summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/crypto
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r--crypto/842.c174
-rw-r--r--crypto/Kconfig28
-rw-r--r--crypto/Makefile3
-rw-r--r--crypto/ablkcipher.c10
-rw-r--r--crypto/aead.c451
-rw-r--r--crypto/algapi.c30
-rw-r--r--crypto/algif_aead.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/algif_rng.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/ansi_cprng.c88
-rw-r--r--crypto/authenc.c17
-rw-r--r--crypto/authencesn.c17
-rw-r--r--crypto/blkcipher.c1
-rw-r--r--crypto/ccm.c14
-rw-r--r--crypto/cryptd.c63
-rw-r--r--crypto/crypto_null.c39
-rw-r--r--crypto/drbg.c513
-rw-r--r--crypto/echainiv.c546
-rw-r--r--crypto/fips.c53
-rw-r--r--crypto/gcm.c45
-rw-r--r--crypto/internal.h3
-rw-r--r--crypto/jitterentropy.c909
-rw-r--r--crypto/krng.c33
-rw-r--r--crypto/md5.c8
-rw-r--r--crypto/pcompress.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/pcrypt.c86
-rw-r--r--crypto/proc.c41
-rw-r--r--crypto/rng.c105
-rw-r--r--crypto/scatterwalk.c38
-rw-r--r--crypto/seqiv.c626
-rw-r--r--crypto/shash.c7
-rw-r--r--crypto/tcrypt.c9
-rw-r--r--crypto/testmgr.c15
-rw-r--r--crypto/testmgr.h501
-rw-r--r--crypto/zlib.c4
34 files changed, 3591 insertions, 896 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/842.c b/crypto/842.c
index b48f4f108c47..98e387efb8c8 100644
--- a/crypto/842.c
+++ b/crypto/842.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Cryptographic API for the 842 compression algorithm.
+ * Cryptographic API for the 842 software compression algorithm.
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
@@ -11,173 +11,73 @@
* MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
* GNU General Public License for more details.
*
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
+ * Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2011-2015
*
- * Copyright (C) IBM Corporation, 2011
+ * Original Authors: Robert Jennings <rcj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ * Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
*
- * Authors: Robert Jennings <rcj@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
- * Seth Jennings <sjenning@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ * Rewrite: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
+ *
+ * This is the software implementation of compression and decompression using
+ * the 842 format. This uses the software 842 library at lib/842/ which is
+ * only a reference implementation, and is very, very slow as compared to other
+ * software compressors. You probably do not want to use this software
+ * compression. If you have access to the PowerPC 842 compression hardware, you
+ * want to use the 842 hardware compression interface, which is at:
+ * drivers/crypto/nx/nx-842-crypto.c
*/
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
-#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
-#include <linux/nx842.h>
-#include <linux/lzo.h>
-#include <linux/timer.h>
-
-static int nx842_uselzo;
-
-struct nx842_ctx {
- void *nx842_wmem; /* working memory for 842/lzo */
-};
+#include <linux/sw842.h>
-enum nx842_crypto_type {
- NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_842,
- NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_LZO
+struct crypto842_ctx {
+ char wmem[SW842_MEM_COMPRESS]; /* working memory for compress */
};
-#define NX842_SENTINEL 0xdeadbeef
-
-struct nx842_crypto_header {
- unsigned int sentinel; /* debug */
- enum nx842_crypto_type type;
-};
-
-static int nx842_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
-{
- struct nx842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- int wmemsize;
-
- wmemsize = max_t(int, nx842_get_workmem_size(), LZO1X_MEM_COMPRESS);
- ctx->nx842_wmem = kmalloc(wmemsize, GFP_NOFS);
- if (!ctx->nx842_wmem)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void nx842_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
-{
- struct nx842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
-
- kfree(ctx->nx842_wmem);
-}
-
-static void nx842_reset_uselzo(unsigned long data)
+static int crypto842_compress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
- nx842_uselzo = 0;
-}
-
-static DEFINE_TIMER(failover_timer, nx842_reset_uselzo, 0, 0);
-
-static int nx842_crypto_compress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
- unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
-{
- struct nx842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- struct nx842_crypto_header *hdr;
- unsigned int tmp_len = *dlen;
- size_t lzodlen; /* needed for lzo */
- int err;
-
- *dlen = 0;
- hdr = (struct nx842_crypto_header *)dst;
- hdr->sentinel = NX842_SENTINEL; /* debug */
- dst += sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
- tmp_len -= sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
- lzodlen = tmp_len;
-
- if (likely(!nx842_uselzo)) {
- err = nx842_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx->nx842_wmem);
-
- if (likely(!err)) {
- hdr->type = NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_842;
- *dlen = tmp_len + sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* hardware failed */
- nx842_uselzo = 1;
+ struct crypto842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- /* set timer to check for hardware again in 1 second */
- mod_timer(&failover_timer, jiffies + msecs_to_jiffies(1000));
- }
-
- /* no hardware, use lzo */
- err = lzo1x_1_compress(src, slen, dst, &lzodlen, ctx->nx842_wmem);
- if (err != LZO_E_OK)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- hdr->type = NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_LZO;
- *dlen = lzodlen + sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
- return 0;
+ return sw842_compress(src, slen, dst, dlen, ctx->wmem);
}
-static int nx842_crypto_decompress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
- unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
+static int crypto842_decompress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
- struct nx842_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- struct nx842_crypto_header *hdr;
- unsigned int tmp_len = *dlen;
- size_t lzodlen; /* needed for lzo */
- int err;
-
- *dlen = 0;
- hdr = (struct nx842_crypto_header *)src;
-
- if (unlikely(hdr->sentinel != NX842_SENTINEL))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- src += sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
- slen -= sizeof(struct nx842_crypto_header);
-
- if (likely(hdr->type == NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_842)) {
- err = nx842_decompress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len,
- ctx->nx842_wmem);
- if (err)
- return -EINVAL;
- *dlen = tmp_len;
- } else if (hdr->type == NX842_CRYPTO_TYPE_LZO) {
- lzodlen = tmp_len;
- err = lzo1x_decompress_safe(src, slen, dst, &lzodlen);
- if (err != LZO_E_OK)
- return -EINVAL;
- *dlen = lzodlen;
- } else
- return -EINVAL;
-
- return 0;
+ return sw842_decompress(src, slen, dst, dlen);
}
static struct crypto_alg alg = {
.cra_name = "842",
+ .cra_driver_name = "842-generic",
+ .cra_priority = 100,
.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_COMPRESS,
- .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct nx842_ctx),
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct crypto842_ctx),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .cra_init = nx842_init,
- .cra_exit = nx842_exit,
.cra_u = { .compress = {
- .coa_compress = nx842_crypto_compress,
- .coa_decompress = nx842_crypto_decompress } }
+ .coa_compress = crypto842_compress,
+ .coa_decompress = crypto842_decompress } }
};
-static int __init nx842_mod_init(void)
+static int __init crypto842_mod_init(void)
{
- del_timer(&failover_timer);
return crypto_register_alg(&alg);
}
+module_init(crypto842_mod_init);
-static void __exit nx842_mod_exit(void)
+static void __exit crypto842_mod_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_alg(&alg);
}
-
-module_init(nx842_mod_init);
-module_exit(nx842_mod_exit);
+module_exit(crypto842_mod_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-MODULE_DESCRIPTION("842 Compression Algorithm");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("842 Software Compression Algorithm");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("842");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("842-generic");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>");
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 362905e7c841..0ff4cd44e4f8 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -221,11 +221,22 @@ config CRYPTO_SEQIV
tristate "Sequence Number IV Generator"
select CRYPTO_AEAD
select CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER
+ select CRYPTO_NULL
select CRYPTO_RNG
help
This IV generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by
xoring it with a salt. This algorithm is mainly useful for CTR
+config CRYPTO_ECHAINIV
+ tristate "Encrypted Chain IV Generator"
+ select CRYPTO_AEAD
+ select CRYPTO_NULL
+ select CRYPTO_RNG
+ help
+ This IV generator generates an IV based on the encryption of
+ a sequence number xored with a salt. This is the default
+ algorithm for CBC.
+
comment "Block modes"
config CRYPTO_CBC
@@ -1412,10 +1423,9 @@ config CRYPTO_LZO
config CRYPTO_842
tristate "842 compression algorithm"
- depends on CRYPTO_DEV_NX_COMPRESS
- # 842 uses lzo if the hardware becomes unavailable
- select LZO_COMPRESS
- select LZO_DECOMPRESS
+ select CRYPTO_ALGAPI
+ select 842_COMPRESS
+ select 842_DECOMPRESS
help
This is the 842 algorithm.
@@ -1479,9 +1489,19 @@ config CRYPTO_DRBG
tristate
default CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU if (CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC || CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH || CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR)
select CRYPTO_RNG
+ select CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
endif # if CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU
+config CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY
+ tristate "Jitterentropy Non-Deterministic Random Number Generator"
+ help
+ The Jitterentropy RNG is a noise that is intended
+ to provide seed to another RNG. The RNG does not
+ perform any cryptographic whitening of the generated
+ random numbers. This Jitterentropy RNG registers with
+ the kernel crypto API and can be used by any caller.
+
config CRYPTO_USER_API
tristate
diff --git a/crypto/Makefile b/crypto/Makefile
index 97b7d3ac87e7..5db5b95dd8fb 100644
--- a/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/crypto/Makefile
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2) += crypto_blkcipher.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2) += chainiv.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2) += eseqiv.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEQIV) += seqiv.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECHAINIV) += echainiv.o
crypto_hash-y += ahash.o
crypto_hash-y += shash.o
@@ -94,6 +95,8 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2) += rng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2) += krng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG) += ansi_cprng.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG) += drbg.o
+CFLAGS_jitterentropy.o = -O0
+obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY) += jitterentropy.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST) += tcrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH) += ghash-generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API) += af_alg.o
diff --git a/crypto/ablkcipher.c b/crypto/ablkcipher.c
index db201bca1581..b15d797f94f9 100644
--- a/crypto/ablkcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/ablkcipher.c
@@ -586,6 +586,13 @@ static int crypto_givcipher_default(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
if (!tmpl)
goto kill_larval;
+ if (tmpl->create) {
+ err = tmpl->create(tmpl, tb);
+ if (err)
+ goto put_tmpl;
+ goto ok;
+ }
+
inst = tmpl->alloc(tb);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
@@ -597,6 +604,7 @@ static int crypto_givcipher_default(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
goto put_tmpl;
}
+ok:
/* Redo the lookup to use the instance we just registered. */
err = -EAGAIN;
@@ -636,7 +644,7 @@ struct crypto_alg *crypto_lookup_skcipher(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
if ((alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK) ==
CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_GIVCIPHER) {
- if ((alg->cra_flags ^ type ^ ~mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED) {
+ if (~alg->cra_flags & (type ^ ~mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED) {
crypto_mod_put(alg);
alg = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
diff --git a/crypto/aead.c b/crypto/aead.c
index 222271070b49..7c3d725bd264 100644
--- a/crypto/aead.c
+++ b/crypto/aead.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
*/
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -26,10 +27,12 @@
#include "internal.h"
+static int aead_null_givencrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req);
+static int aead_null_givdecrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req);
+
static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
- struct aead_alg *aead = crypto_aead_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
int ret;
u8 *buffer, *alignbuffer;
@@ -42,47 +45,94 @@ static int setkey_unaligned(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
alignbuffer = (u8 *)ALIGN((unsigned long)buffer, alignmask + 1);
memcpy(alignbuffer, key, keylen);
- ret = aead->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
+ ret = tfm->setkey(tfm, alignbuffer, keylen);
memset(alignbuffer, 0, keylen);
kfree(buffer);
return ret;
}
-static int setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+int crypto_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
{
- struct aead_alg *aead = crypto_aead_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_aead_alignmask(tfm);
+ tfm = tfm->child;
+
if ((unsigned long)key & alignmask)
return setkey_unaligned(tfm, key, keylen);
- return aead->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+ return tfm->setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setkey);
int crypto_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm, unsigned int authsize)
{
- struct aead_tfm *crt = crypto_aead_crt(tfm);
int err;
- if (authsize > crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->maxauthsize)
+ if (authsize > crypto_aead_maxauthsize(tfm))
return -EINVAL;
- if (crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setauthsize) {
- err = crypto_aead_alg(tfm)->setauthsize(crt->base, authsize);
+ if (tfm->setauthsize) {
+ err = tfm->setauthsize(tfm->child, authsize);
if (err)
return err;
}
- crypto_aead_crt(crt->base)->authsize = authsize;
- crt->authsize = authsize;
+ tfm->child->authsize = authsize;
+ tfm->authsize = authsize;
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_setauthsize);
-static unsigned int crypto_aead_ctxsize(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
- u32 mask)
+struct aead_old_request {
+ struct scatterlist srcbuf[2];
+ struct scatterlist dstbuf[2];
+ struct aead_request subreq;
+};
+
+unsigned int crypto_aead_reqsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+ return tfm->reqsize + sizeof(struct aead_old_request);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_reqsize);
+
+static int old_crypt(struct aead_request *req,
+ int (*crypt)(struct aead_request *req))
{
- return alg->cra_ctxsize;
+ struct aead_old_request *nreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct scatterlist *src, *dst;
+
+ if (req->old)
+ return crypt(req);
+
+ src = scatterwalk_ffwd(nreq->srcbuf, req->src, req->assoclen);
+ dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(nreq->dstbuf, req->dst, req->assoclen);
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(&nreq->subreq, aead);
+ aead_request_set_callback(&nreq->subreq, aead_request_flags(req),
+ req->base.complete, req->base.data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(&nreq->subreq, src, dst, req->cryptlen,
+ req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_assoc(&nreq->subreq, req->src, req->assoclen);
+
+ return crypt(&nreq->subreq);
+}
+
+static int old_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct old_aead_alg *alg = crypto_old_aead_alg(aead);
+
+ return old_crypt(req, alg->encrypt);
+}
+
+static int old_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *aead = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct old_aead_alg *alg = crypto_old_aead_alg(aead);
+
+ return old_crypt(req, alg->decrypt);
}
static int no_givcrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
@@ -90,32 +140,54 @@ static int no_givcrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
return -ENOSYS;
}
-static int crypto_init_aead_ops(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
+static int crypto_old_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
- struct aead_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_aead;
- struct aead_tfm *crt = &tfm->crt_aead;
+ struct old_aead_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_aead;
+ struct crypto_aead *crt = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
if (max(alg->maxauthsize, alg->ivsize) > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
return -EINVAL;
- crt->setkey = tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV ?
- alg->setkey : setkey;
- crt->encrypt = alg->encrypt;
- crt->decrypt = alg->decrypt;
- crt->givencrypt = alg->givencrypt ?: no_givcrypt;
- crt->givdecrypt = alg->givdecrypt ?: no_givcrypt;
- crt->base = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
- crt->ivsize = alg->ivsize;
+ crt->setkey = alg->setkey;
+ crt->setauthsize = alg->setauthsize;
+ crt->encrypt = old_encrypt;
+ crt->decrypt = old_decrypt;
+ if (alg->ivsize) {
+ crt->givencrypt = alg->givencrypt ?: no_givcrypt;
+ crt->givdecrypt = alg->givdecrypt ?: no_givcrypt;
+ } else {
+ crt->givencrypt = aead_null_givencrypt;
+ crt->givdecrypt = aead_null_givdecrypt;
+ }
+ crt->child = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
crt->authsize = alg->maxauthsize;
return 0;
}
+static int crypto_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+ struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(aead);
+
+ if (crypto_old_aead_alg(aead)->encrypt)
+ return crypto_old_aead_init_tfm(tfm);
+
+ aead->setkey = alg->setkey;
+ aead->setauthsize = alg->setauthsize;
+ aead->encrypt = alg->encrypt;
+ aead->decrypt = alg->decrypt;
+ aead->child = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+ aead->authsize = alg->maxauthsize;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
-static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
+static int crypto_old_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_aead raead;
- struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
+ struct old_aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
strncpy(raead.type, "aead", sizeof(raead.type));
strncpy(raead.geniv, aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>", sizeof(raead.geniv));
@@ -133,6 +205,64 @@ nla_put_failure:
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
#else
+static int crypto_old_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void crypto_old_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
+ __attribute__ ((unused));
+static void crypto_old_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ struct old_aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
+
+ seq_printf(m, "type : aead\n");
+ seq_printf(m, "async : %s\n", alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ?
+ "yes" : "no");
+ seq_printf(m, "blocksize : %u\n", alg->cra_blocksize);
+ seq_printf(m, "ivsize : %u\n", aead->ivsize);
+ seq_printf(m, "maxauthsize : %u\n", aead->maxauthsize);
+ seq_printf(m, "geniv : %s\n", aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>");
+}
+
+const struct crypto_type crypto_aead_type = {
+ .extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
+ .init_tfm = crypto_aead_init_tfm,
+#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
+ .show = crypto_old_aead_show,
+#endif
+ .report = crypto_old_aead_report,
+ .lookup = crypto_lookup_aead,
+ .maskclear = ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV),
+ .maskset = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
+ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+ .tfmsize = offsetof(struct crypto_aead, base),
+};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_type);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET
+static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ struct crypto_report_aead raead;
+ struct aead_alg *aead = container_of(alg, struct aead_alg, base);
+
+ strncpy(raead.type, "aead", sizeof(raead.type));
+ strncpy(raead.geniv, "<none>", sizeof(raead.geniv));
+
+ raead.blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
+ raead.maxauthsize = aead->maxauthsize;
+ raead.ivsize = aead->ivsize;
+
+ if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_AEAD,
+ sizeof(struct crypto_report_aead), &raead))
+ goto nla_put_failure;
+ return 0;
+
+nla_put_failure:
+ return -EMSGSIZE;
+}
+#else
static int crypto_aead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return -ENOSYS;
@@ -143,7 +273,7 @@ static void crypto_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
__attribute__ ((unused));
static void crypto_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
- struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
+ struct aead_alg *aead = container_of(alg, struct aead_alg, base);
seq_printf(m, "type : aead\n");
seq_printf(m, "async : %s\n", alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ?
@@ -151,18 +281,21 @@ static void crypto_aead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
seq_printf(m, "blocksize : %u\n", alg->cra_blocksize);
seq_printf(m, "ivsize : %u\n", aead->ivsize);
seq_printf(m, "maxauthsize : %u\n", aead->maxauthsize);
- seq_printf(m, "geniv : %s\n", aead->geniv ?: "<built-in>");
+ seq_printf(m, "geniv : <none>\n");
}
-const struct crypto_type crypto_aead_type = {
- .ctxsize = crypto_aead_ctxsize,
- .init = crypto_init_aead_ops,
+static const struct crypto_type crypto_new_aead_type = {
+ .extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
+ .init_tfm = crypto_aead_init_tfm,
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
.show = crypto_aead_show,
#endif
.report = crypto_aead_report,
+ .maskclear = ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
+ .maskset = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
+ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+ .tfmsize = offsetof(struct crypto_aead, base),
};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_aead_type);
static int aead_null_givencrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
{
@@ -174,33 +307,11 @@ static int aead_null_givdecrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
return crypto_aead_decrypt(&req->areq);
}
-static int crypto_init_nivaead_ops(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
-{
- struct aead_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_aead;
- struct aead_tfm *crt = &tfm->crt_aead;
-
- if (max(alg->maxauthsize, alg->ivsize) > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- crt->setkey = setkey;
- crt->encrypt = alg->encrypt;
- crt->decrypt = alg->decrypt;
- if (!alg->ivsize) {
- crt->givencrypt = aead_null_givencrypt;
- crt->givdecrypt = aead_null_givdecrypt;
- }
- crt->base = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
- crt->ivsize = alg->ivsize;
- crt->authsize = alg->maxauthsize;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
static int crypto_nivaead_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
struct crypto_report_aead raead;
- struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
+ struct old_aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
strncpy(raead.type, "nivaead", sizeof(raead.type));
strncpy(raead.geniv, aead->geniv, sizeof(raead.geniv));
@@ -229,7 +340,7 @@ static void crypto_nivaead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
__attribute__ ((unused));
static void crypto_nivaead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
- struct aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
+ struct old_aead_alg *aead = &alg->cra_aead;
seq_printf(m, "type : nivaead\n");
seq_printf(m, "async : %s\n", alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC ?
