diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | net/mac80211/rx.c | 404 |
1 files changed, 202 insertions, 202 deletions
diff --git a/net/mac80211/rx.c b/net/mac80211/rx.c index 0ac75127b7d2..ffad155316a9 100644 --- a/net/mac80211/rx.c +++ b/net/mac80211/rx.c @@ -1049,207 +1049,6 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_check(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline -ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) -{ - struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; - struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); - struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; - int keyidx; - int hdrlen; - ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL; - int mmie_keyidx = -1; - __le16 fc; - - /* - * Key selection 101 - * - * There are four types of keys: - * - GTK (group keys) - * - IGTK (group keys for management frames) - * - PTK (pairwise keys) - * - STK (station-to-station pairwise keys) - * - * When selecting a key, we have to distinguish between multicast - * (including broadcast) and unicast frames, the latter can only - * use PTKs and STKs while the former always use GTKs and IGTKs. - * Unless, of course, actual WEP keys ("pre-RSNA") are used, then - * unicast frames can also use key indices like GTKs. Hence, if we - * don't have a PTK/STK we check the key index for a WEP key. - * - * Note that in a regular BSS, multicast frames are sent by the - * AP only, associated stations unicast the frame to the AP first - * which then multicasts it on their behalf. - * - * There is also a slight problem in IBSS mode: GTKs are negotiated - * with each station, that is something we don't currently handle. - * The spec seems to expect that one negotiates the same key with - * every station but there's no such requirement; VLANs could be - * possible. - */ - - /* - * No point in finding a key and decrypting if the frame is neither - * addressed to us nor a multicast frame. - */ - if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH)) - return RX_CONTINUE; - - /* start without a key */ - rx->key = NULL; - - if (rx->sta) - sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk); - - fc = hdr->frame_control; - - if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) - mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb); - - if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) { - rx->key = sta_ptk; - if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) - return RX_CONTINUE; - /* Skip decryption if the frame is not protected. */ - if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) - return RX_CONTINUE; - } else if (mmie_keyidx >= 0) { - /* Broadcast/multicast robust management frame / BIP */ - if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) - return RX_CONTINUE; - - if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS || - mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) - return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */ - if (rx->sta) - rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[mmie_keyidx]); - if (!rx->key) - rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[mmie_keyidx]); - } else if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { - /* - * The frame was not protected, so skip decryption. However, we - * need to set rx->key if there is a key that could have been - * used so that the frame may be dropped if encryption would - * have been expected. - */ - struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; - struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = rx->sdata; - int i; - - if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) && - is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && - (key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->default_mgmt_key))) - rx->key = key; - else { - if (rx->sta) { - for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) { - key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[i]); - if (key) - break; - } - } - if (!key) { - for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) { - key = rcu_dereference(sdata->keys[i]); - if (key) - break; - } - } - if (key) - rx->key = key; - } - return RX_CONTINUE; - } else { - u8 keyid; - /* - * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be - * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we - * don't need to decrypt the frame, we just won't - * be able to keep statistics accurate. - * Except for key threshold notifications, should - * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key - * the hardware used if this flag is set? - */ - if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && - (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) - return RX_CONTINUE; - - hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc); - - if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen) - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */ - - /* - * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx, - * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already - */ - skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1); - keyidx = keyid >> 6; - - /* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */ - if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta) - rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[keyidx]); - - /* if not found, try default key */ - if (!rx->key) { - rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[keyidx]); - - /* - * RSNA-protected unicast frames should always be - * sent with pairwise or station-to-station keys, - * but for WEP we allow using a key index as well. - */ - if (rx->key && - rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 && - rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 && - !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) - rx->key = NULL; - } - } - - if (rx->key) { - if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED)) - return RX_DROP_MONITOR; - - rx->key->tx_rx_count++; - /* TODO: add threshold stuff again */ - } else { - return RX_DROP_MONITOR; - } - - switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) { - case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: - case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: - result = ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(rx); - break; - case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: - result = ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(rx); - break; - case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: - result = ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(rx); - break; - case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: - result = ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(rx); - break; - default: - /* - * We can reach here only with HW-only algorithms - * but why didn't it decrypt the frame?! - */ - return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; - } - - /* the hdr variable is invalid after the decrypt handlers */ - - /* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */ - status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED; - - return result; -} - -static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline ieee80211_rx_h_check_more_data(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) { struct ieee80211_local *local; @@ -1550,6 +1349,207 @@ ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) return RX_CONTINUE; } /* ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process */ +static