXT, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_to_sid(buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_to_sid(state, buf, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(sid, &canon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, sid, &canon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -578,21 +629,24 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", selinux_checkreqprot);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", fsi->state->checkreqprot);
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned int new_value;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETCHECKREQPROT,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -613,7 +667,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	selinux_checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
+	fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
 	length = count;
 out:
 	kfree(page);
@@ -629,13 +683,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 					const char __user *buf,
 					size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *oldcon = NULL, *newcon = NULL, *taskcon = NULL;
 	char *req = NULL;
 	u32 osid, nsid, tsid;
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			  SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__VALIDATE_TRANS, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
@@ -673,19 +730,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_validatetrans(struct file *file,
 	if (sscanf(req, "%s %s %hu %s", oldcon, newcon, &tclass, taskcon) != 4)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, oldcon, &osid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, newcon, &nsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	rc = security_context_str_to_sid(state, taskcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = security_validate_transition_user(osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
+	rc = security_validate_transition_user(state, osid, nsid, tsid, tclass);
 	if (!rc)
 		rc = count;
 out:
@@ -755,13 +812,16 @@ static const struct file_operations transaction_ops = {
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct av_decision avd;
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_AV, NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
@@ -780,15 +840,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_access(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	security_compute_av_user(ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
+	security_compute_av_user(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &avd);
 
 	length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
 			  "%x %x %x %x %u %x",
@@ -803,6 +863,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	char *namebuf = NULL, *objname = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
@@ -812,7 +874,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	u32 len;
 	int nargs;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_CREATE,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -868,20 +931,20 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_create(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 		objname = namebuf;
 	}
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_transition_sid_user(ssid, tsid, tclass,
+	length = security_transition_sid_user(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
 					      objname, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -904,6 +967,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
 	u16 tclass;
@@ -911,7 +976,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_RELABEL,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -931,19 +997,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_relabel(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_change_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_change_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -962,6 +1028,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *con = NULL, *user = NULL, *ptr;
 	u32 sid, *sids = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
@@ -969,7 +1037,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	int i, rc;
 	u32 len, nsids;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_USER,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -989,18 +1058,18 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_user(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s", con, user) != 2)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, con, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_get_user_sids(sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
+	length = security_get_user_sids(state, sid, user, &sids, &nsids);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
 	length = sprintf(buf, "%u", nsids) + 1;
 	ptr = buf + length;
 	for (i = 0; i < nsids; i++) {
-		rc = security_sid_to_context(sids[i], &newcon, &len);
+		rc = security_sid_to_context(state, sids[i], &newcon, &len);
 		if (rc) {
 			length = rc;
 			goto out;
@@ -1024,6 +1093,8 @@ out:
 
 static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *scon = NULL, *tcon = NULL;
 	u32 ssid, tsid, newsid;
 	u16 tclass;
@@ -1031,7 +1102,8 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	char *newcon = NULL;
 	u32 len;
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__COMPUTE_MEMBER,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1051,19 +1123,19 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_member(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t size)
 	if (sscanf(buf, "%s %s %hu", scon, tcon, &tclass) != 3)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, scon, &ssid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_context_str_to_sid(tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
+	length = security_context_str_to_sid(state, tcon, &tsid, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_member_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
+	length = security_member_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, &newsid);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
-	length = security_sid_to_context(newsid, &newcon, &len);
+	length = security_sid_to_context(state, newsid, &newcon, &len);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1097,6 +1169,7 @@ static struct inode *sel_make_inode(struct super_block *sb, int mode)
 static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	ssize_t ret;
@@ -1104,10 +1177,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
 	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
 	ret = -EINVAL;
-	if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1115,16 +1189,16 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(index);
+	cur_enforcing = security_get_bool_value(fsi->state, index);
 	if (cur_enforcing < 0) {
 		ret = cur_enforcing;
 		goto out;
 	}
 	length = scnprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d %d", cur_enforcing,
-			  bool_pending_values[index]);
+			  fsi->bool_pending_values[index]);
 	ret = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -1132,22 +1206,25 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 			      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
 	unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
 	const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
 		goto out;
 
 	length = -EINVAL;
-	if (index >= bool_num || strcmp(name, bool_pending_names[index]))
+	if (index >= fsi->bool_num || strcmp(name,
+					     fsi->bool_pending_names[index]))
 		goto out;
 
 	length = -ENOMEM;
@@ -1173,11 +1250,11 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
 	if (new_value)
 		new_value = 1;
 
-	bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values[index] = new_value;
 	length = count;
 
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	kfree(page);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -1192,13 +1269,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 				      const char __user *buf,
 				      size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filep)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *page = NULL;
 	ssize_t length;
 	int new_value;
 
-	mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&fsi->mutex);
 
-	length = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	length = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			      current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			      SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETBOOL,
 			      NULL);
 	if (length)
@@ -1225,14 +1304,15 @@ static ssize_t sel_commit_bools_write(struct file *filep,
 		goto out;
 
 	length = 0;
-	if (new_value && bool_pending_values)
-		length = security_set_bools(bool_num, bool_pending_values);
+	if (new_value && fsi->bool_pending_values)
+		length = security_set_bools(fsi->state, fsi->bool_num,
+					    fsi->bool_pending_values);
 
 	if (!length)
 		length = count;
 
 out:
-	mutex_unlock(&sel_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&fsi->mutex);
 	kfree(page);
 	return length;
 }
@@ -1250,12 +1330,12 @@ static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
 
 #define BOOL_DIR_NAME "booleans"
 
-static int sel_make_bools(void)
+static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
 {
 	int i, ret;
 	ssize_t len;
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
-	struct dentry *dir = bool_dir;
+	struct dentry *dir = fsi->bool_dir;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 	char **names = NULL, *page;
@@ -1264,13 +1344,13 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	u32 sid;
 
 	/* remove any existing files */
-	for (i = 0; i < bool_num; i++)
-		kfree(bool_pending_names[i]);
-	kfree(bool_pending_names);
-	kfree(bool_pending_values);
-	bool_num = 0;
-	bool_pending_names = NULL;
-	bool_pending_values = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < fsi->bool_num; i++)
+		kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names[i]);
+	kfree(fsi->bool_pending_names);
+	kfree(fsi->bool_pending_values);
+	fsi->bool_num = 0;
+	fsi->bool_pending_names = NULL;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values = NULL;
 
 	sel_remove_entries(dir);
 
@@ -1279,7 +1359,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 	if (!page)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = security_get_bools(&num, &names, &values);
+	ret = security_get_bools(fsi->state, &num, &names, &values);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -1300,7 +1380,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 			goto out;
 
 		isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
-		ret = security_genfs_sid("selinuxfs", page, SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
+		ret = security_genfs_sid(fsi->state, "selinuxfs", page,
+					 SECCLASS_FILE, &sid);
 		if (ret) {
 			pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux: no sid found, defaulting to security isid for %s\n",
 					   page);
@@ -1313,9 +1394,9 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
 		inode->i_ino = i|SEL_BOOL_INO_OFFSET;
 		d_add(dentry, inode);
 	}
-	bool_num = num;
-	bool_pending_names = names;
-	bool_pending_values = values;
+	fsi->bool_num = num;
+	fsi->bool_pending_names = names;
+	fsi->bool_pending_values = values;
 
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
 	return 0;
@@ -1333,17 +1414,16 @@ out:
 	return ret;
 }
 
-#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
-
-struct path selinux_null;
-
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 					    size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 
-	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u", avc_cache_threshold);
+	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+			   avc_get_cache_threshold(state->avc));
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
 }
 
@@ -1352,11 +1432,14 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
 					     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t ret;
 	unsigned int new_value;
 
-	ret = avc_has_perm(current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
+	ret = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			   current_sid(), SECINITSID_SECURITY,
 			   SECCLASS_SECURITY, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM,
 			   NULL);
 	if (ret)
@@ -1377,7 +1460,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
 	if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
 		goto out;
 
-	avc_cache_threshold = new_value;
+	avc_set_cache_threshold(state->avc, new_value);
 
 	ret = count;
 out:
@@ -1388,6 +1471,8 @@ out:
 static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 				       size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
+	struct selinux_state *state = fsi->state;
 	char *page;
 	ssize_t length;
 
@@ -1395,7 +1480,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_avc_hash_stats(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
 	if (!page)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	length = avc_get_hash_stats(page);
+	length = avc_get_hash_stats(state->avc, page);
 	if (length >= 0)
 		length = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, length);
 	free_page((unsigned long)page);
@@ -1486,6 +1571,8 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_avc_cache_stats_ops = {
 
 static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 {
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
 	int i;
 	static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
 		{ "cache_threshold",
@@ -1509,7 +1596,7 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
 		inode->i_fop = files[i].ops;
-		inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+		inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
 		d_add(dentry, inode);
 	}
 
@@ -1519,12 +1606,13 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
 static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	char *con;
 	u32 sid, len;
 	ssize_t ret;
 
 	sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
-	ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
+	ret = security_sid_to_context(fsi->state, sid, &con, &len);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -1612,12 +1700,13 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
 static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 				  size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
 	int value;
 	char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
 	ssize_t length;
 	unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
 
-	value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
+	value = security_policycap_supported(fsi->state, i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
 	length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);
 
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
@@ -1631,10 +1720,11 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_policycap_ops = {
 static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
 				struct dentry *dir)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = dir->d_sb->s_fs_info;
 	int i, rc, nperms;
 	char **perms;
 
-	rc = security_get_permissions(objclass, &perms, &nperms);
+	rc = security_get_permissions(fsi->state, objclass, &perms, &nperms);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -1668,6 +1758,8 @@ out:
 static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
 					struct dentry *dir)
 {
+	struct super_block *sb = dir->d_sb;
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 	int rc;
@@ -1684,7 +1776,7 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
 	inode->i_ino = sel_class_to_ino(index);
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
 
-	dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &last_class_ino);
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(dir, "perms", &fsi->last_class_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry))
 		return PTR_ERR(dentry);
 
@@ -1693,26 +1785,27 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_classes(void)
+static int sel_make_classes(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
 {
+
 	int rc, nclasses, i;
 	char **classes;
 
 	/* delete any existing entries */
-	sel_remove_entries(class_dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(fsi->class_dir);
 
-	rc = security_get_classes(&classes, &nclasses);
+	rc = security_get_classes(fsi->state, &classes, &nclasses);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
 	/* +2 since classes are 1-indexed */
-	last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
+	fsi->last_class_ino = sel_class_to_ino(nclasses + 2);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < nclasses; i++) {
 		struct dentry *class_name_dir;
 