@@ -241,43 +352,36 @@ static void crypto_nivaead_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
}
const struct crypto_type crypto_nivaead_type = {
- .ctxsize = crypto_aead_ctxsize,
- .init = crypto_init_nivaead_ops,
+ .extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
+ .init_tfm = crypto_aead_init_tfm,
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
.show = crypto_nivaead_show,
#endif
.report = crypto_nivaead_report,
+ .maskclear = ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV),
+ .maskset = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV,
+ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+ .tfmsize = offsetof(struct crypto_aead, base),
};
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_nivaead_type);
static int crypto_grab_nivaead(struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn,
const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
- struct crypto_alg *alg;
- int err;
-
- type &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV);
- type |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
- mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
-
- alg = crypto_alg_mod_lookup(name, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(alg))
- return PTR_ERR(alg);
-
- err = crypto_init_spawn(&spawn->base, alg, spawn->base.inst, mask);
- crypto_mod_put(alg);
- return err;
+ spawn->base.frontend = &crypto_nivaead_type;
+ return crypto_grab_spawn(&spawn->base, name, type, mask);
}
-struct crypto_instance *aead_geniv_alloc(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
- struct rtattr **tb, u32 type,
- u32 mask)
+struct aead_instance *aead_geniv_alloc(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb, u32 type, u32 mask)
{
const char *name;
struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn;
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
- struct crypto_instance *inst;
- struct crypto_alg *alg;
+ struct aead_instance *inst;
+ struct aead_alg *alg;
+ unsigned int ivsize;
+ unsigned int maxauthsize;
int err;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
@@ -296,20 +400,23 @@ struct crypto_instance *aead_geniv_alloc(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
if (!inst)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- spawn = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+ spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
/* Ignore async algorithms if necessary. */
mask |= crypto_requires_sync(algt->type, algt->mask);
- crypto_set_aead_spawn(spawn, inst);
+ crypto_set_aead_spawn(spawn, aead_crypto_instance(inst));
err = crypto_grab_nivaead(spawn, name, type, mask);
if (err)
goto err_free_inst;
- alg = crypto_aead_spawn_alg(spawn);
+ alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(spawn);
+
+ ivsize = crypto_aead_alg_ivsize(alg);
+ maxauthsize = crypto_aead_alg_maxauthsize(alg);
err = -EINVAL;
- if (!alg->cra_aead.ivsize)
+ if (!ivsize)
goto err_drop_alg;
/*
@@ -318,39 +425,54 @@ struct crypto_instance *aead_geniv_alloc(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
* template name and double-check the IV generator.
*/
if (algt->mask & CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV) {
- if (strcmp(tmpl->name, alg->cra_aead.geniv))
+ if (!alg->base.cra_aead.encrypt)
+ goto err_drop_alg;
+ if (strcmp(tmpl->name, alg->base.cra_aead.geniv))
goto err_drop_alg;
- memcpy(inst->alg.cra_name, alg->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
- memcpy(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, alg->cra_driver_name,
+ memcpy(inst->alg.base.cra_name, alg->base.cra_name,
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
- } else {
- err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
- if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "%s(%s)", tmpl->name, alg->cra_name) >=
- CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- goto err_drop_alg;
- if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "%s(%s)", tmpl->name, alg->cra_driver_name) >=
- CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- goto err_drop_alg;
+ memcpy(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name,
+ alg->base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD |
+ CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_flags |= alg->base.cra_flags &
+ CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->base.cra_blocksize;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_type = &crypto_aead_type;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_aead.ivsize = ivsize;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_aead.maxauthsize = maxauthsize;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_aead.setkey = alg->base.cra_aead.setkey;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_aead.setauthsize =
+ alg->base.cra_aead.setauthsize;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_aead.encrypt = alg->base.cra_aead.encrypt;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_aead.decrypt = alg->base.cra_aead.decrypt;
+
+ goto out;
}
- inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV;
- inst->alg.cra_flags |= alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
- inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority;
- inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
- inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
- inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_aead_type;
+ err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "%s(%s)", tmpl->name, alg->base.cra_name) >=
+ CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto err_drop_alg;
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "%s(%s)", tmpl->name, alg->base.cra_driver_name) >=
+ CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ goto err_drop_alg;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.ivsize = alg->cra_aead.ivsize;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.maxauthsize = alg->cra_aead.maxauthsize;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.geniv = alg->cra_aead.geniv;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_flags = alg->base.cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_priority = alg->base.cra_priority;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_blocksize = alg->base.cra_blocksize;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask = alg->base.cra_alignmask;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.setkey = alg->cra_aead.setkey;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.setauthsize = alg->cra_aead.setauthsize;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.encrypt = alg->cra_aead.encrypt;
- inst->alg.cra_aead.decrypt = alg->cra_aead.decrypt;
+ inst->alg.ivsize = ivsize;
+ inst->alg.maxauthsize = maxauthsize;
out:
return inst;
@@ -364,9 +486,9 @@ err_free_inst:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_geniv_alloc);
-void aead_geniv_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
+void aead_geniv_free(struct aead_instance *inst)
{
- crypto_drop_aead(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
+ crypto_drop_aead(aead_instance_ctx(inst));
kfree(inst);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_geniv_free);
@@ -374,14 +496,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_geniv_free);
int aead_geniv_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst = (void *)tfm->__crt_alg;
+ struct crypto_aead *child;
struct crypto_aead *aead;
- aead = crypto_spawn_aead(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
- if (IS_ERR(aead))
- return PTR_ERR(aead);
+ aead = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+
+ child = crypto_spawn_aead(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
+ if (IS_ERR(child))
+ return PTR_ERR(child);
- tfm->crt_aead.base = aead;
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize += crypto_aead_reqsize(aead);
+ aead->child = child;
+ aead->reqsize += crypto_aead_reqsize(child);
return 0;
}
@@ -389,7 +514,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_geniv_init);
void aead_geniv_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
- crypto_free_aead(tfm->crt_aead.base);
+ crypto_free_aead(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm)->child);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_geniv_exit);
@@ -443,6 +568,13 @@ static int crypto_nivaead_default(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
if (!tmpl)
goto kill_larval;
+ if (tmpl->create) {
+ err = tmpl->create(tmpl, tb);
+ if (err)
+ goto put_tmpl;
+ goto ok;
+ }
+
inst = tmpl->alloc(tb);
err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
@@ -454,6 +586,7 @@ static int crypto_nivaead_default(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type, u32 mask)
goto put_tmpl;
}
+ok:
/* Redo the lookup to use the instance we just registered. */
err = -EAGAIN;
@@ -489,7 +622,7 @@ struct crypto_alg *crypto_lookup_aead(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
return alg;
if (alg->cra_type == &crypto_aead_type) {
- if ((alg->cra_flags ^ type ^ ~mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED) {
+ if (~alg->cra_flags & (type ^ ~mask) & CRYPTO_ALG_TESTED) {
crypto_mod_put(alg);
alg = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
@@ -505,62 +638,62 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_lookup_aead);
int crypto_grab_aead(struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn, const char *name,
u32 type, u32 mask)
{
- struct crypto_alg *alg;
- int err;
+ spawn->base.frontend = &crypto_aead_type;
+ return crypto_grab_spawn(&spawn->base, name, type, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_grab_aead);
- type &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV);
- type |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
- mask &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV);
- mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
+struct crypto_aead *crypto_alloc_aead(const char *alg_name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ return crypto_alloc_tfm(alg_name, &crypto_aead_type, type, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alloc_aead);
- alg = crypto_lookup_aead(name, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(alg))
- return PTR_ERR(alg);
+static int aead_prepare_alg(struct aead_alg *alg)
+{
+ struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base;
- err = crypto_init_spawn(&spawn->base, alg, spawn->base.inst, mask);
- crypto_mod_put(alg);
- return err;
+ if (max(alg->maxauthsize, alg->ivsize) > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ base->cra_type = &crypto_new_aead_type;
+ base->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
+ base->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
+
+ return 0;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_grab_aead);
-struct crypto_aead *crypto_alloc_aead(const char *alg_name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+int crypto_register_aead(struct aead_alg *alg)
{
- struct crypto_tfm *tfm;
+ struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base;
int err;
- type &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV);
- type |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
- mask &= ~(CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_GENIV);
- mask |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
-
- for (;;) {
- struct crypto_alg *alg;
+ err = aead_prepare_alg(alg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- alg = crypto_lookup_aead(alg_name, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(alg)) {
- err = PTR_ERR(alg);
- goto err;
- }
+ return crypto_register_alg(base);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_register_aead);
- tfm = __crypto_alloc_tfm(alg, type, mask);
- if (!IS_ERR(tfm))
- return __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+int crypto_unregister_aead(struct aead_alg *alg)
+{
+ return crypto_unregister_alg(&alg->base);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_aead);
- crypto_mod_put(alg);
- err = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+int aead_register_instance(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct aead_instance *inst)
+{
+ int err;
-err:
- if (err != -EAGAIN)
- break;
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- err = -EINTR;
- break;
- }
- }
+ err = aead_prepare_alg(&inst->alg);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
- return ERR_PTR(err);
+ return crypto_register_instance(tmpl, aead_crypto_instance(inst));
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alloc_aead);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(aead_register_instance);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)");
diff --git a/crypto/algapi.c b/crypto/algapi.c
index d2627a3d4ed8..abf100c054e0 100644
--- a/crypto/algapi.c
+++ b/crypto/algapi.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
@@ -43,12 +44,9 @@ static inline int crypto_set_driver_name(struct crypto_alg *alg)
static inline void crypto_check_module_sig(struct module *mod)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
- if (fips_enabled && mod && !mod->sig_ok)
+ if (fips_enabled && mod && !module_sig_ok(mod))
panic("Module %s signature verification failed in FIPS mode\n",
- mod->name);
-#endif
- return;
+ module_name(mod));
}
static int crypto_check_alg(struct crypto_alg *alg)
@@ -614,6 +612,22 @@ out:
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_init_spawn2);
+int crypto_grab_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn, const char *name,
+ u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ struct crypto_alg *alg;
+ int err;
+
+ alg = crypto_find_alg(name, spawn->frontend, type, mask);
+ if (IS_ERR(alg))
+ return PTR_ERR(alg);
+
+ err = crypto_init_spawn(spawn, alg, spawn->inst, mask);
+ crypto_mod_put(alg);
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_grab_spawn);
+
void crypto_drop_spawn(struct crypto_spawn *spawn)
{
if (!spawn->alg)
@@ -964,6 +978,12 @@ void crypto_xor(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int size)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_xor);
+unsigned int crypto_alg_extsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ return alg->cra_ctxsize;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alg_extsize);
+
static int __init crypto_algapi_init(void)
{
crypto_init_proc();
diff --git a/crypto/algif_aead.c b/crypto/algif_aead.c
index 69abada22373..a55e4e6fa3d8 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_aead.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_aead.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
* any later version.
*/
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <crypto/if_alg.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
diff --git a/crypto/algif_rng.c b/crypto/algif_rng.c
index 8109aaad2726..150c2b6480ed 100644
--- a/crypto/algif_rng.c
+++ b/crypto/algif_rng.c
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static int rng_setkey(void *private, const u8 *seed, unsigned int seedlen)
* Check whether seedlen is of sufficient size is done in RNG
* implementations.
*/
- return crypto_rng_reset(private, (u8 *)seed, seedlen);
+ return crypto_rng_reset(private, seed, seedlen);
}
static const struct af_alg_type algif_type_rng = {
diff --git a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c
index 765fe7609348..eff337ce9003 100644
--- a/crypto/ansi_cprng.c
+++ b/crypto/ansi_cprng.c
@@ -20,8 +20,6 @@
#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include "internal.h"
-
#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KEY "0123456789abcdef"
#define DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ 16
#define DEFAULT_BLK_SZ 16
@@ -281,11 +279,11 @@ static void free_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx)
}
static int reset_prng_context(struct prng_context *ctx,
- unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
- unsigned char *V, unsigned char *DT)
+ const unsigned char *key, size_t klen,
+ const unsigned char *V, const unsigned char *DT)
{
int ret;
- unsigned char *prng_key;
+ const unsigned char *prng_key;
spin_lock_bh(&ctx->prng_lock);
ctx->flags |= PRNG_NEED_RESET;
@@ -353,8 +351,9 @@ static void cprng_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
free_prng_context(crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm));
}
-static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
- unsigned int dlen)
+static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
{
struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
@@ -367,11 +366,12 @@ static int cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
* V and KEY are required during reset, and DT is optional, detected
* as being present by testing the length of the seed
*/
-static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
- u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
- u8 *dt = NULL;
+ const u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
+ const u8 *dt = NULL;
if (slen < DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -387,18 +387,20 @@ static int cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
-static int fips_cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
- unsigned int dlen)
+static int fips_cprng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
{
struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
return get_prng_bytes(rdata, dlen, prng, 1);
}
-static int fips_cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+static int fips_cprng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 rdata[DEFAULT_BLK_SZ];
- u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
+ const u8 *key = seed + DEFAULT_BLK_SZ;
int rc;
struct prng_context *prng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
@@ -424,40 +426,32 @@ out:
}
#endif
-static struct crypto_alg rng_algs[] = { {
- .cra_name = "stdrng",
- .cra_driver_name = "ansi_cprng",
- .cra_priority = 100,
- .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
- .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context),
- .cra_type = &crypto_rng_type,
- .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .cra_init = cprng_init,
- .cra_exit = cprng_exit,
- .cra_u = {
- .rng = {
- .rng_make_random = cprng_get_random,
- .rng_reset = cprng_reset,
- .seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2*DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
- }
+static struct rng_alg rng_algs[] = { {
+ .generate = cprng_get_random,
+ .seed = cprng_reset,
+ .seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "stdrng",
+ .cra_driver_name = "ansi_cprng",
+ .cra_priority = 100,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = cprng_init,
+ .cra_exit = cprng_exit,
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
}, {
- .cra_name = "fips(ansi_cprng)",
- .cra_driver_name = "fips_ansi_cprng",
- .cra_priority = 300,
- .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
- .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context),
- .cra_type = &crypto_rng_type,
- .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .cra_init = cprng_init,
- .cra_exit = cprng_exit,
- .cra_u = {
- .rng = {
- .rng_make_random = fips_cprng_get_random,
- .rng_reset = fips_cprng_reset,
- .seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2*DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
- }
+ .generate = fips_cprng_get_random,
+ .seed = fips_cprng_reset,
+ .seedsize = DEFAULT_PRNG_KSZ + 2 * DEFAULT_BLK_SZ,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "fips(ansi_cprng)",
+ .cra_driver_name = "fips_ansi_cprng",
+ .cra_priority = 300,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct prng_context),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = cprng_init,
+ .cra_exit = cprng_exit,
}
#endif
} };
@@ -465,12 +459,12 @@ static struct crypto_alg rng_algs[] = { {
/* Module initalization */
static int __init prng_mod_init(void)
{
- return crypto_register_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
+ return crypto_register_rngs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
}
static void __exit prng_mod_fini(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_algs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
+ crypto_unregister_rngs(rng_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(rng_algs));
}
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
diff --git a/crypto/authenc.c b/crypto/authenc.c
index 78fb16cab13f..3e852299afb4 100644
--- a/crypto/authenc.c
+++ b/crypto/authenc.c
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
*
*/
-#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/authenc.h>
@@ -570,13 +570,14 @@ static int crypto_authenc_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth) + 1) +
crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(enc);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct authenc_request_ctx) +
- ctx->reqoff +
- max_t(unsigned int,
- crypto_ahash_reqsize(auth) +
- sizeof(struct ahash_request),
- sizeof(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request) +
- crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(enc));
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct authenc_request_ctx) +
+ ctx->reqoff +
+ max_t(unsigned int,
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(auth) +
+ sizeof(struct ahash_request),
+ sizeof(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request) +
+ crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(enc)));
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/authencesn.c b/crypto/authencesn.c
index 024bff2344fc..a3da6770bc9e 100644
--- a/crypto/authencesn.c
+++ b/crypto/authencesn.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
*
*/
-#include <crypto/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/authenc.h>
@@ -662,13 +662,14 @@ static int crypto_authenc_esn_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crypto_ahash_alignmask(auth) + 1) +
crypto_ablkcipher_ivsize(enc);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct authenc_esn_request_ctx) +
- ctx->reqoff +
- max_t(unsigned int,
- crypto_ahash_reqsize(auth) +
- sizeof(struct ahash_request),
- sizeof(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request) +
- crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(enc));
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct authenc_esn_request_ctx) +
+ ctx->reqoff +
+ max_t(unsigned int,
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(auth) +
+ sizeof(struct ahash_request),
+ sizeof(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request) +
+ crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(enc)));
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/blkcipher.c b/crypto/blkcipher.c
index 0122bec38564..11b981492031 100644
--- a/crypto/blkcipher.c
+++ b/crypto/blkcipher.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
*
*/
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
diff --git a/crypto/ccm.c b/crypto/ccm.c
index 003bbbd21a2b..a4d1a5eda18b 100644
--- a/crypto/ccm.c
+++ b/crypto/ccm.c
@@ -453,9 +453,9 @@ static int crypto_ccm_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
align = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(tfm);
align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = align +
- sizeof(struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx) +
- crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(ctr);
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ align + sizeof(struct crypto_ccm_req_priv_ctx) +
+ crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(ctr));
return 0;
@@ -729,10 +729,10 @@ static int crypto_rfc4309_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
align = crypto_aead_alignmask(aead);
align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
- crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
- align + 16;
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+ ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead), crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
+ align + 16);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/crypto/cryptd.c b/crypto/cryptd.c
index b0602ba03111..4264c8d9c97d 100644
--- a/crypto/cryptd.c
+++ b/crypto/cryptd.c
@@ -295,6 +295,23 @@ static void cryptd_blkcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->child);
}
+static int cryptd_init_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst,
+ struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
+ "cryptd(%s)",
+ alg->cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
+
+ memcpy(inst->alg.cra_name, alg->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
+
+ inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority + 50;
+ inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
+ inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void *cryptd_alloc_instance(struct crypto_alg *alg, unsigned int head,
unsigned int tail)
{
@@ -308,17 +325,10 @@ static void *cryptd_alloc_instance(struct crypto_alg *alg, unsigned int head,
inst = (void *)(p + head);
- err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
- if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
- "cryptd(%s)", alg->cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
+ err = cryptd_init_instance(inst, alg);
+ if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
- memcpy(inst->alg.cra_name, alg->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
-
- inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority + 50;
- inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
- inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
-
out:
return p;
@@ -729,7 +739,8 @@ static int cryptd_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crypto_aead_set_flags(cipher, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP);
ctx->child = cipher;
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct cryptd_aead_request_ctx);
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct cryptd_aead_request_ctx));
return 0;
}
@@ -746,29 +757,34 @@ static int cryptd_create_aead(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
struct aead_instance_ctx *ctx;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
- u32 type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
- u32 mask = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
+ const char *name;
+ u32 type = 0;
+ u32 mask = 0;
int err;
cryptd_check_internal(tb, &type, &mask);
- alg = crypto_get_attr_alg(tb, type, mask);
- if (IS_ERR(alg))
- return PTR_ERR(alg);
+ name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+ if (IS_ERR(name))
+ return PTR_ERR(name);
- inst = cryptd_alloc_instance(alg, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
- err = PTR_ERR(inst);
- if (IS_ERR(inst))
- goto out_put_alg;
+ inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!inst)
+ return -ENOMEM;
ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
ctx->queue = queue;
- err = crypto_init_spawn(&ctx->aead_spawn.base, alg, inst,
- CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ctx->aead_spawn, inst);
+ err = crypto_grab_aead(&ctx->aead_spawn, name, type, mask);
if (err)
goto out_free_inst;
+ alg = crypto_aead_spawn_alg(&ctx->aead_spawn);
+ err = cryptd_init_instance(inst, alg);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_drop_aead;
+
type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
if (alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL)
type |= CRYPTO_ALG_INTERNAL;
@@ -789,12 +805,11 @@ static int cryptd_create_aead(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
if (err) {
- crypto_drop_spawn(&ctx->aead_spawn.base);
+out_drop_aead:
+ crypto_drop_aead(&ctx->aead_spawn);
out_free_inst:
kfree(inst);
}
-out_put_alg:
- crypto_mod_put(alg);
return err;
}
diff --git a/crypto/crypto_null.c b/crypto/crypto_null.c
index a20319132e33..941c9a434d50 100644
--- a/crypto/crypto_null.c
+++ b/crypto/crypto_null.c
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(crypto_default_null_skcipher_lock);
+static struct crypto_blkcipher *crypto_default_null_skcipher;
+static int crypto_default_null_skcipher_refcnt;
+
static int null_compress(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, const u8 *src,
unsigned int slen, u8 *dst, unsigned int *dlen)
{
@@ -149,6 +153,41 @@ MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("compress_null");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("digest_null");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("cipher_null");
+struct crypto_blkcipher *crypto_get_default_null_skcipher(void)
+{
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+
+ mutex_lock(&crypto_default_null_skcipher_lock);
+ tfm = crypto_default_null_skcipher;
+
+ if (!tfm) {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(cipher_null)", 0, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ goto unlock;
+
+ crypto_default_null_skcipher = tfm;
+ }
+
+ crypto_default_null_skcipher_refcnt++;
+
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&crypto_default_null_skcipher_lock);
+
+ return tfm;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_get_default_null_skcipher);
+
+void crypto_put_default_null_skcipher(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&crypto_default_null_skcipher_lock);
+ if (!--crypto_default_null_skcipher_refcnt) {
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(crypto_default_null_skcipher);
+ crypto_default_null_skcipher = NULL;
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&crypto_default_null_skcipher_lock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_put_default_null_skcipher);
+
static int __init crypto_null_mod_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index b69409cb7e6a..92843488af09 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ static bool drbg_fips_continuous_test(struct drbg_state *drbg,
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
int ret = 0;
/* skip test if we test the overall system */
- if (drbg->test_data)
+ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list))
return true;
/* only perform test in FIPS mode */
if (0 == fips_enabled)
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static int drbg_ctr_df(struct drbg_state *drbg,
out:
memset(iv, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
- memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
+ memset(temp, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg) + drbg_blocklen(drbg));
memset(pad, 0, drbg_blocklen(drbg));
return ret;
}
@@ -1041,6 +1041,43 @@ static struct drbg_state_ops drbg_hash_ops = {
* Functions common for DRBG implementations
******************************************************************/
+static inline int __drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct list_head *seed,
+ int reseed)
+{
+ int ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, seed, reseed);
+
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ drbg->seeded = true;
+ /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
+ drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void drbg_async_seed(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct drbg_string data;
+ LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(work, struct drbg_state,
+ seed_work);
+ int ret;
+
+ get_blocking_random_bytes(drbg->seed_buf, drbg->seed_buf_len);
+
+ drbg_string_fill(&data, drbg->seed_buf, drbg->seed_buf_len);
+ list_add_tail(&data.list, &seedlist);
+ mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, true);
+ if (!ret && drbg->jent) {
+ crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
+ drbg->jent = NULL;
+ }
+ memzero_explicit(drbg->seed_buf, drbg->seed_buf_len);
+ mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+}
+
/*
* Seeding or reseeding of the DRBG
*
@@ -1056,8 +1093,6 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
bool reseed)
{
int ret = 0;
- unsigned char *entropy = NULL;
- size_t entropylen = 0;
struct drbg_string data1;
LIST_HEAD(seedlist);
@@ -1068,31 +1103,29 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
return -EINVAL;
}
- if (drbg->test_data && drbg->test_data->testentropy) {
- drbg_string_fill(&data1, drbg->test_data->testentropy->buf,
- drbg->test_data->testentropy->len);
+ if (list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list)) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, drbg->test_data.buf,
+ drbg->test_data.len);
pr_devel("DRBG: using test entropy\n");
} else {
- /*
- * Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
- * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition
- * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
- * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2
- * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
- * applicable during initial seeding.
