diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/Makefile | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/exit.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/panic.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 30 |
7 files changed, 36 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count index 08f083d2fd51..90a029813717 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-kernel-warn_count @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -What: /sys/kernel/oops_count +What: /sys/kernel/warn_count Date: November 2022 KernelVersion: 6.2.0 Contact: Linux Kernel Hardening List <linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org> diff --git a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c index 5245cf6013c9..fc28714ae3a6 100644 --- a/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c +++ b/drivers/misc/lkdtm/cfi.c @@ -54,7 +54,11 @@ static void lkdtm_CFI_FORWARD_PROTO(void) # ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_BTI_KERNEL # define __no_pac "branch-protection=bti" # else -# define __no_pac "branch-protection=none" +# ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET +# define __no_pac "branch-protection=none" +# else +# define __no_pac "sign-return-address=none" +# endif # endif # define __no_ret_protection __noscs __attribute__((__target__(__no_pac))) #else diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile index e7fc37a68069..10ef068f598d 100644 --- a/kernel/Makefile +++ b/kernel/Makefile @@ -41,9 +41,6 @@ UBSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n KMSAN_SANITIZE_kcov.o := n CFLAGS_kcov.o := $(call cc-option, -fno-conserve-stack) -fno-stack-protector -# Don't instrument error handlers -CFLAGS_REMOVE_cfi.o := $(CC_FLAGS_CFI) - obj-y += sched/ obj-y += locking/ obj-y += power/ diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c index deffb8e4b1b2..15dc2ec80c46 100644 --- a/kernel/exit.c +++ b/kernel/exit.c @@ -931,6 +931,7 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr) * Then do everything else. */ struct task_struct *tsk = current; + unsigned int limit; if (unlikely(in_interrupt())) panic("Aiee, killing interrupt handler!"); @@ -954,8 +955,9 @@ void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr) * To make sure this can't happen, place an upper bound on how often the * kernel may oops without panic(). */ - if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= READ_ONCE(oops_limit) && oops_limit) - panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", oops_limit); + limit = READ_ONCE(oops_limit); + if (atomic_inc_return(&oops_count) >= limit && limit) + panic("Oopsed too often (kernel.oops_limit is %d)", limit); /* * We're taking recursive faults here in make_task_dead. Safest is to just diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c index 326d91505f04..463c9295bc28 100644 --- a/kernel/panic.c +++ b/kernel/panic.c @@ -232,12 +232,15 @@ static void panic_print_sys_info(bool console_flush) void check_panic_on_warn(const char *origin) { + unsigned int limit; + if (panic_on_warn) panic("%s: panic_on_warn set ...\n", origin); - if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= READ_ONCE(warn_limit) && warn_limit) + limit = READ_ONCE(warn_limit); + if (atomic_inc_return(&warn_count) >= limit && limit) panic("%s: system warned too often (kernel.warn_limit is %d)", - origin, warn_limit); + origin, limit); } /** diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index d766b7d0ffd1..53baa95cb644 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON config CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS def_bool $(cc-option,-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr) + # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1766 + # https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/59242 + depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION > 150006 config ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS bool "Enable register zeroing on function exit" diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c index de41621f4998..110a5ab2b46b 100644 --- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c +++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c @@ -122,21 +122,11 @@ static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) } } -static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, - bool contents) +static int loadpin_check(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { struct super_block *load_root; const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); - /* - * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents - * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged - * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were - * no associated file struct. - */ - if (!contents) - file = NULL; - /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && ignore_read_file_id[id]) { @@ -192,9 +182,25 @@ static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, return 0; } +static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, + bool contents) +{ + /* + * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its + * contents, so we can ignore the "are full contents available" + * argument here. + */ + return loadpin_check(file, id); +} + static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { - return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents); + /* + * LoadPin only cares about the _origin_ of a file, not its + * contents, so a NULL file is passed, and we can ignore the + * state of "contents". + */ + return loadpin_check(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id); } static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { |