diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/Kconfig | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/Makefile | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c | 1388 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/crypto/sa2ul.h | 380 |
4 files changed, 1783 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig index 585ad584e421..aa3a4ed07a66 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/Kconfig +++ b/drivers/crypto/Kconfig @@ -866,4 +866,18 @@ source "drivers/crypto/hisilicon/Kconfig" source "drivers/crypto/amlogic/Kconfig" +config CRYPTO_DEV_SA2UL + tristate "Support for TI security accelerator" + depends on ARCH_K3 || COMPILE_TEST + select ARM64_CRYPTO + select CRYPTO_AES + select CRYPTO_AES_ARM64 + select CRYPTO_ALGAPI + select HW_RANDOM + select SG_SPLIT + help + K3 devices include a security accelerator engine that may be + used for crypto offload. Select this if you want to use hardware + acceleration for cryptographic algorithms on these devices. + endif # CRYPTO_HW diff --git a/drivers/crypto/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/Makefile index 944ed7226e37..53fc115cf459 100644 --- a/drivers/crypto/Makefile +++ b/drivers/crypto/Makefile @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCE) += qce/ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCOM_RNG) += qcom-rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ROCKCHIP) += rockchip/ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_S5P) += s5p-sss.o +obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SA2UL) += sa2ul.o obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SAHARA) += sahara.o obj-$(CONFIG_ARCH_STM32) += stm32/ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_TALITOS) += talitos.o diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..860c7435fefa --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.c @@ -0,0 +1,1388 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * K3 SA2UL crypto accelerator driver + * + * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com + * + * Authors: Keerthy + * Vitaly Andrianov + * Tero Kristo + */ +#include <linux/clk.h> +#include <linux/dmaengine.h> +#include <linux/dmapool.h> +#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/of_device.h> +#include <linux/platform_device.h> +#include <linux/pm_runtime.h> + +#include <crypto/aes.h> +#include <crypto/des.h> +#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h> + +#include "sa2ul.h" + +/* Byte offset for key in encryption security context */ +#define SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4) +/* Byte offset for Aux-1 in encryption security context */ +#define SC_ENC_AUX1_OFFSET (1 + 27 + 4 + 32) + +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC 0x0001 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH 0x0002 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV 0x0004 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUTH_IV 0x0008 +#define SA_CMDL_UPD_AUX_KEY 0x0010 + +#define SA_AUTH_SUBKEY_LEN 16 +#define SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK 0xFFFF +#define SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK 0xFF000000 + +#define MODE_CONTROL_BYTES 27 +#define SA_HASH_PROCESSING 0 +#define SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING 0 +#define SA_UPLOAD_HASH_TO_TLR BIT(6) + +#define SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK 0xF0000 +#define SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK 0x1F00000 +#define SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT BIT(4) +#define SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK 0x3E000000 +#define SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT BIT(30) +#define SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH 0xFF000000 +#define SA_BASIC_HASH 0x10 + +#define SHA256_DIGEST_WORDS 8 +/* Make 32-bit word from 4 bytes */ +#define SA_MK_U32(b0, b1, b2, b3) (((b0) << 24) | ((b1) << 16) | \ + ((b2) << 8) | (b3)) + +/* size of SCCTL structure in bytes */ +#define SA_SCCTL_SZ 16 + +/* Max Authentication tag size */ +#define SA_MAX_AUTH_TAG_SZ 64 + +#define PRIV_ID 0x1 +#define PRIV 0x1 + +static struct device *sa_k3_dev; + +/** + * struct sa_cmdl_cfg - Command label configuration descriptor + * @enc_eng_id: Encryption Engine ID supported by the SA hardware + * @iv_size: Initialization Vector size + */ +struct sa_cmdl_cfg { + u8 enc_eng_id; + u8 iv_size; +}; + +/** + * struct algo_data - Crypto algorithm specific data + * @enc_eng: Encryption engine info structure + * @iv_idx: iv index in psdata + * @iv_out_size: iv out size + * @ealg_id: Encryption Algorithm ID + * @mci_enc: Mode Control Instruction for Encryption algorithm + * @mci_dec: Mode Control Instruction for Decryption + * @inv_key: Whether the encryption algorithm demands key inversion + * @ctx: Pointer to the algorithm context + */ +struct algo_data { + struct sa_eng_info enc_eng; + u8 iv_idx; + u8 iv_out_size; + u8 ealg_id; + u8 *mci_enc; + u8 *mci_dec; + bool inv_key; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_alg_tmpl: A generic template encompassing crypto/aead algorithms + * @type: Type of the crypto algorithm. + * @alg: Union of crypto algorithm definitions. + * @registered: Flag indicating if the crypto algorithm is already registered + */ +struct sa_alg_tmpl { + u32 type; /* CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE from <linux/crypto.h> */ + union { + struct skcipher_alg skcipher; + } alg; + bool registered; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_rx_data: RX Packet miscellaneous data place holder + * @req: crypto request data pointer + * @ddev: pointer to the DMA device + * @tx_in: dma_async_tx_descriptor pointer for rx channel + * @split_src_sg: Set if the src sg is split and needs to be freed up + * @split_dst_sg: Set if the dst sg is split and needs to be freed up + * @enc: Flag indicating either encryption or decryption + * @enc_iv_size: Initialisation vector size + * @iv_idx: Initialisation vector index + * @rx_sg: Static scatterlist entry for overriding RX data + * @tx_sg: Static scatterlist entry for overriding TX data + * @src: Source data pointer + * @dst: Destination data pointer + */ +struct sa_rx_data { + void *req; + struct device *ddev; + struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_in; + struct scatterlist *split_src_sg; + struct scatterlist *split_dst_sg; + u8 enc; + u8 enc_iv_size; + u8 iv_idx; + struct scatterlist rx_sg; + struct scatterlist tx_sg; + struct scatterlist *src; + struct scatterlist *dst; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_req: SA request definition + * @dev: device for the request + * @size: total data to the xmitted