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-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c93
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/extable.c44
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/fault.c75
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c27
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/init.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c287
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c593
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S149
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mmap.c12
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mpx.c33
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c55
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c67
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pat.c9
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/tlb.c331
18 files changed, 1569 insertions, 236 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index 0fbdcb64f9f8..72bf8c01c6e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -39,3 +39,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX) += mpx.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_boot.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index 0470826d2bdc..5e3ac6fe6c9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -13,12 +13,12 @@
*/
#include <linux/debugfs.h>
+#include <linux/kasan.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-#include <asm/kasan.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
/*
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
{
pgprotval_t pr = pgprot_val(prot);
static const char * const level_name[] =
- { "cr3", "pgd", "pud", "pmd", "pte" };
+ { "cr3", "pgd", "p4d", "pud", "pmd", "pte" };
if (!pgprot_val(prot)) {
/* Not present */
@@ -162,12 +162,12 @@ static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
/* Bit 7 has a different meaning on level 3 vs 4 */
- if (level <= 3 && pr & _PAGE_PSE)
+ if (level <= 4 && pr & _PAGE_PSE)
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PSE ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
- if ((level == 4 && pr & _PAGE_PAT) ||
- ((level == 3 || level == 2) && pr & _PAGE_PAT_LARGE))
+ if ((level == 5 && pr & _PAGE_PAT) ||
+ ((level == 4 || level == 3) && pr & _PAGE_PAT_LARGE))
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, "PAT ");
else
pt_dump_cont_printf(m, dmsg, " ");
@@ -188,11 +188,12 @@ static void printk_prot(struct seq_file *m, pgprot_t prot, int level, bool dmsg)
*/
static unsigned long normalize_addr(unsigned long u)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- return (signed long)(u << 16) >> 16;
-#else
- return u;
-#endif
+ int shift;
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+ return u;
+
+ shift = 64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT + 1);
+ return (signed long)(u << shift) >> shift;
}
/*
@@ -297,32 +298,62 @@ static void walk_pte_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pmd_t addr,
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
prot = pte_flags(*start);
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PTE_LEVEL_MULT);
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 4);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 5);
start++;
}
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
+
+/*
+ * This is an optimization for KASAN=y case. Since all kasan page tables
+ * eventually point to the kasan_zero_page we could call note_page()
+ * right away without walking through lower level page tables. This saves
+ * us dozens of seconds (minutes for 5-level config) while checking for
+ * W+X mapping or reading kernel_page_tables debugfs file.
+ */
+static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
+ void *pt)
+{
+ if (__pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pmd) ||
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
+ __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_p4d) ||
+#endif
+ __pa(pt) == __pa(kasan_zero_pud)) {
+ pgprotval_t prot = pte_flags(kasan_zero_pte[0]);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 5);
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+#else
+static inline bool kasan_page_table(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st,
+ void *pt)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
#if PTRS_PER_PMD > 1
static void walk_pmd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pud_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
- pmd_t *start;
+ pmd_t *start, *pmd_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
- start = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(addr);
+ pmd_start = start = (pmd_t *)pud_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PMD; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PMD_LEVEL_MULT);
if (!pmd_none(*start)) {
if (pmd_large(*start) || !pmd_present(*start)) {
prot = pmd_flags(*start);
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 3);
- } else {
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 4);
+ } else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, pmd_start)) {
walk_pte_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * PMD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 3);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 4);
start++;
}
}
@@ -335,39 +366,27 @@ static void walk_pmd_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pud_t addr,
#if PTRS_PER_PUD > 1
-/*
- * This is an optimization for CONFIG_DEBUG_WX=y + CONFIG_KASAN=y
- * KASAN fills page tables with the same values. Since there is no
- * point in checking page table more than once we just skip repeated
- * entries. This saves us dozens of seconds during boot.
- */
-static bool pud_already_checked(pud_t *prev_pud, pud_t *pud, bool checkwx)
-{
- return checkwx && prev_pud && (pud_val(*prev_pud) == pud_val(*pud));
-}
-
static void walk_pud_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, p4d_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
- pud_t *start;
+ pud_t *start, *pud_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
pud_t *prev_pud = NULL;
- start = (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(addr);
+ pud_start = start = (pud_t *)p4d_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PUD; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * PUD_LEVEL_MULT);
- if (!pud_none(*start) &&
- !pud_already_checked(prev_pud, start, st->check_wx)) {
+ if (!pud_none(*start)) {
if (pud_large(*start) || !pud_present(*start)) {
prot = pud_flags(*start);
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 2);
- } else {
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 3);
+ } else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, pud_start)) {
walk_pmd_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * PUD_LEVEL_MULT);
}
} else
- note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 2);
+ note_page(m, st, __pgprot(0), 3);
prev_pud = start;
start++;
@@ -385,10 +404,10 @@ static void walk_pud_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, p4d_t addr,
static void walk_p4d_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pgd_t addr, unsigned long P)
{
int i;
- p4d_t *start;
+ p4d_t *start, *p4d_start;
pgprotval_t prot;
- start = (p4d_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(addr);
+ p4d_start = start = (p4d_t *)pgd_page_vaddr(addr);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_P4D; i++) {
st->current_address = normalize_addr(P + i * P4D_LEVEL_MULT);
@@ -396,7 +415,7 @@ static void walk_p4d_level(struct seq_file *m, struct pg_state *st, pgd_t addr,
if (p4d_large(*start) || !p4d_present(*start)) {
prot = p4d_flags(*start);
note_page(m, st, __pgprot(prot), 2);
- } else {
+ } else if (!kasan_page_table(m, st, p4d_start)) {
walk_pud_level(m, st, *start,
P + i * P4D_LEVEL_MULT);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 0ea8afcb929c..c076f710de4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -36,6 +36,48 @@ bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault);
+/*
+ * Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the
+ * result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub.
+ */
+bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+{
+ /* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
+ *(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;
+
+ /*
+ * Strictly speaking, this reports the fixup destination, not
+ * the fault location, and not the actually overflowing
+ * instruction, which is the instruction before the "js", but
+ * since that instruction could be a variety of lengths, just
+ * report the location after the overflow, which should be close
+ * enough for finding the overflow, as it's at least back in
+ * the function, having returned from .text.unlikely.
+ */
+ regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
+
+ /*
+ * This function has been called because either a negative refcount
+ * value was seen by any of the refcount functions, or a zero
+ * refcount value was seen by refcount_dec().
+ *
+ * If we crossed from INT_MAX to INT_MIN, OF (Overflow Flag: result
+ * wrapped around) will be set. Additionally, seeing the refcount
+ * reach 0 will set ZF (Zero Flag: result was zero). In each of
+ * these cases we want a report, since it's a boundary condition.
+ *
+ */
+ if (regs->flags & (X86_EFLAGS_OF | X86_EFLAGS_ZF)) {
+ bool zero = regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+
+ refcount_error_report(regs, zero ? "hit zero" : "overflow");
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_refcount);
+
bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
@@ -142,7 +184,7 @@ void __init early_fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
* undefined. I'm not sure which CPUs do this, but at least
* the 486 DX works this way.
*/
- if ((regs->cs & 0xFFFF) != __KERNEL_CS)
+ if (regs->cs != __KERNEL_CS)
goto fail;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
index 2a1fa10c6a98..b836a7274e12 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c
@@ -396,14 +396,18 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
pte_t *pte;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_PAE
- printk("*pdpt = %016Lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
+ pr_info("*pdpt = %016Lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
if (!low_pfn(pgd_val(*pgd) >> PAGE_SHIFT) || !pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
+#define pr_pde pr_cont
+#else
+#define pr_pde pr_info
#endif
p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, address);
pud = pud_offset(p4d, address);
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address);
- printk(KERN_CONT "*pde = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pmd) * 2, (u64)pmd_val(*pmd));
+ pr_pde("*pde = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pmd) * 2, (u64)pmd_val(*pmd));
+#undef pr_pde
/*
* We must not directly access the pte in the highpte
@@ -415,9 +419,9 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
goto out;
pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address);
- printk("*pte = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pte) * 2, (u64)pte_val(*pte));
+ pr_cont("*pte = %0*Lx ", sizeof(*pte) * 2, (u64)pte_val(*pte));
out:
- printk("\n");
+ pr_cont("\n");
}
#else /* CONFIG_X86_64: */
@@ -565,7 +569,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pgd))
goto bad;
- printk("PGD %lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
+ pr_info("PGD %lx ", pgd_val(*pgd));
if (!pgd_present(*pgd))
goto out;
@@ -574,7 +578,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(p4d))
goto bad;
- printk("P4D %lx ", p4d_val(*p4d));
+ pr_cont("P4D %lx ", p4d_val(*p4d));
if (!p4d_present(*p4d) || p4d_large(*p4d))
goto out;
@@ -582,7 +586,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pud))
goto bad;
- printk("PUD %lx ", pud_val(*pud));
+ pr_cont("PUD %lx ", pud_val(*pud));
if (!pud_present(*pud) || pud_large(*pud))
goto out;
@@ -590,7 +594,7 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pmd))
goto bad;
- printk("PMD %lx ", pmd_val(*pmd));
+ pr_cont("PMD %lx ", pmd_val(*pmd));
if (!pmd_present(*pmd) || pmd_large(*pmd))
goto out;
@@ -598,12 +602,12 @@ static void dump_pagetable(unsigned long address)
if (bad_address(pte))
goto bad;
- printk("PTE %lx", pte_val(*pte));
+ pr_cont("PTE %lx", pte_val(*pte));
out:
- printk("\n");
+ pr_cont("\n");
return;
bad:
- printk("BAD\n");
+ pr_info("BAD\n");
}
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
@@ -1254,10 +1258,6 @@ static inline bool smap_violation(int error_code, struct pt_regs *regs)
* This routine handles page faults. It determines the address,
* and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate
* routines.
