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Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/block/index.rst | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst | 263 |
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diff --git a/Documentation/block/index.rst b/Documentation/block/index.rst index 3fa7a52fafa4..026addfc69bc 100644 --- a/Documentation/block/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/block/index.rst @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ Block cmdline-partition data-integrity deadline-iosched + inline-encryption ioprio kyber-iosched null_blk diff --git a/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst b/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..354817b80887 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/block/inline-encryption.rst @@ -0,0 +1,263 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +================= +Inline Encryption +================= + +Background +========== + +Inline encryption hardware sits logically between memory and the disk, and can +en/decrypt data as it goes in/out of the disk. Inline encryption hardware has a +fixed number of "keyslots" - slots into which encryption contexts (i.e. the +encryption key, encryption algorithm, data unit size) can be programmed by the +kernel at any time. Each request sent to the disk can be tagged with the index +of a keyslot (and also a data unit number to act as an encryption tweak), and +the inline encryption hardware will en/decrypt the data in the request with the +encryption context programmed into that keyslot. This is very different from +full disk encryption solutions like self encrypting drives/TCG OPAL/ATA +Security standards, since with inline encryption, any block on disk could be +encrypted with any encryption context the kernel chooses. + + +Objective +========= + +We want to support inline encryption (IE) in the kernel. +To allow for testing, we also want a crypto API fallback when actual +IE hardware is absent. We also want IE to work with layered devices +like dm and loopback (i.e. we want to be able to use the IE hardware +of the underlying devices if present, or else fall back to crypto API +en/decryption). + + +Constraints and notes +===================== + +- IE hardware has a limited number of "keyslots" that can be programmed + with an encryption context (key, algorithm, data unit size, etc.) at any time. + One can specify a keyslot in a data request made to the device, and the + device will en/decrypt the data using the encryption context programmed into + that specified keyslot. When possible, we want to make multiple requests with + the same encryption context share the same keyslot. + +- We need a way for upper layers like filesystems to specify an encryption + context to use for en/decrypting a struct bio, and a device driver (like UFS) + needs to be able to use that encryption context when it processes the bio. + +- We need a way for device drivers to expose their inline encryption + capabilities in a unified way to the upper layers. + + +Design +====== + +We add a :c:type:`struct bio_crypt_ctx` to :c:type:`struct bio` that can +represent an encryption context, because we need to be able to pass this +encryption context from the upper layers (like the fs layer) to the +device driver to act upon. + +While IE hardware works on the notion of keyslots, the FS layer has no +knowledge of keyslots - it simply wants to specify an encryption context to +use while en/decrypting a bio. + +We introduce a keyslot manager (KSM) that handles the translation from +encryption contexts specified by the FS to keyslots on the IE hardware. +This KSM also serves as the way IE hardware can expose its capabilities to +upper layers. The generic mode of operation is: each device driver that wants +to support IE will construct a KSM and set it up in its struct request_queue. +Upper layers that want to use IE on this device can then use this KSM in +the device's struct request_queue to translate an encryption context into +a keyslot. The presence of the KSM in the request queue shall be used to mean +that the device supports IE. + +The KSM uses refcounts to track which keyslots are idle (either they have no +encryption context programmed, or there are no in-flight struct bios +referencing that keyslot). When a new encryption context needs a keyslot, it +tries to find a keyslot that has already been programmed with the same +encryption context, and if there is no such keyslot, it evicts the least +recently used idle keyslot and programs the new encryption context into that +one. If no idle keyslots are available, then the caller will sleep until there +is at least one. + + +blk-mq changes, other block layer changes and blk-crypto-fallback +================================================================= + +We add a pointer to a ``bi_crypt_context`` and ``keyslot`` to +:c:type:`struct request`. These will be referred to as the ``crypto fields`` +for the request. This ``keyslot`` is the keyslot into which the +``bi_crypt_context`` has