Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240617' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm

Pull lsm fix from Paul Moore:
 "A single LSM/IMA patch to fix a problem caused by sleeping while in a
  RCU critical section"

* tag 'lsm-pr-20240617' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
  ima: Avoid blocking in RCU read-side critical section

8 files changed, 27 insertions, 17 deletions

diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 	}
 }
 
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct aa_audit_rule *rule;
 
@@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp);
 
 	if (!rule)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
 	/* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */
 	rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr,
-				     GFP_KERNEL, true, false);
+				     gfp, true, false);
 	if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) {
 		int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label);
 		aa_audit_rule_free(rule);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error)
 }
 
 void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule);
-int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule);
+int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp);
 int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule);
 int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule);
 
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig)
 #else
 
 static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
-				       void **lsmrule)
+				       void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	kfree(entry);
 }
 
-static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
+static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
+						gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 	int i;
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	 * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only
 	 * lsm rules can change
 	 */
-	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL);
+	nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp);
 	if (!nentry)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 
 		ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal,
 				     nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
-				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+				     &nentry->lsm[i].rule,
+				     gfp);
 		if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule)
 			pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 				nentry->lsm[i].args_p);
@@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
 	int i;
 	struct ima_rule_entry *nentry;
 
-	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry);
+	nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!nentry)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
@@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ retry:
 		}
 
 		if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) {
-			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule);
+			lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC);
 			if (lsm_rule) {
 				rule_reinitialized = true;
 				goto retry;
@@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
 	entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
 	result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal,
 				      entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
-				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+				      &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule,
+				      GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
 		pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n",
 			entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e5da848c50b9..e5ca08789f74 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -5332,15 +5332,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,
  * @op: rule operator
  * @rulestr: rule context
  * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct
+ * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
  *
  * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure.
  *
  * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of
  *         an invalid rule.
  */
-int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule,
+			     gfp_t gfp)
 {
-	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+	return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp);
 }
 
 /**
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h
@@ -21,12 +21,14 @@
  *	@op: the operator the rule uses
  *	@rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
  *	@rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *	@gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc
  *
  *	Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not.  On success, the rule structure
  *	will be allocated internally.  The caller must free this structure with
  *	selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
  */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule,
+			    gfp_t gfp);
 
 /**
  *	selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index f20e1968b7f7..e33e55384b75 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -3507,7 +3507,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
 	}
 }
 
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+			    gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
 	struct selinux_policy *policy;
@@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+	tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp);
 	if (!tmprule)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 70ba2841e181..f5cbec1e6a92 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4693,11 +4693,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred,
  * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
  * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
  * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
  *
  * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
  * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
  */
-static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule,
+				 gfp_t gfp)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp;
 	char **rule = (char **)vrule;