-		class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(class_dir, classes[i],
-				&last_class_ino);
+		class_name_dir = sel_make_dir(fsi->class_dir, classes[i],
+					      &fsi->last_class_ino);
 		if (IS_ERR(class_name_dir)) {
 			rc = PTR_ERR(class_name_dir);
 			goto out;
@@ -1732,25 +1825,25 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int sel_make_policycap(void)
+static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
 {
 	unsigned int iter;
 	struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode = NULL;
 
-	sel_remove_entries(policycap_dir);
+	sel_remove_entries(fsi->policycap_dir);
 
 	for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) {
 		if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
-			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir,
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir,
 					      selinux_policycap_names[iter]);
 		else
-			dentry = d_alloc_name(policycap_dir, "unknown");
+			dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir, "unknown");
 
 		if (dentry == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
-		inode = sel_make_inode(policycap_dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO);
+		inode = sel_make_inode(fsi->sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
 		if (inode == NULL)
 			return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -1789,8 +1882,11 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
 	return dentry;
 }
 
+#define NULL_FILE_NAME "null"
+
 static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 {
+	struct selinux_fs_info *fsi;
 	int ret;
 	struct dentry *dentry;
 	struct inode *inode;
@@ -1818,14 +1914,20 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 					S_IWUGO},
 		/* last one */ {""}
 	};
+
+	ret = selinux_fs_info_create(sb);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
 	ret = simple_fill_super(sb, SELINUX_MAGIC, selinux_files);
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &sel_last_ino);
-	if (IS_ERR(bool_dir)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(bool_dir);
-		bool_dir = NULL;
+	fsi = sb->s_fs_info;
+	fsi->bool_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, BOOL_DIR_NAME, &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->bool_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->bool_dir);
+		fsi->bool_dir = NULL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
@@ -1839,7 +1941,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (!inode)
 		goto err;
 
-	inode->i_ino = ++sel_last_ino;
+	inode->i_ino = ++fsi->last_ino;
 	isec = (struct inode_security_struct *)inode->i_security;
 	isec->sid = SECINITSID_DEVNULL;
 	isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
@@ -1847,9 +1949,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 
 	init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
 	d_add(dentry, inode);
-	selinux_null.dentry = dentry;
 
-	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &sel_last_ino);
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		goto err;
@@ -1859,7 +1960,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &sel_last_ino);
+	dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "initial_contexts", &fsi->last_ino);
 	if (IS_ERR(dentry)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(dentry);
 		goto err;
@@ -1869,23 +1970,31 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
 	if (ret)
 		goto err;
 
-	class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &sel_last_ino);
-	if (IS_ERR(class_dir)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(class_dir);
-		class_dir = NULL;
+	fsi->class_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "class", &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->class_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->class_dir);
+		fsi->class_dir = NULL;
 		goto err;
 	}
 
-	policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities", &sel_last_ino);
-	if (IS_ERR(policycap_dir)) {
-		ret = PTR_ERR(policycap_dir);
-		policycap_dir = NULL;
+	fsi->policycap_dir = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "policy_capabilities",
+					  &fsi->last_ino);
+	if (IS_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(fsi->policycap_dir);
+		fsi->policycap_dir = NULL;
 		goto err;
 	}
+
+	ret = sel_make_policy_nodes(fsi);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
 	return 0;
 err:
 	printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  failed while creating inodes\n",
 		__func__);
+
+	selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
@@ -1895,16 +2004,25 @@ static struct dentry *sel_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
 	return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, sel_fill_super);
 }
 
+static void sel_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+	selinux_fs_info_free(sb);
+	kill_litter_super(sb);
+}
+
 static struct file_system_type sel_fs_type = {
 	.name		= "selinuxfs",
 	.mount		= sel_mount,
-	.kill_sb	= kill_litter_super,
+	.kill_sb	= sel_kill_sb,
 };
 
 struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
+struct path selinux_null;
 
 static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 {
+	struct qstr null_name = QSTR_INIT(NULL_FILE_NAME,
+					  sizeof(NULL_FILE_NAME)-1);
 	int err;
 
 	if (!selinux_enabled)
@@ -1926,6 +2044,13 @@ static int __init init_sel_fs(void)
 		err = PTR_ERR(selinuxfs_mount);
 		selinuxfs_mount = NULL;
 	}
+	selinux_null.dentry = d_hash_and_lookup(selinux_null.mnt->mnt_root,
+						&null_name);
+	if (IS_ERR(selinux_null.dentry)) {
+		pr_err("selinuxfs:  could not lookup null!\n");
+		err = PTR_ERR(selinux_null.dentry);
+		selinux_null.dentry = NULL;
+	}
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 2c3c7d010d8a..a2c9148b0662 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -655,7 +655,8 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
 
 	return rc;
 }
-void avtab_cache_init(void)
+
+void __init avtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 	avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
 					      sizeof(struct avtab_node),
@@ -664,9 +665,3 @@ void avtab_cache_init(void)
 						sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
 						0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
-
-void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
-	kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
-}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 725853cadc42..0d652fad5319 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -114,9 +114,6 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key);
 
 struct avtab_node *avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified);
 
-void avtab_cache_init(void);
-void avtab_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS 16
 #define MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS (1 << MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BITS)
 
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index b6a78b09235c..5ae8c61b75bf 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -523,14 +523,9 @@ int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void ebitmap_cache_init(void)
+void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void)
 {
 	ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node",
 							sizeof(struct ebitmap_node),
 							0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
-
-void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-	kmem_cache_destroy(ebitmap_node_cachep);
-}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
index edf4fa39c60a..6aa7cf6a2197 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h
@@ -131,9 +131,6 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e);
 int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 int ebitmap_write(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp);
 
-void ebitmap_cache_init(void);
-void ebitmap_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
 int ebitmap_netlbl_export(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_catmap **catmap);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index fe25b3fb2154..ebfdaa31ee32 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -169,14 +169,10 @@ void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info)
 	info->slots_used = slots_used;
 	info->max_chain_len = max_chain_len;
 }
-void hashtab_cache_init(void)
+
+void __init hashtab_cache_init(void)
 {
 		hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node",
 			sizeof(struct hashtab_node),
 			0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
 }
-
-void hashtab_cache_destroy(void)
-{
-		kmem_cache_destroy(hashtab_node_cachep);
-}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 6183ee2a2e7a..3e3e42bfd150 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -85,8 +85,4 @@ int hashtab_map(struct hashtab *h,
 /* Fill info with some hash table statistics */
 void hashtab_stat(struct hashtab *h, struct hashtab_info *info);
 
-/* Use kmem_cache for hashtab_node */
-void hashtab_cache_init(void);
-void hashtab_cache_destroy(void);
-
 #endif	/* _SS_HASHTAB_H */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index ad982ce8bfa4..39475fb455bc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -33,20 +33,20 @@
  * Return the length in bytes for the MLS fields of the
  * security context string representation of `context'.
  */
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context)
 {
 	int i, l, len, head, prev;
 	char *nm;
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	len = 1; /* for the beginning ":" */
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
 		int index_sens = context->range.level[l].sens;
-		len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
+		len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS, index_sens - 1));
 
 		/* categories */
 		head = -2;
@@ -56,17 +56,17 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
 			if (i - prev > 1) {
 				/* one or more negative bits are skipped */
 				if (head != prev) {
-					nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 					len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 				}
-				nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
 				len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 				head = i;
 			}
 			prev = i;
 		}
 		if (prev != head) {
-			nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 			len += strlen(nm) + 1;
 		}
 		if (l == 0) {
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context)
  * the MLS fields of `context' into the string `*scontext'.
  * Update `*scontext' to point to the end of the MLS fields.
  */
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p,
+			struct context *context,
 			char **scontext)
 {
 	char *scontextp, *nm;
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 	struct ebitmap *e;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	scontextp = *scontext;
@@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 	scontextp++;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
-		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_LEVELS,
+		strcpy(scontextp, sym_name(p, SYM_LEVELS,
 					   context->range.level[l].sens - 1));
 		scontextp += strlen(scontextp);
 
@@ -119,7 +120,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 						*scontextp++ = '.';
 					else
 						*scontextp++ = ',';
-					nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+					nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 					strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 					scontextp += strlen(nm);
 				}
@@ -127,7 +128,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 					*scontextp++ = ':';
 				else
 					*scontextp++ = ',';
-				nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, i);
+				nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, i);
 				strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 				scontextp += strlen(nm);
 				head = i;
@@ -140,7 +141,7 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context,
 				*scontextp++ = '.';
 			else
 				*scontextp++ = ',';
-			nm = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CATS, prev);
+			nm = sym_name(p, SYM_CATS, prev);
 			strcpy(scontextp, nm);
 			scontextp += strlen(nm);
 		}
@@ -375,12 +376,13 @@ out:
  * the string `str'.  This function will allocate temporary memory with the
  * given constraints of gfp_mask.
  */
-int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask)
 {
 	char *tmpstr, *freestr;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	/* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
@@ -389,7 +391,7 @@ int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
 	if (!tmpstr) {
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
 	} else {
-		rc = mls_context_to_sid(&policydb, ':', &tmpstr, context,
+		rc = mls_context_to_sid(p, ':', &tmpstr, context,
 					NULL, SECSID_NULL);
 		kfree(freestr);
 	}
@@ -417,10 +419,11 @@ int mls_range_set(struct context *context,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon)
 {
-	if (policydb.mls_enabled) {
+	if (p->mls_enabled) {
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_sen = &(fromcon->range.level[0]);
 		struct mls_level *fromcon_clr = &(fromcon->range.level[1]);
 		struct mls_level *user_low = &(user->range.level[0]);
@@ -470,7 +473,7 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 	int l, i;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!oldp->mls_enabled || !newp->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	for (l = 0; l < 2; l++) {
@@ -503,7 +506,8 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
@@ -515,7 +519,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 	struct class_datum *cladatum;
 	int default_range = 0;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	switch (specified) {
@@ -524,12 +528,12 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 		rtr.source_type = scontext->type;
 		rtr.target_type = tcontext->type;
 		rtr.target_class = tclass;
-		r = hashtab_search(policydb.range_tr, &rtr);
+		r = hashtab_search(p->range_tr, &rtr);
 		if (r)
 			return mls_range_set(newcontext, r);
 
-		if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
-			cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+		if (tclass && tclass <= p->p_classes.nprim) {
+			cladatum = p->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 			if (cladatum)
 				default_range = cladatum->default_range;
 		}
@@ -551,7 +555,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
 
 		/* Fallthrough */
 	case AVTAB_CHANGE:
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+		if ((tclass == p->process_class) || (sock == true))
 			/* Use the process MLS attributes. */
 			return mls_context_cpy(newcontext, scontext);
 		else
@@ -577,10 +581,11 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level field.
  *
  */
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	secattr->attr.mls.lvl = context->range.level[0].sens - 1;
@@ -597,10 +602,11 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
  * NetLabel MLS sensitivity level into the context.
  *
  */
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return;
 
 	context->range.level[0].sens = secattr->attr.mls.lvl + 1;
@@ -617,12 +623,13 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
  * MLS category field.  Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_export(&context->range.level[0].cat,
@@ -645,12 +652,13 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
  * negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	if (!p->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
 	rc = ebitmap_netlbl_import(&context->range.level[0].cat,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 131d76266ea5..9a3ff7af70ad 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -25,8 +25,9 @@
 #include "context.h"
 #include "policydb.h"
 
-int mls_compute_context_len(struct context *context);
-void mls_sid_to_context(struct context *context, char **scontext);
+int mls_compute_context_len(struct policydb *p, struct context *context);
+void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, struct context *context,
+			char **scontext);
 int mls_context_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct context *c);
 int mls_range_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_range *r);
 int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l);
@@ -38,7 +39,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(struct policydb *p,
 		       struct sidtab *s,
 		       u32 def_sid);
 
-int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+int mls_from_string(struct policydb *p, char *str, struct context *context,
+		    gfp_t gfp_mask);
 
 int mls_range_set(struct context *context, struct mls_range *range);
 
@@ -46,42 +48,52 @@ int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
 			struct policydb *newp,
 			struct context *context);
 
-int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scontext,
+int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
+		    struct context *scontext,
 		    struct context *tcontext,
 		    u16 tclass,
 		    u32 specified,
 		    struct context *newcontext,
 		    bool sock);
 
-int mls_setup_user_range(struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
+int mls_setup_user_range(struct policydb *p,
+			 struct context *fromcon, struct user_datum *user,
 			 struct context *usercon);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
-void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+			   struct context *context,
 			   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
-int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+			  struct context *context,
 			  struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr);
 #else
-static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+static inline void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
 					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct context *context,
+static inline void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
+					 struct context *context,
 					 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return;
 }
-static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+static inline int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOMEM;
 }
-static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct context *context,
+static inline int mls_import_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
+					struct context *context,
 					struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
 	return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 8900ea5cbabf..8057e19dc15f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -80,53 +80,32 @@ char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
 	"nnp_nosuid_transition"
 };
 
-int selinux_policycap_netpeer;
-int selinux_policycap_openperm;
-int selinux_policycap_extsockclass;
-int selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork;
-int selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel;
-int selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition;
+static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
 
-static DEFINE_RWLOCK(policy_rwlock);
-
-static struct sidtab sidtab;
-struct policydb policydb;
-int ss_initialized;
-
-/*
- * The largest sequence number that has been used when
- * providing an access decision to the access vector cache.
- * The sequence number only changes when a policy change
- * occurs.
- */
-static u32 latest_granting;
+void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss)
+{
+	rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock);
+	mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock);
+	*ss = &selinux_ss;
+}
 
 /* Forward declaration. */
-static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext,
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext,
 				    u32 *scontext_len);
 
-static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-					struct context *tcontext,
-					u16 tclass,
-					struct av_decision *avd,
-					struct extended_perms *xperms);
-
-struct selinux_mapping {
-	u16 value; /* policy value */
-	unsigned num_perms;
-	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8];
-};
-
-static struct selinux_mapping *current_mapping;
-static u16 current_mapping_size;
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms);
 
 static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 			       struct security_class_mapping *map,
-			       struct selinux_mapping **out_map_p,
-			       u16 *out_map_size)
+			       struct selinux_map *out_map)
 {
-	struct selinux_mapping *out_map = NULL;
-	size_t size = sizeof(struct selinux_mapping);
 	u16 i, j;
 	unsigned k;
 	bool print_unknown_handle = false;
@@ -139,15 +118,15 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 		i++;
 
 	/* Allocate space for the class records, plus one for class zero */
-	out_map = kcalloc(++i, size, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!out_map)
+	out_map->mapping = kcalloc(++i, sizeof(*out_map->mapping), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!out_map->mapping)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Store the raw class and permission values */
 	j = 0;
 	while (map[j].name) {
 		struct security_class_mapping *p_in = map + (j++);
-		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map + j;
+		struct selinux_mapping *p_out = out_map->mapping + j;
 
 		/* An empty class string skips ahead */
 		if (!strcmp(p_in->name, "")) {
@@ -194,11 +173,11 @@ static int selinux_set_mapping(struct policydb *pol,
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: the above unknown classes and permissions will be %s\n",
 		       pol->allow_unknown ? "allowed" : "denied");
 
-	*out_map_p = out_map;
-	*out_map_size = i;
+	out_map->size = i;
 	return 0;
 err:
-	kfree(out_map);
+	kfree(out_map->mapping);
+	out_map->mapping = NULL;
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
@@ -206,10 +185,10 @@ err:
  * Get real, policy values from mapped values
  */
 
-static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
+static u16 unmap_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 tclass)
 {
-	if (tclass < current_mapping_size)
-		return current_mapping[tclass].value;
+	if (tclass < map->size)
+		return map->mapping[tclass].value;
 
 	return tclass;
 }
@@ -217,42 +196,44 @@ static u16 unmap_class(u16 tclass)
 /*
  * Get kernel value for class from its policy value
  */
-static u16 map_class(u16 pol_value)
+static u16 map_class(struct selinux_map *map, u16 pol_value)
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 1; i < current_mapping_size; i++) {
-		if (current_mapping[i].value == pol_value)
+	for (i = 1; i < map->size; i++) {
+		if (map->mapping[i].value == pol_value)
 			return i;
 	}
 
 	return SECCLASS_NULL;
 }
 
-static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
+static void map_decision(struct selinux_map *map,
+			 u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 			 int allow_unknown)
 {
-	if (tclass < current_mapping_size) {
-		unsigned i, n = current_mapping[tclass].num_perms;
+	if (tclass < map->size) {
+		struct selinux_mapping *mapping = &map->mapping[tclass];
+		unsigned int i, n = mapping->num_perms;
 		u32 result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
-			if (avd->allowed & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->allowed & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
-			if (allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
 		avd->allowed = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++)
-			if (avd->auditallow & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->auditallow & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		avd->auditallow = result;
 
 		for (i = 0, result = 0; i < n; i++) {
-			if (avd->auditdeny & current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (avd->auditdeny & mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
-			if (!allow_unknown && !current_mapping[tclass].perms[i])
+			if (!allow_unknown && !mapping->perms[i])
 				result |= 1<<i;
 		}
 		/*
@@ -266,9 +247,11 @@ static void map_decision(u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd,
 	}
 }
 
-int security_mls_enabled(void)
+int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.mls_enabled;
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
+
+	return p->mls_enabled;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -282,7 +265,8 @@ int security_mls_enabled(void)
  * of the process performing the transition.  All other callers of
  * constraint_expr_eval should pass in NULL for xcontext.
  */
-static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
+static int constraint_expr_eval(struct policydb *policydb,
+				struct context *scontext,
 				struct context *tcontext,
 				struct context *xcontext,
 				struct constraint_expr *cexpr)
@@ -326,8 +310,8 @@ static int constraint_expr_eval(struct context *scontext,
 			case CEXPR_ROLE:
 				val1 = scontext->role;
 				val2 = tcontext->role;
-				r1 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
-				r2 = policydb.role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
+				r1 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val1 - 1];
+				r2 = policydb->role_val_to_struct[val2 - 1];
 				switch (e->op) {
 				case CEXPR_DOM:
 					s[++sp] = ebitmap_get_bit(&r1->dominates,
@@ -472,7 +456,8 @@ static int dump_masked_av_helper(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
+static void security_dump_masked_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				    struct context *scontext,
 				    struct context *tcontext,
 				    u16 tclass,
 				    u32 permissions,
@@ -492,8 +477,8 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
 	if (!permissions)
 		return;
 
-	tclass_name = sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
-	tclass_dat = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_name = sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass - 1);
+	tclass_dat = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 	common_dat = tclass_dat->comdatum;
 
 	/* init permission_names */
@@ -507,11 +492,11 @@ static void security_dump_masked_av(struct context *scontext,
 		goto out;
 
 	/* get scontext/tcontext in text form */
-	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext,
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext,
 				     &scontext_name, &length) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext,
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext,
 				     &tcontext_name, &length) < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -550,7 +535,8 @@ out:
  * security_boundary_permission - drops violated permissions
  * on boundary constraint.
  */
-static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
+static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				     struct context *scontext,
 				     struct context *tcontext,
 				     u16 tclass,
 				     struct av_decision *avd)
@@ -562,14 +548,14 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 	struct type_datum *target;
 	u32 masked = 0;
 
-	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+	source = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!source);
 
 	if (!source->bounds)
 		return;
 
-	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+	target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 				    tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!target);
 
@@ -584,7 +570,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 		tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, &lo_scontext,
 				  tcontextp,
 				  tclass,
 				  &lo_avd,
@@ -599,7 +585,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
 	avd->allowed &= ~masked;
 
 	/* audit masked permissions */
-	security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+	security_dump_masked_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
 				tclass, masked, "bounds");
 }
 
@@ -632,11 +618,12 @@ void services_compute_xperms_drivers(
  * Compute access vectors and extended permissions based on a context
  * structure pair for the permissions in a particular class.
  */
-static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
-					struct context *tcontext,
-					u16 tclass,
-					struct av_decision *avd,
-					struct extended_perms *xperms)
+static void context_struct_compute_av(struct policydb *policydb,
+				      struct context *scontext,
+				      struct context *tcontext,
+				      u16 tclass,
+				      struct av_decision *avd,
+				      struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
 	struct constraint_node *constraint;
 	struct role_allow *ra;
@@ -655,13 +642,13 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 		xperms->len = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
 		if (printk_ratelimit())
 			printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 		return;
 	}
 
-	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
 	/*
 	 * If a specific type enforcement rule was defined for
@@ -669,15 +656,18 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 */
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_XPERMS;
-	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, scontext->type - 1);
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
-	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array, tcontext->type - 1);
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
+			       tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
-			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified)) {
 				if (node->key.specified == AVTAB_ALLOWED)
@@ -691,7 +681,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 			}
 
 			/* Check conditional av table for additional permissions */
-			cond_compute_av(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
+			cond_compute_av(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey,
 					avd, xperms);
 
 		}
@@ -704,7 +694,7 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	constraint = tclass_datum->constraints;
 	while (constraint) {
 		if ((constraint->permissions & (avd->allowed)) &&
-		    !constraint_expr_eval(scontext, tcontext, NULL,
+		    !constraint_expr_eval(policydb, scontext, tcontext, NULL,
 					  constraint->expr)) {
 			avd->allowed &= ~(constraint->permissions);
 		}
@@ -716,16 +706,16 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * role is changing, then check the (current_role, new_role)
 	 * pair.
 	 */
-	if (tclass == policydb.process_class &&
-	    (avd->allowed & policydb.process_trans_perms) &&
+	if (tclass == policydb->process_class &&
+	    (avd->allowed & policydb->process_trans_perms) &&
 	    scontext->role != tcontext->role) {
-		for (ra = policydb.role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
+		for (ra = policydb->role_allow; ra; ra = ra->next) {
 			if (scontext->role == ra->role &&
 			    tcontext->role == ra->new_role)
 				break;
 		}
 		if (!ra)
-			avd->allowed &= ~policydb.process_trans_perms;
+			avd->allowed &= ~policydb->process_trans_perms;
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -733,41 +723,46 @@ static void context_struct_compute_av(struct context *scontext,
 	 * constraint, lazy checks have to mask any violated
 	 * permission and notice it to userspace via audit.
 	 */
-	type_attribute_bounds_av(scontext, tcontext,
+	type_attribute_bounds_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext,
 				 tclass, avd);
 }
 
-static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct context *ocontext,
+static int security_validtrans_handle_fail(struct selinux_state *state,
+					   struct context *ocontext,
 					   struct context *ncontext,
 					   struct context *tcontext,
 					   u16 tclass)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *o = NULL, *n = NULL, *t = NULL;
 	u32 olen, nlen, tlen;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(ocontext, &o, &olen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ocontext, &o, &olen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(ncontext, &n, &nlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, ncontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(p, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "op=security_validate_transition seresult=denied"
 		  " oldcontext=%s newcontext=%s taskcontext=%s tclass=%s",
-		  o, n, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+		  o, n, t, sym_name(p, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
 	kfree(o);
 	kfree(n);
 	kfree(t);
 
-	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+	if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
-static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+static int security_compute_validatetrans(struct selinux_state *state,
+					  u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 					  u16 orig_tclass, bool user)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *ocontext;
 	struct context *ncontext;
 	struct context *tcontext;
@@ -776,23 +771,27 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	u16 tclass;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	if (!user)
-		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	else
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
 
-	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim) {
+	if (!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim) {
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	tclass_datum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	tclass_datum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
-	ocontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, oldsid);
+	ocontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, oldsid);
 	if (!ocontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, oldsid);
@@ -800,7 +799,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ncontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, newsid);
+	ncontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, newsid);
 	if (!ncontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, newsid);
@@ -808,7 +807,7 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tasksid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tasksid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, tasksid);
@@ -818,12 +817,13 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 
 	constraint = tclass_datum->validatetrans;
 	while (constraint) {
-		if (!constraint_expr_eval(ocontext, ncontext, tcontext,
-					  constraint->expr)) {
+		if (!constraint_expr_eval(policydb, ocontext, ncontext,
+					  tcontext, constraint->expr)) {
 			if (user)
 				rc = -EPERM;
 			else
-				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(ocontext,
+				rc = security_validtrans_handle_fail(state,
+								     ocontext,
 								     ncontext,
 								     tcontext,
 								     tclass);
@@ -833,22 +833,24 @@ static int security_compute_validatetrans(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition_user(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
-					u16 tclass)
+int security_validate_transition_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+				      u16 tclass)
 {
-	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
-						tclass, true);
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      tclass, true);
 }
 
-int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
+int security_validate_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
 				 u16 orig_tclass)
 {
-	return security_compute_validatetrans(oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
-						orig_tclass, false);
+	return security_compute_validatetrans(state, oldsid, newsid, tasksid,
+					      orig_tclass, false);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -860,20 +862,26 @@ int security_validate_transition(u32 oldsid, u32 newsid, u32 tasksid,
  * @oldsid : current security identifier
  * @newsid : destinated security identifier
  */
-int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
+int security_bounded_transition(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *old_context, *new_context;
 	struct type_datum *type;
 	int index;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	old_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, old_sid);
+	old_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, old_sid);
 	if (!old_context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 		       __func__, old_sid);
@@ -881,7 +889,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	new_context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, new_sid);
+	new_context = sidtab_search(sidtab, new_sid);
 	if (!new_context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s: unrecognized SID %u\n",
 		       __func__, new_sid);
@@ -895,7 +903,7 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 
 	index = new_context->type;
 	while (true) {
-		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
+		type = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb->type_val_to_struct_array,
 					  index - 1);
 		BUG_ON(!type);
 
@@ -917,9 +925,9 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 		char *new_name = NULL;
 		u32 length;
 
-		if (!context_struct_to_string(old_context,
+		if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, old_context,
 					      &old_name, &length) &&
-		    !context_struct_to_string(new_context,
+		    !context_struct_to_string(policydb, new_context,
 					      &new_name, &length)) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context,
 				  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
@@ -932,17 +940,17 @@ int security_bounded_transition(u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 		kfree(old_name);
 	}
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static void avd_init(struct av_decision *avd)
+static void avd_init(struct selinux_state *state, struct av_decision *avd)
 {
 	avd->allowed = 0;
 	avd->auditallow = 0;
 	avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
-	avd->seqno = latest_granting;
+	avd->seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
 	avd->flags = 0;
 }
 
@@ -1000,12 +1008,15 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
 	}
 }
 
-void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
-				u32 tsid,
-				u16 orig_tclass,
-				u8 driver,
-				struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
+void security_compute_xperms_decision(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      u32 ssid,
+				      u32 tsid,
+				      u16 orig_tclass,
+				      u8 driver,
+				      struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext, *tcontext;
 	struct avtab_key avkey;
@@ -1020,60 +1031,64 @@ void security_compute_xperms_decision(u32 ssid,
 	memset(xpermd->auditallow->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->auditallow->p));
 	memset(xpermd->dontaudit->p, 0, sizeof(xpermd->dontaudit->p));
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 
-	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb.p_classes.nprim)) {
+	if (unlikely(!tclass || tclass > policydb->p_classes.nprim)) {
 		pr_warn_ratelimited("SELinux:  Invalid class %hu\n", tclass);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = AVTAB_XPERMS;
-	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+	sattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
 				scontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!sattr);
-	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb.type_attr_map_array,
+	tattr = flex_array_get(policydb->type_attr_map_array,
 				tcontext->type - 1);
 	BUG_ON(!tattr);
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(sattr, snode, i) {
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(tattr, tnode, j) {
 			avkey.source_type = i + 1;
 			avkey.target_type = j + 1;
-			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+			for (node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_avtab,
+						      &avkey);
 			     node;
 			     node = avtab_search_node_next(node, avkey.specified))
 				services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node);
 
-			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb.te_cond_avtab,
+			cond_compute_xperms(&policydb->te_cond_avtab,
 						&avkey, xpermd);
 		}
 	}
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	memset(xpermd->allowed->p, 0xff, sizeof(xpermd->allowed->p));
@@ -1091,22 +1106,28 @@ allow:
  * Compute a set of access vector decisions based on the
  * SID pair (@ssid, @tsid) for the permissions in @tclass.
  */
-void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
+void security_compute_av(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u32 ssid,
 			 u32 tsid,
 			 u16 orig_tclass,
 			 struct av_decision *avd,
 			 struct extended_perms *xperms)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	u16 tclass;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	avd_init(avd);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
 	xperms->len = 0;
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
@@ -1114,45 +1135,53 @@ void security_compute_av(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
 		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+	tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 	if (unlikely(orig_tclass && !tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, xperms);
-	map_decision(orig_tclass, avd, policydb.allow_unknown);
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  xperms);
+	map_decision(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass, avd,
+		     policydb->allow_unknown);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
 	goto out;
 }
 
-void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
+void security_compute_av_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+			      u32 ssid,
 			      u32 tsid,
 			      u16 tclass,
 			      struct av_decision *avd)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	avd_init(avd);
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	avd_init(state, avd);
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto allow;
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
@@ -1160,10 +1189,10 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	/* permissive domain? */
-	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.permissive_map, scontext->type))
+	if (ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->permissive_map, scontext->type))
 		avd->flags |= AVD_FLAGS_PERMISSIVE;
 
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
@@ -1171,14 +1200,15 @@ void security_compute_av_user(u32 ssid,
 	}
 
 	if (unlikely(!tclass)) {
-		if (policydb.allow_unknown)
+		if (policydb->allow_unknown)
 			goto allow;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	context_struct_compute_av(scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd, NULL);
+	context_struct_compute_av(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, avd,
+				  NULL);
  out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return;
 allow:
 	avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
@@ -1192,7 +1222,9 @@ allow:
  * to point to this string and set `*scontext_len' to
  * the length of the string.
  */
-static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+static int context_struct_to_string(struct policydb *p,
+				    struct context *context,
+				    char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
 	char *scontextp;
 
@@ -1211,10 +1243,10 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 	}
 
 	/* Compute the size of the context. */
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
-	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(context);
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += strlen(sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1)) + 1;
+	*scontext_len += mls_compute_context_len(p, context);
 
 	if (!scontext)
 		return 0;
@@ -1229,11 +1261,11 @@ static int context_struct_to_string(struct context *context, char **scontext, u3
 	 * Copy the user name, role name and type name into the context.
 	 */
 	scontextp += sprintf(scontextp, "%s:%s:%s",
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
-		sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
+		sym_name(p, SYM_USERS, context->user - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_ROLES, context->role - 1),
+		sym_name(p, SYM_TYPES, context->type - 1));
 
-	mls_sid_to_context(context, &scontextp);
+	mls_sid_to_context(p, context, &scontextp);
 