- */
- entropylen = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
- if (!entropylen)
- return -EFAULT;
- if (!reseed)
- entropylen = ((entropylen + 1) / 2) * 3;
- pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %zu bytes of entropy\n",
- entropylen);
- entropy = kzalloc(entropylen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!entropy)
- return -ENOMEM;
- get_random_bytes(entropy, entropylen);
- drbg_string_fill(&data1, entropy, entropylen);
+ /* Get seed from in-kernel /dev/urandom */
+ get_random_bytes(drbg->seed_buf, drbg->seed_buf_len);
+
+ /* Get seed from Jitter RNG */
+ if (!drbg->jent ||
+ crypto_rng_get_bytes(drbg->jent,
+ drbg->seed_buf + drbg->seed_buf_len,
+ drbg->seed_buf_len)) {
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, drbg->seed_buf,
+ drbg->seed_buf_len);
+ pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %zu bytes of entropy\n",
+ drbg->seed_buf_len);
+ } else {
+ drbg_string_fill(&data1, drbg->seed_buf,
+ drbg->seed_buf_len * 2);
+ pr_devel("DRBG: (re)seeding with %zu bytes of entropy\n",
+ drbg->seed_buf_len * 2);
+ }
}
list_add_tail(&data1.list, &seedlist);
@@ -1111,16 +1144,28 @@ static int drbg_seed(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
memset(drbg->C, 0, drbg_statelen(drbg));
}
- ret = drbg->d_ops->update(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+ ret = __drbg_seed(drbg, &seedlist, reseed);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the initial entropy buffer as the async call may not overwrite
+ * that buffer for quite some time.
+ */
+ memzero_explicit(drbg->seed_buf, drbg->seed_buf_len * 2);
if (ret)
goto out;
+ /*
+ * For all subsequent seeding calls, we only need the seed buffer
+ * equal to the security strength of the DRBG. We undo the calculation
+ * in drbg_alloc_state.
+ */
+ if (!reseed)
+ drbg->seed_buf_len = drbg->seed_buf_len / 3 * 2;
- drbg->seeded = true;
- /* 10.1.1.2 / 10.1.1.3 step 5 */
- drbg->reseed_ctr = 1;
+ /* Invoke asynchronous seeding unless DRBG is in test mode. */
+ if (!list_empty(&drbg->test_data.list) && !reseed)
+ schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
out:
- kzfree(entropy);
return ret;
}
@@ -1136,11 +1181,19 @@ static inline void drbg_dealloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
kzfree(drbg->scratchpad);
drbg->scratchpad = NULL;
drbg->reseed_ctr = 0;
+ drbg->d_ops = NULL;
+ drbg->core = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
kzfree(drbg->prev);
drbg->prev = NULL;
drbg->fips_primed = false;
#endif
+ kzfree(drbg->seed_buf);
+ drbg->seed_buf = NULL;
+ if (drbg->jent) {
+ crypto_free_rng(drbg->jent);
+ drbg->jent = NULL;
+ }
}
/*
@@ -1152,6 +1205,27 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
int ret = -ENOMEM;
unsigned int sb_size = 0;
+ switch (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_TYPE_MASK) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
+ case DRBG_HMAC:
+ drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
+ case DRBG_HASH:
+ drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hash_ops;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
+ case DRBG_CTR:
+ drbg->d_ops = &drbg_ctr_ops;
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */
+ default:
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
drbg->V = kmalloc(drbg_statelen(drbg), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!drbg->V)
goto err;
@@ -1181,87 +1255,50 @@ static inline int drbg_alloc_state(struct drbg_state *drbg)
if (!drbg->scratchpad)
goto err;
}
- spin_lock_init(&drbg->drbg_lock);
- return 0;
-
-err:
- drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
- return ret;
-}
-/*
- * Strategy to avoid holding long term locks: generate a shadow copy of DRBG
- * and perform all operations on this shadow copy. After finishing, restore
- * the updated state of the shadow copy into original drbg state. This way,
- * only the read and write operations of the original drbg state must be
- * locked
- */
-static inline void drbg_copy_drbg(struct drbg_state *src,
- struct drbg_state *dst)
-{
- if (!src || !dst)
- return;
- memcpy(dst->V, src->V, drbg_statelen(src));
- memcpy(dst->C, src->C, drbg_statelen(src));
- dst->reseed_ctr = src->reseed_ctr;
- dst->seeded = src->seeded;
- dst->pr = src->pr;
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
- dst->fips_primed = src->fips_primed;
- memcpy(dst->prev, src->prev, drbg_blocklen(src));
-#endif
/*
- * Not copied:
- * scratchpad is initialized drbg_alloc_state;
- * priv_data is initialized with call to crypto_init;
- * d_ops and core are set outside, as these parameters are const;
- * test_data is set outside to prevent it being copied back.
+ * Gather entropy equal to the security strength of the DRBG.
+ * With a derivation function, a nonce is required in addition
+ * to the entropy. A nonce must be at least 1/2 of the security
+ * strength of the DRBG in size. Thus, entropy * nonce is 3/2
+ * of the strength. The consideration of a nonce is only
+ * applicable during initial seeding.
*/
-}
-
-static int drbg_make_shadow(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_state **shadow)
-{
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
- struct drbg_state *tmp = NULL;
-
- tmp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct drbg_state), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!tmp)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ drbg->seed_buf_len = drbg_sec_strength(drbg->core->flags);
+ if (!drbg->seed_buf_len) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Ensure we have sufficient buffer space for initial seed which
+ * consists of the seed from get_random_bytes and the Jitter RNG.
+ */
+ drbg->seed_buf_len = ((drbg->seed_buf_len + 1) / 2) * 3;
+ drbg->seed_buf = kzalloc(drbg->seed_buf_len * 2, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!drbg->seed_buf)
+ goto err;
- /* read-only data as they are defined as const, no lock needed */
- tmp->core = drbg->core;
- tmp->d_ops = drbg->d_ops;
+ INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
- ret = drbg_alloc_state(tmp);
- if (ret)
- goto err;
+ drbg->jent = crypto_alloc_rng("jitterentropy_rng", 0, 0);
+ if(IS_ERR(drbg->jent))
+ {
+ pr_info("DRBG: could not allocate Jitter RNG handle for seeding\n");
+ /*
+ * As the Jitter RNG is a module that may not be present, we
+ * continue with the operation and do not fully tie the DRBG
+ * to the Jitter RNG.
+ */
+ drbg->jent = NULL;
+ }
- spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
- drbg_copy_drbg(drbg, tmp);
- /* only make a link to the test buffer, as we only read that data */
- tmp->test_data = drbg->test_data;
- spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
- *shadow = tmp;
return 0;
err:
- kzfree(tmp);
+ drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
return ret;
}
-static void drbg_restore_shadow(struct drbg_state *drbg,
- struct drbg_state **shadow)
-{
- struct drbg_state *tmp = *shadow;
-
- spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
- drbg_copy_drbg(tmp, drbg);
- spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
- drbg_dealloc_state(tmp);
- kzfree(tmp);
- *shadow = NULL;
-}
-
/*************************************************************************
* DRBG interface functions
*************************************************************************/
@@ -1287,14 +1324,12 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
struct drbg_string *addtl)
{
int len = 0;
- struct drbg_state *shadow = NULL;
LIST_HEAD(addtllist);
- struct drbg_string timestamp;
- union {
- cycles_t cycles;
- unsigned char char_cycles[sizeof(cycles_t)];
- } now;
+ if (!drbg->core) {
+ pr_devel("DRBG: not yet seeded\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
if (0 == buflen || !buf) {
pr_devel("DRBG: no output buffer provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1304,15 +1339,9 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
return -EINVAL;
}
- len = drbg_make_shadow(drbg, &shadow);
- if (len) {
- pr_devel("DRBG: shadow copy cannot be generated\n");
- return len;
- }
-
/* 9.3.1 step 2 */
len = -EINVAL;
- if (buflen > (drbg_max_request_bytes(shadow))) {
+ if (buflen > (drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg))) {
pr_devel("DRBG: requested random numbers too large %u\n",
buflen);
goto err;
@@ -1321,7 +1350,7 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
/* 9.3.1 step 3 is implicit with the chosen DRBG */
/* 9.3.1 step 4 */
- if (addtl && addtl->len > (drbg_max_addtl(shadow))) {
+ if (addtl && addtl->len > (drbg_max_addtl(drbg))) {
pr_devel("DRBG: additional information string too long %zu\n",
addtl->len);
goto err;
@@ -1332,46 +1361,29 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
* 9.3.1 step 6 and 9 supplemented by 9.3.2 step c is implemented
* here. The spec is a bit convoluted here, we make it simpler.
*/
- if ((drbg_max_requests(shadow)) < shadow->reseed_ctr)
- shadow->seeded = false;
-
- /* allocate cipher handle */
- len = shadow->d_ops->crypto_init(shadow);
- if (len)
- goto err;
+ if ((drbg_max_requests(drbg)) < drbg->reseed_ctr)
+ drbg->seeded = false;
- if (shadow->pr || !shadow->seeded) {
+ if (drbg->pr || !drbg->seeded) {
pr_devel("DRBG: reseeding before generation (prediction "
"resistance: %s, state %s)\n",
drbg->pr ? "true" : "false",
drbg->seeded ? "seeded" : "unseeded");
/* 9.3.1 steps 7.1 through 7.3 */
- len = drbg_seed(shadow, addtl, true);
+ len = drbg_seed(drbg, addtl, true);
if (len)
goto err;
/* 9.3.1 step 7.4 */
addtl = NULL;
}
- /*
- * Mix the time stamp into the DRBG state if the DRBG is not in
- * test mode. If there are two callers invoking the DRBG at the same
- * time, i.e. before the first caller merges its shadow state back,
- * both callers would obtain the same random number stream without
- * changing the state here.
- */
- if (!drbg->test_data) {
- now.cycles = random_get_entropy();
- drbg_string_fill(&timestamp, now.char_cycles, sizeof(cycles_t));
- list_add_tail(&timestamp.list, &addtllist);
- }
if (addtl && 0 < addtl->len)
list_add_tail(&addtl->list, &addtllist);
/* 9.3.1 step 8 and 10 */
- len = shadow->d_ops->generate(shadow, buf, buflen, &addtllist);
+ len = drbg->d_ops->generate(drbg, buf, buflen, &addtllist);
/* 10.1.1.4 step 6, 10.1.2.5 step 7, 10.2.1.5.2 step 7 */
- shadow->reseed_ctr++;
+ drbg->reseed_ctr++;
if (0 >= len)
goto err;
@@ -1391,7 +1403,7 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
* case somebody has a need to implement the test of 11.3.3.
*/
#if 0
- if (shadow->reseed_ctr && !(shadow->reseed_ctr % 4096)) {
+ if (drbg->reseed_ctr && !(drbg->reseed_ctr % 4096)) {
int err = 0;
pr_devel("DRBG: start to perform self test\n");
if (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_HMAC)
@@ -1410,8 +1422,6 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
* are returned when reusing this DRBG cipher handle
*/
drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
- drbg_dealloc_state(shadow);
- kzfree(shadow);
return 0;
} else {
pr_devel("DRBG: self test successful\n");
@@ -1425,8 +1435,6 @@ static int drbg_generate(struct drbg_state *drbg,
*/
len = 0;
err:
- shadow->d_ops->crypto_fini(shadow);
- drbg_restore_shadow(drbg, &shadow);
return len;
}
@@ -1442,19 +1450,21 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned int buflen,
struct drbg_string *addtl)
{
- int len = 0;
+ unsigned int len = 0;
unsigned int slice = 0;
do {
- int tmplen = 0;
+ int err = 0;
unsigned int chunk = 0;
slice = ((buflen - len) / drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg));
chunk = slice ? drbg_max_request_bytes(drbg) : (buflen - len);
- tmplen = drbg_generate(drbg, buf + len, chunk, addtl);
- if (0 >= tmplen)
- return tmplen;
- len += tmplen;
+ mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ err = drbg_generate(drbg, buf + len, chunk, addtl);
+ mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ if (0 > err)
+ return err;
+ len += chunk;
} while (slice > 0 && (len < buflen));
- return len;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -1477,32 +1487,12 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
int coreref, bool pr)
{
- int ret = -ENOMEM;
+ int ret;
+ bool reseed = true;
pr_devel("DRBG: Initializing DRBG core %d with prediction resistance "
"%s\n", coreref, pr ? "enabled" : "disabled");
- drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
- drbg->pr = pr;
- drbg->seeded = false;
- switch (drbg->core->flags & DRBG_TYPE_MASK) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC
- case DRBG_HMAC:
- drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hmac_ops;
- break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC */
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH
- case DRBG_HASH:
- drbg->d_ops = &drbg_hash_ops;
- break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH */
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR
- case DRBG_CTR:
- drbg->d_ops = &drbg_ctr_ops;
- break;
-#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR */
- default:
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- }
+ mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
/* 9.1 step 1 is implicit with the selected DRBG type */
@@ -1514,22 +1504,36 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
/* 9.1 step 4 is implicit in drbg_sec_strength */
- ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ if (!drbg->core) {
+ drbg->core = &drbg_cores[coreref];
+ drbg->pr = pr;
+ drbg->seeded = false;
- ret = -EFAULT;
- if (drbg->d_ops->crypto_init(drbg))
- goto err;
- ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, false);
- drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
- if (ret)
+ ret = drbg_alloc_state(drbg);
+ if (ret)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (drbg->d_ops->crypto_init(drbg))
+ goto err;
+
+ reseed = false;
+ }
+
+ ret = drbg_seed(drbg, pers, reseed);
+
+ if (ret && !reseed) {
+ drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
goto err;
+ }
- return 0;
+ mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ return ret;
err:
drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
+unlock:
+ mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
return ret;
}
@@ -1544,10 +1548,11 @@ err:
*/
static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
- spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
+ if (drbg->d_ops)
+ drbg->d_ops->crypto_fini(drbg);
drbg_dealloc_state(drbg);
/* no scrubbing of test_data -- this shall survive an uninstantiate */
- spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
return 0;
}
@@ -1555,16 +1560,17 @@ static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
* Helper function for setting the test data in the DRBG
*
* @drbg DRBG state handle
- * @test_data test data to sets
+ * @data test data
+ * @len test data length
*/
-static inline void drbg_set_testdata(struct drbg_state *drbg,
- struct drbg_test_data *test_data)
+static void drbg_kcapi_set_entropy(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *data, unsigned int len)
{
- if (!test_data || !test_data->testentropy)
- return;
- spin_lock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
- drbg->test_data = test_data;
- spin_unlock_bh(&drbg->drbg_lock);
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
+
+ mutex_lock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+ drbg_string_fill(&drbg->test_data, data, len);
+ mutex_unlock(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
}
/***************************************************************
@@ -1714,15 +1720,10 @@ static inline void drbg_convert_tfm_core(const char *cra_driver_name,
static int drbg_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
- bool pr = false;
- int coreref = 0;
- drbg_convert_tfm_core(crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(tfm), &coreref, &pr);
- /*
- * when personalization string is needed, the caller must call reset
- * and provide the personalization string as seed information
- */
- return drbg_instantiate(drbg, NULL, coreref, pr);
+ mutex_init(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+
+ return 0;
}
static void drbg_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
@@ -1734,65 +1735,49 @@ static void drbg_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
* Generate random numbers invoked by the kernel crypto API:
* The API of the kernel crypto API is extended as follows:
*
- * If dlen is larger than zero, rdata is interpreted as the output buffer
- * where random data is to be stored.
- *
- * If dlen is zero, rdata is interpreted as a pointer to a struct drbg_gen
- * which holds the additional information string that is used for the
- * DRBG generation process. The output buffer that is to be used to store
- * data is also pointed to by struct drbg_gen.
+ * src is additional input supplied to the RNG.
+ * slen is the length of src.
+ * dst is the output buffer where random data is to be stored.
+ * dlen is the length of dst.