- *
- * This function must have noinline because both callers
- * {,trace_}do_page_fault() have notrace on. Having this an actual function
- * guarantees there's a function trace entry.
*/
static noinline void
__do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code,
@@ -1490,27 +1490,6 @@ good_area:
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__do_page_fault);
-dotraplinkage void notrace
-do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
-{
- unsigned long address = read_cr2(); /* Get the faulting address */
- enum ctx_state prev_state;
-
- /*
- * We must have this function tagged with __kprobes, notrace and call
- * read_cr2() before calling anything else. To avoid calling any kind
- * of tracing machinery before we've observed the CR2 value.
- *
- * exception_{enter,exit}() contain all sorts of tracepoints.
- */
-
- prev_state = exception_enter();
- __do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address);
- exception_exit(prev_state);
-}
-NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_page_fault);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
static nokprobe_inline void
trace_page_fault_entries(unsigned long address, struct pt_regs *regs,
unsigned long error_code)
@@ -1521,22 +1500,24 @@ trace_page_fault_entries(unsigned long address, struct pt_regs *regs,
trace_page_fault_kernel(address, regs, error_code);
}
+/*
+ * We must have this function blacklisted from kprobes, tagged with notrace
+ * and call read_cr2() before calling anything else. To avoid calling any
+ * kind of tracing machinery before we've observed the CR2 value.
+ *
+ * exception_{enter,exit}() contains all sorts of tracepoints.
+ */
dotraplinkage void notrace
-trace_do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
+do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code)
{
- /*
- * The exception_enter and tracepoint processing could
- * trigger another page faults (user space callchain
- * reading) and destroy the original cr2 value, so read
- * the faulting address now.
- */
- unsigned long address = read_cr2();
+ unsigned long address = read_cr2(); /* Get the faulting address */
enum ctx_state prev_state;
prev_state = exception_enter();
- trace_page_fault_entries(address, regs, error_code);
+ if (trace_pagefault_enabled())
+ trace_page_fault_entries(address, regs, error_code);
+
__do_page_fault(regs, error_code, address);
exception_exit(prev_state);
}
-NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(trace_do_page_fault);
-#endif /* CONFIG_TRACING */
+NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_page_fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c b/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
index 2824607df108..6d06cf33e3de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/hugetlbpage.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/elf.h>
+#include <asm/mpx.h>
#if 0 /* This is just for testing */
struct page *
@@ -85,25 +86,38 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_bottomup(struct file *file,
info.flags = 0;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
+
+ /*
+ * If hint address is above DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW, look for unmapped area
+ * in the full address space.
+ */
info.high_limit = in_compat_syscall() ?
- tasksize_32bit() : tasksize_64bit();
+ task_size_32bit() : task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
+
info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h);
info.align_offset = 0;
return vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *file,
- unsigned long addr0, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
struct vm_unmapped_area_info info;
- unsigned long addr;
info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
info.length = len;
info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
+
+ /*
+ * If hint address is above DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW, look for unmapped area
+ * in the full address space.
+ */
+ if (addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW && !in_compat_syscall())
+ info.high_limit += TASK_SIZE_MAX - DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
+
info.align_mask = PAGE_MASK & ~huge_page_mask(h);
info.align_offset = 0;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
@@ -118,7 +132,7 @@ static unsigned long hugetlb_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *file,
VM_BUG_ON(addr != -ENOMEM);
info.flags = 0;
info.low_limit = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
- info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE;
+ info.high_limit = TASK_SIZE_LOW;
addr = vm_unmapped_area(&info);
}
@@ -135,6 +149,11 @@ hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
if (len & ~huge_page_mask(h))
return -EINVAL;
+
+ addr = mpx_unmapped_area_check(addr, len, flags);
+ if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
+ return addr;
+
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
index adab1595f4bd..31cea988fa36 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static int ident_pud_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pud_t *pud_page,
if (!pmd)
return -ENOMEM;
ident_pmd_init(info, pmd, addr, next);
- set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_pud(pud, __pud(__pa(pmd) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
return 0;
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int ident_p4d_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, p4d_t *p4d_page,
if (!pud)
return -ENOMEM;
ident_pud_init(info, pud, addr, next);
- set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_p4d(p4d, __p4d(__pa(pud) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
return 0;
@@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
unsigned long next;
int result;
+ /* Set the default pagetable flags if not supplied */
+ if (!info->kernpg_flag)
+ info->kernpg_flag = _KERNPG_TABLE;
+
for (; addr < end; addr = next) {
pgd_t *pgd = pgd_page + pgd_index(addr);
p4d_t *p4d;
@@ -116,14 +120,14 @@ int kernel_ident_mapping_init(struct x86_mapping_info *info, pgd_t *pgd_page,
if (result)
return result;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(p4d) | info->kernpg_flag));
} else {
/*
* With p4d folded, pgd is equal to p4d.
* The pgd entry has to point to the pud page table in this case.
*/
pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, 0);
- set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE));
+ set_pgd(pgd, __pgd(__pa(pud) | info->kernpg_flag));
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init.c b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
index bf3f1065d6ad..7777ccc0e9f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/init.c
@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ void __init zone_sizes_init(void)
DEFINE_PER_CPU_SHARED_ALIGNED(struct tlb_state, cpu_tlbstate) = {
.loaded_mm = &init_mm,
- .state = 0,
+ .next_asid = 1,
.cr4 = ~0UL, /* fail hard if we screw up cr4 shadow initialization */
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_tlbstate);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
index 4c1b5fd0c7ad..34f0e1847dd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/mmiotrace.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <asm/set_memory.h>
#include <asm/e820/api.h>
@@ -21,6 +23,7 @@
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/pgalloc.h>
#include <asm/pat.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
#include "physaddr.h"
@@ -106,12 +109,6 @@ static void __iomem *__ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr,
}
/*
- * Don't remap the low PCI/ISA area, it's always mapped..
- */
- if (is_ISA_range(phys_addr, last_addr))
- return (__force void __iomem *)phys_to_virt(phys_addr);
-
- /*
* Don't allow anybody to remap normal RAM that we're using..
*/
pfn = phys_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
@@ -340,13 +337,17 @@ void iounmap(volatile void __iomem *addr)
return;
/*
- * __ioremap special-cases the PCI/ISA range by not instantiating a
- * vm_area and by simply returning an address into the kernel mapping
- * of ISA space. So handle that here.
+ * The PCI/ISA range special-casing was removed from __ioremap()
+ * so this check, in theory, can be removed. However, there are
+ * cases where iounmap() is called for addresses not obtained via
+ * ioremap() (vga16fb for example). Add a warning so that these
+ * cases can be caught and fixed.
*/
if ((void __force *)addr >= phys_to_virt(ISA_START_ADDRESS) &&
- (void __force *)addr < phys_to_virt(ISA_END_ADDRESS))
+ (void __force *)addr < phys_to_virt(ISA_END_ADDRESS)) {
+ WARN(1, "iounmap() called for ISA range not obtained using ioremap()\n");
return;
+ }
addr = (volatile void __iomem *)
(PAGE_MASK & (unsigned long __force)addr);
@@ -399,12 +400,10 @@ void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys)
unsigned long offset = phys & ~PAGE_MASK;
void *vaddr;
- /* If page is RAM, we can use __va. Otherwise ioremap and unmap. */
- if (page_is_ram(start >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- return __va(phys);
+ /* memremap() maps if RAM, otherwise falls back to ioremap() */
+ vaddr = memremap(start, PAGE_SIZE, MEMREMAP_WB);
- vaddr = ioremap_cache(start, PAGE_SIZE);
- /* Only add the offset on success and return NULL if the ioremap() failed: */
+ /* Only add the offset on success and return NULL if memremap() failed */
if (vaddr)
vaddr += offset;
@@ -413,11 +412,263 @@ void *xlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys)
void unxlate_dev_mem_ptr(phys_addr_t phys, void *addr)
{
- if (page_is_ram(phys >> PAGE_SHIFT))
- return;
+ memunmap((void *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is an area of memory
+ * that should be mapped decrypted. If the memory is not part of the
+ * kernel usable area it was accessed and created decrypted, so these
+ * areas should be mapped decrypted. And since the encryption key can
+ * change across reboots, persistent memory should also be mapped
+ * decrypted.
+ */
+static bool memremap_should_map_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ int is_pmem;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the address is part of a persistent memory region.
+ * This check covers areas added by E820, EFI and ACPI.
+ */
+ is_pmem = region_intersects(phys_addr, size, IORESOURCE_MEM,
+ IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
+ if (is_pmem != REGION_DISJOINT)
+ return true;
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the non-volatile attribute is set for an EFI
+ * reserved area.
+ */
+ if (efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+ case EFI_RESERVED_TYPE:
+ if (efi_mem_attributes(phys_addr) & EFI_MEMORY_NV)
+ return true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check if the address is outside kernel usable area */
+ switch (e820__get_entry_type(phys_addr, phys_addr + size - 1)) {
+ case E820_TYPE_RESERVED:
+ case E820_TYPE_ACPI:
+ case E820_TYPE_NVS:
+ case E820_TYPE_UNUSABLE:
+ case E820_TYPE_PRAM:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is EFI data. Check
+ * it against the boot params structure and EFI tables and memory types.
+ */
+static bool memremap_is_efi_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ u64 paddr;
+
+ /* Check if the address is part of EFI boot/runtime data */
+ if (!efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT))
+ return false;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap_hi;
+ paddr <<= 32;
+ paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_memmap;
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi;
+ paddr <<= 32;
+ paddr |= boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab;
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ if (efi_is_table_address(phys_addr))
+ return true;
+
+ switch (efi_mem_type(phys_addr)) {
+ case EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA:
+ case EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA:
+ return true;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
+ * it against the boot params setup_data chain.
+ */
+static bool memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ struct setup_data *data;
+ u64 paddr, paddr_next;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
+ while (paddr) {
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ data = memremap(paddr, sizeof(*data),
+ MEMREMAP_WB | MEMREMAP_DEC);
+
+ paddr_next = data->next;
+ len = data->len;
+
+ memunmap(data);
+
+ if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
+ return true;
+
+ paddr = paddr_next;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Examine the physical address to determine if it is boot data by checking
+ * it against the boot params setup_data chain (early boot version).
+ */
+static bool __init early_memremap_is_setup_data(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ struct setup_data *data;
+ u64 paddr, paddr_next;
+
+ paddr = boot_params.hdr.setup_data;
+ while (paddr) {
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ if (phys_addr == paddr)
+ return true;
+
+ data = early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, sizeof(*data));
+
+ paddr_next = data->next;
+ len = data->len;
+
+ early_memunmap(data, sizeof(*data));
+
+ if ((phys_addr > paddr) && (phys_addr < (paddr + len)))
+ return true;
+
+ paddr = paddr_next;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Architecture function to determine if RAM remap is allowed. By default, a
+ * RAM remap will map the data as encrypted. Determine if a RAM remap should
+ * not be done so that the data will be mapped decrypted.
+ */
+bool arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return true;
+
+ if (flags & MEMREMAP_ENC)
+ return true;
+
+ if (flags & MEMREMAP_DEC)
+ return false;
+
+ if (memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Architecture override of __weak function to adjust the protection attributes
+ * used when remapping memory. By default, early_memremap() will map the data
+ * as encrypted. Determine if an encrypted mapping should not be done and set
+ * the appropriate protection attributes.
+ */
+pgprot_t __init early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size,
+ pgprot_t prot)
+{
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return prot;
+
+ if (early_memremap_is_setup_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_is_efi_data(phys_addr, size) ||
+ memremap_should_map_decrypted(phys_addr, size))
+ prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
+ else
+ prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
+
+ return prot;
+}
+
+bool phys_mem_access_encrypted(unsigned long phys_addr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ return arch_memremap_can_ram_remap(phys_addr, size, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
+/* Remap memory with encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remap memory with encryption and write-protected - cannot be called
+ * before pat_init() is called
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_encrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ /* Be sure the write-protect PAT entry is set for write-protect */
+ if (__pte2cachemode_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_ENC_WP);
+}
+
+/* Remap memory without encryption */
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remap memory without encryption and write-protected - cannot be called
+ * before pat_init() is called
+ */
+void __init *early_memremap_decrypted_wp(resource_size_t phys_addr,
+ unsigned long size)
+{
+ /* Be sure the write-protect PAT entry is set for write-protect */
+ if (__pte2cachemode_tbl[_PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP] != _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP)
+ return NULL;
- iounmap((void __iomem *)((unsigned long)addr & PAGE_MASK));
+ return early_memremap_prot(phys_addr, size, __PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC_WP);
}
+#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT */
static pte_t bm_pte[PAGE_SIZE/sizeof(pte_t)] __page_aligned_bss;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
index 02c9d7553409..bc84b73684b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/kasan_init_64.c
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
#include <asm/e820/types.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
-extern pgd_t early_top_pgt[PTRS_PER_PGD];
extern struct range pfn_mapped[E820_MAX_ENTRIES];
static int __init map_range(struct range *range)
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static struct notifier_block kasan_die_notifier = {
void __init kasan_early_init(void)
{
int i;
- pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL;
+ pteval_t pte_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL | _PAGE_ENC;
pmdval_t pmd_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pte) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
pudval_t pud_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pmd) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
p4dval_t p4d_val = __pa_nodebug(kasan_zero_pud) | _KERNPG_TABLE;
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void __init kasan_init(void)
*/
memset(kasan_zero_page, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < PTRS_PER_PTE; i++) {
- pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO);
+ pte_t pte = __pte(__pa(kasan_zero_page) | __PAGE_KERNEL_RO | _PAGE_ENC);
set_pte(&kasan_zero_pte[i], pte);
}
/* Flush TLBs again to be sure that write protection applied. */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0fbd09269757
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/dma-mapping.h>
+#include <linux/swiotlb.h>
+#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h>
+
+#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/fixmap.h>
+#include <asm/setup.h>
+#include <asm/bootparam.h>
+#include <asm/set_memory.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
+#include <asm/sections.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/cmdline.h>
+
+static char sme_cmdline_arg[] __initdata = "mem_encrypt";
+static char sme_cmdline_on[] __initdata = "on";
+static char sme_cmdline_off[] __initdata = "off";
+
+/*
+ * Since SME related variables are set early in the boot process they must
+ * reside in the .data section so as not to be zeroed out when the .bss
+ * section is later cleared.
+ */
+unsigned long sme_me_mask __section(.data) = 0;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_me_mask);
+
+/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
+static char sme_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+
+/*
+ * This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
+ * page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
+ * meant to be accessed as either encrypted or decrypted but the contents
+ * are currently not in the desired state.
+ *
+ * This routine follows the steps outlined in the AMD64 Architecture
+ * Programmer's Manual Volume 2, Section 7.10.8 Encrypt-in-Place.
+ */
+static void __init __sme_early_enc_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
+ unsigned long size, bool enc)
+{
+ void *src, *dst;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ local_flush_tlb();
+ wbinvd();
+
+ /*
+ * There are limited number of early mapping slots, so map (at most)
+ * one page at time.
+ */
+ while (size) {
+ len = min_t(size_t, sizeof(sme_early_buffer), size);
+
+ /*
+ * Create mappings for the current and desired format of
+ * the memory. Use a write-protected mapping for the source.
+ */
+ src = enc ? early_memremap_decrypted_wp(paddr, len) :
+ early_memremap_encrypted_wp(paddr, len);
+
+ dst = enc ? early_memremap_encrypted(paddr, len) :
+ early_memremap_decrypted(paddr, len);
+
+ /*
+ * If a mapping can't be obtained to perform the operation,
+ * then eventual access of that area in the desired mode
+ * will cause a crash.
+ */
+ BUG_ON(!src || !dst);
+
+ /*
+ * Use a temporary buffer, of cache-line multiple size, to
+ * avoid data corruption as documented in the APM.
+ */
+ memcpy(sme_early_buffer, src, len);
+ memcpy(dst, sme_early_buffer, len);
+
+ early_memunmap(dst, len);
+ early_memunmap(src, len);
+
+ paddr += len;
+ size -= len;
+ }
+}
+
+void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, true);
+}
+
+void __init sme_early_decrypt(resource_size_t paddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ __sme_early_enc_dec(paddr, size, false);
+}
+
+static void __init __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(void *vaddr, unsigned long size,
+ bool map)
+{
+ unsigned long paddr = (unsigned long)vaddr - __PAGE_OFFSET;
+ pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
+
+ /* Use early_pmd_flags but remove the encryption mask */
+ pmd_flags = __sme_clr(early_pmd_flags);
+
+ do {
+ pmd = map ? (paddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags : 0;
+ __early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)vaddr, pmd);
+
+ vaddr += PMD_SIZE;
+ paddr += PMD_SIZE;
+ size = (size <= PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
+ } while (size);
+
+ __native_flush_tlb();
+}
+
+void __init sme_unmap_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+ struct boot_params *boot_data;
+ unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return;
+
+ /* Get the command line address before unmapping the real_mode_data */
+ boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+ cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), false);
+
+ if (!cmdline_paddr)
+ return;
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, false);
+}
+
+void __init sme_map_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
+{
+ struct boot_params *boot_data;
+ unsigned long cmdline_paddr;
+
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return;
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(real_mode_data, sizeof(boot_params), true);
+
+ /* Get the command line address after mapping the real_mode_data */
+ boot_data = (struct boot_params *)real_mode_data;
+ cmdline_paddr = boot_data->hdr.cmd_line_ptr | ((u64)boot_data->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32);
+
+ if (!cmdline_paddr)
+ return;
+
+ __sme_early_map_unmap_mem(__va(cmdline_paddr), COMMAND_LINE_SIZE, true);
+}
+
+void __init sme_early_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ early_pmd_flags = __sme_set(early_pmd_flags);
+
+ __supported_pte_mask = __sme_set(__supported_pte_mask);
+
+ /* Update the protection map with memory encryption mask */
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(protection_map); i++)
+ protection_map[i] = pgprot_encrypted(protection_map[i]);
+}
+
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void)
+{
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return;
+
+ /* Call into SWIOTLB to update the SWIOTLB DMA buffers */
+ swiotlb_update_mem_attributes();
+
+ pr_info("AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) active\n");
+}
+
+void swiotlb_set_mem_attributes(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ WARN(PAGE_ALIGN(size) != size,
+ "size is not page-aligned (%#lx)\n", size);
+
+ /* Make the SWIOTLB buffer area decrypted */
+ set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)vaddr, size >> PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
+static void __init sme_clear_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, unsigned long start,
+ unsigned long end)
+{
+ unsigned long pgd_start, pgd_end, pgd_size;
+ pgd_t *pgd_p;
+
+ pgd_start = start & PGDIR_MASK;
+ pgd_end = end & PGDIR_MASK;
+
+ pgd_size = (((pgd_end - pgd_start) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1);
+ pgd_size *= sizeof(pgd_t);
+
+ pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(start);
+
+ memset(pgd_p, 0, pgd_size);
+}
+
+#define PGD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define P4D_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PUD_FLAGS _KERNPG_TABLE_NOENC
+#define PMD_FLAGS (__PAGE_KERNEL_LARGE_EXEC & ~_PAGE_GLOBAL)
+
+static void __init *sme_populate_pgd(pgd_t *pgd_base, void *pgtable_area,
+ unsigned long vaddr, pmdval_t pmd_val)
+{
+ pgd_t *pgd_p;
+ p4d_t *p4d_p;
+ pud_t *pud_p;
+ pmd_t *pmd_p;
+
+ pgd_p = pgd_base + pgd_index(vaddr);
+ if (native_pgd_val(*pgd_p)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL))
+ p4d_p = (p4d_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ else
+ pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_pgd_val(*pgd_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ pgd_t pgd;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(p4d_p, 0, sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*p4d_p) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+
+ pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)p4d_p + PGD_FLAGS);
+ } else {
+ pud_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+
+ pgd = native_make_pgd((pgdval_t)pud_p + PGD_FLAGS);
+ }
+ native_set_pgd(pgd_p, pgd);
+ }
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_p += p4d_index(vaddr);
+ if (native_p4d_val(*p4d_p)) {
+ pud_p = (pud_t *)(native_p4d_val(*p4d_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ p4d_t p4d;
+
+ pud_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pud_p, 0, sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pud_p) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+
+ p4d = native_make_p4d((pudval_t)pud_p + P4D_FLAGS);
+ native_set_p4d(p4d_p, p4d);
+ }
+ }
+
+ pud_p += pud_index(vaddr);
+ if (native_pud_val(*pud_p)) {
+ if (native_pud_val(*pud_p) & _PAGE_PSE)
+ goto out;
+
+ pmd_p = (pmd_t *)(native_pud_val(*pud_p) & ~PTE_FLAGS_MASK);
+ } else {
+ pud_t pud;
+
+ pmd_p = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pmd_p, 0, sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pmd_p) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+ pud = native_make_pud((pmdval_t)pmd_p + PUD_FLAGS);
+ native_set_pud(pud_p, pud);
+ }
+
+ pmd_p += pmd_index(vaddr);
+ if (!native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) || !(native_pmd_val(*pmd_p) & _PAGE_PSE))
+ native_set_pmd(pmd_p, native_make_pmd(pmd_val));
+
+out:
+ return pgtable_area;
+}
+
+static unsigned long __init sme_pgtable_calc(unsigned long len)
+{
+ unsigned long p4d_size, pud_size, pmd_size;
+ unsigned long total;
+
+ /*
+ * Perform a relatively simplistic calculation of the pagetable
+ * entries that are needed. That mappings will be covered by 2MB
+ * PMD entries so we can conservatively calculate the required
+ * number of P4D, PUD and PMD structures needed to perform the
+ * mappings. Incrementing the count for each covers the case where
+ * the addresses cross entries.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1;
+ p4d_size *= sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+ pud_size = (ALIGN(len, P4D_SIZE) / P4D_SIZE) + 1;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ } else {
+ p4d_size = 0;
+ pud_size = (ALIGN(len, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE) + 1;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ }
+ pmd_size = (ALIGN(len, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE) + 1;
+ pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+ total = p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size;
+
+ /*
+ * Now calculate the added pagetable structures needed to populate
+ * the new pagetables.
+ */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL)) {
+ p4d_size = ALIGN(total, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE;
+ p4d_size *= sizeof(p4d_t) * PTRS_PER_P4D;
+ pud_size = ALIGN(total, P4D_SIZE) / P4D_SIZE;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ } else {
+ p4d_size = 0;
+ pud_size = ALIGN(total, PGDIR_SIZE) / PGDIR_SIZE;
+ pud_size *= sizeof(pud_t) * PTRS_PER_PUD;
+ }
+ pmd_size = ALIGN(total, PUD_SIZE) / PUD_SIZE;
+ pmd_size *= sizeof(pmd_t) * PTRS_PER_PMD;
+
+ total += p4d_size + pud_size + pmd_size;
+
+ return total;
+}
+
+void __init sme_encrypt_kernel(void)
+{
+ unsigned long workarea_start, workarea_end, workarea_len;
+ unsigned long execute_start, execute_end, execute_len;
+ unsigned long kernel_start, kernel_end, kernel_len;
+ unsigned long pgtable_area_len;
+ unsigned long paddr, pmd_flags;
+ unsigned long decrypted_base;
+ void *pgtable_area;
+ pgd_t *pgd;
+
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare for encrypting the kernel by building new pagetables with
+ * the necessary attributes needed to encrypt the kernel in place.
+ *
+ * One range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
+ * by the kernel as encrypted.
+ *
+ * Another range of virtual addresses will map the memory occupied
+ * by the kernel as decrypted and write-protected.
+ *
+ * The use of write-protect attribute will prevent any of the
+ * memory from being cached.
+ */
+
+ /* Physical addresses gives us the identity mapped virtual addresses */
+ kernel_start = __pa_symbol(_text);
+ kernel_end = ALIGN(__pa_symbol(_end), PMD_PAGE_SIZE);
+ kernel_len = kernel_end - kernel_start;
+
+ /* Set the encryption workarea to be immediately after the kernel */
+ workarea_start = kernel_end;
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate required number of workarea bytes needed:
+ * executable encryption area size:
+ * stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * intermediate copy buffer (PMD_PAGE_SIZE)
+ * pagetable structures for the encryption of the kernel
+ * pagetable structures for workarea (in case not currently mapped)
+ */
+ execute_start = workarea_start;
+ execute_end = execute_start + (PAGE_SIZE * 2) + PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ execute_len = execute_end - execute_start;
+
+ /*
+ * One PGD for both encrypted and decrypted mappings and a set of
+ * PUDs and PMDs for each of the encrypted and decrypted mappings.
+ */
+ pgtable_area_len = sizeof(pgd_t) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
+ pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_end - kernel_start) * 2;
+
+ /* PUDs and PMDs needed in the current pagetables for the workarea */
+ pgtable_area_len += sme_pgtable_calc(execute_len + pgtable_area_len);
+
+ /*
+ * The total workarea includes the executable encryption area and
+ * the pagetable area.
+ */
+ workarea_len = execute_len + pgtable_area_len;
+ workarea_end = workarea_start + workarea_len;
+
+ /*
+ * Set the address to the start of where newly created pagetable
+ * structures (PGDs, PUDs and PMDs) will be allocated. New pagetable
+ * structures are created when the workarea is added to the current
+ * pagetables and when the new encrypted and decrypted kernel
+ * mappings are populated.
+ */
+ pgtable_area = (void *)execute_end;
+
+ /*
+ * Make sure the current pagetable structure has entries for
+ * addressing the workarea.
+ */
+ pgd = (pgd_t *)native_read_cr3_pa();
+ paddr = workarea_start;
+ while (paddr < workarea_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr,
+ paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
+ native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
+
+ /*
+ * A new pagetable structure is being built to allow for the kernel
+ * to be encrypted. It starts with an empty PGD that will then be
+ * populated with new PUDs and PMDs as the encrypted and decrypted
+ * kernel mappings are created.
+ */
+ pgd = pgtable_area;
+ memset(pgd, 0, sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD);
+ pgtable_area += sizeof(*pgd) * PTRS_PER_PGD;
+
+ /* Add encrypted kernel (identity) mappings */
+ pmd_flags = PMD_FLAGS | _PAGE_ENC;
+ paddr = kernel_start;
+ while (paddr < kernel_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr,
+ paddr + pmd_flags);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A different PGD index/entry must be used to get different
+ * pagetable entries for the decrypted mapping. Choose the next
+ * PGD index and convert it to a virtual address to be used as
+ * the base of the mapping.
+ */
+ decrypted_base = (pgd_index(workarea_end) + 1) & (PTRS_PER_PGD - 1);
+ decrypted_base <<= PGDIR_SHIFT;
+
+ /* Add decrypted, write-protected kernel (non-identity) mappings */
+ pmd_flags = (PMD_FLAGS & ~_PAGE_CACHE_MASK) | (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT);
+ paddr = kernel_start;
+ while (paddr < kernel_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr + decrypted_base,
+ paddr + pmd_flags);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Add decrypted workarea mappings to both kernel mappings */
+ paddr = workarea_start;
+ while (paddr < workarea_end) {
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr,
+ paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+
+ pgtable_area = sme_populate_pgd(pgd, pgtable_area,
+ paddr + decrypted_base,
+ paddr + PMD_FLAGS);
+
+ paddr += PMD_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ /* Perform the encryption */
+ sme_encrypt_execute(kernel_start, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
+ kernel_len, workarea_start, (unsigned long)pgd);
+
+ /*
+ * At this point we are running encrypted. Remove the mappings for
+ * the decrypted areas - all that is needed for this is to remove
+ * the PGD entry/entries.
+ */
+ sme_clear_pgd(pgd, kernel_start + decrypted_base,
+ kernel_end + decrypted_base);
+
+ sme_clear_pgd(pgd, workarea_start + decrypted_base,
+ workarea_end + decrypted_base);
+
+ /* Flush the TLB - no globals so cr3 is enough */
+ native_write_cr3(__native_read_cr3());
+}
+
+void __init __nostackprotector sme_enable(struct boot_params *bp)
+{
+ const char *cmdline_ptr, *cmdline_arg, *cmdline_on, *cmdline_off;
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+ bool active_by_default;
+ unsigned long me_mask;
+ char buffer[16];
+ u64 msr;
+
+ /* Check for the SME support leaf */
+ eax = 0x80000000;
+ ecx = 0;
+ native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (eax < 0x8000001f)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Check for the SME feature:
+ * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 0
+ * Secure Memory Encryption support
+ * CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0
+ * Pagetable bit position used to indicate encryption
+ */
+ eax = 0x8000001f;
+ ecx = 0;
+ native_cpuid(&eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+ if (!(eax & 1))
+ return;
+
+ me_mask = 1UL << (ebx & 0x3f);
+
+ /* Check if SME is enabled */
+ msr = __rdmsr(MSR_K8_SYSCFG);
+ if (!(msr & MSR_K8_SYSCFG_MEM_ENCRYPT))
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Fixups have not been applied to phys_base yet and we're running
+ * identity mapped, so we must obtain the address to the SME command
+ * line argument data using rip-relative addressing.
+ */
+ asm ("lea sme_cmdline_arg(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (cmdline_arg)
+ : "p" (sme_cmdline_arg));
+ asm ("lea sme_cmdline_on(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (cmdline_on)
+ : "p" (sme_cmdline_on));
+ asm ("lea sme_cmdline_off(%%rip), %0"
+ : "=r" (cmdline_off)
+ : "p" (sme_cmdline_off));
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT_ACTIVE_BY_DEFAULT))
+ active_by_default = true;
+ else
+ active_by_default = false;
+
+ cmdline_ptr = (const char *)((u64)bp->hdr.cmd_line_ptr |
+ ((u64)bp->ext_cmd_line_ptr << 32));
+
+ cmdline_find_option(cmdline_ptr, cmdline_arg, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+
+ if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_on, sizeof(buffer)))
+ sme_me_mask = me_mask;
+ else if (!strncmp(buffer, cmdline_off, sizeof(buffer)))
+ sme_me_mask = 0;
+ else
+ sme_me_mask = active_by_default ? me_mask : 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..730e6d541df1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_boot.S
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+/*
+ * AMD Memory Encryption Support
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
+ *
+ * Author: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/linkage.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
+#include <asm/page.h>
+#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
+#include <asm/msr-index.h>
+
+ .text
+ .code64
+ENTRY(sme_encrypt_execute)
+
+ /*
+ * Entry parameters:
+ * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
+ * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
+ * RDX - length of kernel
+ * RCX - virtual address of the encryption workarea, including:
+ * - stack page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * - encryption routine page (PAGE_SIZE)
+ * - intermediate copy buffer (PMD_PAGE_SIZE)
+ * R8 - physcial address of the pagetables to use for encryption
+ */
+
+ push %rbp
+ movq %rsp, %rbp /* RBP now has original stack pointer */
+
+ /* Set up a one page stack in the non-encrypted memory area */
+ movq %rcx, %rax /* Workarea stack page */
+ leaq PAGE_SIZE(%rax), %rsp /* Set new stack pointer */
+ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %rax /* Workarea encryption routine */
+
+ push %r12
+ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Encrypted kernel */
+ movq %rsi, %r11 /* Decrypted kernel */
+ movq %rdx, %r12 /* Kernel length */
+
+ /* Copy encryption routine into the workarea */
+ movq %rax, %rdi /* Workarea encryption routine */
+ leaq __enc_copy(%rip), %rsi /* Encryption routine */
+ movq $(.L__enc_copy_end - __enc_copy), %rcx /* Encryption routine length */
+ rep movsb
+
+ /* Setup registers for call */
+ movq %r10, %rdi /* Encrypted kernel */
+ movq %r11, %rsi /* Decrypted kernel */
+ movq %r8, %rdx /* Pagetables used for encryption */
+ movq %r12, %rcx /* Kernel length */
+ movq %rax, %r8 /* Workarea encryption routine */
+ addq $PAGE_SIZE, %r8 /* Workarea intermediate copy buffer */
+
+ call *%rax /* Call the encryption routine */
+
+ pop %r12
+
+ movq %rbp, %rsp /* Restore original stack pointer */
+ pop %rbp
+
+ ret
+ENDPROC(sme_encrypt_execute)
+
+ENTRY(__enc_copy)
+/*
+ * Routine used to encrypt kernel.
+ * This routine must be run outside of the kernel proper since
+ * the kernel will be encrypted during the process. So this
+ * routine is defined here and then copied to an area outside
+ * of the kernel where it will remain and run decrypted
+ * during execution.
+ *
+ * On entry the registers must be:
+ * RDI - virtual address for the encrypted kernel mapping
+ * RSI - virtual address for the decrypted kernel mapping
+ * RDX - address of the pagetables to use for encryption
+ * RCX - length of kernel
+ * R8 - intermediate copy buffer
+ *
+ * RAX - points to this routine
+ *
+ * The kernel will be encrypted by copying from the non-encrypted
+ * kernel space to an intermediate buffer and then copying from the
+ * intermediate buffer back to the encrypted kernel space. The physical
+ * addresses of the two kernel space mappings are the same which
+ * results in the kernel being encrypted "in place".
+ */
+ /* Enable the new page tables */
+ mov %rdx, %cr3
+
+ /* Flush any global TLBs */
+ mov %cr4, %rdx
+ andq $~X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx
+ mov %rdx, %cr4
+ orq $X86_CR4_PGE, %rdx
+ mov %rdx, %cr4
+
+ /* Set the PAT register PA5 entry to write-protect */
+ push %rcx
+ movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
+ rdmsr
+ push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */
+ andl $0xffff00ff, %edx /* Clear PA5 */
+ orl $0x00000500, %edx /* Set PA5 to WP */
+ wrmsr
+ pop %rdx /* RDX contains original PAT value */
+ pop %rcx
+
+ movq %rcx, %r9 /* Save kernel length */
+ movq %rdi, %r10 /* Save encrypted kernel address */
+ movq %rsi, %r11 /* Save decrypted kernel address */
+
+ wbinvd /* Invalidate any cache entries */
+
+ /* Copy/encrypt 2MB at a time */
+1:
+ movq %r11, %rsi /* Source - decrypted kernel */
+ movq %r8, %rdi /* Dest - intermediate copy buffer */
+ movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */
+ rep movsb
+
+ movq %r8, %rsi /* Source - intermediate copy buffer */
+ movq %r10, %rdi /* Dest - encrypted kernel */
+ movq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %rcx /* 2MB length */
+ rep movsb
+
+ addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r11
+ addq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r10
+ subq $PMD_PAGE_SIZE, %r9 /* Kernel length decrement */
+ jnz 1b /* Kernel length not zero? */
+
+ /* Restore PAT register */
+ push %rdx /* Save original PAT value */
+ movl $MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, %ecx
+ rdmsr
+ pop %rdx /* Restore original PAT value */
+ wrmsr
+
+ ret
+.L__enc_copy_end:
+ENDPROC(__enc_copy)
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
index a88cfbfbd078..a99679826846 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mmap.c
@@ -37,21 +37,21 @@ struct va_alignment __read_mostly va_align = {
.flags = -1,
};
-unsigned long tasksize_32bit(void)
+unsigned long task_size_32bit(void)
{
return IA32_PAGE_OFFSET;
}
-unsigned long tasksize_64bit(void)
+unsigned long task_size_64bit(int full_addr_space)
{
- return TASK_SIZE_MAX;
+ return full_addr_space ? TASK_SIZE_MAX : DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW;
}
static unsigned long stack_maxrandom_size(unsigned long task_size)
{
unsigned long max = 0;
if (current->flags & PF_RANDOMIZE) {
- max = (-1UL) & __STACK_RND_MASK(task_size == tasksize_32bit());
+ max = (-1UL) & __STACK_RND_MASK(task_size == task_size_32bit());
max <<= PAGE_SHIFT;
}
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
mm->get_unmapped_area = arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown;
arch_pick_mmap_base(&mm->mmap_base, &mm->mmap_legacy_base,
- arch_rnd(mmap64_rnd_bits), tasksize_64bit());
+ arch_rnd(mmap64_rnd_bits), task_size_64bit(0));
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES
/*
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void arch_pick_mmap_layout(struct mm_struct *mm)
* mmap_base, the compat syscall uses mmap_compat_base.
*/
arch_pick_mmap_base(&mm->mmap_compat_base, &mm->mmap_compat_legacy_base,
- arch_rnd(mmap32_rnd_bits), tasksize_32bit());
+ arch_rnd(mmap32_rnd_bits), task_size_32bit());
#endif
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
index 1c34b767c84c..9ceaa955d2ba 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mpx.c
@@ -355,10 +355,19 @@ int mpx_enable_management(void)
*/
bd_base = mpx_get_bounds_dir();
down_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
+
+ /* MPX doesn't support addresses above 47 bits yet. */
+ if (find_vma(mm, DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)) {
+ pr_warn_once("%s (%d): MPX cannot handle addresses "
+ "above 47-bits. Disabling.",
+ current->comm, current->pid);
+ ret = -ENXIO;
+ goto out;
+ }
mm->context.bd_addr = bd_base;
if (mm->context.bd_addr == MPX_INVALID_BOUNDS_DIR)
ret = -ENXIO;
-
+out:
up_write(&mm->mmap_sem);
return ret;
}
@@ -1030,3 +1039,25 @@ void mpx_notify_unmap(struct mm_struct *mm, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
if (ret)
force_sig(SIGSEGV, current);
}
+
+/* MPX cannot handle addresses above 47 bits yet. */
+unsigned long mpx_unmapped_area_check(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (!kernel_managing_mpx_tables(current->mm))
+ return addr;
+ if (addr + len <= DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)
+ return addr;
+ if (flags & MAP_FIXED)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /*
+ * Requested len is larger than the whole area we're allowed to map in.
+ * Resetting hinting address wouldn't do much good -- fail early.
+ */
+ if (len > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Look for unmap area within DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW */
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c b/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c
index a8f90ce3dedf..d805162e6045 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/numa_emulation.c
@@ -75,13 +75,15 @@ static int __init emu_setup_memblk(struct numa_meminfo *ei,
/*
* Sets up nr_nodes fake nodes interleaved over physical nodes ranging from addr
- * to max_addr. The return value is the number of nodes allocated.
+ * to max_addr.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success or negative on error.
*/
static int __init split_nodes_interleave(struct numa_meminfo *ei,
struct numa_meminfo *pi,
u64 addr, u64 max_addr, int nr_nodes)
{
- nodemask_t physnode_mask = NODE_MASK_NONE;
+ nodemask_t physnode_mask = numa_nodes_parsed;
u64 size;
int big;
int nid = 0;
@@ -116,9 +118,6 @@ static int __init split_nodes_interleave(struct numa_meminfo *ei,
return -1;
}
- for (i = 0; i < pi->nr_blks; i++)
- node_set(pi->blk[i].nid, physnode_mask);
-
/*
* Continue to fill physical nodes with fake nodes until there is no
* memory left on any of them.
@@ -200,13 +199,15 @@ static u64 __init find_end_of_node(u64 start, u64 max_addr, u64 size)
/*
* Sets up fake nodes of `size' interleaved over physical nodes ranging from
- * `addr' to `max_addr'. The return value is the number of nodes allocated.
+ * `addr' to `max_addr'.
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success or negative on error.
*/
static int __init split_nodes_size_interleave(struct numa_meminfo *ei,
struct numa_meminfo *pi,
u64 addr, u64 max_addr, u64 size)
{
- nodemask_t physnode_mask = NODE_MASK_NONE;
+ nodemask_t physnode_mask = numa_nodes_parsed;
u64 min_size;
int nid = 0;
int i, ret;
@@ -231,9 +232,6 @@ static int __init split_nodes_size_interleave(struct numa_meminfo *ei,
}
size &= FAKE_NODE_MIN_HASH_MASK;
- for (i = 0; i < pi->nr_blks; i++)
- node_set(pi->blk[i].nid, physnode_mask);
-
/*
* Fill physical nodes with fake nodes of size until there is no memory
* left on any of them.
@@ -280,6 +278,22 @@ static int __init split_nodes_size_interleave(struct numa_meminfo *ei,
return 0;
}
+int __init setup_emu2phys_nid(int *dfl_phys_nid)
+{
+ int i, max_emu_nid = 0;
+
+ *dfl_phys_nid = NUMA_NO_NODE;
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emu_nid_to_phys); i++) {
+ if (emu_nid_to_phys[i] != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
+ max_emu_nid = i;
+ if (*dfl_phys_nid == NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ *dfl_phys_nid = emu_nid_to_phys[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return max_emu_nid;
+}
+
/**
* numa_emulation - Emulate NUMA nodes
* @numa_meminfo: NUMA configuration to massage
@@ -376,23 +390,18 @@ void __init numa_emulation(struct numa_meminfo *numa_meminfo, int numa_dist_cnt)
* Determine the max emulated nid and the default phys nid to use
* for unmapped nodes.
*/
- max_emu_nid = 0;
- dfl_phys_nid = NUMA_NO_NODE;
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(emu_nid_to_phys); i++) {
- if (emu_nid_to_phys[i] != NUMA_NO_NODE) {
- max_emu_nid = i;
- if (dfl_phys_nid == NUMA_NO_NODE)
- dfl_phys_nid = emu_nid_to_phys[i];
- }
- }
- if (dfl_phys_nid == NUMA_NO_NODE) {
- pr_warning("NUMA: Warning: can't determine default physical node, disabling emulation\n");
- goto no_emu;
- }
+ max_emu_nid = setup_emu2phys_nid(&dfl_phys_nid);
/* commit */
*numa_meminfo = ei;
+ /* Make sure numa_nodes_parsed only contains emulated nodes */
+ nodes_clear(numa_nodes_parsed);
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ei.blk); i++)
+ if (ei.blk[i].start != ei.blk[i].end &&
+ ei.blk[i].nid != NUMA_NO_NODE)
+ node_set(ei.blk[i].nid, numa_nodes_parsed);
+
/*
* Transform __apicid_to_node table to use emulated nids by
* reverse-mapping phys_nid. The maps should always exist but fall
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 757b0bcdf712..dfb7d657cf43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -1775,6 +1775,70 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
__pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL);
}
+static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)
+{
+ struct cpa_data cpa;
+ unsigned long start;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Nothing to do if the SME is not active */
+ if (!sme_active())
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Should not be working on unaligned addresses */
+ if (WARN_ONCE(addr & ~PAGE_MASK, "misaligned address: %#lx\n", addr))
+ addr &= PAGE_MASK;
+
+ start = addr;
+
+ memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
+ cpa.vaddr = &addr;
+ cpa.numpages = numpages;
+ cpa.mask_set = enc ? __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC) : __pgprot(0);
+ cpa.mask_clr = enc ? __pgprot(0) : __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC);
+ cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
+
+ /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */
+ kmap_flush_unused();
+ vm_unmap_aliases();
+
+ /*
+ * Before changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush caches.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
+ cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 1);
+ else
+ cpa_flush_all(1);
+
+ ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * After changing the encryption attribute, we need to flush TLBs
+ * again in case any speculative TLB caching occurred (but no need
+ * to flush caches again). We could just use cpa_flush_all(), but
+ * in case TLB flushing gets optimized in the cpa_flush_range()
+ * path use the same logic as above.