via DMA + * @enc_offset: offset of cipher data + * @enc_size: data to be passed to cipher engine + * @enc_iv: cipher IV + * @type: algorithm type for the request + * @cmdl: command label pointer + * @base: pointer to the base request + * @ctx: pointer to the algorithm context data + * @enc: true if this is an encode request + * @src: source data + * @dst: destination data + * @callback: DMA callback for the request + * @mdata_size: metadata size passed to DMA + */ +struct sa_req { + struct device *dev; + u16 size; + u8 enc_offset; + u16 enc_size; + u8 *enc_iv; + u32 type; + u32 *cmdl; + struct crypto_async_request *base; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx; + bool enc; + struct scatterlist *src; + struct scatterlist *dst; + dma_async_tx_callback callback; + u16 mdata_size; +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for encryption + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_enc_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + { 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x0a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x4a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x61, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode for decryption + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_dec_array[3][MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + { 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x71, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for encryption + */ +static u8 mci_ecb_enc_array[3][27] = { + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x21, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for various Key lengths 128, 192, 256 + * For ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode for decryption + */ +static u8 mci_ecb_dec_array[3][27] = { + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x84, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, + { 0x31, 0x00, 0x00, 0x88, 0x8a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }, +}; + +/* + * Mode Control Instructions for DES algorithm + * For CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode and ECB mode + * encryption and for decryption respectively + */ +static u8 mci_cbc_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x60, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, 0x88, 0x52, 0xaa, 0x4b, 0x7e, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +static u8 mci_cbc_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x70, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x98, 0xf4, 0x40, 0xc0, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +static u8 mci_ecb_3des_enc_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +static u8 mci_ecb_3des_dec_array[MODE_CONTROL_BYTES] = { + 0x30, 0x00, 0x00, 0x85, 0x0a, 0x04, 0xb7, 0x90, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, +}; + +/* + * Perform 16 byte or 128 bit swizzling + * The SA2UL Expects the security context to + * be in little Endian and the bus width is 128 bits or 16 bytes + * Hence swap 16 bytes at a time from higher to lower address + */ +static void sa_swiz_128(u8 *in, u16 len) +{ + u8 data[16]; + int i, j; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { + memcpy(data, &in[i], 16); + for (j = 0; j < 16; j++) + in[i + j] = data[15 - j]; + } +} + +/* Derive the inverse key used in AES-CBC decryption operation */ +static inline int sa_aes_inv_key(u8 *inv_key, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz) +{ + struct crypto_aes_ctx ctx; + int key_pos; + + if (aes_expandkey(&ctx, key, key_sz)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz); + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* work around to get the right inverse for AES_KEYSIZE_192 size keys */ + if (key_sz == AES_KEYSIZE_192) { + ctx.key_enc[52] = ctx.key_enc[51] ^ ctx.key_enc[46]; + ctx.key_enc[53] = ctx.key_enc[52] ^ ctx.key_enc[47]; + } + + /* Based crypto_aes_expand_key logic */ + switch (key_sz) { + case AES_KEYSIZE_128: + case AES_KEYSIZE_192: + key_pos = key_sz + 24; + break; + + case AES_KEYSIZE_256: + key_pos = key_sz + 24 - 4; + break; + + default: + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: bad key len(%d)\n", __func__, key_sz); + return -EINVAL; + } + + memcpy(inv_key, &ctx.key_enc[key_pos], key_sz); + return 0; +} + +/* Set Security context for the encryption engine */ +static int sa_set_sc_enc(struct algo_data *ad, const u8 *key, u16 key_sz, + u8 enc, u8 *sc_buf) +{ + const u8 *mci = NULL; + + /* Set Encryption mode selector to crypto processing */ + sc_buf[0] = SA_CRYPTO_PROCESSING; + + if (enc) + mci = ad->mci_enc; + else + mci = ad->mci_dec; + /* Set the mode control instructions in security context */ + if (mci) + memcpy(&sc_buf[1], mci, MODE_CONTROL_BYTES); + + /* For AES-CBC decryption get the inverse key */ + if (ad->inv_key && !enc) { + if (sa_aes_inv_key(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz)) + return -EINVAL; + /* For all other cases: key is used */ + } else { + memcpy(&sc_buf[SC_ENC_KEY_OFFSET], key, key_sz); + } + + return 0; +} + +static inline void sa_copy_iv(__be32 *out, const u8 *iv, bool size16) +{ + int j; + + for (j = 0; j < ((size16) ? 4 : 2); j++) { + *out = cpu_to_be32(*((u32 *)iv)); + iv += 4; + out++; + } +} + +/* Format general command label */ +static int sa_format_cmdl_gen(struct sa_cmdl_cfg *cfg, u8 *cmdl, + struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info) +{ + u8 enc_offset = 0, total = 0; + u8 enc_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2; + u32 *word_ptr = (u32 *)cmdl; + int i; + + /* Clear the command label */ + memzero_explicit(cmdl, (SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))); + + /* Iniialize the command update structure */ + memzero_explicit(upd_info, sizeof(*upd_info)); + + if (cfg->enc_eng_id != SA_ENG_ID_NONE) + total = SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + + if (cfg->iv_size) + total += cfg->iv_size; + + enc_next_eng = SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2; + + if (cfg->enc_eng_id != SA_ENG_ID_NONE) { + upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC; + upd_info->enc_size.index = enc_offset >> 2; + upd_info->enc_offset.index = upd_info->enc_size.index + 1; + /* Encryption command label */ + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC] = enc_next_eng; + + /* Encryption modes requiring IV */ + if (cfg->iv_size) { + upd_info->flags |= SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV; + upd_info->enc_iv.index = + (enc_offset + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES) >> 2; + upd_info->enc_iv.size = cfg->iv_size; + + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] = + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size; + + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL1] = + (SA_CTX_ENC_AUX2_OFFSET | (cfg->iv_size >> 3)); + enc_offset += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + cfg->iv_size; + } else { + cmdl[enc_offset + SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN] = + SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + enc_offset += SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES; + } + } + + total = roundup(total, 8); + + for (i = 0; i < total / 4; i++) + word_ptr[i] = swab32(word_ptr[i]); + + return total; +} + +/* Update Command label */ +static inline void sa_update_cmdl(struct sa_req *req, u32 *cmdl, + struct sa_cmdl_upd_info *upd_info) +{ + int i = 0, j; + + if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC)) { + cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] &= ~SA_CMDL_PAYLOAD_LENGTH_MASK; + cmdl[upd_info->enc_size.index] |= req->enc_size; + cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] &= + ~SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK; + cmdl[upd_info->enc_offset.index] |= + ((u32)req->enc_offset << + __ffs(SA_CMDL_SOP_BYPASS_LEN_MASK)); + + if (likely(upd_info->flags & SA_CMDL_UPD_ENC_IV)) { + __be32 *data = (__be32 *)&cmdl[upd_info->enc_iv.index]; + u32 *enc_iv = (u32 *)req->enc_iv; + + for (j = 0; i < upd_info->enc_iv.size; i += 4, j++) { + data[j] = cpu_to_be32(*enc_iv); + enc_iv++; + } + } + } +} + +/* Format SWINFO words to be sent to SA */ +static +void sa_set_swinfo(u8 eng_id, u16 sc_id, dma_addr_t sc_phys, + u8 cmdl_present, u8 cmdl_offset, u8 flags, + u8 hash_size, u32 *swinfo) +{ + swinfo[0] = sc_id; + swinfo[0] |= (flags << __ffs(SA_SW0_FLAGS_MASK)); + if (likely(cmdl_present)) + swinfo[0] |= ((cmdl_offset | SA_SW0_CMDL_PRESENT) << + __ffs(SA_SW0_CMDL_INFO_MASK)); + swinfo[0] |= (eng_id << __ffs(SA_SW0_ENG_ID_MASK)); + + swinfo[0] |= SA_SW0_DEST_INFO_PRESENT; + swinfo[1] = (u32)(sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFFULL); + swinfo[2] = (u32)((sc_phys & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL) >> 32); + swinfo[2] |= (hash_size << __ffs(SA_SW2_EGRESS_LENGTH)); +} + +/* Dump the security context */ +static void sa_dump_sc(u8 *buf, dma_addr_t dma_addr) +{ +#ifdef DEBUG + dev_info(sa_k3_dev, "Security context dump:: 0x%pad\n", &dma_addr); + print_hex_dump(KERN_CONT, "", DUMP_PREFIX_OFFSET, + 16, 1, buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, false); +#endif +} + +static +int sa_init_sc(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, const u8 *enc_key, + u16 enc_key_sz, struct algo_data *ad, u8 enc, u32 *swinfo) +{ + int enc_sc_offset = 0; + u8 *sc_buf = ctx->sc; + u16 sc_id = ctx->sc_id; + u8 first_engine; + + memzero_explicit(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ); + + enc_sc_offset = SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ; + + /* SCCTL Owner info: 0=host, 1=CP_ACE */ + sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0; + /* SCCTL F/E control */ + sc_buf[1] = SA_SCCTL_FE_ENC; + memcpy(&sc_buf[2], &sc_id, 2); + sc_buf[4] = 0x0; + sc_buf[5] = PRIV_ID; + sc_buf[6] = PRIV; + sc_buf[7] = 0x0; + + /* Prepare context for encryption engine */ + if (ad->enc_eng.sc_size) { + if (sa_set_sc_enc(ad, enc_key, enc_key_sz, enc, + &sc_buf[enc_sc_offset])) + return -EINVAL; + } + + /* Set the ownership of context to CP_ACE */ + sc_buf[SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET] = 0x80; + + /* swizzle the security context */ + sa_swiz_128(sc_buf, SA_CTX_MAX_SZ); + /* Setup SWINFO */ + first_engine = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + + sa_set_swinfo(first_engine, ctx->sc_id, ctx->sc_phys, 1, 0, + SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_EVICT, ad->iv_out_size, swinfo); + + sa_dump_sc(sc_buf, ctx->sc_phys); + + return 0; +} + +/* Free the per direction context memory */ +static void sa_free_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, + struct sa_crypto_data *data) +{ + unsigned long bn; + + bn = ctx->sc_id - data->sc_id_start; + spin_lock(&data->scid_lock); + __clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm); + data->sc_id--; + spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock); + + if (ctx->sc) { + dma_pool_free(data->sc_pool, ctx->sc, ctx->sc_phys); + ctx->sc = NULL; + } +} + +static int sa_init_ctx_info(struct sa_ctx_info *ctx, + struct sa_crypto_data *data) +{ + unsigned long bn; + int err; + + spin_lock(&data->scid_lock); + bn = find_first_zero_bit(data->ctx_bm, SA_MAX_NUM_CTX); + __set_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm); + data->sc_id++; + spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock); + + ctx->sc_id = (u16)(data->sc_id_start + bn); + + ctx->sc = dma_pool_alloc(data->sc_pool, GFP_KERNEL, &ctx->sc_phys); + if (!ctx->sc) { + dev_err(&data->pdev->dev, "Failed to allocate SC memory\n"); + err = -ENOMEM; + goto scid_rollback; + } + + return 0; + +scid_rollback: + spin_lock(&data->scid_lock); + __clear_bit(bn, data->ctx_bm); + data->sc_id--; + spin_unlock(&data->scid_lock); + + return err; +} + +static void sa_cipher_cra_exit(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data); + + crypto_free_sync_skcipher(ctx->fallback.skcipher); +} + +static int sa_cipher_cra_init(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + struct sa_crypto_data *data = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + const char *name = crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base); + int ret; + + memzero_explicit(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); + ctx->dev_data = data; + + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + if (ret) + return ret; + ret = sa_init_ctx_info(&ctx->dec, data); + if (ret) { + sa_free_ctx_info(&ctx->enc, data); + return ret; + } + + ctx->fallback.skcipher = + crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher(name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK); + + if (IS_ERR(ctx->fallback.skcipher)) { + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "Error allocating fallback algo %s\n", name); + return PTR_ERR(ctx->fallback.skcipher); + } + + dev_dbg(sa_k3_dev, "%s(0x%p) sc-ids(0x%x(0x%pad), 0x%x(0x%pad))\n", + __func__, tfm, ctx->enc.sc_id, &ctx->enc.sc_phys, + ctx->dec.sc_id, &ctx->dec.sc_phys); + return 0; +} + +static int sa_cipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen, struct algo_data *ad) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(tfm); + int cmdl_len; + struct sa_cmdl_cfg cfg; + int ret; + + if (keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 && + keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) + return -EINVAL; + + ad->enc_eng.eng_id = SA_ENG_ID_EM1; + ad->enc_eng.sc_size = SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ; + + memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg)); + cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + cfg.iv_size = crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm); + + crypto_sync_skcipher_clear_flags(ctx->fallback.skcipher, + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + crypto_sync_skcipher_set_flags(ctx->fallback.skcipher, + tfm->base.crt_flags & + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK); + ret = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(ctx->fallback.skcipher, key, keylen); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* Setup Encryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->enc, key, keylen, ad, 1, &ctx->enc.epib[1])) + goto badkey; + + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, + (u8 *)ctx->enc.cmdl, + &ctx->enc.cmdl_upd_info); + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + goto badkey; + + ctx->enc.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + + /* Setup Decryption Security Context & Command label template */ + if (sa_init_sc(&ctx->dec, key, keylen, ad, 0, &ctx->dec.epib[1])) + goto badkey; + + cfg.enc_eng_id = ad->enc_eng.eng_id; + cmdl_len = sa_format_cmdl_gen(&cfg, (u8 *)ctx->dec.cmdl, + &ctx->dec.cmdl_upd_info); + + if (cmdl_len <= 0 || (cmdl_len > SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS * sizeof(u32))) + goto badkey; + + ctx->dec.cmdl_size = cmdl_len; + ctx->iv_idx = ad->iv_idx; + + return 0; + +badkey: + dev_err(sa_k3_dev, "%s: badkey\n", __func__); + return -EINVAL; +} + +static int sa_aes_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + /* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */ + int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2; + + if (key_idx >= 3) + return -EINVAL; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_enc_array[key_idx]; + ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_dec_array[key_idx]; + ad.inv_key = true; + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC; + ad.iv_idx = 4; + ad.iv_out_size = 16; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_aes_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + /* Convert the key size (16/24/32) to the key size index (0/1/2) */ + int key_idx = (keylen >> 3) - 2; + + if (key_idx >= 3) + return -EINVAL; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_enc_array[key_idx]; + ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_dec_array[key_idx]; + ad.inv_key = true; + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_AES_ECB; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_3des_cbc_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_cbc_3des_enc_array; + ad.mci_dec = mci_cbc_3des_dec_array; + ad.ealg_id = SA_EALG_ID_3DES_CBC; + ad.iv_idx = 6; + ad.iv_out_size = 8; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static int sa_3des_ecb_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, const u8 *key, + unsigned int keylen) +{ + struct algo_data ad = { 0 }; + + ad.mci_enc = mci_ecb_3des_enc_array; + ad.mci_dec = mci_ecb_3des_dec_array; + + return sa_cipher_setkey(tfm, key, keylen, &ad); +} + +static void sa_aes_dma_in_callback(void *data) +{ + struct sa_rx_data *rxd = (struct sa_rx_data *)data; + struct skcipher_request *req; + int sglen; + u32 *result; + __be32 *mdptr; + size_t ml, pl; + int i; + enum dma_data_direction dir_src; + bool diff_dst; + + req = container_of(rxd->req, struct skcipher_request, base); + sglen = sg_nents_for_len(req->src, req->cryptlen); + + diff_dst = (req->src != req->dst) ? true : false; + dir_src = diff_dst ? DMA_TO_DEVICE : DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL; + + if (req->iv) { + mdptr = (__be32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(rxd->tx_in, &pl, + &ml); + result = (u32 *)req->iv; + + for (i = 0; i < (rxd->enc_iv_size / 4); i++) + result[i] = be32_to_cpu(mdptr[i + rxd->iv_idx]); + } + + dma_unmap_sg(rxd->ddev, req->src, sglen, dir_src); + kfree(rxd->split_src_sg); + + if (diff_dst) { + sglen = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->cryptlen); + + dma_unmap_sg(rxd->ddev, req->dst, sglen, + DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + kfree(rxd->split_dst_sg); + } + + kfree(rxd); + + skcipher_request_complete(req, 0); +} + +static void +sa_prepare_tx_desc(u32 *mdptr, u32 pslen, u32 *psdata, u32 epiblen, u32 *epib) +{ + u32 *out, *in; + int i; + + for (out = mdptr, in = epib, i = 0; i < epiblen / sizeof(u32); i++) + *out++ = *in++; + + mdptr[4] = (0xFFFF << 16); + for (out = &mdptr[5], in = psdata, i = 0; + i < pslen / sizeof(u32); i++) + *out++ = *in++; +} + +static int sa_run(struct sa_req *req) +{ + struct sa_rx_data *rxd; + gfp_t gfp_flags; + u32 cmdl[SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS]; + struct sa_crypto_data *pdata = dev_get_drvdata(sa_k3_dev); + struct device *ddev; + struct dma_chan *dma_rx; + int sg_nents, src_nents, dst_nents; + int mapped_src_nents, mapped_dst_nents; + struct scatterlist *src, *dst; + size_t pl, ml, split_size; + struct sa_ctx_info *sa_ctx = req->enc ? &req->ctx->enc : &req->ctx->dec; + int ret; + struct dma_async_tx_descriptor *tx_out; + u32 *mdptr; + bool diff_dst; + enum dma_data_direction dir_src; + + gfp_flags = req->base->flags & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? + GFP_KERNEL : GFP_ATOMIC; + + rxd = kzalloc(sizeof(*rxd), gfp_flags); + if (!rxd) + return -ENOMEM; + + if (req->src != req->dst) { + diff_dst = true; + dir_src = DMA_TO_DEVICE; + } else { + diff_dst = false; + dir_src = DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL; + } + + /* + * SA2UL has an interesting feature where the receive DMA channel + * is selected based on the data passed to the engine. Within the + * transition range, there is also a space where it is impossible + * to determine where the data will end up, and this should be + * avoided. This will be handled by the SW fallback mechanism by + * the individual algorithm implementations. + */ + if (req->size >= 256) + dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx2; + else + dma_rx = pdata->dma_rx1; + + ddev = dma_rx->device->dev; + + memcpy(cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl, sa_ctx->cmdl_size); + + sa_update_cmdl(req, cmdl, &sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info); + + if (req->type != CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AHASH) { + if (req->enc) + req->type |= + (SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_ENC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT); + else + req->type |= + (SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_DEC << SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT); + } + + cmdl[sa_ctx->cmdl_size / sizeof(u32)] = req->type; + + /* + * Map the packets, first we check if the data fits into a single + * sg entry and use that if possible. If it does not fit, we check + * if we need to do sg_split to align the scatterlist data on the + * actual data size being processed by the crypto engine. + */ + src = req->src; + sg_nents = sg_nents_for_len(src, req->size); + + split_size = req->size; + + if (sg_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->src->length) { + src = &rxd->rx_sg; + sg_init_table(src, 1); + sg_set_page(src, sg_page(req->src), split_size, + req->src->offset); + src_nents = 1; + dma_map_sg(ddev, src, sg_nents, dir_src); + } else { + mapped_src_nents = dma_map_sg(ddev, req->src, sg_nents, + dir_src); + ret = sg_split(req->src, mapped_src_nents, 0, 1, &split_size, + &src, &src_nents, gfp_flags); + if (ret) { + src_nents = sg_nents; + src = req->src; + } else { + rxd->split_src_sg = src; + } + } + + if (!diff_dst) { + dst_nents = src_nents; + dst = src; + } else { + dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->size); + + if (dst_nents == 1 && split_size <= req->dst->length) { + dst = &rxd->tx_sg; + sg_init_table(dst, 1); + sg_set_page(dst, sg_page(req->dst), split_size, + req->dst->offset); + dst_nents = 1; + dma_map_sg(ddev, dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + } else { + mapped_dst_nents = dma_map_sg(ddev, req->dst, dst_nents, + DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + ret = sg_split(req->dst, mapped_dst_nents, 0, 1, + &split_size, &dst, &dst_nents, + gfp_flags); + if (ret) { + dst_nents = dst_nents; + dst = req->dst; + } else { + rxd->split_dst_sg = dst; + } + } + } + + if (unlikely(src_nents != sg_nents)) { + dev_warn_ratelimited(sa_k3_dev, "failed to map tx pkt\n"); + ret = -EIO; + goto err_cleanup; + } + + rxd->tx_in = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(dma_rx, dst, dst_nents, + DMA_DEV_TO_MEM, + DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); + if (!rxd->tx_in) { + dev_err(pdata->dev, "IN prep_slave_sg() failed\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup; + } + + rxd->req = (void *)req->base; + rxd->enc = req->enc; + rxd->ddev = ddev; + rxd->src = src; + rxd->dst = dst; + rxd->iv_idx = req->ctx->iv_idx; + rxd->enc_iv_size = sa_ctx->cmdl_upd_info.enc_iv.size; + rxd->tx_in->callback = req->callback; + rxd->tx_in->callback_param = rxd; + + tx_out = dmaengine_prep_slave_sg(pdata->dma_tx, src, + src_nents, DMA_MEM_TO_DEV, + DMA_PREP_INTERRUPT | DMA_CTRL_ACK); + + if (!tx_out) { + dev_err(pdata->dev, "OUT prep_slave_sg() failed\n"); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err_cleanup; + } + + /* + * Prepare metadata for DMA engine. This essentially describes the + * crypto algorithm to be used, data sizes, different keys etc. + */ + mdptr = (u32 *)dmaengine_desc_get_metadata_ptr(tx_out, &pl, &ml); + + sa_prepare_tx_desc(mdptr, (sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS * + sizeof(u32))), cmdl, sizeof(sa_ctx->epib), + sa_ctx->epib); + + ml = sa_ctx->cmdl_size + (SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS * sizeof(u32)); + dmaengine_desc_set_metadata_len(tx_out, req->mdata_size); + + dmaengine_submit(tx_out); + dmaengine_submit(rxd->tx_in); + + dma_async_issue_pending(dma_rx); + dma_async_issue_pending(pdata->dma_tx); + + return -EINPROGRESS; + +err_cleanup: + dma_unmap_sg(ddev, req->src, sg_nents, DMA_TO_DEVICE); + kfree(rxd->split_src_sg); + + if (req->src != req->dst) { + dst_nents = sg_nents_for_len(req->dst, req->size); + dma_unmap_sg(ddev, req->dst, dst_nents, DMA_FROM_DEVICE); + kfree(rxd->split_dst_sg); + } + + kfree(rxd); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_cipher_run(struct skcipher_request *req, u8 *iv, int enc) +{ + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx = + crypto_skcipher_ctx(crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req)); + struct crypto_alg *alg = req->base.tfm->__crt_alg; + struct sa_req sa_req = { 0 }; + int ret; + + if (!req->cryptlen) + return 0; + + if (req->cryptlen % alg->cra_blocksize) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Use SW fallback if the data size is not supported */ + if (req->cryptlen > SA_MAX_DATA_SZ || + (req->cryptlen >= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN && + req->cryptlen <= SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX)) { + SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(subreq, ctx->fallback.skcipher); + + skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(subreq, ctx->fallback.skcipher); + skcipher_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, + NULL, NULL); + skcipher_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst, + req->cryptlen, req->iv); + if (enc) + ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(subreq); + else + ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(subreq); + + skcipher_request_zero(subreq); + return ret; + } + + sa_req.size = req->cryptlen; + sa_req.enc_size = req->cryptlen; + sa_req.src = req->src; + sa_req.dst = req->dst; + sa_req.enc_iv = iv; + sa_req.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER; + sa_req.enc = enc; + sa_req.callback = sa_aes_dma_in_callback; + sa_req.mdata_size = 44; + sa_req.base = &req->base; + sa_req.ctx = ctx; + + return sa_run(&sa_req); +} + +static int sa_encrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 1); +} + +static int sa_decrypt(struct skcipher_request *req) +{ + return sa_cipher_run(req, req->iv, 0); +} + +static struct sa_alg_tmpl sa_algs[] = { + { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-aes-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_aes_cbc_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(aes)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-aes-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_aes_ecb_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "cbc(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "cbc-des3-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .ivsize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_3des_cbc_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, + { + .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER, + .alg.skcipher = { + .base.cra_name = "ecb(des3_ede)", + .base.cra_driver_name = "ecb-des3-sa2ul", + .base.cra_priority = 30000, + .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER | + CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY | + CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | + CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK, + .base.cra_blocksize = DES_BLOCK_SIZE, + .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct sa_tfm_ctx), + .