diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 43 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 9 |
4 files changed, 42 insertions, 21 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h index afce8ee5d7b7..b0a887209400 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h @@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/percpu.h> +#include <asm/runtime-const.h> + +/* + * Virtual variable: there's no actual backing store for this, + * it can purely be used as 'runtime_const_ptr(USER_PTR_MAX)' + */ +extern unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX; #ifdef CONFIG_ADDRESS_MASKING /* @@ -46,19 +53,24 @@ static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr_remote(struct mm_struct *mm, #endif -/* - * The virtual address space space is logically divided into a kernel - * half and a user half. When cast to a signed type, user pointers - * are positive and kernel pointers are negative. - */ -#define valid_user_address(x) ((__force long)(x) >= 0) +#define valid_user_address(x) \ + ((__force unsigned long)(x) <= runtime_const_ptr(USER_PTR_MAX)) /* * Masking the user address is an alternative to a conditional * user_access_begin that can avoid the fencing. This only works * for dense accesses starting at the address. */ -#define mask_user_address(x) ((typeof(x))((long)(x)|((long)(x)>>63))) +static inline void __user *mask_user_address(const void __user *ptr) +{ + unsigned long mask; + asm("cmp %1,%0\n\t" + "sbb %0,%0" + :"=r" (mask) + :"r" (ptr), + "0" (runtime_const_ptr(USER_PTR_MAX))); + return (__force void __user *)(mask | (__force unsigned long)ptr); +} #define masked_user_access_begin(x) ({ \ __auto_type __masked_ptr = (x); \ __masked_ptr = mask_user_address(__masked_ptr); \ @@ -69,23 +81,16 @@ static inline unsigned long __untagged_addr_remote(struct mm_struct *mm, * arbitrary values in those bits rather then masking them off. * * Enforce two rules: - * 1. 'ptr' must be in the user half of the address space + * 1. 'ptr' must be in the user part of the address space * 2. 'ptr+size' must not overflow into kernel addresses * - * Note that addresses around the sign change are not valid addresses, - * and will GP-fault even with LAM enabled if the sign bit is set (see - * "CR3.LAM_SUP" that can narrow the canonicality check if we ever - * enable it, but not remove it entirely). - * - * So the "overflow into kernel addresses" does not imply some sudden - * exact boundary at the sign bit, and we can allow a lot of slop on the - * size check. + * Note that we always have at least one guard page between the + * max user address and the non-canonical gap, allowing us to + * ignore small sizes entirely. * * In fact, we could probably remove the size check entirely, since * any kernel accesses will be in increasing address order starting - * at 'ptr', and even if the end might be in kernel space, we'll - * hit the GP faults for non-canonical accesses before we ever get - * there. + * at 'ptr'. * * That's a separate optimization, for now just handle the small * constant case. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c index f1040cb64841..a5f221ea5688 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> #include <asm/posted_intr.h> +#include <asm/runtime-const.h> #include "cpu.h" @@ -2389,6 +2390,15 @@ void __init arch_cpu_finalize_init(void) alternative_instructions(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64)) { + unsigned long USER_PTR_MAX = TASK_SIZE_MAX-1; + + /* + * Enable this when LAM is gated on LASS support + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LAM)) + USER_PTR_MAX = (1ul << 63) - PAGE_SIZE - 1; + */ + runtime_const_init(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX); + /* * Make sure the first 2MB area is not mapped by huge pages * There are typically fixed size MTRRs in there and overlapping diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 6726be89b7a6..b8c5741d2fb4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -358,6 +358,7 @@ SECTIONS #endif RUNTIME_CONST_VARIABLES + RUNTIME_CONST(ptr, USER_PTR_MAX) . = ALIGN(PAGE_SIZE); diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S index d066aecf8aeb..4357ec2a0bfc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S +++ b/arch/x86/lib/getuser.S @@ -39,8 +39,13 @@ .macro check_range size:req .if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) - mov %rax, %rdx - sar $63, %rdx + movq $0x0123456789abcdef,%rdx + 1: + .pushsection runtime_ptr_USER_PTR_MAX,"a" + .long 1b - 8 - . + .popsection + cmp %rax, %rdx + sbb %rdx, %rdx or %rdx, %rax .else cmp $TASK_SIZE_MAX-\size+1, %eax |