diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/Kconfig | 50 |
1 files changed, 49 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index 3abe581878d6..cae0958a2298 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK bool "Force initialization of variables containing userspace addresses" depends on GCC_PLUGINS help - This plugin zero-initializes any structures that containing a + This plugin zero-initializes any structures containing a __user attribute. This can prevent some classes of information exposures. @@ -443,6 +443,45 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE initialized. Since not all existing initializers are detected by the plugin, this can produce false positive warnings. +config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT + bool "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures" + depends on GCC_PLUGINS + select MODVERSIONS if MODULES + help + If you say Y here, the layouts of structures explicitly + marked by __randomize_layout will be randomized at + compile-time. This can introduce the requirement of an + additional information exposure vulnerability for exploits + targeting these structure types. + + Enabling this feature will introduce some performance impact, + slightly increase memory usage, and prevent the use of forensic + tools like Volatility against the system (unless the kernel + source tree isn't cleaned after kernel installation). + + The seed used for compilation is located at + scripts/gcc-plgins/randomize_layout_seed.h. It remains after + a make clean to allow for external modules to be compiled with + the existing seed and will be removed by a make mrproper or + make distclean. + + Note that the implementation requires gcc 4.7 or newer. + + This plugin was ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: + * https://grsecurity.net/ + * https://pax.grsecurity.net/ + +config GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT_PERFORMANCE + bool "Use cacheline-aware structure randomization" + depends on GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT + depends on !COMPILE_TEST + help + If you say Y here, the RANDSTRUCT randomization will make a + best effort at restricting randomization to cacheline-sized + groups of elements. It will further not randomize bitfields + in structures. This reduces the performance hit of RANDSTRUCT + at the cost of weakened randomization. + config HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR bool help @@ -867,4 +906,13 @@ config STRICT_MODULE_RWX config ARCH_WANT_RELAX_ORDER bool +config REFCOUNT_FULL + bool "Perform full reference count validation at the expense of speed" + help + Enabling this switches the refcounting infrastructure from a fast + unchecked atomic_t implementation to a fully state checked + implementation, which can be (slightly) slower but provides protections + against various use-after-free conditions that can be used in + security flaw exploits. + source "kernel/gcov/Kconfig" |