+ */
+ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
+ cpa_flush_range(start, numpages, 0);
+ else
+ cpa_flush_all(0);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int set_memory_encrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+ return __set_memory_enc_dec(addr, numpages, true);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_encrypted);
+
+int set_memory_decrypted(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+ return __set_memory_enc_dec(addr, numpages, false);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(set_memory_decrypted);
+
int set_pages_uc(struct page *page, int numpages)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
@@ -2020,6 +2084,9 @@ int kernel_map_pages_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, u64 pfn, unsigned long address,
if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_RW))
cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_RW);
+ if (!(page_flags & _PAGE_ENC))
+ cpa.mask_clr = pgprot_encrypted(cpa.mask_clr);
+
cpa.mask_set = __pgprot(_PAGE_PRESENT | page_flags);
retval = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 0);
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
index 45979502f64b..fe7d57a8fb60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ void init_cache_modes(void)
* pat_init - Initialize PAT MSR and PAT table
*
* This function initializes PAT MSR and PAT table with an OS-defined value
- * to enable additional cache attributes, WC and WT.
+ * to enable additional cache attributes, WC, WT and WP.
*
* This function must be called on all CPUs using the specific sequence of
* operations defined in Intel SDM. mtrr_rendezvous_handler() provides this
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ void pat_init(void)
* 010 2 UC-: _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC_MINUS
* 011 3 UC : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC
* 100 4 WB : Reserved
- * 101 5 WC : Reserved
+ * 101 5 WP : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WP
* 110 6 UC-: Reserved
* 111 7 WT : _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_WT
*
@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ void pat_init(void)
* corresponding types in the presence of PAT errata.
*/
pat = PAT(0, WB) | PAT(1, WC) | PAT(2, UC_MINUS) | PAT(3, UC) |
- PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WC) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, WT);
+ PAT(4, WB) | PAT(5, WP) | PAT(6, UC_MINUS) | PAT(7, WT);
}
if (!boot_cpu_done) {
@@ -744,6 +744,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(arch_io_free_memtype_wc);
pgprot_t phys_mem_access_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long pfn,
unsigned long size, pgprot_t vma_prot)
{
+ if (!phys_mem_access_encrypted(pfn << PAGE_SHIFT, size))
+ vma_prot = pgprot_decrypted(vma_prot);
+
return vma_prot;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 508a708eb9a6..218834a3e9ad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ void ___pte_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, struct page *pte)
{
pgtable_page_dtor(pte);
paravirt_release_pte(page_to_pfn(pte));
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, pte);
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, pte);
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
@@ -72,21 +72,21 @@ void ___pmd_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pmd_t *pmd)
tlb->need_flush_all = 1;
#endif
pgtable_pmd_page_dtor(page);
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, page);
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, page);
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
void ___pud_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, pud_t *pud)
{
paravirt_release_pud(__pa(pud) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, virt_to_page(pud));
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, virt_to_page(pud));
}
#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4
void ___p4d_free_tlb(struct mmu_gather *tlb, p4d_t *p4d)
{
paravirt_release_p4d(__pa(p4d) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- tlb_remove_page(tlb, virt_to_page(p4d));
+ tlb_remove_table(tlb, virt_to_page(p4d));
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 4 */
#endif /* CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 014d07a80053..ce104b962a17 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -28,6 +28,42 @@
* Implement flush IPI by CALL_FUNCTION_VECTOR, Alex Shi
*/
+atomic64_t last_mm_ctx_id = ATOMIC64_INIT(1);
+
+static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
+ u16 *new_asid, bool *need_flush)
+{
+ u16 asid;
+
+ if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCID)) {
+ *new_asid = 0;
+ *need_flush = true;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ for (asid = 0; asid < TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS; asid++) {
+ if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[asid].ctx_id) !=
+ next->context.ctx_id)
+ continue;
+
+ *new_asid = asid;
+ *need_flush = (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[asid].tlb_gen) <
+ next_tlb_gen);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We don't currently own an ASID slot on this CPU.
+ * Allocate a slot.
+ */
+ *new_asid = this_cpu_add_return(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1) - 1;
+ if (*new_asid >= TLB_NR_DYN_ASIDS) {
+ *new_asid = 0;
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.next_asid, 1);
+ }
+ *need_flush = true;
+}
+
void leave_mm(int cpu)
{
struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
@@ -43,12 +79,11 @@ void leave_mm(int cpu)
if (loaded_mm == &init_mm)
return;
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) == TLBSTATE_OK)
- BUG();
+ /* Warn if we're not lazy. */
+ WARN_ON(cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(loaded_mm)));
switch_mm(NULL, &init_mm, NULL);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(leave_mm);
void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
@@ -63,115 +98,219 @@ void switch_mm(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
void switch_mm_irqs_off(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next,
struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
struct mm_struct *real_prev = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
+ u16 prev_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+ unsigned cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ u64 next_tlb_gen;
/*
- * NB: The scheduler will call us with prev == next when
- * switching from lazy TLB mode to normal mode if active_mm
- * isn't changing. When this happens, there is no guarantee
- * that CR3 (and hence cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm) matches next.
+ * NB: The scheduler will call us with prev == next when switching
+ * from lazy TLB mode to normal mode if active_mm isn't changing.
+ * When this happens, we don't assume that CR3 (and hence
+ * cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm) matches next.
*
* NB: leave_mm() calls us with prev == NULL and tsk == NULL.
*/
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.state, TLBSTATE_OK);
+ /* We don't want flush_tlb_func_* to run concurrently with us. */
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING))
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that CR3 is what we think it is. This will catch
+ * hypothetical buggy code that directly switches to swapper_pg_dir
+ * without going through leave_mm() / switch_mm_irqs_off() or that
+ * does something like write_cr3(read_cr3_pa()).
+ */
+ VM_BUG_ON(__read_cr3() != (__sme_pa(real_prev->pgd) | prev_asid));
if (real_prev == next) {
- /*
- * There's nothing to do: we always keep the per-mm control
- * regs in sync with cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm. Just
- * sanity-check mm_cpumask.
- */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next))))
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
- return;
- }
+ VM_BUG_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].ctx_id) !=
+ next->context.ctx_id);
+
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next))) {
+ /*
+ * There's nothing to do: we weren't lazy, and we
+ * aren't changing our mm. We don't need to flush
+ * anything, nor do we need to update CR3, CR4, or
+ * LDTR.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Resume remote flushes and then read tlb_gen. */
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
+ next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&next->context.tlb_gen);
+
+ if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].tlb_gen) <
+ next_tlb_gen) {
+ /*
+ * Ideally, we'd have a flush_tlb() variant that
+ * takes the known CR3 value as input. This would
+ * be faster on Xen PV and on hypothetical CPUs
+ * on which INVPCID is fast.
+ */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[prev_asid].tlb_gen,
+ next_tlb_gen);
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(next->pgd) | prev_asid);
+ trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH,
+ TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ }
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
/*
- * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
- * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly
- * map it.
+ * We just exited lazy mode, which means that CR4 and/or LDTR
+ * may be stale. (Changes to the required CR4 and LDTR states
+ * are not reflected in tlb_gen.)
*/
- unsigned int stack_pgd_index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer());
-
- pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + stack_pgd_index;
-
- if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)))
- set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[stack_pgd_index]);
- }
+ } else {
+ u16 new_asid;
+ bool need_flush;
+
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMAP_STACK)) {
+ /*
+ * If our current stack is in vmalloc space and isn't
+ * mapped in the new pgd, we'll double-fault. Forcibly
+ * map it.
+ */
+ unsigned int index = pgd_index(current_stack_pointer());
+ pgd_t *pgd = next->pgd + index;
+
+ if (unlikely(pgd_none(*pgd)))
+ set_pgd(pgd, init_mm.pgd[index]);
+ }
- this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
+ /* Stop remote flushes for the previous mm */
+ if (cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev)))
+ cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev));
- WARN_ON_ONCE(cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)));
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
+ VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next)));
- /*
- * Re-load page tables.
- *
- * This logic has an ordering constraint:
- *
- * CPU 0: Write to a PTE for 'next'
- * CPU 0: load bit 1 in mm_cpumask. if nonzero, send IPI.
- * CPU 1: set bit 1 in next's mm_cpumask
- * CPU 1: load from the PTE that CPU 0 writes (implicit)
- *
- * We need to prevent an outcome in which CPU 1 observes
- * the new PTE value and CPU 0 observes bit 1 clear in
- * mm_cpumask. (If that occurs, then the IPI will never
- * be sent, and CPU 0's TLB will contain a stale entry.)
- *
- * The bad outcome can occur if either CPU's load is
- * reordered before that CPU's store, so both CPUs must
- * execute full barriers to prevent this from happening.
- *
- * Thus, switch_mm needs a full barrier between the
- * store to mm_cpumask and any operation that could load
- * from next->pgd. TLB fills are special and can happen
- * due to instruction fetches or for no reason at all,
- * and neither LOCK nor MFENCE orders them.