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, + .init = sa_cipher_cra_init, + .exit = sa_cipher_cra_exit, + .min_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .max_keysize = 3 * DES_KEY_SIZE, + .setkey = sa_3des_ecb_setkey, + .encrypt = sa_encrypt, + .decrypt = sa_decrypt, + } + }, +}; + +/* Register the algorithms in crypto framework */ +static void sa_register_algos(const struct device *dev) +{ + char *alg_name; + u32 type; + int i, err; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) { + type = sa_algs[i].type; + if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) { + alg_name = sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher.base.cra_name; + err = crypto_register_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher); + } else { + dev_err(dev, + "un-supported crypto algorithm (%d)", + sa_algs[i].type); + continue; + } + + if (err) + dev_err(dev, "Failed to register '%s'\n", alg_name); + else + sa_algs[i].registered = true; + } +} + +/* Unregister the algorithms in crypto framework */ +static void sa_unregister_algos(const struct device *dev) +{ + u32 type; + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(sa_algs); i++) { + type = sa_algs[i].type; + if (!sa_algs[i].registered) + continue; + if (type == CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_SKCIPHER) + crypto_unregister_skcipher(&sa_algs[i].alg.skcipher); + + sa_algs[i].registered = false; + } +} + +static int sa_init_mem(struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data) +{ + struct device *dev = &dev_data->pdev->dev; + /* Setup dma pool for security context buffers */ + dev_data->sc_pool = dma_pool_create("keystone-sc", dev, + SA_CTX_MAX_SZ, 64, 0); + if (!dev_data->sc_pool) { + dev_err(dev, "Failed to create dma pool"); + return -ENOMEM; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int sa_dma_init(struct sa_crypto_data *dd) +{ + int ret; + struct dma_slave_config cfg; + + dd->dma_rx1 = NULL; + dd->dma_tx = NULL; + dd->dma_rx2 = NULL; + + ret = dma_coerce_mask_and_coherent(dd->dev, DMA_BIT_MASK(48)); + if (ret) + return ret; + + dd->dma_rx1 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx1"); + if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx1)) { + if (PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx1) != -EPROBE_DEFER) + dev_err(dd->dev, "Unable to request rx1 DMA channel\n"); + return PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx1); + } + + dd->dma_rx2 = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "rx2"); + if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_rx2)) { + dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx1); + if (PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx2) != -EPROBE_DEFER) + dev_err(dd->dev, "Unable to request rx2 DMA channel\n"); + return PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx2); + } + + dd->dma_tx = dma_request_chan(dd->dev, "tx"); + if (IS_ERR(dd->dma_tx)) { + if (PTR_ERR(dd->dma_rx1) != -EPROBE_DEFER) + dev_err(dd->dev, "Unable to request tx DMA channel\n"); + ret = PTR_ERR(dd->dma_tx); + goto err_dma_tx; + } + + memzero_explicit(&cfg, sizeof(cfg)); + + cfg.src_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES; + cfg.dst_addr_width = DMA_SLAVE_BUSWIDTH_4_BYTES; + cfg.src_maxburst = 4; + cfg.dst_maxburst = 4; + + ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx1, &cfg); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n", + ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_rx2, &cfg); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure IN dmaengine slave: %d\n", + ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = dmaengine_slave_config(dd->dma_tx, &cfg); + if (ret) { + dev_err(dd->dev, "can't configure OUT dmaengine slave: %d\n", + ret); + return ret; + } + + return 0; + +err_dma_tx: + dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx1); + dma_release_channel(dd->dma_rx2); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_ul_probe(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct device *dev = &pdev->dev; + struct device_node *node = dev->of_node; + struct resource *res; + static void __iomem *saul_base; + struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data; + u32 val; + int ret; + + dev_data = devm_kzalloc(dev, sizeof(*dev_data), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!dev_data) + return -ENOMEM; + + sa_k3_dev = dev; + dev_data->dev = dev; + dev_data->pdev = pdev; + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, dev_data); + dev_set_drvdata(sa_k3_dev, dev_data); + + pm_runtime_enable(dev); + ret = pm_runtime_get_sync(dev); + if (ret) { + dev_err(&pdev->dev, "%s: failed to get sync: %d\n", __func__, + ret); + return ret; + } + + sa_init_mem(dev_data); + ret = sa_dma_init(dev_data); + if (ret) + goto disable_pm_runtime; + + spin_lock_init(&dev_data->scid_lock); + res = platform_get_resource(pdev, IORESOURCE_MEM, 0); + saul_base = devm_ioremap_resource(dev, res); + + dev_data->base = saul_base; + val = SA_EEC_ENCSS_EN | SA_EEC_AUTHSS_EN | SA_EEC_CTXCACH_EN | + SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_IN_EN | SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_OUT_EN | + SA_EEC_TRNG_EN; + + writel_relaxed(val, saul_base + SA_ENGINE_ENABLE_CONTROL); + + sa_register_algos(dev); + + ret = of_platform_populate(node, NULL, NULL, &pdev->dev); + if (ret) + goto release_dma; + + return 0; + +release_dma: + sa_unregister_algos(&pdev->dev); + + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx); + + dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool); + +disable_pm_runtime: + pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev); + pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); + + return ret; +} + +static int sa_ul_remove(struct platform_device *pdev) +{ + struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data = platform_get_drvdata(pdev); + + sa_unregister_algos(&pdev->dev); + + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx2); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_rx1); + dma_release_channel(dev_data->dma_tx); + + dma_pool_destroy(dev_data->sc_pool); + + platform_set_drvdata(pdev, NULL); + + pm_runtime_put_sync(&pdev->dev); + pm_runtime_disable(&pdev->dev); + + return 0; +} + +static const struct of_device_id of_match[] = { + {.compatible = "ti,j721e-sa2ul",}, + {.compatible = "ti,am654-sa2ul",}, + {}, +}; +MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(of, of_match); + +static struct platform_driver sa_ul_driver = { + .probe = sa_ul_probe, + .remove = sa_ul_remove, + .driver = { + .name = "saul-crypto", + .of_match_table = of_match, + }, +}; +module_platform_driver(sa_ul_driver); +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2"); diff --git a/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.h b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..45ba86cb5d11 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/crypto/sa2ul.h @@ -0,0 +1,380 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * K3 SA2UL crypto accelerator driver + * + * Copyright (C) 2018-2020 Texas Instruments Incorporated - http://www.ti.com + * + * Authors: Keerthy + * Vitaly Andrianov + * Tero Kristo + */ + +#ifndef _K3_SA2UL_ +#define _K3_SA2UL_ + +#include <linux/interrupt.h> +#include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/hw_random.h> +#include <crypto/aes.h> + +#define SA_ENGINE_ENABLE_CONTROL 0x1000 + +struct sa_tfm_ctx; +/* + * SA_ENGINE_ENABLE_CONTROL register bits + */ +#define SA_EEC_ENCSS_EN 0x00000001 +#define SA_EEC_AUTHSS_EN 0x00000002 +#define SA_EEC_TRNG_EN 0x00000008 +#define SA_EEC_PKA_EN 0x00000010 +#define SA_EEC_CTXCACH_EN 0x00000080 +#define SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_IN_EN 0x00000200 +#define SA_EEC_CPPI_PORT_OUT_EN 0x00000800 + +/* + * Encoding used to identify the typo of crypto operation + * performed on the packet when the packet is returned + * by SA + */ +#define SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_ENC 0x0001 +#define SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_DEC 0x0002 +#define SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_SHIFT 16 +#define SA_REQ_SUBTYPE_MASK 0xffff + +/* Number of 32 bit words in EPIB */ +#define SA_DMA_NUM_EPIB_WORDS 4 + +/* Number of 32 bit words in PS data */ +#define SA_DMA_NUM_PS_WORDS 16 +#define NKEY_SZ 3 +#define MCI_SZ 27 + +/* + * Maximum number of simultaeneous security contexts + * supported by the driver + */ +#define SA_MAX_NUM_CTX 512 + +/* + * Assumption: CTX size is multiple of 32 + */ +#define SA_CTX_SIZE_TO_DMA_SIZE(ctx_sz) \ + ((ctx_sz) ? ((ctx_sz) / 32 - 1) : 0) + +#define SA_CTX_ENC_KEY_OFFSET 32 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX1_OFFSET 64 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX2_OFFSET 96 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX3_OFFSET 112 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX4_OFFSET 128 + +/* Next Engine Select code in CP_ACE */ +#define SA_ENG_ID_EM1 2 /* Enc/Dec engine with AES/DEC core */ +#define SA_ENG_ID_EM2 3 /* Encryption/Decryption enginefor pass 2 */ +#define SA_ENG_ID_AM1 4 /* Auth. engine with SHA1/MD5/SHA2 core */ +#define SA_ENG_ID_AM2 5 /* Authentication engine for pass 2 */ +#define SA_ENG_ID_OUTPORT2 20 /* Egress module 2 */ +#define SA_ENG_ID_NONE 0xff + +/* + * Command Label Definitions + */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_NESC 0 /* Next Engine Select Code */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_LABEL_LEN 1 /* Engine Command Label Length */ +/* 16-bit Length of Data to be processed */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_DATA_LEN 2 +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_DATA_OFFSET 4 /* Stat Data Offset */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL1 5 /* Option Control Byte 1 */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL2 6 /* Option Control Byte 2 */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_CTRL3 7 /* Option Control Byte 3 */ +#define SA_CMDL_OFFSET_OPTION_BYTE 8 + +#define SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES 8 + +#define SA_CMDL_OPTION_BYTES_MAX_SIZE 72 +#define SA_CMDL_MAX_SIZE_BYTES (SA_CMDL_HEADER_SIZE_BYTES + \ + SA_CMDL_OPTION_BYTES_MAX_SIZE) + +/* SWINFO word-0 flags */ +#define SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_EVICT 0x0001 +#define SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_TEAR 0x0002 +#define SA_SW_INFO_FLAG_NOPD 0x0004 + +/* + * This type represents the various packet types to be processed + * by the PHP engine in SA. + * It is used to identify the corresponding PHP processing function. + */ +#define SA_CTX_PE_PKT_TYPE_3GPP_AIR 0 /* 3GPP Air Cipher */ +#define SA_CTX_PE_PKT_TYPE_SRTP 1 /* SRTP */ +#define SA_CTX_PE_PKT_TYPE_IPSEC_AH 2 /* IPSec Authentication Header */ +/* IPSec Encapsulating Security Payload */ +#define SA_CTX_PE_PKT_TYPE_IPSEC_ESP 3 +/* Indicates that it is in data mode, It may not be used by PHP */ +#define SA_CTX_PE_PKT_TYPE_NONE 4 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE1_SZ 64 /* Encryption SC with Key only */ +#define SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE2_SZ 96 /* Encryption SC with Key and Aux1 */ + +#define SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE1_SZ 64 /* Auth SC with Key only */ +#define SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ 96 /* Auth SC with Key and Aux1 */ +/* Size of security context for PHP engine */ +#define SA_CTX_PHP_PE_CTX_SZ 64 + +#define SA_CTX_MAX_SZ (64 + SA_CTX_ENC_TYPE2_SZ + SA_CTX_AUTH_TYPE2_SZ) + +/* + * Encoding of F/E control in SCCTL + * Bit 0-1: Fetch PHP Bytes + * Bit 2-3: Fetch Encryption/Air Ciphering Bytes + * Bit 4-5: Fetch Authentication Bytes or Encr pass 2 + * Bit 6-7: Evict PHP Bytes + * + * where 00 = 0 bytes + * 01 = 64 bytes + * 10 = 96 bytes + * 11 = 128 bytes + */ +#define SA_CTX_DMA_SIZE_0 0 +#define SA_CTX_DMA_SIZE_64 1 +#define SA_CTX_DMA_SIZE_96 2 +#define SA_CTX_DMA_SIZE_128 3 + +/* + * Byte offset of the owner word in SCCTL + * in the security context + */ +#define SA_CTX_SCCTL_OWNER_OFFSET 0 + +#define SA_CTX_ENC_KEY_OFFSET 32 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX1_OFFSET 64 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX2_OFFSET 96 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX3_OFFSET 112 +#define SA_CTX_ENC_AUX4_OFFSET 128 + +#define SA_SCCTL_FE_AUTH_ENC 0x65 +#define SA_SCCTL_FE_ENC 0x8D + +#define SA_ALIGN_MASK (sizeof(u32) - 1) +#define SA_ALIGNED __aligned(32) + +/* SA2UL can only handle maximum data size of 64KB */ +#define SA_MAX_DATA_SZ U16_MAX + +/* + * SA2UL can provide unpredictable results with packet sizes that fall + * the following range, so avoid using it. + */ +#define SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MIN 240 +#define SA_UNSAFE_DATA_SZ_MAX 256 + +/** + * struct sa_crypto_data - Crypto driver instance data + * @base: Base address of the register space + * @pdev: Platform device pointer + * @sc_pool: security context pool + * @dev: Device pointer + * @scid_lock: secure context ID lock + * @sc_id_start: starting index for SC ID + * @sc_id_end: Ending index for SC ID + * @sc_id: Security Context ID + * @ctx_bm: Bitmap to keep track of Security context ID's + * @ctx: SA tfm context pointer + * @dma_rx1: Pointer to DMA rx channel for sizes < 256 Bytes + * @dma_rx2: Pointer to DMA rx channel for