been programmed in the KSM of the ``request_queue`` +that this request is being sent to. + +We introduce ``block/blk-crypto-fallback.c``, which allows upper layers to remain +blissfully unaware of whether or not real inline encryption hardware is present +underneath. When a bio is submitted with a target ``request_queue`` that doesn't +support the encryption context specified with the bio, the block layer will +en/decrypt the bio with the blk-crypto-fallback. + +If the bio is a ``WRITE`` bio, a bounce bio is allocated, and the data in the bio +is encrypted stored in the bounce bio - blk-mq will then proceed to process the +bounce bio as if it were not encrypted at all (except when blk-integrity is +concerned). ``blk-crypto-fallback`` sets the bounce bio's ``bi_end_io`` to an +internal function that cleans up the bounce bio and ends the original bio. + +If the bio is a ``READ`` bio, the bio's ``bi_end_io`` (and also ``bi_private``) +is saved and overwritten by ``blk-crypto-fallback`` to +``bio_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio``. The bio's ``bi_crypt_context`` is also +overwritten with ``NULL``, so that to the rest of the stack, the bio looks +as if it was a regular bio that never had an encryption context specified. +``bio_crypto_fallback_decrypt_bio`` will decrypt the bio, restore the original +``bi_end_io`` (and also ``bi_private``) and end the bio again. + +Regardless of whether real inline encryption hardware is used or the +blk-crypto-fallback is used, the ciphertext written to disk (and hence the +on-disk format of data) will be the same (assuming the hardware's implementation +of the algorithm being used adheres to spec and functions correctly). + +If a ``request queue``'s inline encryption hardware claimed to support the +encryption context specified with a bio, then it will not be handled by the +``blk-crypto-fallback``. We will eventually reach a point in blk-mq when a +:c:type:`struct request` needs to be allocated for that bio. At that point, +blk-mq tries to program the encryption context into the ``request_queue``'s +keyslot_manager, and obtain a keyslot, which it stores in its newly added +``keyslot`` field. This keyslot is released when the request is completed. + +When the first bio is added to a request, ``blk_crypto_rq_bio_prep`` is called, +which sets the request's ``crypt_ctx`` to a copy of the bio's +``bi_crypt_context``. bio_crypt_do_front_merge is called whenever a subsequent +bio is merged to the front of the request, which updates the ``crypt_ctx`` of +the request so that it matches the newly merged bio's ``bi_crypt_context``. In particular, the request keeps a copy of the ``bi_crypt_context`` of the first +bio in its bio-list (blk-mq needs to be careful to maintain this invariant +during bio and request merges). + +To make it possible for inline encryption to work with request queue based +layered devices, when a request is cloned, its ``crypto fields`` are cloned as +well. When the cloned request is submitted, blk-mq programs the +``bi_crypt_context`` of the request into the clone's request_queue's keyslot +manager, and stores the returned keyslot in the clone's ``keyslot``. + + +API presented to users of the block layer +========================================= + +``struct blk_crypto_key`` represents a crypto key (the raw key, size of the +key, the crypto algorithm to use, the data unit size to use, and the number of +bytes required to represent data unit numbers that will be specified with the +``bi_crypt_context``). + +``blk_crypto_init_key`` allows upper layers to initialize such a +``blk_crypto_key``. + +``bio_crypt_set_ctx`` should be called on any bio that a user of +the block layer wants en/decrypted via inline encryption (or the +blk-crypto-fallback, if hardware support isn't available for the desired +crypto configuration). This function takes the ``blk_crypto_key`` and the +data unit number (DUN) to use when en/decrypting the bio. + +``blk_crypto_config_supported`` allows upper layers to query whether or not the +an encryption context passed to request queue can be handled by blk-crypto +(either by real inline encryption hardware, or by the blk-crypto-fallback). +This is useful e.g. when blk-crypto-fallback is disabled, and the upper layer +wants to use an algorithm that may not supported by hardware - this function +lets the upper layer know ahead of time that the algorithm isn't supported, +and the upper layer can fallback to something else if appropriate. + +``blk_crypto_start_using_key`` - Upper layers must call this function on +``blk_crypto_key`` and a ``request_queue`` before using the key with any bio +headed for that ``request_queue``. This function ensures that either the +hardware supports the key's crypto settings, or the crypto API fallback has +transforms for the needed mode allocated and ready to go. Note that this +function may allocate an ``skcipher``, and must not be called from the data +path, since allocating ``skciphers`` from the data path can deadlock. + +``blk_crypto_evict_key`` *must* be called by upper