- * Fortunately, load_cr3() is serializing and gives the
- * ordering guarantee we need.
- */
- load_cr3(next->pgd);
-
- /*
- * This gets called via leave_mm() in the idle path where RCU
- * functions differently. Tracing normally uses RCU, so we have to
- * call the tracepoint specially here.
- */
- trace_tlb_flush_rcuidle(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ /*
+ * Start remote flushes and then read tlb_gen.
+ */
+ cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(next));
+ next_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&next->context.tlb_gen);
+
+ choose_new_asid(next, next_tlb_gen, &new_asid, &need_flush);
+
+ if (need_flush) {
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].ctx_id, next->context.ctx_id);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[new_asid].tlb_gen, next_tlb_gen);
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(next->pgd) | new_asid);
+ trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH,
+ TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
+ } else {
+ /* The new ASID is already up to date. */
+ write_cr3(__sme_pa(next->pgd) | new_asid | CR3_NOFLUSH);
+ trace_tlb_flush(TLB_FLUSH_ON_TASK_SWITCH, 0);
+ }
- /* Stop flush ipis for the previous mm */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev)) &&
- real_prev != &init_mm);
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, mm_cpumask(real_prev));
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm, next);
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid, new_asid);
+ }
- /* Load per-mm CR4 and LDTR state */
load_mm_cr4(next);
switch_ldt(real_prev, next);
}
+/*
+ * flush_tlb_func_common()'s memory ordering requirement is that any
+ * TLB fills that happen after we flush the TLB are ordered after we
+ * read active_mm's tlb_gen. We don't need any explicit barriers
+ * because all x86 flush operations are serializing and the
+ * atomic64_read operation won't be reordered by the compiler.
+ */
static void flush_tlb_func_common(const struct flush_tlb_info *f,
bool local, enum tlb_flush_reason reason)
{
+ /*
+ * We have three different tlb_gen values in here. They are:
+ *
+ * - mm_tlb_gen: the latest generation.
+ * - local_tlb_gen: the generation that this CPU has already caught
+ * up to.
+ * - f->new_tlb_gen: the generation that the requester of the flush
+ * wants us to catch up to.
+ */
+ struct mm_struct *loaded_mm = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm);
+ u32 loaded_mm_asid = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.loaded_mm_asid);
+ u64 mm_tlb_gen = atomic64_read(&loaded_mm->context.tlb_gen);
+ u64 local_tlb_gen = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[loaded_mm_asid].tlb_gen);
+
/* This code cannot presently handle being reentered. */
VM_WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) != TLBSTATE_OK) {
- leave_mm(smp_processor_id());
+ VM_WARN_ON(this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[loaded_mm_asid].ctx_id) !=
+ loaded_mm->context.ctx_id);
+
+ if (!cpumask_test_cpu(smp_processor_id(), mm_cpumask(loaded_mm))) {
+ /*
+ * We're in lazy mode -- don't flush. We can get here on
+ * remote flushes due to races and on local flushes if a
+ * kernel thread coincidentally flushes the mm it's lazily
+ * still using.
+ */
return;
}
- if (f->end == TLB_FLUSH_ALL) {
- local_flush_tlb();
- if (local)
- count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
- trace_tlb_flush(reason, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
- } else {
+ if (unlikely(local_tlb_gen == mm_tlb_gen)) {
+ /*
+ * There's nothing to do: we're already up to date. This can
+ * happen if two concurrent flushes happen -- the first flush to
+ * be handled can catch us all the way up, leaving no work for
+ * the second flush.
+ */
+ trace_tlb_flush(reason, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(local_tlb_gen > mm_tlb_gen);
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(f->new_tlb_gen > mm_tlb_gen);
+
+ /*
+ * If we get to this point, we know that our TLB is out of date.
+ * This does not strictly imply that we need to flush (it's
+ * possible that f->new_tlb_gen <= local_tlb_gen), but we're
+ * going to need to flush in the very near future, so we might
+ * as well get it over with.
+ *
+ * The only question is whether to do a full or partial flush.
+ *
+ * We do a partial flush if requested and two extra conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. f->new_tlb_gen == local_tlb_gen + 1. We have an invariant that
+ * we've always done all needed flushes to catch up to
+ * local_tlb_gen. If, for example, local_tlb_gen == 2 and
+ * f->new_tlb_gen == 3, then we know that the flush needed to bring
+ * us up to date for tlb_gen 3 is the partial flush we're
+ * processing.
+ *
+ * As an example of why this check is needed, suppose that there
+ * are two concurrent flushes. The first is a full flush that
+ * changes context.tlb_gen from 1 to 2. The second is a partial
+ * flush that changes context.tlb_gen from 2 to 3. If they get
+ * processed on this CPU in reverse order, we'll see
+ * local_tlb_gen == 1, mm_tlb_gen == 3, and end != TLB_FLUSH_ALL.
+ * If we were to use __flush_tlb_single() and set local_tlb_gen to
+ * 3, we'd be break the invariant: we'd update local_tlb_gen above
+ * 1 without the full flush that's needed for tlb_gen 2.
+ *
+ * 2. f->new_tlb_gen == mm_tlb_gen. This is purely an optimiation.
+ * Partial TLB flushes are not all that much cheaper than full TLB
+ * flushes, so it seems unlikely that it would be a performance win
+ * to do a partial flush if that won't bring our TLB fully up to
+ * date. By doing a full flush instead, we can increase
+ * local_tlb_gen all the way to mm_tlb_gen and we can probably
+ * avoid another flush in the very near future.
+ */
+ if (f->end != TLB_FLUSH_ALL &&
+ f->new_tlb_gen == local_tlb_gen + 1 &&
+ f->new_tlb_gen == mm_tlb_gen) {
+ /* Partial flush */
unsigned long addr;
unsigned long nr_pages = (f->end - f->start) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
addr = f->start;
while (addr < f->end) {
__flush_tlb_single(addr);
@@ -180,7 +319,16 @@ static void flush_tlb_func_common(const struct flush_tlb_info *f,
if (local)
count_vm_tlb_events(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ONE, nr_pages);
trace_tlb_flush(reason, nr_pages);
+ } else {
+ /* Full flush. */
+ local_flush_tlb();
+ if (local)
+ count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_LOCAL_FLUSH_ALL);
+ trace_tlb_flush(reason, TLB_FLUSH_ALL);
}
+
+ /* Both paths above update our state to mm_tlb_gen. */
+ this_cpu_write(cpu_tlbstate.ctxs[loaded_mm_asid].tlb_gen, mm_tlb_gen);
}
static void flush_tlb_func_local(void *info, enum tlb_flush_reason reason)
@@ -214,6 +362,21 @@ void native_flush_tlb_others(const struct cpumask *cpumask,
(info->end - info->start) >> PAGE_SHIFT);
if (is_uv_system()) {
+ /*
+ * This whole special case is confused. UV has a "Broadcast
+ * Assist Unit", which seems to be a fancy way to send IPIs.
+ * Back when x86 used an explicit TLB flush IPI, UV was
+ * optimized to use its own mechanism. These days, x86 uses
+ * smp_call_function_many(), but UV still uses a manual IPI,
+ * and that IPI's action is out of date -- it does a manual
+ * flush instead of calling flush_tlb_func_remote(). This
+ * means that the percpu tlb_gen variables won't be updated
+ * and we'll do pointless flushes on future context switches.
+ *
+ * Rather than hooking native_flush_tlb_others() here, I think
+ * that UV should be updated so that smp_call_function_many(),
+ * etc, are optimal on UV.
+ */
unsigned int cpu;
cpu = smp_processor_id();
@@ -250,8 +413,8 @@ void flush_tlb_mm_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
cpu = get_cpu();
- /* Synchronize with switch_mm. */
- smp_mb();
+ /* This is also a barrier that synchronizes with switch_mm(). */
+ info.new_tlb_gen = inc_mm_tlb_gen(mm);
/* Should we flush just the requested range? */
if ((end != TLB_FLUSH_ALL) &&
@@ -273,6 +436,7 @@ void flush_tlb_mm_range(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start,
if (cpumask_any_but(mm_cpumask(mm), cpu) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(mm_cpumask(mm), &info);
+
put_cpu();
}
@@ -281,8 +445,6 @@ static void do_flush_tlb_all(void *info)
{
count_vm_tlb_event(NR_TLB_REMOTE_FLUSH_RECEIVED);
__flush_tlb_all();
- if (this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.state) == TLBSTATE_LAZY)
- leave_mm(smp_processor_id());
}
void flush_tlb_all(void)
@@ -335,6 +497,7 @@ void arch_tlbbatch_flush(struct arch_tlbflush_unmap_batch *batch)
if (cpumask_any_but(&batch->cpumask, cpu) < nr_cpu_ids)
flush_tlb_others(&batch->cpumask, &info);
+
cpumask_clear(&batch->cpumask);
put_cpu();
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-30 12:49:20 +0100