 	*scontextp = 0;
 
@@ -1249,9 +1281,12 @@ const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid)
 	return initial_sid_to_string[sid];
 }
 
-static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
+static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					u32 sid, char **scontext,
 					u32 *scontext_len, int force)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *context;
 	int rc = 0;
 
@@ -1259,7 +1294,7 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 		*scontext = NULL;
 	*scontext_len  = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
 			char *scontextp;
 
@@ -1280,20 +1315,23 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(u32 sid, char **scontext,
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	if (force)
-		context = sidtab_search_force(&sidtab, sid);
+		context = sidtab_search_force(sidtab, sid);
 	else
-		context = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+		context = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	rc = context_struct_to_string(context, scontext, scontext_len);
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, scontext,
+				      scontext_len);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	return rc;
 
@@ -1309,14 +1347,18 @@ out:
  * into a dynamically allocated string of the correct size.  Set @scontext
  * to point to this string and set @scontext_len to the length of the string.
  */
-int security_sid_to_context(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+int security_sid_to_context(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 0);
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 0);
 }
 
-int security_sid_to_context_force(u32 sid, char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
+int security_sid_to_context_force(struct selinux_state *state, u32 sid,
+				  char **scontext, u32 *scontext_len)
 {
-	return security_sid_to_context_core(sid, scontext, scontext_len, 1);
+	return security_sid_to_context_core(state, sid, scontext,
+					    scontext_len, 1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1404,10 +1446,13 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
+					const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 					u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags,
 					int force)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	char *scontext2, *str = NULL;
 	struct context context;
 	int rc = 0;
@@ -1421,7 +1466,7 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 	if (!scontext2)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		int i;
 
 		for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
@@ -1442,9 +1487,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		if (!str)
 			goto out;
 	}
-
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = string_to_context_struct(&policydb, &sidtab, scontext2,
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+	rc = string_to_context_struct(policydb, sidtab, scontext2,
 				      scontext_len, &context, def_sid);
 	if (rc == -EINVAL && force) {
 		context.str = str;
@@ -1452,10 +1498,10 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 		str = NULL;
 	} else if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &context, sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &context, sid);
 	context_destroy(&context);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 out:
 	kfree(scontext2);
 	kfree(str);
@@ -1474,16 +1520,19 @@ out:
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
+int security_context_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len, u32 *sid,
 			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, SECSID_NULL, gfp, 0);
 }
 
-int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
+int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid(scontext, strlen(scontext), sid, gfp);
+	return security_context_to_sid(state, scontext, strlen(scontext),
+				       sid, gfp);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -1504,51 +1553,56 @@ int security_context_str_to_sid(const char *scontext, u32 *sid, gfp_t gfp)
  * Returns -%EINVAL if the context is invalid, -%ENOMEM if insufficient
  * memory is available, or 0 on success.
  */
-int security_context_to_sid_default(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_default(struct selinux_state *state,
+				    const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				    u32 *sid, u32 def_sid, gfp_t gfp_flags)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, def_sid, gfp_flags, 1);
 }
 
-int security_context_to_sid_force(const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
+int security_context_to_sid_force(struct selinux_state *state,
+				  const char *scontext, u32 scontext_len,
 				  u32 *sid)
 {
-	return security_context_to_sid_core(scontext, scontext_len,
+	return security_context_to_sid_core(state, scontext, scontext_len,
 					    sid, SECSID_NULL, GFP_KERNEL, 1);
 }
 
 static int compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
 	struct context *scontext,
 	struct context *tcontext,
 	u16 tclass,
 	struct context *newcontext)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *s = NULL, *t = NULL, *n = NULL;
 	u32 slen, tlen, nlen;
 
-	if (context_struct_to_string(scontext, &s, &slen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, scontext, &s, &slen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(tcontext, &t, &tlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, tcontext, &t, &tlen))
 		goto out;
-	if (context_struct_to_string(newcontext, &n, &nlen))
+	if (context_struct_to_string(policydb, newcontext, &n, &nlen))
 		goto out;
 	audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 		  "op=security_compute_sid invalid_context=%s"
 		  " scontext=%s"
 		  " tcontext=%s"
 		  " tclass=%s",
-		  n, s, t, sym_name(&policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
+		  n, s, t, sym_name(policydb, SYM_CLASSES, tclass-1));
 out:
 	kfree(s);
 	kfree(t);
 	kfree(n);
-	if (!selinux_enforcing)
+	if (!enforcing_enabled(state))
 		return 0;
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext,
+static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
+				  struct context *newcontext,
 				  u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
 				  const char *objname)
 {
@@ -1560,7 +1614,7 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 	 * like /dev or /var/run.  This bitmap will quickly skip rule searches
 	 * if the ttype does not contain any rules.
 	 */
-	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
+	if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
 		return;
 
 	ft.stype = stype;
@@ -1568,12 +1622,13 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *p, struct context *newcontext
 	ft.tclass = tclass;
 	ft.name = objname;
 
-	otype = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &ft);
+	otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
 	if (otype)
 		newcontext->type = otype->otype;
 }
 
-static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
+static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				u32 ssid,
 				u32 tsid,
 				u16 orig_tclass,
 				u32 specified,
@@ -1581,6 +1636,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 				u32 *out_sid,
 				bool kern)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct class_datum *cladatum = NULL;
 	struct context *scontext = NULL, *tcontext = NULL, newcontext;
 	struct role_trans *roletr = NULL;
@@ -1591,7 +1648,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	int rc = 0;
 	bool sock;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		switch (orig_tclass) {
 		case SECCLASS_PROCESS: /* kernel value */
 			*out_sid = ssid;
@@ -1605,24 +1662,28 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	context_init(&newcontext);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (kern) {
-		tclass = unmap_class(orig_tclass);
+		tclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_tclass);
 		sock = security_is_socket_class(orig_tclass);
 	} else {
 		tclass = orig_tclass;
-		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(tclass));
+		sock = security_is_socket_class(map_class(&state->ss->map,
+							  tclass));
 	}
 
-	scontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ssid);
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	scontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, ssid);
 	if (!scontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, ssid);
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
-	tcontext = sidtab_search(&sidtab, tsid);
+	tcontext = sidtab_search(sidtab, tsid);
 	if (!tcontext) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, tsid);
@@ -1630,8 +1691,8 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb.p_classes.nprim)
-		cladatum = policydb.class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
+	if (tclass && tclass <= policydb->p_classes.nprim)
+		cladatum = policydb->class_val_to_struct[tclass - 1];
 
 	/* Set the user identity. */
 	switch (specified) {
@@ -1657,7 +1718,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_role == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.role = tcontext->role;
 	} else {
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true))
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true))
 			newcontext.role = scontext->role;
 		else
 			newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL;
@@ -1669,7 +1730,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	} else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) {
 		newcontext.type = tcontext->type;
 	} else {
-		if ((tclass == policydb.process_class) || (sock == true)) {
+		if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || (sock == true)) {
 			/* Use the type of process. */
 			newcontext.type = scontext->type;
 		} else {
@@ -1683,11 +1744,11 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 	avkey.target_type = tcontext->type;
 	avkey.target_class = tclass;
 	avkey.specified = specified;
-	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb.te_avtab, &avkey);
+	avdatum = avtab_search(&policydb->te_avtab, &avkey);
 
 	/* If no permanent rule, also check for enabled conditional rules */
 	if (!avdatum) {
-		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb.te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
+		node = avtab_search_node(&policydb->te_cond_avtab, &avkey);
 		for (; node; node = avtab_search_node_next(node, specified)) {
 			if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) {
 				avdatum = &node->datum;
@@ -1703,13 +1764,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	/* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */
 	if (objname)
-		filename_compute_type(&policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
+		filename_compute_type(policydb, &newcontext, scontext->type,
 				      tcontext->type, tclass, objname);
 
 	/* Check for class-specific changes. */
 	if (specified & AVTAB_TRANSITION) {
 		/* Look for a role transition rule. */
-		for (roletr = policydb.role_tr; roletr; roletr = roletr->next) {
+		for (roletr = policydb->role_tr; roletr;
+		     roletr = roletr->next) {
 			if ((roletr->role == scontext->role) &&
 			    (roletr->type == tcontext->type) &&
 			    (roletr->tclass == tclass)) {
@@ -1722,14 +1784,14 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 
 	/* Set the MLS attributes.
 	   This is done last because it may allocate memory. */
-	rc = mls_compute_sid(scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
+	rc = mls_compute_sid(policydb, scontext, tcontext, tclass, specified,
 			     &newcontext, sock);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/* Check the validity of the context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcontext)) {
-		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(scontext,
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcontext)) {
+		rc = compute_sid_handle_invalid_context(state, scontext,
 							tcontext,
 							tclass,
 							&newcontext);
@@ -1737,9 +1799,9 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid,
 			goto out_unlock;
 	}
 	/* Obtain the sid for the context. */
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcontext, out_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcontext);
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -1758,17 +1820,21 @@ out:
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the new SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_transition_sid(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 			    const struct qstr *qstr, u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 				    qstr ? qstr->name : NULL, out_sid, true);
 }
 
-int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
 				 const char *objname, u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_TRANSITION,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_TRANSITION,
 				    objname, out_sid, false);
 }
 
@@ -1785,12 +1851,14 @@ int security_transition_sid_user(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
+int security_member_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
+	return security_compute_sid(state, ssid, tsid, tclass,
+				    AVTAB_MEMBER, NULL,
 				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
@@ -1807,12 +1875,14 @@ int security_member_sid(u32 ssid,
  * if insufficient memory is available, or %0 if the SID was
  * computed successfully.
  */
-int security_change_sid(u32 ssid,
+int security_change_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			u32 ssid,
 			u32 tsid,
 			u16 tclass,
 			u32 *out_sid)
 {
-	return security_compute_sid(ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
+	return security_compute_sid(state,
+				    ssid, tsid, tclass, AVTAB_CHANGE, NULL,
 				    out_sid, false);
 }
 
@@ -1829,15 +1899,18 @@ static int clone_sid(u32 sid,
 		return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context)
+static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(
+	struct selinux_state *state,
+	struct context *context)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	char *s;
 	u32 len;
 