*/
-static int drbg_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata,
- unsigned int dlen)
+static int drbg_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *dst, unsigned int dlen)
{
struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
- if (0 < dlen) {
- return drbg_generate_long(drbg, rdata, dlen, NULL);
- } else {
- struct drbg_gen *data = (struct drbg_gen *)rdata;
- struct drbg_string addtl;
- /* catch NULL pointer */
- if (!data)
- return 0;
- drbg_set_testdata(drbg, data->test_data);
+ struct drbg_string *addtl = NULL;
+ struct drbg_string string;
+
+ if (slen) {
/* linked list variable is now local to allow modification */
- drbg_string_fill(&addtl, data->addtl->buf, data->addtl->len);
- return drbg_generate_long(drbg, data->outbuf, data->outlen,
- &addtl);
+ drbg_string_fill(&string, src, slen);
+ addtl = &string;
}
+
+ return drbg_generate_long(drbg, dst, dlen, addtl);
}
/*
- * Reset the DRBG invoked by the kernel crypto API
- * The reset implies a full re-initialization of the DRBG. Similar to the
- * generate function of drbg_kcapi_random, this function extends the
- * kernel crypto API interface with struct drbg_gen
+ * Seed the DRBG invoked by the kernel crypto API
*/
-static int drbg_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+static int drbg_kcapi_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
struct drbg_state *drbg = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_tfm *tfm_base = crypto_rng_tfm(tfm);
bool pr = false;
- struct drbg_string seed_string;
+ struct drbg_string string;
+ struct drbg_string *seed_string = NULL;
int coreref = 0;
- drbg_uninstantiate(drbg);
drbg_convert_tfm_core(crypto_tfm_alg_driver_name(tfm_base), &coreref,
&pr);
if (0 < slen) {
- drbg_string_fill(&seed_string, seed, slen);
- return drbg_instantiate(drbg, &seed_string, coreref, pr);
- } else {
- struct drbg_gen *data = (struct drbg_gen *)seed;
- /* allow invocation of API call with NULL, 0 */
- if (!data)
- return drbg_instantiate(drbg, NULL, coreref, pr);
- drbg_set_testdata(drbg, data->test_data);
- /* linked list variable is now local to allow modification */
- drbg_string_fill(&seed_string, data->addtl->buf,
- data->addtl->len);
- return drbg_instantiate(drbg, &seed_string, coreref, pr);
+ drbg_string_fill(&string, seed, slen);
+ seed_string = &string;
}
+
+ return drbg_instantiate(drbg, seed_string, coreref, pr);
}
/***************************************************************
@@ -1811,7 +1796,6 @@ static int drbg_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
*/
static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
int len = 0;
#define OUTBUFLEN 16
unsigned char buf[OUTBUFLEN];
@@ -1839,6 +1823,8 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
if (!drbg)
return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_init(&drbg->drbg_mutex);
+
/*
* if the following tests fail, it is likely that there is a buffer
* overflow as buf is much smaller than the requested or provided
@@ -1877,37 +1863,33 @@ static inline int __init drbg_healthcheck_sanity(void)
outbuf:
kzfree(drbg);
return rc;
-#else /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
- return 0;
-#endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS */
}
-static struct crypto_alg drbg_algs[22];
+static struct rng_alg drbg_algs[22];
/*
* Fill the array drbg_algs used to register the different DRBGs
* with the kernel crypto API. To fill the array, the information
* from drbg_cores[] is used.
*/
-static inline void __init drbg_fill_array(struct crypto_alg *alg,
+static inline void __init drbg_fill_array(struct rng_alg *alg,
const struct drbg_core *core, int pr)
{
int pos = 0;
static int priority = 100;
- memset(alg, 0, sizeof(struct crypto_alg));
- memcpy(alg->cra_name, "stdrng", 6);
+ memcpy(alg->base.cra_name, "stdrng", 6);
if (pr) {
- memcpy(alg->cra_driver_name, "drbg_pr_", 8);
+ memcpy(alg->base.cra_driver_name, "drbg_pr_", 8);
pos = 8;
} else {
- memcpy(alg->cra_driver_name, "drbg_nopr_", 10);
+ memcpy(alg->base.cra_driver_name, "drbg_nopr_", 10);
pos = 10;
}
- memcpy(alg->cra_driver_name + pos, core->cra_name,
+ memcpy(alg->base.cra_driver_name + pos, core->cra_name,
strlen(core->cra_name));
- alg->cra_priority = priority;
+ alg->base.cra_priority = priority;
priority++;
/*
* If FIPS mode enabled, the selected DRBG shall have the
@@ -1915,17 +1897,16 @@ static inline void __init drbg_fill_array(struct crypto_alg *alg,
* it is selected.
*/
if (fips_enabled)
- alg->cra_priority += 200;
-
- alg->cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG;
- alg->cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct drbg_state);
- alg->cra_type = &crypto_rng_type;
- alg->cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
- alg->cra_init = drbg_kcapi_init;
- alg->cra_exit = drbg_kcapi_cleanup;
- alg->cra_u.rng.rng_make_random = drbg_kcapi_random;
- alg->cra_u.rng.rng_reset = drbg_kcapi_reset;
- alg->cra_u.rng.seedsize = 0;
+ alg->base.cra_priority += 200;
+
+ alg->base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct drbg_state);
+ alg->base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
+ alg->base.cra_init = drbg_kcapi_init;
+ alg->base.cra_exit = drbg_kcapi_cleanup;
+ alg->generate = drbg_kcapi_random;
+ alg->seed = drbg_kcapi_seed;
+ alg->set_ent = drbg_kcapi_set_entropy;
+ alg->seedsize = 0;
}
static int __init drbg_init(void)
@@ -1958,12 +1939,12 @@ static int __init drbg_init(void)
drbg_fill_array(&drbg_algs[i], &drbg_cores[j], 1);
for (j = 0; ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) > j; j++, i++)
drbg_fill_array(&drbg_algs[i], &drbg_cores[j], 0);
- return crypto_register_algs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2));
+ return crypto_register_rngs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2));
}
static void __exit drbg_exit(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_algs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2));
+ crypto_unregister_rngs(drbg_algs, (ARRAY_SIZE(drbg_cores) * 2));
}
module_init(drbg_init);
diff --git a/crypto/echainiv.c b/crypto/echainiv.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..bd85dcc4fa3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/echainiv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,546 @@
+/*
+ * echainiv: Encrypted Chain IV Generator
+ *
+ * This generator generates an IV based on a sequence number by xoring it
+ * with a salt and then encrypting it with the same key as used to encrypt
+ * the plain text. This algorithm requires that the block size be equal
+ * to the IV size. It is mainly useful for CBC.
+ *
+ * This generator can only be used by algorithms where authentication
+ * is performed after encryption (i.e., authenc).
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
+ * Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your option)
+ * any later version.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/null.h>
+#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#define MAX_IV_SIZE 16
+
+struct echainiv_request_ctx {
+ struct scatterlist src[2];
+ struct scatterlist dst[2];
+ struct scatterlist ivbuf[2];
+ struct scatterlist *ivsg;
+ struct aead_givcrypt_request subreq;
+};
+
+struct echainiv_ctx {
+ struct crypto_aead *child;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *null;
+ u8 salt[] __attribute__ ((aligned(__alignof__(u32))));
+};
+
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(u32 [MAX_IV_SIZE / sizeof(u32)], echainiv_iv);
+
+static int echainiv_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->child, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->child, authsize);
+}
+
+/* We don't care if we get preempted and read/write IVs from the next CPU. */
+static void echainiv_read_iv(u8 *dst, unsigned size)
+{
+ u32 *a = (u32 *)dst;
+ u32 __percpu *b = echainiv_iv;
+
+ for (; size >= 4; size -= 4) {
+ *a++ = this_cpu_read(*b);
+ b++;
+ }
+}
+
+static void echainiv_write_iv(const u8 *src, unsigned size)
+{
+ const u32 *a = (const u32 *)src;
+ u32 __percpu *b = echainiv_iv;
+
+ for (; size >= 4; size -= 4) {
+ this_cpu_write(*b, *a);
+ a++;
+ b++;
+ }
+}
+
+static void echainiv_encrypt_compat_complete2(struct aead_request *req,
+ int err)
+{
+ struct echainiv_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct aead_givcrypt_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv;
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(subreq->giv, rctx->ivsg, 0,
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv), 1);
+
+out:
+ kzfree(subreq->giv);
+}
+
+static void echainiv_encrypt_compat_complete(
+ struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req = base->data;
+
+ echainiv_encrypt_compat_complete2(req, err);
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static void echainiv_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv;
+ unsigned int ivsize;
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+
+ echainiv_write_iv(subreq->iv, ivsize);
+
+ if (req->iv != subreq->iv)
+ memcpy(req->iv, subreq->iv, ivsize);
+
+out:
+ if (req->iv != subreq->iv)
+ kzfree(subreq->iv);
+}
+
+static void echainiv_encrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
+ int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req = base->data;
+
+ echainiv_encrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_encrypt_compat(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct echainiv_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct aead_givcrypt_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ u8 *info;
+ __be64 seq;
+ int err;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+
+ rctx->ivsg = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->ivbuf, req->dst, req->assoclen);
+ info = PageHighMem(sg_page(rctx->ivsg)) ? NULL : sg_virt(rctx->ivsg);
+
+ if (!info) {
+ info = kmalloc(ivsize, req->base.flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? GFP_KERNEL:
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ compl = echainiv_encrypt_compat_complete;
+ data = req;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(&seq, req->iv + ivsize - sizeof(seq), sizeof(seq));
+
+ aead_givcrypt_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+ aead_givcrypt_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags,
+ req->base.complete, req->base.data);
+ aead_givcrypt_set_crypt(subreq,
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->src, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst, rctx->ivsg,
+ ivsize),
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_givcrypt_set_assoc(subreq, req->src, req->assoclen);
+ aead_givcrypt_set_giv(subreq, info, be64_to_cpu(seq));
+
+ err = crypto_aead_givencrypt(subreq);
+ if (unlikely(PageHighMem(sg_page(rctx->ivsg))))
+ echainiv_encrypt_compat_complete2(req, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int echainiv_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ u8 *info;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+ int err;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = echainiv_encrypt_complete;
+ data = req;
+ info = req->iv;
+
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
+ struct scatterlist src[2];
+ struct scatterlist dst[2];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
+ .tfm = ctx->null,
+ };
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
+ &desc,
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(dst, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(src, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)info,
+ crypto_aead_alignmask(geniv) + 1))) {
+ info = kmalloc(ivsize, req->base.flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? GFP_KERNEL:
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(info, req->iv, ivsize);
+ }
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->dst, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, info);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen + ivsize);
+
+ crypto_xor(info, ctx->salt, ivsize);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(info, req->dst, req->assoclen, ivsize, 1);
+ echainiv_read_iv(info, ivsize);
+
+ err = crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq);
+ echainiv_encrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int echainiv_decrypt_compat(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct echainiv_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq.areq;
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize + crypto_aead_authsize(geniv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq,
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->src, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_assoc(subreq, req->src, req->assoclen);
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->src, req->assoclen, ivsize, 0);
+
+ return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned int ivsize = crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv);
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize + crypto_aead_authsize(geniv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen + ivsize);
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->src, req->assoclen, ivsize, 0);
+ if (req->src != req->dst)
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen, ivsize, 1);
+
+ return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_encrypt_compat_first(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+ if (geniv->encrypt != echainiv_encrypt_compat_first)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ geniv->encrypt = echainiv_encrypt_compat;
+ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt,
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
+
+unlock:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return echainiv_encrypt_compat(req);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_encrypt_first(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+ if (geniv->encrypt != echainiv_encrypt_first)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ geniv->encrypt = echainiv_encrypt;
+ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt,
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
+
+unlock:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return echainiv_encrypt(req);
+}
+
+static int echainiv_compat_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(geniv, sizeof(struct echainiv_request_ctx));
+
+ err = aead_geniv_init(tfm);
+
+ ctx->child = geniv->child;
+ geniv->child = geniv;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int echainiv_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(geniv, sizeof(struct aead_request));
+
+ ctx->null = crypto_get_default_null_skcipher();
+ err = PTR_ERR(ctx->null);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx->null))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = aead_geniv_init(tfm);
+ if (err)
+ goto drop_null;
+
+ ctx->child = geniv->child;
+ geniv->child = geniv;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+
+drop_null:
+ crypto_put_default_null_skcipher();
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static void echainiv_compat_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
+}
+
+static void echainiv_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct echainiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
+ crypto_put_default_null_skcipher();
+}
+
+static int echainiv_aead_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ struct aead_instance *inst;
+ struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn;
+ struct aead_alg *alg;
+ int err;
+
+ inst = aead_geniv_alloc(tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(inst))
+ return PTR_ERR(inst);
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (inst->alg.ivsize < sizeof(u64) ||
+ inst->alg.ivsize & (sizeof(u32) - 1) ||
+ inst->alg.ivsize > MAX_IV_SIZE)
+ goto free_inst;
+
+ spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+ alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(spawn);
+
+ inst->alg.setkey = echainiv_setkey;
+ inst->alg.setauthsize = echainiv_setauthsize;
+ inst->alg.encrypt = echainiv_encrypt_first;
+ inst->alg.decrypt = echainiv_decrypt;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_init = echainiv_init;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_exit = echainiv_exit;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct echainiv_ctx);
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.base.cra_aead.ivsize;
+
+ if (alg->base.cra_aead.encrypt) {
+ inst->alg.encrypt = echainiv_encrypt_compat_first;
+ inst->alg.decrypt = echainiv_decrypt_compat;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_init = echainiv_compat_init;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_exit = echainiv_compat_exit;
+ }
+
+ err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_inst;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+
+free_inst:
+ aead_geniv_free(inst);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int echainiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_get_default_rng();
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = echainiv_aead_create(tmpl, tb);
+ if (err)
+ goto put_rng;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+
+put_rng:
+ crypto_put_default_rng();
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static void echainiv_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
+{
+ aead_geniv_free(aead_instance(inst));
+ crypto_put_default_rng();
+}
+
+static struct crypto_template echainiv_tmpl = {
+ .name = "echainiv",
+ .create = echainiv_create,
+ .free = echainiv_free,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static int __init echainiv_module_init(void)
+{
+ return crypto_register_template(&echainiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+static void __exit echainiv_module_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_template(&echainiv_tmpl);
+}
+
+module_init(echainiv_module_init);
+module_exit(echainiv_module_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Encrypted Chain IV Generator");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("echainiv");
diff --git a/crypto/fips.c b/crypto/fips.c
index 553970081c62..9d627c1cf8bc 100644
--- a/crypto/fips.c
+++ b/crypto/fips.c
@@ -10,7 +10,12 @@
*
*/
-#include "internal.h"
+#include <linux/export.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
int fips_enabled;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fips_enabled);
@@ -25,3 +30,49 @@ static int fips_enable(char *str)
}
__setup("fips=", fips_enable);
+
+static struct ctl_table crypto_sysctl_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "fips_enabled",
+ .data = &fips_enabled,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec
+ },
+ {}
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table crypto_dir_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "crypto",
+ .mode = 0555,
+ .child = crypto_sysctl_table
+ },
+ {}
+};
+
+static struct ctl_table_header *crypto_sysctls;
+
+static void crypto_proc_fips_init(void)
+{
+ crypto_sysctls = register_sysctl_table(crypto_dir_table);
+}
+
+static void crypto_proc_fips_exit(void)
+{
+ unregister_sysctl_table(crypto_sysctls);
+}
+
+static int __init fips_init(void)
+{
+ crypto_proc_fips_init();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit fips_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_proc_fips_exit();
+}
+
+module_init(fips_init);
+module_exit(fips_exit);
diff --git a/crypto/gcm.c b/crypto/gcm.c
index 2e403f6138c1..fc2b55eaf1ed 100644
--- a/crypto/gcm.c
+++ b/crypto/gcm.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <crypto/null.h>
#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include "internal.h"
@@ -39,7 +40,6 @@ struct crypto_rfc4106_ctx {
struct crypto_rfc4543_instance_ctx {
struct crypto_aead_spawn aead;
- struct crypto_skcipher_spawn null;
};
struct crypto_rfc4543_ctx {
@@ -672,12 +672,12 @@ static int crypto_gcm_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
align = crypto_tfm_alg_alignmask(tfm);
align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = align +
- offsetof(struct crypto_gcm_req_priv_ctx, u) +
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ align + offsetof(struct crypto_gcm_req_priv_ctx, u) +
max(sizeof(struct ablkcipher_request) +
crypto_ablkcipher_reqsize(ctr),
sizeof(struct ahash_request) +
- crypto_ahash_reqsize(ghash));
+ crypto_ahash_reqsize(ghash)));
return 0;
@@ -946,10 +946,10 @@ static int crypto_rfc4106_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
align = crypto_aead_alignmask(aead);
align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request) +
- ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
- crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
- align + 16;
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct aead_request) +
+ ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead), crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
+ align + 16);
return 0;
}
@@ -1246,7 +1246,7 @@ static int crypto_rfc4543_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
if (IS_ERR(aead))
return PTR_ERR(aead);
- null = crypto_spawn_blkcipher(&ictx->null.base);
+ null = crypto_get_default_null_skcipher();
err = PTR_ERR(null);
if (IS_ERR(null))
goto err_free_aead;
@@ -1256,10 +1256,10 @@ static int crypto_rfc4543_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
align = crypto_aead_alignmask(aead);
align &= ~(crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment() - 1);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct crypto_rfc4543_req_ctx) +
- ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead),
- crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
- align + 16;
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct crypto_rfc4543_req_ctx) +
+ ALIGN(crypto_aead_reqsize(aead), crypto_tfm_ctx_alignment()) +
+ align + 16);
return 0;
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static void crypto_rfc4543_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
struct crypto_rfc4543_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
- crypto_free_blkcipher(ctx->null);
+ crypto_put_default_null_skcipher();
}
static struct crypto_instance *crypto_rfc4543_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
@@ -1311,23 +1311,15 @@ static struct crypto_instance *crypto_rfc4543_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
alg = crypto_aead_spawn_alg(spawn);
- crypto_set_skcipher_spawn(&ctx->null, inst);
- err = crypto_grab_skcipher(&ctx->null, "ecb(cipher_null)", 0,
- CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
- if (err)
- goto out_drop_alg;
-
- crypto_skcipher_spawn_alg(&ctx->null);
-
err = -EINVAL;
/* We only support 16-byte blocks. */
if (alg->cra_aead.ivsize != 16)
- goto out_drop_ecbnull;
+ goto out_drop_alg;
/* Not a stream cipher? */
if (alg->cra_blocksize != 1)
- goto out_drop_ecbnull;
+ goto out_drop_alg;
err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
@@ -1335,7 +1327,7 @@ static struct crypto_instance *crypto_rfc4543_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"rfc4543(%s)", alg->cra_driver_name) >=
CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- goto out_drop_ecbnull;
+ goto out_drop_alg;
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD;
inst->alg.cra_flags |= alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
@@ -1362,8 +1354,6 @@ static struct crypto_instance *crypto_rfc4543_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
out:
return inst;
-out_drop_ecbnull:
- crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->null);
out_drop_alg:
crypto_drop_aead(spawn);
out_free_inst:
@@ -1377,7 +1367,6 @@ static void crypto_rfc4543_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
struct crypto_rfc4543_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
crypto_drop_aead(&ctx->aead);
- crypto_drop_skcipher(&ctx->null);
kfree(inst);
}
diff --git a/crypto/internal.h b/crypto/internal.h
index bd39bfc92eab..00e42a3ed814 100644
--- a/crypto/internal.h
+++ b/crypto/internal.h
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
/* Crypto notification events. */
enum {
@@ -103,6 +102,8 @@ int crypto_register_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
int crypto_unregister_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
int crypto_probing_notify(unsigned long val, void *v);
+unsigned int crypto_alg_extsize(struct crypto_alg *alg);
+
static inline struct crypto_alg *crypto_alg_get(struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
atomic_inc(&alg->cra_refcnt);
diff --git a/crypto/jitterentropy.c b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1ebe58a26619
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/jitterentropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,909 @@
+/*
+ * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter.
+ *
+ * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014
+ *
+ * Design
+ * ======
+ *
+ * See http://www.chronox.de/jent.html
+ *
+ * License
+ * =======
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
+ * DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library
+ * version 1.1.0 provided at http://www.chronox.de/jent.html
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
+
+#ifdef __OPTIMIZE__
+ #error "The CPU Jitter random number generator must not be compiled with optimizations. See documentation. Use the compiler switch -O0 for compiling jitterentropy.c."
+#endif
+
+/* The entropy pool */
+struct rand_data {
+ /* all data values that are vital to maintain the security
+ * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not
+ * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to
+ * calculate the next random value. */
+ __u64 data; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */
+ __u64 old_data; /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */
+ __u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
+#define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8)
+ __u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
+ __s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
+ unsigned int stuck:1; /* Time measurement stuck */
+ unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */
+ unsigned int stir:1; /* Post-processing stirring */
+ unsigned int disable_unbias:1; /* Deactivate Von-Neuman unbias */
+#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
+#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
+#define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128
+#define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
+ unsigned char *mem; /* Memory access location with size of
+ * memblocks * memblocksize */
+ unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */
+ unsigned int memblocks; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */
+ unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */
+ unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random
+ * bit generation */
+};
+
+/* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */
+#define JENT_DISABLE_STIR (1<<0) /* Disable stirring the entropy pool */
+#define JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS (1<<1) /* Disable the Von-Neuman Unbiaser */
+#define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more
+ * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for
+ * entropy collector */
+
+#define DRIVER_NAME "jitterentropy"
+
+/* -- error codes for init function -- */
+#define JENT_ENOTIME 1 /* Timer service not available */
+#define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */
+#define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */
+#define JENT_EMINVARIATION 4 /* Timer variations too small for RNG */
+#define JENT_EVARVAR 5 /* Timer does not produce variations of
+ * variations (2nd derivation of time is
+ * zero). */
+#define JENT_EMINVARVAR 6 /* Timer variations of variations is tooi
+ * small. */
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Helper functions
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+static inline void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out)
+{
+ struct timespec ts;
+ __u64 tmp = 0;
+
+ tmp = random_get_entropy();
+
+ /*
+ * If random_get_entropy does not return a value (which is possible on,
+ * for example, MIPS), invoke __getnstimeofday
+ * hoping that there are timers we can work with.