sizes > 256 Bytes + * @dma_tx: Pointer to DMA TX channel + */ +struct sa_crypto_data { + void __iomem *base; + struct platform_device *pdev; + struct dma_pool *sc_pool; + struct device *dev; + spinlock_t scid_lock; /* lock for SC-ID allocation */ + /* Security context data */ + u16 sc_id_start; + u16 sc_id_end; + u16 sc_id; + unsigned long ctx_bm[DIV_ROUND_UP(SA_MAX_NUM_CTX, + BITS_PER_LONG)]; + struct sa_tfm_ctx *ctx; + struct dma_chan *dma_rx1; + struct dma_chan *dma_rx2; + struct dma_chan *dma_tx; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_cmdl_param_info: Command label parameters info + * @index: Index of the parameter in the command label format + * @offset: the offset of the parameter + * @size: Size of the parameter + */ +struct sa_cmdl_param_info { + u16 index; + u16 offset; + u16 size; +}; + +/* Maximum length of Auxiliary data in 32bit words */ +#define SA_MAX_AUX_DATA_WORDS 8 + +/** + * struct sa_cmdl_upd_info: Command label updation info + * @flags: flags in command label + * @submode: Encryption submodes + * @enc_size: Size of first pass encryption size + * @enc_size2: Size of second pass encryption size + * @enc_offset: Encryption payload offset in the packet + * @enc_iv: Encryption initialization vector for pass2 + * @enc_iv2: Encryption initialization vector for pass2 + * @aad: Associated data + * @payload: Payload info + * @auth_size: Authentication size for pass 1 + * @auth_size2: Authentication size for pass 2 + * @auth_offset: Authentication payload offset + * @auth_iv: Authentication initialization vector + * @aux_key_info: Authentication aux key information + * @aux_key: Aux key for authentication + */ +struct sa_cmdl_upd_info { + u16 flags; + u16 submode; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info enc_size; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info enc_size2; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info enc_offset; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info enc_iv; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info enc_iv2; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info aad; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info payload; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info auth_size; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info auth_size2; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info auth_offset; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info auth_iv; + struct sa_cmdl_param_info aux_key_info; + u32 aux_key[SA_MAX_AUX_DATA_WORDS]; +}; + +/* + * Number of 32bit words appended after the command label + * in PSDATA to identify the crypto request context. + * word-0: Request type + * word-1: pointer to request + */ +#define SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS 4 + +/* Maximum size of Command label in 32 words */ +#define SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS (SA_DMA_NUM_PS_WORDS - SA_PSDATA_CTX_WORDS) + +/** + * struct sa_ctx_info: SA context information + * @sc: Pointer to security context + * @sc_phys: Security context physical address that is passed on to SA2UL + * @sc_id: Security context ID + * @cmdl_size: Command label size + * @cmdl: Command label for a particular iteration + * @cmdl_upd_info: structure holding command label updation info + * @epib: Extended protocol information block words + */ +struct sa_ctx_info { + u8 *sc; + dma_addr_t sc_phys; + u16 sc_id; + u16 cmdl_size; + u32 cmdl[SA_MAX_CMDL_WORDS]; + struct sa_cmdl_upd_info cmdl_upd_info; + /* Store Auxiliary data such as K2/K3 subkeys in AES-XCBC */ + u32 epib[SA_DMA_NUM_EPIB_WORDS]; +}; + +/** + * struct sa_tfm_ctx: TFM context structure + * @dev_data: struct sa_crypto_data pointer + * @enc: struct sa_ctx_info for encryption + * @dec: struct sa_ctx_info for decryption + * @keylen: encrption/decryption keylength + * @iv_idx: Initialization vector index + * @key: encryption key + * @fallback: SW fallback algorithm + */ +struct sa_tfm_ctx { + struct sa_crypto_data *dev_data; + struct sa_ctx_info enc; + struct sa_ctx_info dec; + int keylen; + int iv_idx; + u32 key[AES_KEYSIZE_256 / sizeof(u32)]; + /* for fallback */ + union { + struct crypto_sync_skcipher *skcipher; + } fallback; +}; + +enum sa_submode { + SA_MODE_GEN = 0, + SA_MODE_CCM, + SA_MODE_GCM, + SA_MODE_GMAC +}; + +/* Encryption algorithms */ +enum sa_ealg_id { + SA_EALG_ID_NONE = 0, /* No encryption */ + SA_EALG_ID_NULL, /* NULL encryption */ + SA_EALG_ID_AES_CTR, /* AES Counter mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_AES_F8, /* AES F8 mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_AES_CBC, /* AES CBC mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_DES_CBC, /* DES CBC mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_3DES_CBC, /* 3DES CBC mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_CCM, /* Counter with CBC-MAC mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_GCM, /* Galois Counter mode */ + SA_EALG_ID_AES_ECB, + SA_EALG_ID_LAST +}; + +/* Authentication algorithms */ +enum sa_aalg_id { + SA_AALG_ID_NONE = 0, /* No Authentication */ + SA_AALG_ID_NULL = SA_EALG_ID_LAST, /* NULL Authentication */ + SA_AALG_ID_MD5, /* MD5 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_SHA1, /* SHA1 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_224, /* 224-bit SHA2 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_256, /* 256-bit SHA2 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_SHA2_512, /* 512-bit SHA2 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_MD5, /* HMAC with MD5 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA1, /* HMAC with SHA1 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA2_224, /* HMAC with 224-bit SHA2 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_HMAC_SHA2_256, /* HMAC with 256-bit SHA2 mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_GMAC, /* Galois Message Auth. Code mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_CMAC, /* Cipher-based Mes. Auth. Code mode */ + SA_AALG_ID_CBC_MAC, /* Cipher Block Chaining */ + SA_AALG_ID_AES_XCBC /* AES Extended Cipher Block Chaining */ +}; + +/* + * Mode control engine algorithms used to index the + * mode control instruction tables + */ +enum sa_eng_algo_id { + SA_ENG_ALGO_ECB = 0, + SA_ENG_ALGO_CBC, + SA_ENG_ALGO_CFB, + SA_ENG_ALGO_OFB, + SA_ENG_ALGO_CTR, + SA_ENG_ALGO_F8, + SA_ENG_ALGO_F8F9, + SA_ENG_ALGO_GCM, + SA_ENG_ALGO_GMAC, + SA_ENG_ALGO_CCM, + SA_ENG_ALGO_CMAC, + SA_ENG_ALGO_CBCMAC, + SA_NUM_ENG_ALGOS +}; + +/** + * struct sa_eng_info: Security accelerator engine info + * @eng_id: Engine ID + * @sc_size: security context size + */ +struct sa_eng_info { + u8 eng_id; + u16 sc_size; +}; + +#endif /* _K3_SA2UL_ */ |