diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/boot')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S | 71 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S | 68 |
2 files changed, 68 insertions, 71 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S index 30ba541ddf30..db577fb26fa3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S @@ -711,77 +711,6 @@ SYM_DATA_START(boot_idt) SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(boot_idt, SYM_L_GLOBAL, boot_idt_end) /* - * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used. - * - * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is - * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND - * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the - * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here. - * - * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same - * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active - * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory. - * - * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is - * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will - * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that - * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail. - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT - .text -SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit) - pushl %ebx - pushl %ebp - - call 0f -0: popl %ebp - - /* Check for non-zero sev_status */ - movl (sev_status - 0b)(%ebp), %eax - testl %eax, %eax - jz 4f - - /* - * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails - * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value - * can be gathered. - */ -1: rdrand %eax - jnc 1b -2: rdrand %ebx - jnc 2b - - /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */ - leal (sev_check_data - 0b)(%ebp), %ebp - movl %eax, 0(%ebp) - movl %ebx, 4(%ebp) - - /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */ - movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */ - movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */ - movl %ecx, %cr0 - - cmpl %eax, 0(%ebp) - jne 3f - cmpl %ebx, 4(%ebp) - jne 3f - - movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */ - - jmp 4f - -3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */ - hlt - jmp 3b - -4: - popl %ebp - popl %ebx - RET -SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit) -#endif - -/* * Stack and heap for uncompression */ .bss diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S index 6747e5e4c696..14cf04a1ed09 100644 --- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S +++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/mem_encrypt.S @@ -243,6 +243,74 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_load_idt) RET SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_load_idt) +/* + * Check for the correct C-bit position when the startup_32 boot-path is used. + * + * The check makes use of the fact that all memory is encrypted when paging is + * disabled. The function creates 64 bits of random data using the RDRAND + * instruction. RDRAND is mandatory for SEV guests, so always available. If the + * hypervisor violates that the kernel will crash right here. + * + * The 64 bits of random data are stored to a memory location and at the same + * time kept in the %eax and %ebx registers. Since encryption is always active + * when paging is off the random data will be stored encrypted in main memory. + * + * Then paging is enabled. When the C-bit position is correct all memory is + * still mapped encrypted and comparing the register values with memory will + * succeed. An incorrect C-bit position will map all memory unencrypted, so that + * the compare will use the encrypted random data and fail. + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(startup32_check_sev_cbit) + pushl %ebx + pushl %ebp + + call 0f +0: popl %ebp + + /* Check for non-zero sev_status */ + movl (sev_status - 0b)(%ebp), %eax + testl %eax, %eax + jz 4f + + /* + * Get two 32-bit random values - Don't bail out if RDRAND fails + * because it is better to prevent forward progress if no random value + * can be gathered. + */ +1: rdrand %eax + jnc 1b +2: rdrand %ebx + jnc 2b + + /* Store to memory and keep it in the registers */ + leal (sev_check_data - 0b)(%ebp), %ebp + movl %eax, 0(%ebp) + movl %ebx, 4(%ebp) + + /* Enable paging to see if encryption is active */ + movl %cr0, %edx /* Backup %cr0 in %edx */ + movl $(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %ecx /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */ + movl %ecx, %cr0 + + cmpl %eax, 0(%ebp) + jne 3f + cmpl %ebx, 4(%ebp) + jne 3f + + movl %edx, %cr0 /* Restore previous %cr0 */ + + jmp 4f + +3: /* Check failed - hlt the machine */ + hlt + jmp 3b + +4: + popl %ebp + popl %ebx + RET +SYM_FUNC_END(startup32_check_sev_cbit) + .code64 #include "../../kernel/sev_verify_cbit.S" |