-	if (selinux_enforcing)
+	if (enforcing_enabled(state))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (!context_struct_to_string(context, &s, &len)) {
+	if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, context, &s, &len)) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  Context %s would be invalid if enforcing\n", s);
 		kfree(s);
 	}
@@ -1845,6 +1918,7 @@ static inline int convert_context_handle_invalid_context(struct context *context
 }
 
 struct convert_context_args {
+	struct selinux_state *state;
 	struct policydb *oldp;
 	struct policydb *newp;
 };
@@ -1971,7 +2045,8 @@ static int convert_context(u32 key,
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
 	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(args->newp, c)) {
-		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&oldc);
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(args->state,
+							    &oldc);
 		if (rc)
 			goto bad;
 	}
@@ -1983,7 +2058,7 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 bad:
 	/* Map old representation to string and save it. */
-	rc = context_struct_to_string(&oldc, &s, &len);
+	rc = context_struct_to_string(args->oldp, &oldc, &s, &len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 	context_destroy(&oldc);
@@ -1996,39 +2071,29 @@ bad:
 	goto out;
 }
 
-static void security_load_policycaps(void)
+static void security_load_policycaps(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	unsigned int i;
 	struct ebitmap_node *node;
 
-	selinux_policycap_netpeer = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER);
-	selinux_policycap_openperm = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM);
-	selinux_policycap_extsockclass = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-					  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS);
-	selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-						  POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK);
-	selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel =
-		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL);
-	selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition =
-		ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps,
-				POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION);
+	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(state->policycap); i++)
+		state->policycap[i] = ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names); i++)
 		pr_info("SELinux:  policy capability %s=%d\n",
 			selinux_policycap_names[i],
-			ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, i));
+			ebitmap_get_bit(&p->policycaps, i));
 
-	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&policydb.policycaps, node, i) {
+	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&p->policycaps, node, i) {
 		if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names))
 			pr_info("SELinux:  unknown policy capability %u\n",
 				i);
 	}
 }
 
-static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *newpolicydb);
 
 /**
  * security_load_policy - Load a security policy configuration.
@@ -2040,14 +2105,16 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p);
  * This function will flush the access vector cache after
  * loading the new policy.
  */
-int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
+int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void *data, size_t len)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct policydb *oldpolicydb, *newpolicydb;
 	struct sidtab oldsidtab, newsidtab;
-	struct selinux_mapping *oldmap, *map = NULL;
+	struct selinux_mapping *oldmapping;
+	struct selinux_map newmap;
 	struct convert_context_args args;
 	u32 seqno;
-	u16 map_size;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct policy_file file = { data, len }, *fp = &file;
 
@@ -2058,53 +2125,42 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	}
 	newpolicydb = oldpolicydb + 1;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
-		avtab_cache_init();
-		ebitmap_cache_init();
-		hashtab_cache_init();
-		rc = policydb_read(&policydb, fp);
-		if (rc) {
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		rc = policydb_read(policydb, fp);
+		if (rc)
 			goto out;
-		}
 
-		policydb.len = len;
-		rc = selinux_set_mapping(&policydb, secclass_map,
-					 &current_mapping,
-					 &current_mapping_size);
+		policydb->len = len;
+		rc = selinux_set_mapping(policydb, secclass_map,
+					 &state->ss->map);
 		if (rc) {
-			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		rc = policydb_load_isids(&policydb, &sidtab);
+		rc = policydb_load_isids(policydb, sidtab);
 		if (rc) {
-			policydb_destroy(&policydb);
-			avtab_cache_destroy();
-			ebitmap_cache_destroy();
-			hashtab_cache_destroy();
+			policydb_destroy(policydb);
 			goto out;
 		}
 
-		security_load_policycaps();
-		ss_initialized = 1;
-		seqno = ++latest_granting;
+		security_load_policycaps(state);
+		state->initialized = 1;
+		seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 		selinux_complete_init();
-		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 #if 0
-	sidtab_hash_eval(&sidtab, "sids");
+	sidtab_hash_eval(sidtab, "sids");
 #endif
 
 	rc = policydb_read(newpolicydb, fp);
@@ -2113,9 +2169,9 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 
 	newpolicydb->len = len;
 	/* If switching between different policy types, log MLS status */
-	if (policydb.mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+	if (policydb->mls_enabled && !newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabling MLS support...\n");
-	else if (!policydb.mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
+	else if (!policydb->mls_enabled && newpolicydb->mls_enabled)
 		printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Enabling MLS support...\n");
 
 	rc = policydb_load_isids(newpolicydb, &newsidtab);
@@ -2125,20 +2181,20 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &map, &map_size);
+	rc = selinux_set_mapping(newpolicydb, secclass_map, &newmap);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	rc = security_preserve_bools(newpolicydb);
+	rc = security_preserve_bools(state, newpolicydb);
 	if (rc) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to preserve booleans\n");
 		goto err;
 	}
 
 	/* Clone the SID table. */
-	sidtab_shutdown(&sidtab);
+	sidtab_shutdown(sidtab);
 
-	rc = sidtab_map(&sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
+	rc = sidtab_map(sidtab, clone_sid, &newsidtab);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
@@ -2146,7 +2202,8 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	 * Convert the internal representations of contexts
 	 * in the new SID table.
 	 */
-	args.oldp = &policydb;
+	args.state = state;
+	args.oldp = policydb;
 	args.newp = newpolicydb;
 	rc = sidtab_map(&newsidtab, convert_context, &args);
 	if (rc) {
@@ -2157,28 +2214,28 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	}
 
 	/* Save the old policydb and SID table to free later. */
-	memcpy(oldpolicydb, &policydb, sizeof(policydb));
-	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, &sidtab);
+	memcpy(oldpolicydb, policydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(&oldsidtab, sidtab);
 
 	/* Install the new policydb and SID table. */
-	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
-	memcpy(&policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(policydb));
-	sidtab_set(&sidtab, &newsidtab);
-	security_load_policycaps();
-	oldmap = current_mapping;
-	current_mapping = map;
-	current_mapping_size = map_size;
-	seqno = ++latest_granting;
-	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	memcpy(policydb, newpolicydb, sizeof(*policydb));
+	sidtab_set(sidtab, &newsidtab);
+	security_load_policycaps(state);
+	oldmapping = state->ss->map.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.mapping = newmap.mapping;
+	state->ss->map.size = newmap.size;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	/* Free the old policydb and SID table. */
 	policydb_destroy(oldpolicydb);
 	sidtab_destroy(&oldsidtab);
-	kfree(oldmap);
+	kfree(oldmapping);
 
-	avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+	avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
 	selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-	selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+	selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 	selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate();
 	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 
@@ -2186,7 +2243,7 @@ int security_load_policy(void *data, size_t len)
 	goto out;
 
 err:
-	kfree(map);
+	kfree(newmap.mapping);
 	sidtab_destroy(&newsidtab);
 	policydb_destroy(newpolicydb);
 
@@ -2195,13 +2252,14 @@ out:
 	return rc;
 }
 
-size_t security_policydb_len(void)
+size_t security_policydb_len(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
+	struct policydb *p = &state->ss->policydb;
 	size_t len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	len = policydb.len;
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	len = p->len;
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return len;
 }
@@ -2212,14 +2270,20 @@ size_t security_policydb_len(void)
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_port_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_PORT];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.port.protocol == protocol &&
 		    c->u.port.low_port <= port &&
@@ -2230,7 +2294,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2242,7 +2306,7 @@ int security_port_sid(u8 protocol, u16 port, u32 *out_sid)
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2252,14 +2316,20 @@ out:
  * @pkey_num: pkey number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_ib_pkey_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBPKEY];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.ibpkey.low_pkey <= pkey_num &&
 		    c->u.ibpkey.high_pkey >= pkey_num &&
@@ -2271,7 +2341,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2282,7 +2352,7 @@ int security_ib_pkey_sid(u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey_num, u32 *out_sid)
 		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2292,14 +2362,20 @@ out:
  * @port: port number
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
+int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	int rc = 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_IBENDPORT];
 	while (c) {
 		if (c->u.ibendport.port == port_num &&
 		    !strncmp(c->u.ibendport.dev_name,
@@ -2312,7 +2388,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2323,7 +2399,7 @@ int security_ib_endport_sid(const char *dev_name, u8 port_num, u32 *out_sid)
 		*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2332,14 +2408,20 @@ out:
  * @name: interface name
  * @if_sid: interface SID
  */
-int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
+int security_netif_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NETIF];
 	while (c) {
 		if (strcmp(name, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
@@ -2348,12 +2430,12 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						  &c->context[0],
 						  &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[1],
 						   &c->sid[1]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2364,7 +2446,7 @@ int security_netif_sid(char *name, u32 *if_sid)
 		*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2388,15 +2470,21 @@ static int match_ipv6_addrmask(u32 *input, u32 *addr, u32 *mask)
  * @addrlen: address length in bytes
  * @out_sid: security identifier
  */
-int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
+int security_node_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		      u16 domain,
 		      void *addrp,
 		      u32 addrlen,
 		      u32 *out_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	switch (domain) {
 	case AF_INET: {
@@ -2408,7 +2496,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 
 		addr = *((u32 *)addrp);
 
-		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE];
 		while (c) {
 			if (c->u.node.addr == (addr & c->u.node.mask))
 				break;
@@ -2421,7 +2509,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 		rc = -EINVAL;
 		if (addrlen != sizeof(u64) * 2)
 			goto out;
-		c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
+		c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_NODE6];
 		while (c) {
 			if (match_ipv6_addrmask(addrp, c->u.node6.addr,
 						c->u.node6.mask))
@@ -2438,7 +2526,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 
 	if (c) {
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab,
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
 						   &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
@@ -2451,7 +2539,7 @@ int security_node_sid(u16 domain,
 
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -2471,11 +2559,14 @@ out:
  * number of elements in the array.
  */
 
-int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
+int security_get_user_sids(struct selinux_state *state,
+			   u32 fromsid,
 			   char *username,
 			   u32 **sids,
 			   u32 *nel)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	struct context *fromcon, usercon;
 	u32 *mysids = NULL, *mysids2, sid;
 	u32 mynel = 0, maxnel = SIDS_NEL;
@@ -2487,20 +2578,23 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 	*sids = NULL;
 	*nel = 0;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		goto out;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 
 	context_init(&usercon);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	fromcon = sidtab_search(&sidtab, fromsid);
+	fromcon = sidtab_search(sidtab, fromsid);
 	if (!fromcon)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	user = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, username);
+	user = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, username);
 	if (!user)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
@@ -2512,15 +2606,16 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&user->roles, rnode, i) {
-		role = policydb.role_val_to_struct[i];
+		role = policydb->role_val_to_struct[i];
 		usercon.role = i + 1;
 		ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&role->types, tnode, j) {
 			usercon.type = j + 1;
 