+ *
+ * The list of available timers can be obtained from
+ * /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/available_clocksource
+ * and are registered with clocksource_register()
+ */
+ if ((0 == tmp) &&
+#ifndef MODULE
+ (0 == timekeeping_valid_for_hres()) &&
+#endif
+ (0 == __getnstimeofday(&ts))) {
+ tmp = ts.tv_sec;
+ tmp = tmp << 32;
+ tmp = tmp | ts.tv_nsec;
+ }
+
+ *out = tmp;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Update of the loop count used for the next round of
+ * an entropy collection.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
+ * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
+ * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
+ * the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
+ *
+ * @return Newly calculated loop counter
+ */
+static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec,
+ unsigned int bits, unsigned int min)
+{
+ __u64 time = 0;
+ __u64 shuffle = 0;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+ unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1;
+
+ jent_get_nstime(&time);
+ /*
+ * mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle
+ * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more
+ */
+ if (ec)
+ time ^= ec->data;
+ /*
+ * we fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
+ * bits of the time stamp are included as possible
+ */
+ for (i = 0; (DATA_SIZE_BITS / bits) > i; i++) {
+ shuffle ^= time & mask;
+ time = time >> bits;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum
+ * RNG loop count.
+ */
+ return (shuffle + (1<<min));
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Noise sources
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU
+ * execution time jitter
+ *
+ * This function folds the time into one bit units by iterating
+ * through the DATA_SIZE_BITS bit time value as follows: assume our time value
+ * is 0xabcd
+ * 1st loop, 1st shift generates 0xd000
+ * 1st loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000d
+ * 2nd loop, 1st shift generates 0xcd00
+ * 2nd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000c
+ * 3rd loop, 1st shift generates 0xbcd0
+ * 3rd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000b
+ * 4th loop, 1st shift generates 0xabcd
+ * 4th loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000a
+ * Now, the values at the end of the 2nd shifts are XORed together.
+ *
+ * The code is deliberately inefficient and shall stay that way. This function
+ * is the root cause why the code shall be compiled without optimization. This
+ * function not only acts as folding operation, but this function's execution
+ * is used to measure the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in
+ * this function implies that careful retesting must be done.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
+ * @time time stamp to be folded
+ * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
+ * loops to perform the folding
+ *
+ * Output:
+ * @folded result of folding operation
+ *
+ * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed
+ */
+static __u64 jent_fold_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time,
+ __u64 *folded, __u64 loop_cnt)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ __u64 j = 0;
+ __u64 new = 0;
+#define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4
+#define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0
+ __u64 fold_loop_cnt =
+ jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);
+
+ /*
+ * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
+ * needed during runtime
+ */
+ if (loop_cnt)
+ fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
+ for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) {
+ new = 0;
+ for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) {
+ __u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i);
+
+ tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1);
+ new ^= tmp;
+ }
+ }
+ *folded = new;
+ return fold_loop_cnt;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in
+ * memory access times
+ *
+ * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing
+ * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be
+ * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1
+ * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing.
+ *
+ * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually
+ * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal
+ * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant
+ * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more
+ * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses.
+ * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However,
+ * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite
+ * large which is usually not desirable.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @ec Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if
+ * the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise
+ * source is disabled
+ * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
+ * loops to perform the folding
+ *
+ * @return Number of memory access operations
+ */
+static unsigned int jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt)
+{
+ unsigned char *tmpval = NULL;
+ unsigned int wrap = 0;
+ __u64 i = 0;
+#define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
+#define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0
+ __u64 acc_loop_cnt =
+ jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT);
+
+ if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem)
+ return 0;
+ wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks;
+
+ /*
+ * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
+ * needed during runtime
+ */
+ if (loop_cnt)
+ acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) {
+ tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation;
+ /*
+ * memory access: just add 1 to one byte,
+ * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read
+ * from and write to memory location
+ */
+ *tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff;
+ /*
+ * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer
+ * with wrap around logic to ensure that every
+ * memory location is hit evenly
+ */
+ ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1;
+ ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap;
+ }
+ return i;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Start of entropy processing logic
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+/**
+ * Stuck test by checking the:
+ * 1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta)
+ * 2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas)
+ * 3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas)
+ *
+ * All values must always be non-zero.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @ec Reference to entropy collector
+ * @current_delta Jitter time delta
+ *
+ * @return
+ * 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit)
+ * 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit)
+ */
+static void jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta)
+{
+ __s64 delta2 = ec->last_delta - current_delta;
+ __s64 delta3 = delta2 - ec->last_delta2;
+
+ ec->last_delta = current_delta;
+ ec->last_delta2 = delta2;
+
+ if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3)
+ ec->stuck = 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and
+ * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is folded into one
+ * bit. You can call this function the "random bit generator" as it
+ * produces one random bit per invocation.
+ *
+ * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output
+ * of this function! This can be done by calling this function
+ * and not using its result.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
+ *
+ * @return One random bit
+ */
+static __u64 jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
+{
+ __u64 time = 0;
+ __u64 data = 0;
+ __u64 current_delta = 0;
+
+ /* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */
+ jent_memaccess(ec, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous
+ * invocation to measure the timing variations
+ */
+ jent_get_nstime(&time);
+ current_delta = time - ec->prev_time;
+ ec->prev_time = time;
+
+ /* Now call the next noise sources which also folds the data */
+ jent_fold_time(ec, current_delta, &data, 0);
+
+ /*
+ * Check whether we have a stuck measurement. The enforcement
+ * is performed after the stuck value has been mixed into the
+ * entropy pool.
+ */
+ jent_stuck(ec, current_delta);
+
+ return data;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Von Neuman unbias as explained in RFC 4086 section 4.2. As shown in the
+ * documentation of that RNG, the bits from jent_measure_jitter are considered
+ * independent which implies that the Von Neuman unbias operation is applicable.
+ * A proof of the Von-Neumann unbias operation to remove skews is given in the
+ * document "A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number
+ * generators", version 2.0 by Werner Schindler, section 5.4.1.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
+ *
+ * @return One random bit
+ */
+static __u64 jent_unbiased_bit(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
+{
+ do {
+ __u64 a = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector);
+ __u64 b = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector);
+
+ if (a == b)
+ continue;
+ if (1 == a)
+ return 1;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ } while (1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function (XOR)
+ * into the pool.
+ *
+ * The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and the
+ * location of the set bits in the random number generated by the entropy
+ * source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this mixer value
+ * can have 2**64 different values. That mixer value is initialized with the
+ * first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the mixer value, it is XORed into
+ * the random number.
+ *
+ * The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the XOR
+ * operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the entropy pool.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
+ */
+static void jent_stir_pool(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
+{
+ /*
+ * to shut up GCC on 32 bit, we have to initialize the 64 variable
+ * with two 32 bit variables
+ */
+ union c {
+ __u64 u64;
+ __u32 u32[2];
+ };
+ /*
+ * This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization
+ * vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
+ */
+ union c constant;
+ /*
+ * The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third
+ * and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in
+ * FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
+ */
+ union c mixer;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Store the SHA-1 constants in reverse order to make up the 64 bit
+ * value -- this applies to a little endian system, on a big endian
+ * system, it reverses as expected. But this really does not matter
+ * as we do not rely on the specific numbers. We just pick the SHA-1
+ * constants as they have a good mix of bit set and unset.
+ */
+ constant.u32[1] = 0x67452301;
+ constant.u32[0] = 0xefcdab89;
+ mixer.u32[1] = 0x98badcfe;
+ mixer.u32[0] = 0x10325476;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < DATA_SIZE_BITS; i++) {
+ /*
+ * get the i-th bit of the input random number and only XOR
+ * the constant into the mixer value when that bit is set
+ */
+ if ((entropy_collector->data >> i) & 1)
+ mixer.u64 ^= constant.u64;
+ mixer.u64 = rol64(mixer.u64, 1);
+ }
+ entropy_collector->data ^= mixer.u64;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generator of one 64 bit random number
+ * Function fills rand_data->data
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @ec Reference to entropy collector
+ */
+static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec)
+{
+ unsigned int k = 0;
+
+ /* priming of the ->prev_time value */
+ jent_measure_jitter(ec);
+
+ while (1) {
+ __u64 data = 0;
+
+ if (ec->disable_unbias == 1)
+ data = jent_measure_jitter(ec);
+ else
+ data = jent_unbiased_bit(ec);
+
+ /* enforcement of the jent_stuck test */
+ if (ec->stuck) {
+ /*
+ * We only mix in the bit considered not appropriate
+ * without the LSFR. The reason is that if we apply
+ * the LSFR and we do not rotate, the 2nd bit with LSFR
+ * will cancel out the first LSFR application on the
+ * bad bit.
+ *
+ * And we do not rotate as we apply the next bit to the
+ * current bit location again.
+ */
+ ec->data ^= data;
+ ec->stuck = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Fibonacci LSFR with polynom of
+ * x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is
+ * primitive according to
+ * http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf
+ * (the shift values are the polynom values minus one
+ * due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current
+ * position is always the LSB, the polynom only needs
+ * to shift data in from the left without wrap.
+ */
+ ec->data ^= data;
+ ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 63) & 1);
+ ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 60) & 1);
+ ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 55) & 1);
+ ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 30) & 1);
+ ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 27) & 1);
+ ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 22) & 1);
+ ec->data = rol64(ec->data, 1);
+
+ /*
+ * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the
+ * oversampling rate requested by the caller
+ */
+ if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr))
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ec->stir)
+ jent_stir_pool(ec);
+}
+
+/**
+ * The continuous test required by FIPS 140-2 -- the function automatically
+ * primes the test if needed.
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * 0 if FIPS test passed
+ * < 0 if FIPS test failed
+ */
+static void jent_fips_test(struct rand_data *ec)
+{
+ if (!fips_enabled)
+ return;
+
+ /* prime the FIPS test */
+ if (!ec->old_data) {
+ ec->old_data = ec->data;
+ jent_gen_entropy(ec);
+ }
+
+ if (ec->data == ec->old_data)
+ panic(DRIVER_NAME ": Duplicate output detected\n");
+
+ ec->old_data = ec->data;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
+ *
+ * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
+ * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
+ * creates 64 bit per invocation.
+ *
+ * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
+ * size specified by the caller.
+ *
+ * Input:
+ * @ec Reference to entropy collector
+ * @data pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already
+ * exist
+ * @len size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
+ * in bytes
+ *
+ * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error
+ *
+ * The following error codes can occur:
+ * -1 entropy_collector is NULL
+ */
+static ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, u8 *data, size_t len)
+{
+ u8 *p = data;
+
+ if (!ec)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ while (0 < len) {
+ size_t tocopy;
+
+ jent_gen_entropy(ec);
+ jent_fips_test(ec);
+ if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len)
+ tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8);
+ else
+ tocopy = len;
+ memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy);
+
+ len -= tocopy;
+ p += tocopy;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Initialization logic
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+static struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
+ unsigned int flags)
+{
+ struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
+
+ entropy_collector = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entropy_collector)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
+ /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory
+ * access
+ */
+ entropy_collector->mem = kzalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entropy_collector->mem) {
+ kfree(entropy_collector);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
+ entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
+ entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
+ }
+
+ /* verify and set the oversampling rate */
+ if (0 == osr)
+ osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
+ entropy_collector->osr = osr;
+
+ entropy_collector->stir = 1;
+ if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_STIR)
+ entropy_collector->stir = 0;
+ if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS)
+ entropy_collector->disable_unbias = 1;
+
+ /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
+ jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);
+
+ return entropy_collector;
+}
+
+static void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
+{
+ if (entropy_collector->mem)
+ kzfree(entropy_collector->mem);
+ entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
+ if (entropy_collector)
+ kzfree(entropy_collector);
+ entropy_collector = NULL;
+}
+
+static int jent_entropy_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ __u64 delta_sum = 0;
+ __u64 old_delta = 0;
+ int time_backwards = 0;
+ int count_var = 0;
+ int count_mod = 0;
+
+ /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
+ * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
+ * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce
+ * false positives.
+ *
+ * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic
+ * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But
+ * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely
+ * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus,
+ * no statistical tests.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
+ * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
+ * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
+ * timer.
+ */
+ /*
+ * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is
+ * definitely too little.
+ */
+#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 300
+#define CLEARCACHE 100
+ for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
+ __u64 time = 0;
+ __u64 time2 = 0;
+ __u64 folded = 0;
+ __u64 delta = 0;
+ unsigned int lowdelta = 0;
+
+ jent_get_nstime(&time);
+ jent_fold_time(NULL, time, &folded, 1<<MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);
+ jent_get_nstime(&time2);
+
+ /* test whether timer works */
+ if (!time || !time2)
+ return JENT_ENOTIME;
+ delta = time2 - time;
+ /*
+ * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
+ * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
+ * implies that we also have a high resolution timer
+ */
+ if (!delta)
+ return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
+
+ /*
+ * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
+ * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
+ * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
+ * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
+ * measurements.
+ */
+ if (CLEARCACHE > i)
+ continue;
+
+ /* test whether we have an increasing timer */
+ if (!(time2 > time))
+ time_backwards++;
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid modulo of 64 bit integer to allow code to compile
+ * on 32 bit architectures.
+ */
+ lowdelta = time2 - time;
+ if (!(lowdelta % 100))
+ count_mod++;
+
+ /*
+ * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
+ * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
+ * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
+ * the old_data value
+ */
+ if (i) {
+ if (delta != old_delta)
+ count_var++;
+ if (delta > old_delta)
+ delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
+ else
+ delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
+ }
+ old_delta = delta;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
+ * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
+ * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
+ * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
+ * performed during our test run.
+ */
+ if (3 < time_backwards)
+ return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
+ /* Error if the time variances are always identical */
+ if (!delta_sum)
+ return JENT_EVARVAR;
+
+ /*
+ * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
+ * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
+ * implied with 1 is preserved
+ */
+ if (delta_sum <= 1)
+ return JENT_EMINVARVAR;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
+ * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter
+ * increments in multiples of 100, but not always
+ */
+ if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
+ return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/***************************************************************************
+ * Kernel crypto API interface
+ ***************************************************************************/
+
+struct jitterentropy {
+ spinlock_t jent_lock;
+ struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
+};
+
+static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0);
+ if (!rng->entropy_collector)
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void jent_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
+ if (rng->entropy_collector)
+ jent_entropy_collector_free(rng->entropy_collector);
+ rng->entropy_collector = NULL;
+ spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
+}
+
+static int jent_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
+{
+ struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
+ ret = jent_read_entropy(rng->entropy_collector, rdata, dlen);
+ spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int jent_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct rng_alg jent_alg = {
+ .generate = jent_kcapi_random,
+ .seed = jent_kcapi_reset,
+ .seedsize = 0,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "jitterentropy_rng",
+ .cra_driver_name = "jitterentropy_rng",
+ .cra_priority = 100,
+ .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct jitterentropy),
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
+ .cra_init = jent_kcapi_init,
+ .cra_exit = jent_kcapi_cleanup,
+
+ }
+};
+
+static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ ret = jent_entropy_init();
+ if (ret) {
+ pr_info(DRIVER_NAME ": Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ return crypto_register_rng(&jent_alg);
+}
+
+static void __exit jent_mod_exit(void)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_rng(&jent_alg);
+}
+
+module_init(jent_mod_init);
+module_exit(jent_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Non-physical True Random Number Generator based on CPU Jitter");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("jitterentropy_rng");
diff --git a/crypto/krng.c b/crypto/krng.c
index 0224841b6579..40ed78e32fa5 100644
--- a/crypto/krng.c
+++ b/crypto/krng.c
@@ -16,31 +16,27 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
-static int krng_get_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
+static int krng_generate(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
+ const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
+ u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
{
get_random_bytes(rdata, dlen);
return 0;
}
-static int krng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+static int krng_seed(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
return 0;
}
-static struct crypto_alg krng_alg = {
- .cra_name = "stdrng",
- .cra_driver_name = "krng",
- .cra_priority = 200,
- .cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
- .cra_ctxsize = 0,
- .cra_type = &crypto_rng_type,
- .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .cra_u = {
- .rng = {
- .rng_make_random = krng_get_random,
- .rng_reset = krng_reset,
- .seedsize = 0,
- }
+static struct rng_alg krng_alg = {
+ .generate = krng_generate,
+ .seed = krng_seed,
+ .base = {
+ .cra_name = "stdrng",
+ .cra_driver_name = "krng",
+ .cra_priority = 200,
+ .cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
}
};
@@ -48,13 +44,12 @@ static struct crypto_alg krng_alg = {
/* Module initalization */
static int __init krng_mod_init(void)
{
- return crypto_register_alg(&krng_alg);
+ return crypto_register_rng(&krng_alg);
}
static void __exit krng_mod_fini(void)
{
- crypto_unregister_alg(&krng_alg);
- return;
+ crypto_unregister_rng(&krng_alg);
}
module_init(krng_mod_init);
diff --git a/crypto/md5.c b/crypto/md5.c
index 36f5e5b103f3..33d17e9a8702 100644
--- a/crypto/md5.c
+++ b/crypto/md5.c
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ static int md5_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
struct md5_state *mctx = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- mctx->hash[0] = 0x67452301;
- mctx->hash[1] = 0xefcdab89;
- mctx->hash[2] = 0x98badcfe;
- mctx->hash[3] = 0x10325476;
+ mctx->hash[0] = MD5_H0;
+ mctx->hash[1] = MD5_H1;
+ mctx->hash[2] = MD5_H2;
+ mctx->hash[3] = MD5_H3;
mctx->byte_count = 0;
return 0;
diff --git a/crypto/pcompress.c b/crypto/pcompress.c
index 7140fe70c7af..7a13b4088857 100644
--- a/crypto/pcompress.c
+++ b/crypto/pcompress.c
@@ -38,11 +38,6 @@ static int crypto_pcomp_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
return 0;
}
-static unsigned int crypto_pcomp_extsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
-{
- return alg->cra_ctxsize;
-}
-
static int crypto_pcomp_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
return 0;
@@ -77,7 +72,7 @@ static void crypto_pcomp_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
}
static const struct crypto_type crypto_pcomp_type = {
- .extsize = crypto_pcomp_extsize,
+ .extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
.init = crypto_pcomp_init,
.init_tfm = crypto_pcomp_init_tfm,
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
diff --git a/crypto/pcrypt.c b/crypto/pcrypt.c
index c305d4112735..ff174b61d820 100644
--- a/crypto/pcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/pcrypt.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <crypto/algapi.h>
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <linux/atomic.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -60,8 +61,8 @@ static struct padata_pcrypt pdecrypt;
static struct kset *pcrypt_kset;
struct pcrypt_instance_ctx {
- struct crypto_spawn spawn;
- unsigned int tfm_count;
+ struct crypto_aead_spawn spawn;
+ atomic_t tfm_count;
};
struct pcrypt_aead_ctx {
@@ -278,9 +279,8 @@ static int pcrypt_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
struct pcrypt_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct crypto_aead *cipher;
- ictx->tfm_count++;
-
- cpu_index = ictx->tfm_count % cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask);
+ cpu_index = (unsigned int)atomic_inc_return(&ictx->tfm_count) %
+ cpumask_weight(cpu_online_mask);
ctx->cb_cpu = cpumask_first(cpu_online_mask);
for (cpu = 0; cpu < cpu_index; cpu++)
@@ -292,9 +292,10 @@ static int pcrypt_aead_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
return PTR_ERR(cipher);
ctx->child = cipher;
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct pcrypt_request)
- + sizeof(struct aead_givcrypt_request)
- + crypto_aead_reqsize(cipher);
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct pcrypt_request) +
+ sizeof(struct aead_givcrypt_request) +
+ crypto_aead_reqsize(cipher));
return 0;
}
@@ -306,57 +307,50 @@ static void pcrypt_aead_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
}
-static struct crypto_instance *pcrypt_alloc_instance(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+static int pcrypt_init_instance(struct crypto_instance *inst,
+ struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
- struct crypto_instance *inst;
- struct pcrypt_instance_ctx *ctx;
- int err;
-
- inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!inst) {
- inst = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- goto out;
- }
-
- err = -ENAMETOOLONG;
if (snprintf(inst->alg.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME,
"pcrypt(%s)", alg->cra_driver_name) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME)
- goto out_free_inst;
+ return -ENAMETOOLONG;
memcpy(inst->alg.cra_name, alg->cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME);
- ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
- err = crypto_init_spawn(&ctx->spawn, alg, inst,
- CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK);
- if (err)
- goto out_free_inst;
-
inst->alg.cra_priority = alg->cra_priority + 100;
inst->alg.cra_blocksize = alg->cra_blocksize;
inst->alg.cra_alignmask = alg->cra_alignmask;
-out:
- return inst;
-
-out_free_inst:
- kfree(inst);
- inst = ERR_PTR(err);
- goto out;
+ return 0;
}
static struct crypto_instance *pcrypt_alloc_aead(struct rtattr **tb,
u32 type, u32 mask)
{
+ struct pcrypt_instance_ctx *ctx;
struct crypto_instance *inst;
struct crypto_alg *alg;
+ const char *name;
+ int err;
+
+ name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]);
+ if (IS_ERR(name))
+ return ERR_CAST(name);
+
+ inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!inst)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
+ crypto_set_aead_spawn(&ctx->spawn, inst);
- alg = crypto_get_attr_alg(tb, type, (mask & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK));
- if (IS_ERR(alg))
- return ERR_CAST(alg);
+ err = crypto_grab_aead(&ctx->spawn, name, 0, 0);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_free_inst;
- inst = pcrypt_alloc_instance(alg);
- if (IS_ERR(inst))
- goto out_put_alg;
+ alg = crypto_aead_spawn_alg(&ctx->spawn);
+ err = pcrypt_init_instance(inst, alg);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_drop_aead;
inst->alg.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD | CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC;
inst->alg.cra_type = &crypto_aead_type;
@@ -376,9 +370,15 @@ static struct crypto_instance *pcrypt_alloc_aead(struct rtattr **tb,
inst->alg.cra_aead.decrypt = pcrypt_aead_decrypt;
inst->alg.cra_aead.givencrypt = pcrypt_aead_givencrypt;
-out_put_alg:
- crypto_mod_put(alg);
+out:
return inst;
+
+out_drop_aead:
+ crypto_drop_aead(&ctx->spawn);
+out_free_inst:
+ kfree(inst);
+ inst = ERR_PTR(err);
+ goto out;
}
static struct crypto_instance *pcrypt_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ static void pcrypt_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
struct pcrypt_instance_ctx *ctx = crypto_instance_ctx(inst);
- crypto_drop_spawn(&ctx->spawn);
+ crypto_drop_aead(&ctx->spawn);
kfree(inst);
}
diff --git a/crypto/proc.c b/crypto/proc.c
index 4ffe73b51612..2cc10c96d753 100644
--- a/crypto/proc.c
+++ b/crypto/proc.c
@@ -20,47 +20,8 @@
#include <linux/rwsem.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
-#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include "internal.h"
-#ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS
-static struct ctl_table crypto_sysctl_table[] = {
- {
- .procname = "fips_enabled",
- .data = &fips_enabled,
- .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec
- },
- {}
-};
-
-static struct ctl_table crypto_dir_table[] = {
- {
- .procname = "crypto",
- .mode = 0555,
- .child = crypto_sysctl_table
- },
- {}
-};
-
-static struct ctl_table_header *crypto_sysctls;
-
-static void crypto_proc_fips_init(void)
-{
- crypto_sysctls = register_sysctl_table(crypto_dir_table);
-}
-
-static void crypto_proc_fips_exit(void)
-{
- if (crypto_sysctls)
- unregister_sysctl_table(crypto_sysctls);
-}
-#else
-#define crypto_proc_fips_init()
-#define crypto_proc_fips_exit()
-#endif
-
static void *c_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
{
down_read(&crypto_alg_sem);
@@ -148,11 +109,9 @@ static const struct file_operations proc_crypto_ops = {
void __init crypto_init_proc(void)
{
proc_create("crypto", 0, NULL, &proc_crypto_ops);
- crypto_proc_fips_init();
}
void __exit crypto_exit_proc(void)
{
- crypto_proc_fips_exit();
remove_proc_entry("crypto", NULL);
}
diff --git a/crypto/rng.c b/crypto/rng.c
index e0a25c2456de..13155058b193 100644
--- a/crypto/rng.c
+++ b/crypto/rng.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
* RNG operations.
