Merge branch 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security

Pull tpm updates from James Morris:

 - Clean up the transmission flow

   Cleaned up the whole transmission flow. Locking of the chip is now
   done in the level of tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops() instead
   taking the chip lock inside tpm_transmit(). The nested calls inside
   tpm_transmit(), used with the resource manager, have been refactored
   out.

   Should make easier to perform more complex transactions with the TPM
   without making the subsystem a bigger mess (e.g. encrypted channel
   patches by James Bottomley).

 - PPI 1.3 support

   TPM PPI 1.3 introduces an additional optional command parameter that
   may be needed for some commands. Display the parameter if the command
   requires such a parameter. Only command 23 (SetPCRBanks) needs one.

   The PPI request file will show output like this then:

      # echo "23 16" > request
      # cat request
      23 16

      # echo "5" > request
      # cat request
      5

 - Extend all PCR banks in IMA

   Instead of static PCR banks array, the array of available PCR banks
   is now allocated dynamically. The digests sizes are determined
   dynamically using a probe PCR read without relying crypto's static
   list of hash algorithms.

   This should finally make sealing of measurements in IMA safe and
   secure.

 - TPM 2.0 selftests

   Added a test suite to tools/testing/selftests/tpm2 previously outside
   of the kernel tree: https://github.com/jsakkine-intel/tpm2-scripts

* 'next-tpm' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (37 commits)
  tpm/ppi: Enable submission of optional command parameter for PPI 1.3
  tpm/ppi: Possibly show command parameter if TPM PPI 1.3 is used
  tpm/ppi: Display up to 101 operations as define for version 1.3
  tpm/ppi: rename TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID to TPM_PPI_REVISION_ID_1
  tpm/ppi: pass function revision ID to tpm_eval_dsm()
  tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()
  KEYS: trusted: explicitly use tpm_chip structure from tpm_default_chip()
  tpm: move tpm_chip definition to include/linux/tpm.h
  tpm: retrieve digest size of unknown algorithms with PCR read
  tpm: rename and export tpm2_digest and tpm2_algorithms
  tpm: dynamically allocate the allocated_banks array
  tpm: remove @flags from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: take TPM chip power gating out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: introduce tpm_chip_start() and tpm_chip_stop()
  tpm: remove TPM_TRANSMIT_UNLOCKED flag
  tpm: use tpm_try_get_ops() in tpm-sysfs.c.
  tpm: remove @space from tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move TPM space code out of tpm_transmit()
  tpm: move tpm_validate_commmand() to tpm2-space.c
  tpm: clean up tpm_try_transmit() error handling flow
  ...

5 files changed, 90 insertions, 25 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 026163f37ba1..d213e835c498 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -153,6 +153,7 @@ int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
 unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void);
 int ima_init_template(void);
 void ima_init_template_list(void);
+int __init ima_init_digests(void);
 
 /*
  * used to protect h_table and sha_table
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index acf2c7df7145..16a4f45863b1 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -643,12 +643,12 @@ int ima_calc_buffer_hash(const void *buf, loff_t len,
 	return calc_buffer_shash(buf, len, hash);
 }
 
-static void __init ima_pcrread(u32 idx, u8 *pcr)
+static void __init ima_pcrread(u32 idx, struct tpm_digest *d)
 {
 	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
 		return;
 
-	if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, pcr) != 0)
+	if (tpm_pcr_read(ima_tpm_chip, idx, d) != 0)
 		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
 }
 
@@ -658,7 +658,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(u32 idx, u8 *pcr)
 static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
 					      struct crypto_shash *tfm)
 {
-	u8 pcr_i[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	struct tpm_digest d = { .alg_id = TPM_ALG_SHA1, .digest = {0} };
 	int rc;
 	u32 i;
 	SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(shash, tfm);
@@ -672,9 +672,9 @@ static int __init ima_calc_boot_aggregate_tfm(char *digest,
 
 	/* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
 	for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
-		ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
+		ima_pcrread(i, &d);
 		/* now accumulate with current aggregate */
-		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, pcr_i, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		rc = crypto_shash_update(shash, d.digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
 	}
 	if (!rc)
 		crypto_shash_final(shash, digest);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 6bb42a9c5e47..6c9295449751 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -123,8 +123,12 @@ int __init ima_init(void)
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
 
+	/* It can be called before ima_init_digests(), it does not use TPM. */
 	ima_load_kexec_buffer();
 
