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author | Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2016-06-01 20:14:01 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> | 2016-06-30 07:14:20 +0200 |
commit | 0260643ce8047d2a58f76222d09f161149622465 (patch) | |
tree | 2d08485e5c54c13da4111c5932dadb5ea931a280 /security | |
parent | integrity: add measured_pcrs field to integrity cache (diff) | |
download | linux-0260643ce8047d2a58f76222d09f161149622465.tar.xz linux-0260643ce8047d2a58f76222d09f161149622465.zip |
ima: add policy support for extending different pcrs
This patch defines a new IMA measurement policy rule option "pcr=",
which allows extending different PCRs on a per rule basis. For example,
the system independent files could extend the default IMA Kconfig
specified PCR, while the system dependent files could extend a different
PCR.
The following is an example of this usage with an SELinux policy; the
rule would extend PCR 11 with system configuration files:
measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ obj_type=system_conf_t pcr=11
Changelog v3:
- FIELD_SIZEOF returns bytes, not bits. Fixed INVALID_PCR
Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 0f887a564a29..3d35fbe3be0b 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080 +#define IMA_PCR 0x0100 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 #define AUDIT 0x0040 +#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ + (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) + int ima_policy_flag; static int temp_ima_appraise; @@ -60,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { u8 fsuuid[16]; kuid_t uid; kuid_t fowner; + int pcr; struct { void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */ void *args_p; /* audit value */ @@ -478,7 +483,8 @@ enum { Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, - Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio + Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio, + Opt_pcr }; static match_table_t policy_tokens = { @@ -502,6 +508,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, + {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} }; @@ -774,6 +781,20 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case Opt_permit_directio: entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO; break; + case Opt_pcr: + if (entry->action != MEASURE) { + result = -EINVAL; + break; + } + ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from); + + result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr); + if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr)) + result = -EINVAL; + else + entry->flags |= IMA_PCR; + + break; case Opt_err: ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p); result = -EINVAL; @@ -1011,6 +1032,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, " "); } + if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) { + snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr); + seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf); + seq_puts(m, " "); + } + if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) { seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", entry->fsuuid); seq_puts(m, " "); |