*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the Free
@@ -24,12 +25,19 @@
#include <linux/cryptouser.h>
#include <net/netlink.h>
+#include "internal.h"
+
static DEFINE_MUTEX(crypto_default_rng_lock);
struct crypto_rng *crypto_default_rng;
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_default_rng);
static int crypto_default_rng_refcnt;
-static int rngapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
+static inline struct crypto_rng *__crypto_rng_cast(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return container_of(tfm, struct crypto_rng, base);
+}
+
+int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
int err;
@@ -43,21 +51,23 @@ static int rngapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
seed = buf;
}
- err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->rng_reset(tfm, seed, slen);
+ err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
- kfree(buf);
+ kzfree(buf);
return err;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_rng_reset);
-static int crypto_init_rng_ops(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, u32 type, u32 mask)
+static int crypto_rng_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
- struct rng_alg *alg = &tfm->__crt_alg->cra_rng;
- struct rng_tfm *ops = &tfm->crt_rng;
+ return 0;
+}
- ops->rng_gen_random = alg->rng_make_random;
- ops->rng_reset = rngapi_reset;
+static unsigned int seedsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
+{
+ struct rng_alg *ralg = container_of(alg, struct rng_alg, base);
- return 0;
+ return ralg->seedsize;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
@@ -67,7 +77,7 @@ static int crypto_rng_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
strncpy(rrng.type, "rng", sizeof(rrng.type));
- rrng.seedsize = alg->cra_rng.seedsize;
+ rrng.seedsize = seedsize(alg);
if (nla_put(skb, CRYPTOCFGA_REPORT_RNG,
sizeof(struct crypto_report_rng), &rrng))
@@ -89,24 +99,27 @@ static void crypto_rng_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
static void crypto_rng_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
seq_printf(m, "type : rng\n");
- seq_printf(m, "seedsize : %u\n", alg->cra_rng.seedsize);
-}
-
-static unsigned int crypto_rng_ctxsize(struct crypto_alg *alg, u32 type,
- u32 mask)
-{
- return alg->cra_ctxsize;
+ seq_printf(m, "seedsize : %u\n", seedsize(alg));
}
-const struct crypto_type crypto_rng_type = {
- .ctxsize = crypto_rng_ctxsize,
- .init = crypto_init_rng_ops,
+static const struct crypto_type crypto_rng_type = {
+ .extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
+ .init_tfm = crypto_rng_init_tfm,
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
.show = crypto_rng_show,
#endif
.report = crypto_rng_report,
+ .maskclear = ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
+ .maskset = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK,
+ .type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG,
+ .tfmsize = offsetof(struct crypto_rng, base),
};
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_rng_type);
+
+struct crypto_rng *crypto_alloc_rng(const char *alg_name, u32 type, u32 mask)
+{
+ return crypto_alloc_tfm(alg_name, &crypto_rng_type, type, mask);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_alloc_rng);
int crypto_get_default_rng(void)
{
@@ -150,5 +163,55 @@ void crypto_put_default_rng(void)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_put_default_rng);
+int crypto_register_rng(struct rng_alg *alg)
+{
+ struct crypto_alg *base = &alg->base;
+
+ if (alg->seedsize > PAGE_SIZE / 8)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ base->cra_type = &crypto_rng_type;
+ base->cra_flags &= ~CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK;
+ base->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_RNG;
+
+ return crypto_register_alg(base);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_register_rng);
+
+void crypto_unregister_rng(struct rng_alg *alg)
+{
+ crypto_unregister_alg(&alg->base);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_rng);
+
+int crypto_register_rngs(struct rng_alg *algs, int count)
+{
+ int i, ret;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+ ret = crypto_register_rng(algs + i);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+err:
+ for (--i; i >= 0; --i)
+ crypto_unregister_rng(algs + i);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_register_rngs);
+
+void crypto_unregister_rngs(struct rng_alg *algs, int count)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = count - 1; i >= 0; --i)
+ crypto_unregister_rng(algs + i);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(crypto_unregister_rngs);
+
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Random Number Generator");
diff --git a/crypto/scatterwalk.c b/crypto/scatterwalk.c
index 3bd749c7bb70..8690324d3aef 100644
--- a/crypto/scatterwalk.c
+++ b/crypto/scatterwalk.c
@@ -104,22 +104,18 @@ void scatterwalk_map_and_copy(void *buf, struct scatterlist *sg,
unsigned int start, unsigned int nbytes, int out)
{
struct scatter_walk walk;
- unsigned int offset = 0;
+ struct scatterlist tmp[2];
if (!nbytes)
return;
- for (;;) {
- scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg);
-
- if (start < offset + sg->length)
- break;
+ sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(tmp, sg, start);
- offset += sg->length;
- sg = sg_next(sg);
- }
+ if (sg_page(sg) == virt_to_page(buf) &&
+ sg->offset == offset_in_page(buf))
+ return;
- scatterwalk_advance(&walk, start - offset);
+ scatterwalk_start(&walk, sg);
scatterwalk_copychunks(buf, &walk, nbytes, out);
scatterwalk_done(&walk, out, 0);
}
@@ -146,3 +142,25 @@ int scatterwalk_bytes_sglen(struct scatterlist *sg, int num_bytes)
return n;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(scatterwalk_bytes_sglen);
+
+struct scatterlist *scatterwalk_ffwd(struct scatterlist dst[2],
+ struct scatterlist *src,
+ unsigned int len)
+{
+ for (;;) {
+ if (!len)
+ return src;
+
+ if (src->length > len)
+ break;
+
+ len -= src->length;
+ src = sg_next(src);
+ }
+
+ sg_set_page(dst, sg_page(src), src->length - len, src->offset + len);
+ scatterwalk_crypto_chain(dst, sg_next(src), 0, 2);
+
+ return dst;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(scatterwalk_ffwd);
diff --git a/crypto/seqiv.c b/crypto/seqiv.c
index b7bb9a2f4a31..127970a69ecf 100644
--- a/crypto/seqiv.c
+++ b/crypto/seqiv.c
@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@
#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
#include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/null.h>
#include <crypto/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -24,11 +26,41 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
+struct seqniv_request_ctx {
+ struct scatterlist dst[2];
+ struct aead_request subreq;
+};
+
struct seqiv_ctx {
spinlock_t lock;
u8 salt[] __attribute__ ((aligned(__alignof__(u32))));
};
+struct seqiv_aead_ctx {
+ struct crypto_aead *child;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ struct crypto_blkcipher *null;
+ u8 salt[] __attribute__ ((aligned(__alignof__(u32))));
+};
+
+static void seqiv_free(struct crypto_instance *inst);
+
+static int seqiv_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return crypto_aead_setkey(ctx->child, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int seqiv_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *tfm,
+ unsigned int authsize)
+{
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+ return crypto_aead_setauthsize(ctx->child, authsize);
+}
+
static void seqiv_complete2(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req, int err)
{
struct ablkcipher_request *subreq = skcipher_givcrypt_reqctx(req);
@@ -81,6 +113,77 @@ static void seqiv_aead_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base, int err)
aead_givcrypt_complete(req, err);
}
+static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv;
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ memcpy(req->iv, subreq->iv, crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
+
+out:
+ kzfree(subreq->iv);
+}
+
+static void seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
+ int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req = base->data;
+
+ seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static void seqniv_aead_encrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err)
+{
+ unsigned int ivsize = 8;
+ u8 data[20];
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
+ /* Swap IV and ESP header back to correct order. */
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(data, req->dst, 0, req->assoclen + ivsize, 0);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(data + ivsize, req->dst, 0, req->assoclen, 1);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(data, req->dst, req->assoclen, ivsize, 1);
+}
+
+static void seqniv_aead_encrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
+ int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req = base->data;
+
+ seqniv_aead_encrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
+static void seqniv_aead_decrypt_complete2(struct aead_request *req, int err)
+{
+ u8 data[4];
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+
+ /* Move ESP header back to correct location. */
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(data, req->dst, 16, req->assoclen - 8, 0);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(data, req->dst, 8, req->assoclen - 8, 1);
+}
+
+static void seqniv_aead_decrypt_complete(struct crypto_async_request *base,
+ int err)
+{
+ struct aead_request *req = base->data;
+
+ seqniv_aead_decrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ aead_request_complete(req, err);
+}
+
static void seqiv_geniv(struct seqiv_ctx *ctx, u8 *info, u64 seq,
unsigned int ivsize)
{
@@ -186,6 +289,228 @@ static int seqiv_aead_givencrypt(struct aead_givcrypt_request *req)
return err;
}
+static int seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct seqniv_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
+ struct scatterlist *dst;
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned int ivsize = 8;
+ u8 buf[20] __attribute__ ((aligned(__alignof__(u32))));
+ int err;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* ESP AD is at most 12 bytes (ESN). */
+ if (req->assoclen > 12)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = seqniv_aead_encrypt_complete;
+ data = req;
+
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
+ struct scatterlist srcbuf[2];
+ struct scatterlist dstbuf[2];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
+ .tfm = ctx->null,
+ };
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
+ &desc,
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(dstbuf, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(srcbuf, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst, req->dst, ivsize);
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, dst, dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+
+ memcpy(buf, req->iv, ivsize);
+ crypto_xor(buf, ctx->salt, ivsize);
+ memcpy(req->iv, buf, ivsize);
+
+ /* Swap order of IV and ESP AD for ICV generation. */
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf + ivsize, req->dst, 0, req->assoclen, 0);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->dst, 0, req->assoclen + ivsize, 1);
+
+ err = crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq);
+ seqniv_aead_encrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int seqiv_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ u8 *info;
+ unsigned int ivsize = 8;
+ int err;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+ info = req->iv;
+
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
+ struct scatterlist src[2];
+ struct scatterlist dst[2];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
+ .tfm = ctx->null,
+ };
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
+ &desc,
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(dst, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(src, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)info,
+ crypto_aead_alignmask(geniv) + 1))) {
+ info = kmalloc(ivsize, req->base.flags &
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP ? GFP_KERNEL:
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!info)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(info, req->iv, ivsize);
+ compl = seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete;
+ data = req;
+ }
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->dst, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, info);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen + ivsize);
+
+ crypto_xor(info, ctx->salt, ivsize);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(info, req->dst, req->assoclen, ivsize, 1);
+
+ err = crypto_aead_encrypt(subreq);
+ if (unlikely(info != req->iv))
+ seqiv_aead_encrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int seqiv_aead_decrypt_compat(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct seqniv_request_ctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = &rctx->subreq;
+ struct scatterlist *dst;
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned int ivsize = 8;
+ u8 buf[20];
+ int err;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize + crypto_aead_authsize(geniv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+
+ if (req->assoclen > 12)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ else if (req->assoclen > 8) {
+ compl = seqniv_aead_decrypt_complete;
+ data = req;
+ }
+
+ if (req->src != req->dst) {
+ struct scatterlist srcbuf[2];
+ struct scatterlist dstbuf[2];
+ struct blkcipher_desc desc = {
+ .tfm = ctx->null,
+ };
+
+ err = crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(
+ &desc,
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(dstbuf, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ scatterwalk_ffwd(srcbuf, req->src,
+ req->assoclen + ivsize),
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Move ESP AD forward for ICV generation. */
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->dst, 0, req->assoclen + ivsize, 0);
+ memcpy(req->iv, buf + req->assoclen, ivsize);
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(buf, req->dst, ivsize, req->assoclen, 1);
+
+ dst = scatterwalk_ffwd(rctx->dst, req->dst, ivsize);
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, dst, dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen);
+
+ err = crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+ if (req->assoclen > 8)
+ seqniv_aead_decrypt_complete2(req, err);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int seqiv_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ struct aead_request *subreq = aead_request_ctx(req);
+ crypto_completion_t compl;
+ void *data;
+ unsigned int ivsize = 8;
+
+ if (req->cryptlen < ivsize + crypto_aead_authsize(geniv))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ aead_request_set_tfm(subreq, ctx->child);
+
+ compl = req->base.complete;
+ data = req->base.data;
+
+ aead_request_set_callback(subreq, req->base.flags, compl, data);
+ aead_request_set_crypt(subreq, req->src, req->dst,
+ req->cryptlen - ivsize, req->iv);
+ aead_request_set_ad(subreq, req->assoclen + ivsize);
+
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->src, req->assoclen, ivsize, 0);
+ if (req->src != req->dst)
+ scatterwalk_map_and_copy(req->iv, req->dst,
+ req->assoclen, ivsize, 1);
+
+ return crypto_aead_decrypt(subreq);
+}
+
static int seqiv_givencrypt_first(struct skcipher_givcrypt_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *geniv = skcipher_givcrypt_reqtfm(req);
@@ -232,6 +557,52 @@ unlock:
return seqiv_aead_givencrypt(req);
}
+static int seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat_first(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+ if (geniv->encrypt != seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat_first)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ geniv->encrypt = seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat;
+ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt,
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
+
+unlock:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat(req);
+}
+
+static int seqiv_aead_encrypt_first(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+ if (geniv->encrypt != seqiv_aead_encrypt_first)