ieee80211_rx_result debug_noinline +ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx) +{ + struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb; + struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb); + struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data; + int keyidx; + int hdrlen; + ieee80211_rx_result result = RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + struct ieee80211_key *sta_ptk = NULL; + int mmie_keyidx = -1; + __le16 fc; + + /* + * Key selection 101 + * + * There are four types of keys: + * - GTK (group keys) + * - IGTK (group keys for management frames) + * - PTK (pairwise keys) + * - STK (station-to-station pairwise keys) + * + * When selecting a key, we have to distinguish between multicast + * (including broadcast) and unicast frames, the latter can only + * use PTKs and STKs while the former always use GTKs and IGTKs. + * Unless, of course, actual WEP keys ("pre-RSNA") are used, then + * unicast frames can also use key indices like GTKs. Hence, if we + * don't have a PTK/STK we check the key index for a WEP key. + * + * Note that in a regular BSS, multicast frames are sent by the + * AP only, associated stations unicast the frame to the AP first + * which then multicasts it on their behalf. + * + * There is also a slight problem in IBSS mode: GTKs are negotiated + * with each station, that is something we don't currently handle. + * The spec seems to expect that one negotiates the same key with + * every station but there's no such requirement; VLANs could be + * possible. + */ + + /* + * No point in finding a key and decrypting if the frame is neither + * addressed to us nor a multicast frame. + */ + if (!(status->rx_flags & IEEE80211_RX_RA_MATCH)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + /* start without a key */ + rx->key = NULL; + + if (rx->sta) + sta_ptk = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->ptk); + + fc = hdr->frame_control; + + if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) + mmie_keyidx = ieee80211_get_mmie_keyidx(rx->skb); + + if (!is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && sta_ptk) { + rx->key = sta_ptk; + if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + /* Skip decryption if the frame is not protected. */ + if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + } else if (mmie_keyidx >= 0) { + /* Broadcast/multicast robust management frame / BIP */ + if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + if (mmie_keyidx < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS || + mmie_keyidx >= NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS + NUM_DEFAULT_MGMT_KEYS) + return RX_DROP_MONITOR; /* unexpected BIP keyidx */ + if (rx->sta) + rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[mmie_keyidx]); + if (!rx->key) + rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[mmie_keyidx]); + } else if (!ieee80211_has_protected(fc)) { + /* + * The frame was not protected, so skip decryption. However, we + * need to set rx->key if there is a key that could have been + * used so that the frame may be dropped if encryption would + * have been expected. + */ + struct ieee80211_key *key = NULL; + struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata = rx->sdata; + int i; + + if (ieee80211_is_mgmt(fc) && + is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && + (key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->default_mgmt_key))) + rx->key = key; + else { + if (rx->sta) { + for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) { + key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[i]); + if (key) + break; + } + } + if (!key) { + for (i = 0; i < NUM_DEFAULT_KEYS; i++) { + key = rcu_dereference(sdata->keys[i]); + if (key) + break; + } + } + if (key) + rx->key = key; + } + return RX_CONTINUE; + } else { + u8 keyid; + /* + * The device doesn't give us the IV so we won't be + * able to look up the key. That's ok though, we + * don't need to decrypt the frame, we just won't + * be able to keep statistics accurate. + * Except for key threshold notifications, should + * we somehow allow the driver to tell us which key + * the hardware used if this flag is set? + */ + if ((status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) && + (status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) + return RX_CONTINUE; + + hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(fc); + + if (rx->skb->len < 8 + hdrlen) + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* TODO: count this? */ + + /* + * no need to call ieee80211_wep_get_keyidx, + * it verifies a bunch of things we've done already + */ + skb_copy_bits(rx->skb, hdrlen + 3, &keyid, 1); + keyidx = keyid >> 6; + + /* check per-station GTK first, if multicast packet */ + if (is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1) && rx->sta) + rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sta->gtk[keyidx]); + + /* if not found, try default key */ + if (!rx->key) { + rx->key = rcu_dereference(rx->sdata->keys[keyidx]); + + /* + * RSNA-protected unicast frames should always be + * sent with pairwise or station-to-station keys, + * but for WEP we allow using a key index as well. + */ + if (rx->key && + rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40 && + rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104 && + !is_multicast_ether_addr(hdr->addr1)) + rx->key = NULL; + } + } + + if (rx->key) { + if (unlikely(rx->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_TAINTED)) + return RX_DROP_MONITOR; + + rx->key->tx_rx_count++; + /* TODO: add threshold stuff again */ + } else { + return RX_DROP_MONITOR; + } + + switch (rx->key->conf.cipher) { + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40: + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104: + result = ieee80211_crypto_wep_decrypt(rx); + break; + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP: + result = ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(rx); + break; + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_CCMP: + result = ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(rx); + break; + case WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC: + result = ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(rx); + break; + default: + /* + * We can reach here only with HW-only algorithms + * but why didn't it decrypt the frame?! + */ + return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; + } + + /* the hdr variable is invalid after the decrypt handlers */ + + /* either the frame has been decrypted or will be dropped */ + status->flag |= RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED; + + return result; +} + static inline struct ieee80211_fragment_entry * ieee80211_reassemble_add(struct ieee80211_sub_if_data *sdata, unsigned int frag, unsigned int seq, int rx_queue, @@ -2933,10 +2933,10 @@ static void ieee80211_rx_handlers(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx, */ rx->skb = skb; - CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt) CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_check_more_data) CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_uapsd_and_pspoll) CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_sta_process) + CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt) CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_defragment) CALL_RXH(ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify) /* must be after MMIC verify so header is counted in MPDU mic */ |