diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt | 60 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt index 13d6166d7a27..88152f214f48 100644 --- a/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt @@ -32,6 +32,8 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs: - nr_open - overflowuid - overflowgid +- protected_hardlinks +- protected_symlinks - suid_dumpable - super-max - super-nr @@ -157,22 +159,68 @@ The default is 65534. ============================================================== +protected_hardlinks: + +A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a +root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, +on systems without separated partitions, this stops unauthorized users +from "pinning" vulnerable setuid/setgid files against being upgraded by +the administrator, or linking to special files. + +When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not +already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + +============================================================== + +protected_symlinks: + +A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based +time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable +directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw +is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a +root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely +incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: +http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp + +When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted. + +When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside +a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and +follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. + +This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity. + +============================================================== + suid_dumpable: This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are 0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed - privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped + privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped. 1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked. + This is insecure as it allows regular users to examine the memory + contents of privileged processes. 2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped - readable by root only. This allows the end user to remove - such a dump but not access it directly. For security reasons - core dumps in this mode will not overwrite one another or - other files. This mode is appropriate when administrators are - attempting to debug problems in a normal environment. + anyway, but only if the "core_pattern" kernel sysctl is set to + either a pipe handler or a fully qualified path. (For more details + on this limitation, see CVE-2006-2451.) This mode is appropriate + when administrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal + environment, and either have a core dump pipe handler that knows + to treat privileged core dumps with care, or specific directory + defined for catching core dumps. If a core dump happens without + a pipe handler or fully qualifid path, a message will be emitted + to syslog warning about the lack of a correct setting. ============================================================== |