+ goto unlock;
+
+ geniv->encrypt = seqiv_aead_encrypt;
+ err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, ctx->salt,
+ crypto_aead_ivsize(geniv));
+
+unlock:
+ spin_unlock_bh(&ctx->lock);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ return seqiv_aead_encrypt(req);
+}
+
static int seqiv_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_ablkcipher *geniv = __crypto_ablkcipher_cast(tfm);
@@ -244,34 +615,81 @@ static int seqiv_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
return skcipher_geniv_init(tfm);
}
-static int seqiv_aead_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+static int seqiv_old_aead_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_aead *geniv = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
struct seqiv_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
- tfm->crt_aead.reqsize = sizeof(struct aead_request);
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(__crypto_aead_cast(tfm),
+ sizeof(struct aead_request));
return aead_geniv_init(tfm);
}
-static struct crypto_template seqiv_tmpl;
+static int seqiv_aead_init_common(struct crypto_tfm *tfm, unsigned int reqsize)
+{
+ struct crypto_aead *geniv = __crypto_aead_cast(tfm);
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(geniv);
+ int err;
+
+ spin_lock_init(&ctx->lock);
+
+ crypto_aead_set_reqsize(geniv, sizeof(struct aead_request));
+
+ ctx->null = crypto_get_default_null_skcipher();
+ err = PTR_ERR(ctx->null);
+ if (IS_ERR(ctx->null))
+ goto out;
+
+ err = aead_geniv_init(tfm);
+ if (err)
+ goto drop_null;
+
+ ctx->child = geniv->child;
+ geniv->child = geniv;
+
+out:
+ return err;
-static struct crypto_instance *seqiv_ablkcipher_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
+drop_null:
+ crypto_put_default_null_skcipher();
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int seqiv_aead_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return seqiv_aead_init_common(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_request));
+}
+
+static int seqniv_aead_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ return seqiv_aead_init_common(tfm, sizeof(struct seqniv_request_ctx));
+}
+
+static void seqiv_aead_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+ struct seqiv_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+ crypto_free_aead(ctx->child);
+ crypto_put_default_null_skcipher();
+}
+
+static int seqiv_ablkcipher_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_instance *inst;
+ int err;
- inst = skcipher_geniv_alloc(&seqiv_tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
+ inst = skcipher_geniv_alloc(tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
- goto out;
+ return PTR_ERR(inst);
- if (inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.ivsize < sizeof(u64)) {
- skcipher_geniv_free(inst);
- inst = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- goto out;
- }
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.ivsize < sizeof(u64))
+ goto free_inst;
inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.givencrypt = seqiv_givencrypt_first;
@@ -279,65 +697,174 @@ static struct crypto_instance *seqiv_ablkcipher_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
inst->alg.cra_exit = skcipher_geniv_exit;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.cra_ablkcipher.ivsize;
+ inst->alg.cra_ctxsize += sizeof(struct seqiv_ctx);
+
+ inst->alg.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
+
+ err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_inst;
out:
- return inst;
+ return err;
+
+free_inst:
+ skcipher_geniv_free(inst);
+ goto out;
}
-static struct crypto_instance *seqiv_aead_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
+static int seqiv_old_aead_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl,
+ struct aead_instance *aead)
{
- struct crypto_instance *inst;
-
- inst = aead_geniv_alloc(&seqiv_tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
-
- if (IS_ERR(inst))
- goto out;
+ struct crypto_instance *inst = aead_crypto_instance(aead);
+ int err = -EINVAL;
- if (inst->alg.cra_aead.ivsize < sizeof(u64)) {
- aead_geniv_free(inst);
- inst = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- goto out;
- }
+ if (inst->alg.cra_aead.ivsize < sizeof(u64))
+ goto free_inst;
inst->alg.cra_aead.givencrypt = seqiv_aead_givencrypt_first;
- inst->alg.cra_init = seqiv_aead_init;
+ inst->alg.cra_init = seqiv_old_aead_init;
inst->alg.cra_exit = aead_geniv_exit;
inst->alg.cra_ctxsize = inst->alg.cra_aead.ivsize;
+ inst->alg.cra_ctxsize += sizeof(struct seqiv_ctx);
+
+ err = crypto_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_inst;
out:
- return inst;
+ return err;
+
+free_inst:
+ aead_geniv_free(aead);
+ goto out;
}
-static struct crypto_instance *seqiv_alloc(struct rtattr **tb)
+static int seqiv_aead_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ struct aead_instance *inst;
+ struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn;
+ struct aead_alg *alg;
+ int err;
+
+ inst = aead_geniv_alloc(tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
+
+ if (IS_ERR(inst))
+ return PTR_ERR(inst);
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
+
+ if (inst->alg.base.cra_aead.encrypt)
+ return seqiv_old_aead_create(tmpl, inst);
+
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (inst->alg.ivsize != sizeof(u64))
+ goto free_inst;
+
+ spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+ alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(spawn);
+
+ inst->alg.setkey = seqiv_aead_setkey;
+ inst->alg.setauthsize = seqiv_aead_setauthsize;
+ inst->alg.encrypt = seqiv_aead_encrypt_first;
+ inst->alg.decrypt = seqiv_aead_decrypt;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_init = seqiv_aead_init;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_exit = seqiv_aead_exit;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct seqiv_aead_ctx);
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.base.cra_aead.ivsize;
+
+ if (alg->base.cra_aead.encrypt) {
+ inst->alg.encrypt = seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat_first;
+ inst->alg.decrypt = seqiv_aead_decrypt_compat;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_init = seqniv_aead_init;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_exit = seqiv_aead_exit;
+ }
+
+ err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_inst;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+
+free_inst:
+ aead_geniv_free(inst);
+ goto out;
+}
+
+static int seqiv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
{
struct crypto_attr_type *algt;
- struct crypto_instance *inst;
int err;
algt = crypto_get_attr_type(tb);
if (IS_ERR(algt))
- return ERR_CAST(algt);
+ return PTR_ERR(algt);
err = crypto_get_default_rng();
if (err)
- return ERR_PTR(err);
+ return err;
if ((algt->type ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK)
- inst = seqiv_ablkcipher_alloc(tb);
+ err = seqiv_ablkcipher_create(tmpl, tb);
else
- inst = seqiv_aead_alloc(tb);
+ err = seqiv_aead_create(tmpl, tb);
+
+ if (err)
+ crypto_put_default_rng();
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int seqniv_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb)
+{
+ struct aead_instance *inst;
+ struct crypto_aead_spawn *spawn;
+ struct aead_alg *alg;
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_get_default_rng();
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ inst = aead_geniv_alloc(tmpl, tb, 0, 0);
+ err = PTR_ERR(inst);
if (IS_ERR(inst))
goto put_rng;
- inst->alg.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
- inst->alg.cra_ctxsize += sizeof(struct seqiv_ctx);
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ if (inst->alg.ivsize != sizeof(u64))
+ goto free_inst;
+
+ spawn = aead_instance_ctx(inst);
+ alg = crypto_spawn_aead_alg(spawn);
+
+ inst->alg.setkey = seqiv_aead_setkey;
+ inst->alg.setauthsize = seqiv_aead_setauthsize;
+ inst->alg.encrypt = seqiv_aead_encrypt_compat_first;
+ inst->alg.decrypt = seqiv_aead_decrypt_compat;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_init = seqniv_aead_init;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_exit = seqiv_aead_exit;
+
+ inst->alg.base.cra_alignmask |= __alignof__(u32) - 1;
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct seqiv_aead_ctx);
+ inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize += inst->alg.base.cra_aead.ivsize;
+
+ err = aead_register_instance(tmpl, inst);
+ if (err)
+ goto free_inst;
out:
- return inst;
+ return err;
+free_inst:
+ aead_geniv_free(inst);
put_rng:
crypto_put_default_rng();
goto out;
@@ -348,20 +875,42 @@ static void seqiv_free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
if ((inst->alg.cra_flags ^ CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD) & CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_MASK)
skcipher_geniv_free(inst);
else
- aead_geniv_free(inst);
+ aead_geniv_free(aead_instance(inst));
crypto_put_default_rng();
}
static struct crypto_template seqiv_tmpl = {
.name = "seqiv",
- .alloc = seqiv_alloc,
+ .create = seqiv_create,
+ .free = seqiv_free,
+ .module = THIS_MODULE,
+};
+
+static struct crypto_template seqniv_tmpl = {
+ .name = "seqniv",
+ .create = seqniv_create,
.free = seqiv_free,
.module = THIS_MODULE,
};
static int __init seqiv_module_init(void)
{
- return crypto_register_template(&seqiv_tmpl);
+ int err;
+
+ err = crypto_register_template(&seqiv_tmpl);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ err = crypto_register_template(&seqniv_tmpl);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_undo_niv;
+
+out:
+ return err;
+
+out_undo_niv:
+ crypto_unregister_template(&seqiv_tmpl);
+ goto out;
}
static void __exit seqiv_module_exit(void)
@@ -375,3 +924,4 @@ module_exit(seqiv_module_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Sequence Number IV Generator");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("seqiv");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("seqniv");
diff --git a/crypto/shash.c b/crypto/shash.c
index 47c713954bf3..ecb1e3d39bf0 100644
--- a/crypto/shash.c
+++ b/crypto/shash.c
@@ -520,11 +520,6 @@ static int crypto_shash_init_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
return 0;
}
-static unsigned int crypto_shash_extsize(struct crypto_alg *alg)
-{
- return alg->cra_ctxsize;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NET
static int crypto_shash_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
@@ -564,7 +559,7 @@ static void crypto_shash_show(struct seq_file *m, struct crypto_alg *alg)
static const struct crypto_type crypto_shash_type = {
.ctxsize = crypto_shash_ctxsize,
- .extsize = crypto_shash_extsize,
+ .extsize = crypto_alg_extsize,
.init = crypto_init_shash_ops,
.init_tfm = crypto_shash_init_tfm,
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
diff --git a/crypto/tcrypt.c b/crypto/tcrypt.c
index 1a2800107fc8..2bff6130d806 100644
--- a/crypto/tcrypt.c
+++ b/crypto/tcrypt.c
@@ -22,8 +22,10 @@
*
*/
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/gfp.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
@@ -34,7 +36,6 @@
#include <linux/timex.h>
#include <linux/interrupt.h>
#include "tcrypt.h"
-#include "internal.h"
/*
* Need slab memory for testing (size in number of pages).
@@ -808,7 +809,7 @@ static int test_ahash_jiffies(struct ahash_request *req, int blen,
for (start = jiffies, end = start + secs * HZ, bcount = 0;
time_before(jiffies, end); bcount++) {
- ret = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+ ret = do_one_ahash_op(req, crypto_ahash_init(req));
if (ret)
return ret;
for (pcount = 0; pcount < blen; pcount += plen) {
@@ -877,7 +878,7 @@ static int test_ahash_cycles(struct ahash_request *req, int blen,
/* Warm-up run. */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
- ret = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+ ret = do_one_ahash_op(req, crypto_ahash_init(req));
if (ret)
goto out;
for (pcount = 0; pcount < blen; pcount += plen) {
@@ -896,7 +897,7 @@ static int test_ahash_cycles(struct ahash_request *req, int blen,
start = get_cycles();
- ret = crypto_ahash_init(req);
+ ret = do_one_ahash_op(req, crypto_ahash_init(req));
if (ret)
goto out;
for (pcount = 0; pcount < blen; pcount += plen) {
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.c b/crypto/testmgr.c
index f9bce3d7ee7f..277b3ac0ca1a 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.c
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.c
@@ -20,8 +20,10 @@
*
*/
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
#include <crypto/hash.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
@@ -2318,6 +2320,15 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
.alg = "compress_null",
.test = alg_test_null,
}, {
+ .alg = "crc32",
+ .test = alg_test_hash,
+ .suite = {
+ .hash = {
+ .vecs = crc32_tv_template,
+ .count = CRC32_TEST_VECTORS
+ }
+ }
+ }, {
.alg = "crc32c",
.test = alg_test_crc32c,
.fips_allowed = 1,
@@ -3095,6 +3106,10 @@ static const struct alg_test_desc alg_test_descs[] = {
}
}
}, {
+ .alg = "jitterentropy_rng",
+ .fips_allowed = 1,
+ .test = alg_test_null,
+ }, {
.alg = "lrw(aes)",
.test = alg_test_skcipher,
.suite = {
diff --git a/crypto/testmgr.h b/crypto/testmgr.h
index 62e2485bb428..60031439f8d3 100644
--- a/crypto/testmgr.h
+++ b/crypto/testmgr.h
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ struct cipher_testvec {
unsigned short tap[MAX_TAP];
int np;
unsigned char also_non_np;
- unsigned char fail;
+ bool fail;
unsigned char wk; /* weak key flag */
unsigned char klen;
unsigned short ilen;
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ struct aead_testvec {
unsigned char atap[MAX_TAP];
int np;
int anp;
- unsigned char fail;
+ bool fail;
unsigned char novrfy; /* ccm dec verification failure expected */
unsigned char wk; /* weak key flag */
unsigned char klen;
@@ -1822,7 +1822,7 @@ static struct hash_testvec tgr128_tv_template[] = {
},
};
-#define GHASH_TEST_VECTORS 5
+#define GHASH_TEST_VECTORS 6
static struct hash_testvec ghash_tv_template[] =
{
@@ -1875,6 +1875,63 @@ static struct hash_testvec ghash_tv_template[] =
.psize = 20,
.digest = "\xf8\x94\x87\x2a\x4b\x63\x99\x28"
"\x23\xf7\x93\xf7\x19\xf5\x96\xd9",
+ }, {
+ .key = "\x0a\x1b\x2c\x3d\x4e\x5f\x64\x71"
+ "\x82\x93\xa4\xb5\xc6\xd7\xe8\xf9",
+ .ksize = 16,
+ .plaintext = "\x56\x6f\x72\x20\x6c\x61\x75\x74"
+ "\x65\x72\x20\x4c\x61\x75\x73\x63"
+ "\x68\x65\x6e\x20\x75\x6e\x64\x20"
+ "\x53\x74\x61\x75\x6e\x65\x6e\x20"
+ "\x73\x65\x69\x20\x73\x74\x69\x6c"
+ "\x6c\x2c\x0a\x64\x75\x20\x6d\x65"
+ "\x69\x6e\x20\x74\x69\x65\x66\x74"
+ "\x69\x65\x66\x65\x73\x20\x4c\x65"
+ "\x62\x65\x6e\x3b\x0a\x64\x61\x73"
+ "\x73\x20\x64\x75\x20\x77\x65\x69"
+ "\xc3\x9f\x74\x20\x77\x61\x73\x20"
+ "\x64\x65\x72\x20\x57\x69\x6e\x64"
+ "\x20\x64\x69\x72\x20\x77\x69\x6c"
+ "\x6c\x2c\x0a\x65\x68\x20\x6e\x6f"
+ "\x63\x68\x20\x64\x69\x65\x20\x42"
+ "\x69\x72\x6b\x65\x6e\x20\x62\x65"
+ "\x62\x65\x6e\x2e\x0a\x0a\x55\x6e"
+ "\x64\x20\x77\x65\x6e\x6e\x20\x64"
+ "\x69\x72\x20\x65\x69\x6e\x6d\x61"
+ "\x6c\x20\x64\x61\x73\x20\x53\x63"
+ "\x68\x77\x65\x69\x67\x65\x6e\x20"
+ "\x73\x70\x72\x61\x63\x68\x2c\x0a"
+ "\x6c\x61\x73\x73\x20\x64\x65\x69"
+ "\x6e\x65\x20\x53\x69\x6e\x6e\x65"
+ "\x20\x62\x65\x73\x69\x65\x67\x65"
+ "\x6e\x2e\x0a\x4a\x65\x64\x65\x6d"
+ "\x20\x48\x61\x75\x63\x68\x65\x20"
+ "\x67\x69\x62\x74\x20\x64\x69\x63"
+ "\x68\x2c\x20\x67\x69\x62\x20\x6e"
+ "\x61\x63\x68\x2c\x0a\x65\x72\x20"
+ "\x77\x69\x72\x64\x20\x64\x69\x63"
+ "\x68\x20\x6c\x69\x65\x62\x65\x6e"
+ "\x20\x75\x6e\x64\x20\x77\x69\x65"
+ "\x67\x65\x6e\x2e\x0a\x0a\x55\x6e"
+ "\x64\x20\x64\x61\x6e\x6e\x20\x6d"
+ "\x65\x69\x6e\x65\x20\x53\x65\x65"
+ "\x6c\x65\x20\x73\x65\x69\x74\x20"
+ "\x77\x65\x69\x74\x2c\x20\x73\x65"
+ "\x69\x20\x77\x65\x69\x74\x2c\x0a"
+ "\x64\x61\x73\x73\x20\x64\x69\x72"
+ "\x20\x64\x61\x73\x20\x4c\x65\x62"
+ "\x65\x6e\x20\x67\x65\x6c\x69\x6e"
+ "\x67\x65\x2c\x0a\x62\x72\x65\x69"
+ "\x74\x65\x20\x64\x69\x63\x68\x20"
+ "\x77\x69\x65\x20\x65\x69\x6e\x20"
+ "\x46\x65\x69\x65\x72\x6b\x6c\x65"
+ "\x69\x64\x0a\xc3\xbc\x62\x65\x72"
+ "\x20\x64\x69\x65\x20\x73\x69\x6e"
+ "\x6e\x65\x6e\x64\x65\x6e\x20\x44"
+ "\x69\x6e\x67\x65\x2e\x2e\x2e\x0a",
+ .psize = 400,
+ .digest = "\xad\xb1\xc1\xe9\x56\x70\x31\x1d"
+ "\xbb\x5b\xdf\x5e\x70\x72\x1a\x57",
},
};