layers before a +``blk_crypto_key`` is freed. Further, it *must* only be called only once +there are no more in-flight requests that use that ``blk_crypto_key``. +``blk_crypto_evict_key`` will ensure that a key is removed from any keyslots in +inline encryption hardware that the key might have been programmed into (or the blk-crypto-fallback). + +API presented to device drivers +=============================== + +A :c:type:``struct blk_keyslot_manager`` should be set up by device drivers in +the ``request_queue`` of the device. The device driver needs to call +``blk_ksm_init`` on the ``blk_keyslot_manager``, which specifying the number of +keyslots supported by the hardware. + +The device driver also needs to tell the KSM how to actually manipulate the +IE hardware in the device to do things like programming the crypto key into +the IE hardware into a particular keyslot. All this is achieved through the +:c:type:`struct blk_ksm_ll_ops` field in the KSM that the device driver +must fill up after initing the ``blk_keyslot_manager``. + +The KSM also handles runtime power management for the device when applicable +(e.g. when it wants to program a crypto key into the IE hardware, the device +must be runtime powered on) - so the device driver must also set the ``dev`` +field in the ksm to point to the `struct device` for the KSM to use for runtime +power management. + +``blk_ksm_reprogram_all_keys`` can be called by device drivers if the device +needs each and every of its keyslots to be reprogrammed with the key it +"should have" at the point in time when the function is called. This is useful +e.g. if a device loses all its keys on runtime power down/up. + +``blk_ksm_destroy`` should be called to free up all resources used by a keyslot +manager upon ``blk_ksm_init``, once the ``blk_keyslot_manager`` is no longer +needed. + + +Layered Devices +=============== + +Request queue based layered devices like dm-rq that wish to support IE need to +create their own keyslot manager for their request queue, and expose whatever +functionality they choose. When a layered device wants to pass a clone of that +request to another ``request_queue``, blk-crypto will initialize and prepare the +clone as necessary - see ``blk_crypto_insert_cloned_request`` in +``blk-crypto.c``. + + +Future Optimizations for layered devices +======================================== + +Creating a keyslot manager for a layered device uses up memory for each +keyslot, and in general, a layered device merely passes the request on to a +"child" device, so the keyslots in the layered device itself are completely +unused, and don't need any refcounting or keyslot programming. We can instead +define a new type of KSM; the "passthrough KSM", that layered devices can use +to advertise an unlimited number of keyslots, and support for any encryption +algorithms they choose, while not actually using any memory for each keyslot. +Another use case for the "passthrough KSM" is for IE devices that do not have a +limited number of keyslots. + + +Interaction between inline encryption and blk integrity +======================================================= + +At the time of this patch, there is no real hardware that supports both these +features. However, these features do interact with each other, and it's not +completely trivial to make them both work together properly. In particular, +when a WRITE bio wants to use inline encryption on a device that supports both +features, the bio will have an encryption context specified, after which +its integrity information is calculated (using the plaintext data, since +the encryption will happen while data is being written), and the data and +integrity info is sent to the device. Obviously, the integrity info must be +verified before the data is encrypted. After the data is encrypted, the device +must not store the integrity info that it received with the plaintext data +since that might reveal information about the plaintext data. As such, it must +re-generate the integrity info from the ciphertext data and store that on disk +instead. Another issue with storing the integrity info of the plaintext data is +that it changes the on disk format depending on whether hardware inline +encryption support is present or the kernel crypto API fallback is used (since +if the fallback is used, the device will receive the integrity info of the +ciphertext, not that of the plaintext). + +Because there isn't any real hardware yet, it seems prudent to assume that +hardware implementations might not implement both features together correctly, +and disallow the combination for now. Whenever a device supports integrity, the +kernel will pretend that the device does not support hardware inline encryption +(by essentially setting the keyslot manager in the request_queue of the device +to NULL). When the crypto API fallback is enabled, this means that all bios with +and encryption context will use the fallback, and IO will complete as usual. +When the fallback is disabled, a bio with an encryption context will be failed. |