-			if (mls_setup_user_range(fromcon, user, &usercon))
+			if (mls_setup_user_range(policydb, fromcon, user,
+						 &usercon))
 				continue;
 
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &usercon, &sid);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out_unlock;
 			if (mynel < maxnel) {
@@ -2540,7 +2635,7 @@ int security_get_user_sids(u32 fromsid,
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (rc || !mynel) {
 		kfree(mysids);
 		goto out;
@@ -2554,7 +2649,8 @@ out_unlock:
 	}
 	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < mynel; i++) {
 		struct av_decision dummy_avd;
-		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(fromsid, mysids[i],
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(state,
+					  fromsid, mysids[i],
 					  SECCLASS_PROCESS, /* kernel value */
 					  PROCESS__TRANSITION, AVC_STRICT,
 					  &dummy_avd);
@@ -2583,11 +2679,14 @@ out:
  *
  * The caller must acquire the policy_rwlock before calling this function.
  */
-static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				       const char *fstype,
 				       char *path,
 				       u16 orig_sclass,
 				       u32 *sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int len;
 	u16 sclass;
 	struct genfs *genfs;
@@ -2597,10 +2696,10 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 	while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
 		path++;
 
-	sclass = unmap_class(orig_sclass);
+	sclass = unmap_class(&state->ss->map, orig_sclass);
 	*sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 
-	for (genfs = policydb.genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
+	for (genfs = policydb->genfs; genfs; genfs = genfs->next) {
 		cmp = strcmp(fstype, genfs->fstype);
 		if (cmp <= 0)
 			break;
@@ -2622,7 +2721,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
 		goto out;
 
 	if (!c->sid[0]) {
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -2643,16 +2742,17 @@ out:
  * Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
  * it afterward.
  */
-int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
+int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       const char *fstype,
 		       char *path,
 		       u16 orig_sclass,
 		       u32 *sid)
 {
 	int retval;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	retval = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	retval = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, path, orig_sclass, sid);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return retval;
 }
 
@@ -2660,16 +2760,21 @@ int security_genfs_sid(const char *fstype,
  * security_fs_use - Determine how to handle labeling for a filesystem.
  * @sb: superblock in question
  */
-int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
+int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab;
 	int rc = 0;
 	struct ocontext *c;
 	struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 	const char *fstype = sb->s_type->name;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	c = policydb.ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
+
+	c = policydb->ocontexts[OCON_FSUSE];
 	while (c) {
 		if (strcmp(fstype, c->u.name) == 0)
 			break;
@@ -2679,14 +2784,14 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 	if (c) {
 		sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
 		if (!c->sid[0]) {
-			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &c->context[0],
+			rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
 						   &c->sid[0]);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
 	} else {
-		rc = __security_genfs_sid(fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
+		rc = __security_genfs_sid(state, fstype, "/", SECCLASS_DIR,
 					  &sbsec->sid);
 		if (rc) {
 			sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE;
@@ -2697,20 +2802,32 @@ int security_fs_use(struct super_block *sb)
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+		       int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*len = 0;
+		*names = NULL;
+		*values = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+
 	*names = NULL;
 	*values = NULL;
 
 	rc = 0;
-	*len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	*len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (!*len)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -2725,16 +2842,17 @@ int security_get_bools(int *len, char ***names, int **values)
 		goto err;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < *len; i++) {
-		(*values)[i] = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
+		(*values)[i] = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state;
 
 		rc = -ENOMEM;
-		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i), GFP_ATOMIC);
+		(*names)[i] = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				      GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (!(*names)[i])
 			goto err;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 err:
 	if (*names) {
@@ -2746,90 +2864,98 @@ err:
 }
 
 
-int security_set_bools(int len, int *values)
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int i, rc;
 	int lenp, seqno = 0;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	write_lock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
-	lenp = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	lenp = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (len != lenp)
 		goto out;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-		if (!!values[i] != policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
+		if (!!values[i] != policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state) {
 			audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC,
 				AUDIT_MAC_CONFIG_CHANGE,
 				"bool=%s val=%d old_val=%d auid=%u ses=%u",
-				sym_name(&policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
+				sym_name(policydb, SYM_BOOLS, i),
 				!!values[i],
-				policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
+				policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state,
 				from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)),
 				audit_get_sessionid(current));
 		}
 		if (values[i])
-			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 1;
 		else
-			policydb.bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
+			policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
 	}
 
-	for (cur = policydb.cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
-		rc = evaluate_cond_node(&policydb, cur);
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	seqno = ++latest_granting;
+	seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	write_unlock_irq(&policy_rwlock);
+	write_unlock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	if (!rc) {
-		avc_ss_reset(seqno);
+		avc_ss_reset(state->avc, seqno);
 		selnl_notify_policyload(seqno);
-		selinux_status_update_policyload(seqno);
+		selinux_status_update_policyload(state, seqno);
 		selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 	}
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_bool_value(int index)
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
+			    int index)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb;
 	int rc;
 	int len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+
+	policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 
 	rc = -EFAULT;
-	len = policydb.p_bools.nprim;
+	len = policydb->p_bools.nprim;
 	if (index >= len)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = policydb.bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
+	rc = policydb->bool_val_to_struct[index]->state;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-static int security_preserve_bools(struct policydb *p)
+static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct policydb *policydb)
 {
 	int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
 	char **bnames = NULL;
 	struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
 	struct cond_node *cur;
 
-	rc = security_get_bools(&nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
+	rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
 	if (rc)
 		goto out;
 	for (i = 0; i < nbools; i++) {
-		booldatum = hashtab_search(p->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
+		booldatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_bools.table, bnames[i]);
 		if (booldatum)
 			booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
 	}
-	for (cur = p->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
-		rc = evaluate_cond_node(p, cur);
+	for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+		rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -2848,8 +2974,11 @@ out:
  * security_sid_mls_copy() - computes a new sid based on the given
  * sid and the mls portion of mls_sid.
  */
-int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
+int security_sid_mls_copy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			  u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	struct context *context1;
 	struct context *context2;
 	struct context newcon;
@@ -2858,17 +2987,17 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 	int rc;
 
 	rc = 0;
-	if (!ss_initialized || !policydb.mls_enabled) {
+	if (!state->initialized || !policydb->mls_enabled) {
 		*new_sid = sid;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	context_init(&newcon);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	context1 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	context1 = sidtab_search(sidtab, sid);
 	if (!context1) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, sid);
@@ -2876,7 +3005,7 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 	}
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	context2 = sidtab_search(&sidtab, mls_sid);
+	context2 = sidtab_search(sidtab, mls_sid);
 	if (!context2) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			__func__, mls_sid);
@@ -2891,10 +3020,11 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
 	/* Check the validity of the new context. */
-	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(&policydb, &newcon)) {
-		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(&newcon);
+	if (!policydb_context_isvalid(policydb, &newcon)) {
+		rc = convert_context_handle_invalid_context(state, &newcon);
 		if (rc) {
-			if (!context_struct_to_string(&newcon, &s, &len)) {
+			if (!context_struct_to_string(policydb, &newcon, &s,
+						      &len)) {
 				audit_log(current->audit_context,
 					  GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
 					  "op=security_sid_mls_copy "
@@ -2905,9 +3035,9 @@ int security_sid_mls_copy(u32 sid, u32 mls_sid, u32 *new_sid)
 		}
 	}
 
-	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
+	rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &newcon, new_sid);
 out_unlock:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	context_destroy(&newcon);
 out:
 	return rc;
@@ -2933,10 +3063,13 @@ out:
  *   multiple, inconsistent labels |    -<errno>     |    SECSID_NULL
  *
  */
-int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
+int security_net_peersid_resolve(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 				 u32 xfrm_sid,
 				 u32 *peer_sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *nlbl_ctx;
 	struct context *xfrm_ctx;
@@ -2958,23 +3091,25 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	/* we don't need to check ss_initialized here since the only way both
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check initialized here since the only way both
 	 * nlbl_sid and xfrm_sid are not equal to SECSID_NULL would be if the
-	 * security server was initialized and ss_initialized was true */
-	if (!policydb.mls_enabled)
+	 * security server was initialized and state->initialized was true.
+	 */
+	if (!policydb->mls_enabled)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, nlbl_sid);
+	nlbl_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, nlbl_sid);
 	if (!nlbl_ctx) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, nlbl_sid);
 		goto out;
 	}
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, xfrm_sid);
+	xfrm_ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, xfrm_sid);
 	if (!xfrm_ctx) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized SID %d\n",
 		       __func__, xfrm_sid);
@@ -2991,7 +3126,7 @@ int security_net_peersid_resolve(u32 nlbl_sid, u32 nlbl_type,
 	 * expressive */
 	*peer_sid = xfrm_sid;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3008,19 +3143,27 @@ static int get_classes_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
+int security_get_classes(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	if (!state->initialized) {
+		*nclasses = 0;
+		*classes = NULL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	*nclasses = policydb.p_classes.nprim;
+	*nclasses = policydb->p_classes.nprim;
 	*classes = kcalloc(*nclasses, sizeof(**classes), GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (!*classes)
 		goto out;
 
-	rc = hashtab_map(policydb.p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
+	rc = hashtab_map(policydb->p_classes.table, get_classes_callback,
 			*classes);
 	if (rc) {
 		int i;
@@ -3030,7 +3173,7 @@ int security_get_classes(char ***classes, int *nclasses)
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3047,15 +3190,17 @@ static int get_permissions_callback(void *k, void *d, void *args)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
+int security_get_permissions(struct selinux_state *state,
+			     char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc, i;
 	struct class_datum *match;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -EINVAL;
-	match = hashtab_search(policydb.p_classes.table, class);
+	match = hashtab_search(policydb->p_classes.table, class);
 	if (!match) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized class %s\n",
 			__func__, class);
@@ -3081,25 +3226,25 @@ int security_get_permissions(char *class, char ***perms, int *nperms)
 		goto err;
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 
 err:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	for (i = 0; i < *nperms; i++)
 		kfree((*perms)[i]);
 	kfree(*perms);
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int security_get_reject_unknown(void)
+int security_get_reject_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.reject_unknown;
+	return state->ss->policydb.reject_unknown;
 }
 
-int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
+int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
-	return policydb.allow_unknown;
+	return state->ss->policydb.allow_unknown;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3112,13 +3257,15 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(void)
  * supported, false (0) if it isn't supported.
  *
  */
-int security_policycap_supported(unsigned int req_cap)
+int security_policycap_supported(struct selinux_state *state,
+				 unsigned int req_cap)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb.policycaps, req_cap);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->policycaps, req_cap);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	return rc;
 }
@@ -3140,6 +3287,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 
 int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 {
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
 	struct role_datum *roledatum;
 	struct type_datum *typedatum;
@@ -3149,7 +3298,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 	*rule = NULL;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	switch (field) {
@@ -3182,15 +3331,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
+	tmprule->au_seqno = state->ss->latest_granting;
 
 	switch (field) {
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
+		userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_users.table, rulestr);
 		if (!userdatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
@@ -3198,7 +3347,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
+		roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_roles.table, rulestr);
 		if (!roledatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
@@ -3206,7 +3355,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
 		rc = -EINVAL;
-		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
+		typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb->p_types.table, rulestr);
 		if (!typedatum)
 			goto out;
 		tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
@@ -3215,14 +3364,15 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 	case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
 	case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
-		rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		rc = mls_from_string(policydb, rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt,
+				     GFP_ATOMIC);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out;
 		break;
 	}
 	rc = 0;
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc) {
 		selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
@@ -3262,6 +3412,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule)
 int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 			     struct audit_context *actx)
 {
+	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct context *ctxt;
 	struct mls_level *level;
 	struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = vrule;
@@ -3272,14 +3423,14 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 		return -ENOENT;
 	}
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
-	if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
+	if (rule->au_seqno < state->ss->latest_granting) {
 		match = -ESTALE;
 		goto out;
 	}
 
-	ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	ctxt = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
 	if (unlikely(!ctxt)) {
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
 			  sid);
@@ -3363,7 +3514,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
 	}
 
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return match;
 }
 
@@ -3437,19 +3588,22 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
  * failure.
  *
  */
-int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
+int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 				   u32 *sid)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
+	struct sidtab *sidtab = &state->ss->sidtab;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *ctx;
 	struct context ctx_new;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized) {
+	if (!state->initialized) {
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE)
 		*sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;
@@ -3457,7 +3611,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		*sid = secattr->attr.secid;
 	else if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) {
 		rc = -EIDRM;
-		ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
+		ctx = sidtab_search(sidtab, SECINITSID_NETMSG);
 		if (ctx == NULL)
 			goto out;
 
@@ -3465,17 +3619,17 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 		ctx_new.user = ctx->user;
 		ctx_new.role = ctx->role;
 		ctx_new.type = ctx->type;
-		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(&ctx_new, secattr);
+		mls_import_netlbl_lvl(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
 		if (secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) {
-			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(&ctx_new, secattr);
+			rc = mls_import_netlbl_cat(policydb, &ctx_new, secattr);
 			if (rc)
 				goto out;
 		}
 		rc = -EIDRM;
-		if (!mls_context_isvalid(&policydb, &ctx_new))
+		if (!mls_context_isvalid(policydb, &ctx_new))
 			goto out_free;
 
-		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(&sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
+		rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &ctx_new, sid);
 		if (rc)
 			goto out_free;
 
@@ -3485,12 +3639,12 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
 	} else
 		*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return 0;
 out_free:
 	ebitmap_destroy(&ctx_new.range.level[0].cat);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 
@@ -3504,33 +3658,35 @@ out:
  * Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
  *
  */
-int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
+int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,
+				   u32 sid, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 	struct context *ctx;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return 0;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	rc = -ENOENT;
-	ctx = sidtab_search(&sidtab, sid);
+	ctx = sidtab_search(&state->ss->sidtab, sid);
 	if (ctx == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	rc = -ENOMEM;
-	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(&policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
+	secattr->domain = kstrdup(sym_name(policydb, SYM_TYPES, ctx->type - 1),
 				  GFP_ATOMIC);
 	if (secattr->domain == NULL)
 		goto out;
 
 	secattr->attr.secid = sid;
 	secattr->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY | NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID;
-	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(ctx, secattr);
-	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(ctx, secattr);
+	mls_export_netlbl_lvl(policydb, ctx, secattr);
+	rc = mls_export_netlbl_cat(policydb, ctx, secattr);
 out:
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 	return rc;
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
@@ -3541,15 +3697,17 @@ out:
  * @len: length of data in bytes
  *
  */
-int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
+int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
+			 void **data, size_t *len)
 {
+	struct policydb *policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
 	int rc;
 	struct policy_file fp;
 
-	if (!ss_initialized)
+	if (!state->initialized)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*len = security_policydb_len();
+	*len = security_policydb_len(state);
 
 	*data = vmalloc_user(*len);
 	if (!*data)
@@ -3558,9 +3716,9 @@ int security_read_policy(void **data, size_t *len)
 	fp.data = *data;
 	fp.len = *len;
 
-	read_lock(&policy_rwlock);
-	rc = policydb_write(&policydb, &fp);
-	read_unlock(&policy_rwlock);
+	read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
+	rc = policydb_write(policydb, &fp);
+	read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
 
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index 356bdd36cf6d..24c7bdcc8075 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -10,7 +10,28 @@
 #include "policydb.h"
 #include "sidtab.h"
 
-extern struct policydb policydb;
+/* Mapping for a single class */
+struct selinux_mapping {
+	u16 value; /* policy value for class */
+	unsigned int num_perms; /* number of permissions in class */
+	u32 perms[sizeof(u32) * 8]; /* policy values for permissions */
+};
+
+/* Map for all of the classes, with array size */
+struct selinux_map {
+	struct selinux_mapping *mapping; /* indexed by class */
+	u16 size; /* array size of mapping */
+};
+
+struct selinux_ss {
+	struct sidtab sidtab;
+	struct policydb policydb;
+	rwlock_t policy_rwlock;
+	u32 latest_granting;
+	struct selinux_map map;
+	struct page *status_page;
+	struct mutex status_lock;
+};
 
 void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
 				struct avtab_node *node);
@@ -19,4 +40,3 @@ void services_compute_xperms_decision(struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd,
 					struct avtab_node *node);
 
 #endif	/* _SS_SERVICES_H_ */
-
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
index d982365f9d1a..a121de45ac0e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/status.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/status.c
@@ -35,8 +35,6 @@
  * In most cases, application shall confirm the kernel status is not
  * changed without any system call invocations.
  */
-static struct page *selinux_status_page;
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
 
 /*
  * selinux_kernel_status_page
@@ -44,21 +42,21 @@ static DEFINE_MUTEX(selinux_status_lock);
  * It returns a reference to selinux_status_page. If the status page is
  * not allocated yet, it also tries to allocate it at the first time.
  */
-struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
+struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 	struct page		       *result = NULL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (!selinux_status_page) {
-		selinux_status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (!state->ss->status_page) {
+		state->ss->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
 
-		if (selinux_status_page) {
-			status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+		if (state->ss->status_page) {
+			status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 			status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
 			status->sequence = 0;
-			status->enforcing = selinux_enforcing;
+			status->enforcing = enforcing_enabled(state);
 			/*
 			 * NOTE: the next policyload event shall set
 			 * a positive value on the status->policyload,
@@ -66,11 +64,12 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
 			 * So, application can know it was updated.
 			 */
 			status->policyload = 0;
-			status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+			status->deny_unknown =
+				!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 		}
 	}
-	result = selinux_status_page;
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	result = state->ss->status_page;
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 
 	return result;
 }
@@ -80,13 +79,14 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(void)
  *
  * It updates status of the current enforcing/permissive mode.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
+void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int enforcing)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (selinux_status_page) {
-		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -105,22 +105,23 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(int enforcing)
  * It updates status of the times of policy reloaded, and current
  * setting of deny_unknown.
  */
-void selinux_status_update_policyload(int seqno)
+void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
+				      int seqno)
 {
 	struct selinux_kernel_status   *status;
 
-	mutex_lock(&selinux_status_lock);
-	if (selinux_status_page) {
-		status = page_address(selinux_status_page);
+	mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+	if (state->ss->status_page) {
+		status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
 
 		status->sequence++;
 		smp_wmb();
 
 		status->policyload = seqno;
-		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown();
+		status->deny_unknown = !security_get_allow_unknown(state);
 
 		smp_wmb();
 		status->sequence++;
 	}
-	mutex_unlock(&selinux_status_lock);
+	mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
 }
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 928188902901..91dc3783ed94 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -101,11 +101,13 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_alloc_user(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp,
 	ctx->ctx_len = str_len;
 	memcpy(ctx->ctx_str, &uctx[1], str_len);
 	ctx->ctx_str[str_len] = '\0';
-	rc = security_context_to_sid(ctx->ctx_str, str_len, &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
+	rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, ctx->ctx_str, str_len,
+				     &ctx->ctx_sid, gfp);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT, NULL);
 	if (rc)
 		goto err;
@@ -141,7 +143,8 @@ static int selinux_xfrm_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx)
 	if (!ctx)
 		return 0;
 
-	return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    tsec->sid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SETCONTEXT,
 			    NULL);
 }
@@ -163,7 +166,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
 	if (!selinux_authorizable_ctx(ctx))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = avc_has_perm(fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
+	rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			  fl_secid, ctx->ctx_sid,
 			  SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__POLMATCH, NULL);
 	return (rc == -EACCES ? -ESRCH : rc);
 }
@@ -202,7 +206,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	/* We don't need a separate SA Vs. policy polmatch check since the SA
 	 * is now of the same label as the flow and a flow Vs. policy polmatch
 	 * check had already happened in selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() above. */
-	return (avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
+	return (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			     fl->flowi_secid, state_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
 			    NULL) ? 0 : 1);
 }
@@ -352,7 +357,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x,
 	if (secid == 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	rc = security_sid_to_context(secid, &ctx_str, &str_len);
+	rc = security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, secid, &ctx_str,
+				     &str_len);
 	if (rc)
 		return rc;
 
@@ -420,7 +426,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
 	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
 	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
+			    sk_sid, peer_sid,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__RECVFROM, ad);
 }
 
@@ -463,6 +470,6 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 sk_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	/* This check even when there's no association involved is intended,
 	 * according to Trent Jaeger, to make sure a process can't engage in
 	 * non-IPsec communication unless explicitly allowed by policy. */
-	return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sk_sid, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
 			    SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, ad);
 }