+	rc = ima_init_digests();
+	if (rc != 0)
+		return rc;
 	rc = ima_add_boot_aggregate();	/* boot aggregate must be first entry */
 	if (rc != 0)
 		return rc;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 0e41dc1df1d4..6b6d044e0440 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
 
 #define AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX 32
 
+/* pre-allocated array of tpm_digest structures to extend a PCR */
+static struct tpm_digest *digests;
+
 LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements);	/* list of all measurements */
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
 static unsigned long binary_runtime_size;
@@ -140,11 +143,15 @@ unsigned long ima_get_binary_runtime_size(void)
 static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
 {
 	int result = 0;
+	int i;
 
 	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
 		return result;
 
-	result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, hash);
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
+		memcpy(digests[i].digest, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	result = tpm_pcr_extend(ima_tpm_chip, pcr, digests);
 	if (result != 0)
 		pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
 	return result;
@@ -211,3 +218,21 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
 	mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
 	return result;
 }
+
+int __init ima_init_digests(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!ima_tpm_chip)
+		return 0;
+
+	digests = kcalloc(ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
+			  GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!digests)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ima_tpm_chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
+		digests[i].alg_id = ima_tpm_chip->allocated_banks[i].alg_id;
+
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 4d98f4f87236..bcc9c6ead7fd 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
 
 static const char hmac_alg[] = "hmac(sha1)";
 static const char hash_alg[] = "sha1";
+static struct tpm_chip *chip;
+static struct tpm_digest *digests;
 
 struct sdesc {
 	struct shash_desc shash;
@@ -362,7 +364,7 @@ int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen)
 	int rc;
 
 	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
-	rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen);
+	rc = tpm_send(chip, cmd, buflen);
 	dump_tpm_buf(cmd);
 	if (rc > 0)
 		/* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */
@@ -379,15 +381,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(trusted_tpm_send);
  */
 static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
 {
-	unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	int ret;
-
 	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
-	ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
-		return ret;
-	return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+
+	return tpm_pcr_extend(chip, pcrnum, digests) ? -EINVAL : 0;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -400,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s,
 	unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE];
 	int ret;
 
-	ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
 		return ret;
 
@@ -496,7 +493,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
-	ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE)
 		goto out;
 	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL);
@@ -606,7 +603,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb,
 
 	ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL);
 	keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE);
-	ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE);
 	if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) {
 		pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret);
 		return ret;
@@ -751,7 +748,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay,
 	int i;
 	int tpm2;
 
-	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
 	if (tpm2 < 0)
 		return tpm2;
 
@@ -920,7 +917,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void)
 	struct trusted_key_options *options;
 	int tpm2;
 
-	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
 	if (tpm2 < 0)
 		return NULL;
 
@@ -970,7 +967,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	size_t key_len;
 	int tpm2;
 
-	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL);
+	tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip);
 	if (tpm2 < 0)
 		return tpm2;
 
@@ -1011,7 +1008,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	switch (key_cmd) {
 	case Opt_load:
 		if (tpm2)
-			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
+			ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
 		else
 			ret = key_unseal(payload, options);
 		dump_payload(payload);
@@ -1021,13 +1018,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 		break;
 	case Opt_new:
 		key_len = payload->key_len;
-		ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len);
+		ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len);
 		if (ret != key_len) {
 			pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret);
 			goto out;
 		}
 		if (tpm2)
-			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options);
+			ret = tpm_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options);
 		else
 			ret = key_seal(payload, options);
 		if (ret < 0)
@@ -1221,21 +1218,59 @@ hashalg_fail:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int __init init_digests(void)
+{
+	u8 digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	int ret;
+	int i;
+
+	ret = tpm_get_random(chip, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (ret < TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE)
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	digests = kcalloc(chip->nr_allocated_banks, sizeof(*digests),
+			  GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!digests)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < chip->nr_allocated_banks; i++)
+		memcpy(digests[i].digest, digest, TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int __init init_trusted(void)
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	chip = tpm_default_chip();
+	if (!chip)
+		return -ENOENT;
+	ret = init_digests();
+	if (ret < 0)
+		goto err_put;
 	ret = trusted_shash_alloc();
 	if (ret < 0)
-		return ret;
+		goto err_free;
 	ret = register_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
 	if (ret < 0)
-		trusted_shash_release();
+		goto err_release;
+	return 0;
+err_release:
+	trusted_shash_release();
+err_free:
+	kfree(digests);
+err_put:
+	put_device(&chip->dev);
 	return ret;
 }
 
 static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void)
 {
+	put_device(&chip->dev);
+	kfree(digests);
 	trusted_shash_release();
 	unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
 }