@@ -3018,7 +3075,7 @@ static struct cipher_testvec des_enc_tv_template[] = {
"\xb4\x99\x26\xf7\x1f\xe1\xd4\x90",
.rlen = 24,
}, { /* Weak key */
- .fail = 1,
+ .fail = true,
.wk = 1,
.key = "\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01\x01",
.klen = 8,
@@ -28591,7 +28648,7 @@ struct comp_testvec {
};
struct pcomp_testvec {
- void *params;
+ const void *params;
unsigned int paramsize;
int inlen, outlen;
char input[COMP_BUF_SIZE];
@@ -28946,6 +29003,440 @@ static struct hash_testvec michael_mic_tv_template[] = {
};
/*
+ * CRC32 test vectors
+ */
+#define CRC32_TEST_VECTORS 14
+
+static struct hash_testvec crc32_tv_template[] = {
+ {
+ .key = "\x87\xa9\xcb\xed",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .psize = 0,
+ .digest = "\x87\xa9\xcb\xed",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+ "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10"
+ "\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18"
+ "\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20"
+ "\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x3a\xdf\x4b\xb0",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30"
+ "\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38"
+ "\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40"
+ "\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48"
+ "\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\xa9\x7a\x7f\x7b",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58"
+ "\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60"
+ "\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68"
+ "\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f\x70"
+ "\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\xba\xd3\xf8\x1c",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80"
+ "\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88"
+ "\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90"
+ "\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98"
+ "\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\xa8\xa9\xc2\x02",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8"
+ "\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf\xb0"
+ "\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8"
+ "\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf\xc0"
+ "\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x27\xf0\x57\xe2",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0"
+ "\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8"
+ "\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0"
+ "\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8"
+ "\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x49\x78\x10\x08",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\x80\xea\xd3\xf1",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30"
+ "\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38"
+ "\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40"
+ "\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48"
+ "\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x9a\xb1\xdc\xf0",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xf3\x4a\x1d\x5d",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58"
+ "\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60"
+ "\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68"
+ "\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f\x70"
+ "\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\xb4\x97\xcc\xd4",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\x2e\x80\x04\x59",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80"
+ "\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88"
+ "\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90"
+ "\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98"
+ "\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x67\x9b\xfa\x79",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xa6\xcc\x19\x85",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8"
+ "\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf\xb0"
+ "\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8"
+ "\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf\xc0"
+ "\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x24\xb5\x16\xef",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\x41\xfc\xfe\x2d",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0"
+ "\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8"
+ "\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0"
+ "\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8"
+ "\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0",
+ .psize = 40,
+ .digest = "\x15\x94\x80\x39",
+ },
+ {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+ "\x09\x0a\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10"
+ "\x11\x12\x13\x14\x15\x16\x17\x18"
+ "\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x20"
+ "\x21\x22\x23\x24\x25\x26\x27\x28"
+ "\x29\x2a\x2b\x2c\x2d\x2e\x2f\x30"
+ "\x31\x32\x33\x34\x35\x36\x37\x38"
+ "\x39\x3a\x3b\x3c\x3d\x3e\x3f\x40"
+ "\x41\x42\x43\x44\x45\x46\x47\x48"
+ "\x49\x4a\x4b\x4c\x4d\x4e\x4f\x50"
+ "\x51\x52\x53\x54\x55\x56\x57\x58"
+ "\x59\x5a\x5b\x5c\x5d\x5e\x5f\x60"
+ "\x61\x62\x63\x64\x65\x66\x67\x68"
+ "\x69\x6a\x6b\x6c\x6d\x6e\x6f\x70"
+ "\x71\x72\x73\x74\x75\x76\x77\x78"
+ "\x79\x7a\x7b\x7c\x7d\x7e\x7f\x80"
+ "\x81\x82\x83\x84\x85\x86\x87\x88"
+ "\x89\x8a\x8b\x8c\x8d\x8e\x8f\x90"
+ "\x91\x92\x93\x94\x95\x96\x97\x98"
+ "\x99\x9a\x9b\x9c\x9d\x9e\x9f\xa0"
+ "\xa1\xa2\xa3\xa4\xa5\xa6\xa7\xa8"
+ "\xa9\xaa\xab\xac\xad\xae\xaf\xb0"
+ "\xb1\xb2\xb3\xb4\xb5\xb6\xb7\xb8"
+ "\xb9\xba\xbb\xbc\xbd\xbe\xbf\xc0"
+ "\xc1\xc2\xc3\xc4\xc5\xc6\xc7\xc8"
+ "\xc9\xca\xcb\xcc\xcd\xce\xcf\xd0"
+ "\xd1\xd2\xd3\xd4\xd5\xd6\xd7\xd8"
+ "\xd9\xda\xdb\xdc\xdd\xde\xdf\xe0"
+ "\xe1\xe2\xe3\xe4\xe5\xe6\xe7\xe8"
+ "\xe9\xea\xeb\xec\xed\xee\xef\xf0",
+ .psize = 240,
+ .digest = "\x6c\xc6\x56\xde",
+ .np = 2,
+ .tap = { 31, 209 }
+ }, {
+ .key = "\xff\xff\xff\xff",
+ .ksize = 4,
+ .plaintext = "\x6e\x05\x79\x10\xa7\x1b\xb2\x49"
+ "\xe0\x54\xeb\x82\x19\x8d\x24\xbb"
+ "\x2f\xc6\x5d\xf4\x68\xff\x96\x0a"
+ "\xa1\x38\xcf\x43\xda\x71\x08\x7c"
+ "\x13\xaa\x1e\xb5\x4c\xe3\x57\xee"
+ "\x85\x1c\x90\x27\xbe\x32\xc9\x60"
+ "\xf7\x6b\x02\x99\x0d\xa4\x3b\xd2"
+ "\x46\xdd\x74\x0b\x7f\x16\xad\x21"
+ "\xb8\x4f\xe6\x5a\xf1\x88\x1f\x93"
+ "\x2a\xc1\x35\xcc\x63\xfa\x6e\x05"
+ "\x9c\x10\xa7\x3e\xd5\x49\xe0\x77"
+ "\x0e\x82\x19\xb0\x24\xbb\x52\xe9"
+ "\x5d\xf4\x8b\x22\x96\x2d\xc4\x38"
+ "\xcf\x66\xfd\x71\x08\x9f\x13\xaa"
+ "\x41\xd8\x4c\xe3\x7a\x11\x85\x1c"
+ "\xb3\x27\xbe\x55\xec\x60\xf7\x8e"
+ "\x02\x99\x30\xc7\x3b\xd2\x69\x00"
+ "\x74\x0b\xa2\x16\xad\x44\xdb\x4f"
+ "\xe6\x7d\x14\x88\x1f\xb6\x2a\xc1"
+ "\x58\xef\x63\xfa\x91\x05\x9c\x33"
+ "\xca\x3e\xd5\x6c\x03\x77\x0e\xa5"
+ "\x19\xb0\x47\xde\x52\xe9\x80\x17"
+ "\x8b\x22\xb9\x2d\xc4\x5b\xf2\x66"
+ "\xfd\x94\x08\x9f\x36\xcd\x41\xd8"
+ "\x6f\x06\x7a\x11\xa8\x1c\xb3\x4a"
+ "\xe1\x55\xec\x83\x1a\x8e\x25\xbc"
+ "\x30\xc7\x5e\xf5\x69\x00\x97\x0b"
+ "\xa2\x39\xd0\x44\xdb\x72\x09\x7d"
+ "\x14\xab\x1f\xb6\x4d\xe4\x58\xef"
+ "\x86\x1d\x91\x28\xbf\x33\xca\x61"
+ "\xf8\x6c\x03\x9a\x0e\xa5\x3c\xd3"
+ "\x47\xde\x75\x0c\x80\x17\xae\x22"
+ "\xb9\x50\xe7\x5b\xf2\x89\x20\x94"
+ "\x2b\xc2\x36\xcd\x64\xfb\x6f\x06"
+ "\x9d\x11\xa8\x3f\xd6\x4a\xe1\x78"
+ "\x0f\x83\x1a\xb1\x25\xbc\x53\xea"
+ "\x5e\xf5\x8c\x00\x97\x2e\xc5\x39"
+ "\xd0\x67\xfe\x72\x09\xa0\x14\xab"
+ "\x42\xd9\x4d\xe4\x7b\x12\x86\x1d"
+ "\xb4\x28\xbf\x56\xed\x61\xf8\x8f"
+ "\x03\x9a\x31\xc8\x3c\xd3\x6a\x01"
+ "\x75\x0c\xa3\x17\xae\x45\xdc\x50"
+ "\xe7\x7e\x15\x89\x20\xb7\x2b\xc2"
+ "\x59\xf0\x64\xfb\x92\x06\x9d\x34"
+ "\xcb\x3f\xd6\x6d\x04\x78\x0f\xa6"
+ "\x1a\xb1\x48\xdf\x53\xea\x81\x18"
+ "\x8c\x23\xba\x2e\xc5\x5c\xf3\x67"
+ "\xfe\x95\x09\xa0\x37\xce\x42\xd9"
+ "\x70\x07\x7b\x12\xa9\x1d\xb4\x4b"
+ "\xe2\x56\xed\x84\x1b\x8f\x26\xbd"
+ "\x31\xc8\x5f\xf6\x6a\x01\x98\x0c"
+ "\xa3\x3a\xd1\x45\xdc\x73\x0a\x7e"
+ "\x15\xac\x20\xb7\x4e\xe5\x59\xf0"
+ "\x87\x1e\x92\x29\xc0\x34\xcb\x62"
+ "\xf9\x6d\x04\x9b\x0f\xa6\x3d\xd4"
+ "\x48\xdf\x76\x0d\x81\x18\xaf\x23"
+ "\xba\x51\xe8\x5c\xf3\x8a\x21\x95"
+ "\x2c\xc3\x37\xce\x65\xfc\x70\x07"
+ "\x9e\x12\xa9\x40\xd7\x4b\xe2\x79"
+ "\x10\x84\x1b\xb2\x26\xbd\x54\xeb"
+ "\x5f\xf6\x8d\x01\x98\x2f\xc6\x3a"
+ "\xd1\x68\xff\x73\x0a\xa1\x15\xac"
+ "\x43\xda\x4e\xe5\x7c\x13\x87\x1e"
+ "\xb5\x29\xc0\x57\xee\x62\xf9\x90"
+ "\x04\x9b\x32\xc9\x3d\xd4\x6b\x02"
+ "\x76\x0d\xa4\x18\xaf\x46\xdd\x51"
+ "\xe8\x7f\x16\x8a\x21\xb8\x2c\xc3"
+ "\x5a\xf1\x65\xfc\x93\x07\x9e\x35"
+ "\xcc\x40\xd7\x6e\x05\x79\x10\xa7"
+ "\x1b\xb2\x49\xe0\x54\xeb\x82\x19"
+ "\x8d\x24\xbb\x2f\xc6\x5d\xf4\x68"
+ "\xff\x96\x0a\xa1\x38\xcf\x43\xda"
+ "\x71\x08\x7c\x13\xaa\x1e\xb5\x4c"
+ "\xe3\x57\xee\x85\x1c\x90\x27\xbe"
+ "\x32\xc9\x60\xf7\x6b\x02\x99\x0d"
+ "\xa4\x3b\xd2\x46\xdd\x74\x0b\x7f"
+ "\x16\xad\x21\xb8\x4f\xe6\x5a\xf1"
+ "\x88\x1f\x93\x2a\xc1\x35\xcc\x63"
+ "\xfa\x6e\x05\x9c\x10\xa7\x3e\xd5"
+ "\x49\xe0\x77\x0e\x82\x19\xb0\x24"
+ "\xbb\x52\xe9\x5d\xf4\x8b\x22\x96"
+ "\x2d\xc4\x38\xcf\x66\xfd\x71\x08"
+ "\x9f\x13\xaa\x41\xd8\x4c\xe3\x7a"
+ "\x11\x85\x1c\xb3\x27\xbe\x55\xec"
+ "\x60\xf7\x8e\x02\x99\x30\xc7\x3b"
+ "\xd2\x69\x00\x74\x0b\xa2\x16\xad"
+ "\x44\xdb\x4f\xe6\x7d\x14\x88\x1f"
+ "\xb6\x2a\xc1\x58\xef\x63\xfa\x91"
+ "\x05\x9c\x33\xca\x3e\xd5\x6c\x03"
+ "\x77\x0e\xa5\x19\xb0\x47\xde\x52"
+ "\xe9\x80\x17\x8b\x22\xb9\x2d\xc4"
+ "\x5b\xf2\x66\xfd\x94\x08\x9f\x36"
+ "\xcd\x41\xd8\x6f\x06\x7a\x11\xa8"
+ "\x1c\xb3\x4a\xe1\x55\xec\x83\x1a"
+ "\x8e\x25\xbc\x30\xc7\x5e\xf5\x69"
+ "\x00\x97\x0b\xa2\x39\xd0\x44\xdb"
+ "\x72\x09\x7d\x14\xab\x1f\xb6\x4d"
+ "\xe4\x58\xef\x86\x1d\x91\x28\xbf"
+ "\x33\xca\x61\xf8\x6c\x03\x9a\x0e"
+ "\xa5\x3c\xd3\x47\xde\x75\x0c\x80"
+ "\x17\xae\x22\xb9\x50\xe7\x5b\xf2"
+ "\x89\x20\x94\x2b\xc2\x36\xcd\x64"
+ "\xfb\x6f\x06\x9d\x11\xa8\x3f\xd6"
+ "\x4a\xe1\x78\x0f\x83\x1a\xb1\x25"
+ "\xbc\x53\xea\x5e\xf5\x8c\x00\x97"
+ "\x2e\xc5\x39\xd0\x67\xfe\x72\x09"
+ "\xa0\x14\xab\x42\xd9\x4d\xe4\x7b"
+ "\x12\x86\x1d\xb4\x28\xbf\x56\xed"
+ "\x61\xf8\x8f\x03\x9a\x31\xc8\x3c"
+ "\xd3\x6a\x01\x75\x0c\xa3\x17\xae"
+ "\x45\xdc\x50\xe7\x7e\x15\x89\x20"
+ "\xb7\x2b\xc2\x59\xf0\x64\xfb\x92"
+ "\x06\x9d\x34\xcb\x3f\xd6\x6d\x04"
+ "\x78\x0f\xa6\x1a\xb1\x48\xdf\x53"
+ "\xea\x81\x18\x8c\x23\xba\x2e\xc5"
+ "\x5c\xf3\x67\xfe\x95\x09\xa0\x37"
+ "\xce\x42\xd9\x70\x07\x7b\x12\xa9"
+ "\x1d\xb4\x4b\xe2\x56\xed\x84\x1b"
+ "\x8f\x26\xbd\x31\xc8\x5f\xf6\x6a"
+ "\x01\x98\x0c\xa3\x3a\xd1\x45\xdc"
+ "\x73\x0a\x7e\x15\xac\x20\xb7\x4e"
+ "\xe5\x59\xf0\x87\x1e\x92\x29\xc0"
+ "\x34\xcb\x62\xf9\x6d\x04\x9b\x0f"
+ "\xa6\x3d\xd4\x48\xdf\x76\x0d\x81"
+ "\x18\xaf\x23\xba\x51\xe8\x5c\xf3"
+ "\x8a\x21\x95\x2c\xc3\x37\xce\x65"
+ "\xfc\x70\x07\x9e\x12\xa9\x40\xd7"
+ "\x4b\xe2\x79\x10\x84\x1b\xb2\x26"
+ "\xbd\x54\xeb\x5f\xf6\x8d\x01\x98"
+ "\x2f\xc6\x3a\xd1\x68\xff\x73\x0a"
+ "\xa1\x15\xac\x43\xda\x4e\xe5\x7c"
+ "\x13\x87\x1e\xb5\x29\xc0\x57\xee"
+ "\x62\xf9\x90\x04\x9b\x32\xc9\x3d"
+ "\xd4\x6b\x02\x76\x0d\xa4\x18\xaf"
+ "\x46\xdd\x51\xe8\x7f\x16\x8a\x21"
+ "\xb8\x2c\xc3\x5a\xf1\x65\xfc\x93"
+ "\x07\x9e\x35\xcc\x40\xd7\x6e\x05"
+ "\x79\x10\xa7\x1b\xb2\x49\xe0\x54"
+ "\xeb\x82\x19\x8d\x24\xbb\x2f\xc6"
+ "\x5d\xf4\x68\xff\x96\x0a\xa1\x38"
+ "\xcf\x43\xda\x71\x08\x7c\x13\xaa"
+ "\x1e\xb5\x4c\xe3\x57\xee\x85\x1c"
+ "\x90\x27\xbe\x32\xc9\x60\xf7\x6b"
+ "\x02\x99\x0d\xa4\x3b\xd2\x46\xdd"
+ "\x74\x0b\x7f\x16\xad\x21\xb8\x4f"
+ "\xe6\x5a\xf1\x88\x1f\x93\x2a\xc1"
+ "\x35\xcc\x63\xfa\x6e\x05\x9c\x10"
+ "\xa7\x3e\xd5\x49\xe0\x77\x0e\x82"
+ "\x19\xb0\x24\xbb\x52\xe9\x5d\xf4"
+ "\x8b\x22\x96\x2d\xc4\x38\xcf\x66"
+ "\xfd\x71\x08\x9f\x13\xaa\x41\xd8"
+ "\x4c\xe3\x7a\x11\x85\x1c\xb3\x27"
+ "\xbe\x55\xec\x60\xf7\x8e\x02\x99"
+ "\x30\xc7\x3b\xd2\x69\x00\x74\x0b"
+ "\xa2\x16\xad\x44\xdb\x4f\xe6\x7d"
+ "\x14\x88\x1f\xb6\x2a\xc1\x58\xef"
+ "\x63\xfa\x91\x05\x9c\x33\xca\x3e"
+ "\xd5\x6c\x03\x77\x0e\xa5\x19\xb0"
+ "\x47\xde\x52\xe9\x80\x17\x8b\x22"
+ "\xb9\x2d\xc4\x5b\xf2\x66\xfd\x94"
+ "\x08\x9f\x36\xcd\x41\xd8\x6f\x06"
+ "\x7a\x11\xa8\x1c\xb3\x4a\xe1\x55"
+ "\xec\x83\x1a\x8e\x25\xbc\x30\xc7"
+ "\x5e\xf5\x69\x00\x97\x0b\xa2\x39"
+ "\xd0\x44\xdb\x72\x09\x7d\x14\xab"
+ "\x1f\xb6\x4d\xe4\x58\xef\x86\x1d"
+ "\x91\x28\xbf\x33\xca\x61\xf8\x6c"
+ "\x03\x9a\x0e\xa5\x3c\xd3\x47\xde"
+ "\x75\x0c\x80\x17\xae\x22\xb9\x50"
+ "\xe7\x5b\xf2\x89\x20\x94\x2b\xc2"
+ "\x36\xcd\x64\xfb\x6f\x06\x9d\x11"
+ "\xa8\x3f\xd6\x4a\xe1\x78\x0f\x83"
+ "\x1a\xb1\x25\xbc\x53\xea\x5e\xf5"
+ "\x8c\x00\x97\x2e\xc5\x39\xd0\x67"
+ "\xfe\x72\x09\xa0\x14\xab\x42\xd9"
+ "\x4d\xe4\x7b\x12\x86\x1d\xb4\x28"
+ "\xbf\x56\xed\x61\xf8\x8f\x03\x9a"
+ "\x31\xc8\x3c\xd3\x6a\x01\x75\x0c"
+ "\xa3\x17\xae\x45\xdc\x50\xe7\x7e"
+ "\x15\x89\x20\xb7\x2b\xc2\x59\xf0"
+ "\x64\xfb\x92\x06\x9d\x34\xcb\x3f"
+ "\xd6\x6d\x04\x78\x0f\xa6\x1a\xb1"
+ "\x48\xdf\x53\xea\x81\x18\x8c\x23"
+ "\xba\x2e\xc5\x5c\xf3\x67\xfe\x95"
+ "\x09\xa0\x37\xce\x42\xd9\x70\x07"
+ "\x7b\x12\xa9\x1d\xb4\x4b\xe2\x56"
+ "\xed\x84\x1b\x8f\x26\xbd\x31\xc8"
+ "\x5f\xf6\x6a\x01\x98\x0c\xa3\x3a"
+ "\xd1\x45\xdc\x73\x0a\x7e\x15\xac"
+ "\x20\xb7\x4e\xe5\x59\xf0\x87\x1e"
+ "\x92\x29\xc0\x34\xcb\x62\xf9\x6d"
+ "\x04\x9b\x0f\xa6\x3d\xd4\x48\xdf"
+ "\x76\x0d\x81\x18\xaf\x23\xba\x51"
+ "\xe8\x5c\xf3\x8a\x21\x95\x2c\xc3"
+ "\x37\xce\x65\xfc\x70\x07\x9e\x12"
+ "\xa9\x40\xd7\x4b\xe2\x79\x10\x84"
+ "\x1b\xb2\x26\xbd\x54\xeb\x5f\xf6"
+ "\x8d\x01\x98\x2f\xc6\x3a\xd1\x68"
+ "\xff\x73\x0a\xa1\x15\xac\x43\xda"
+ "\x4e\xe5\x7c\x13\x87\x1e\xb5\x29"
+ "\xc0\x57\xee\x62\xf9\x90\x04\x9b"
+ "\x32\xc9\x3d\xd4\x6b\x02\x76\x0d"
+ "\xa4\x18\xaf\x46\xdd\x51\xe8\x7f"
+ "\x16\x8a\x21\xb8\x2c\xc3\x5a\xf1"
+ "\x65\xfc\x93\x07\x9e\x35\xcc\x40"
+ "\xd7\x6e\x05\x79\x10\xa7\x1b\xb2"
+ "\x49\xe0\x54\xeb\x82\x19\x8d\x24"
+ "\xbb\x2f\xc6\x5d\xf4\x68\xff\x96"
+ "\x0a\xa1\x38\xcf\x43\xda\x71\x08"
+ "\x7c\x13\xaa\x1e\xb5\x4c\xe3\x57"
+ "\xee\x85\x1c\x90\x27\xbe\x32\xc9"
+ "\x60\xf7\x6b\x02\x99\x0d\xa4\x3b"
+ "\xd2\x46\xdd\x74\x0b\x7f\x16\xad"
+ "\x21\xb8\x4f\xe6\x5a\xf1\x88\x1f"
+ "\x93\x2a\xc1\x35\xcc\x63\xfa\x6e"
+ "\x05\x9c\x10\xa7\x3e\xd5\x49\xe0"
+ "\x77\x0e\x82\x19\xb0\x24\xbb\x52"
+ "\xe9\x5d\xf4\x8b\x22\x96\x2d\xc4"
+ "\x38\xcf\x66\xfd\x71\x08\x9f\x13"
+ "\xaa\x41\xd8\x4c\xe3\x7a\x11\x85"
+ "\x1c\xb3\x27\xbe\x55\xec\x60\xf7"
+ "\x8e\x02\x99\x30\xc7\x3b\xd2\x69"
+ "\x00\x74\x0b\xa2\x16\xad\x44\xdb"
+ "\x4f\xe6\x7d\x14\x88\x1f\xb6\x2a"
+ "\xc1\x58\xef\x63\xfa\x91\x05\x9c"
+ "\x33\xca\x3e\xd5\x6c\x03\x77\x0e"
+ "\xa5\x19\xb0\x47\xde\x52\xe9\x80"
+ "\x17\x8b\x22\xb9\x2d\xc4\x5b\xf2"
+ "\x66\xfd\x94\x08\x9f\x36\xcd\x41"
+ "\xd8\x6f\x06\x7a\x11\xa8\x1c\xb3"
+ "\x4a\xe1\x55\xec\x83\x1a\x8e\x25"
+ "\xbc\x30\xc7\x5e\xf5\x69\x00\x97"
+ "\x0b\xa2\x39\xd0\x44\xdb\x72\x09"
+ "\x7d\x14\xab\x1f\xb6\x4d\xe4\x58"
+ "\xef\x86\x1d\x91\x28\xbf\x33\xca"
+ "\x61\xf8\x6c\x03\x9a\x0e\xa5\x3c"
+ "\xd3\x47\xde\x75\x0c\x80\x17\xae"
+ "\x22\xb9\x50\xe7\x5b\xf2\x89\x20"
+ "\x94\x2b\xc2\x36\xcd\x64\xfb\x6f"
+ "\x06\x9d\x11\xa8\x3f\xd6\x4a\xe1"
+ "\x78\x0f\x83\x1a\xb1\x25\xbc\x53"
+ "\xea\x5e\xf5\x8c\x00\x97\x2e\xc5"
+ "\x39\xd0\x67\xfe\x72\x09\xa0\x14"
+ "\xab\x42\xd9\x4d\xe4\x7b\x12\x86"
+ "\x1d\xb4\x28\xbf\x56\xed\x61\xf8"
+ "\x8f\x03\x9a\x31\xc8\x3c\xd3\x6a"
+ "\x01\x75\x0c\xa3\x17\xae\x45\xdc"
+ "\x50\xe7\x7e\x15\x89\x20\xb7\x2b"
+ "\xc2\x59\xf0\x64\xfb\x92\x06\x9d"
+ "\x34\xcb\x3f\xd6\x6d\x04\x78\x0f"
+ "\xa6\x1a\xb1\x48\xdf\x53\xea\x81"
+ "\x18\x8c\x23\xba\x2e\xc5\x5c\xf3"
+ "\x67\xfe\x95\x09\xa0\x37\xce\x42"
+ "\xd9\x70\x07\x7b\x12\xa9\x1d\xb4"
+ "\x4b\xe2\x56\xed\x84\x1b\x8f\x26"
+ "\xbd\x31\xc8\x5f\xf6\x6a\x01\x98",
+ .psize = 2048,
+ .digest = "\xfb\x3a\x7a\xda",
+ }
+};
+
+/*
* CRC32C test vectors
*/
#define CRC32C_TEST_VECTORS 15
diff --git a/crypto/zlib.c b/crypto/zlib.c
index 0eefa9d237ac..d51a30a29e42 100644
--- a/crypto/zlib.c
+++ b/crypto/zlib.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static void zlib_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
}
-static int zlib_compress_setup(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm, void *params,
+static int zlib_compress_setup(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm, const void *params,
unsigned int len)
{
struct zlib_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_pcomp_tfm(tfm));
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ static int zlib_compress_final(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm,
}
-static int zlib_decompress_setup(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm, void *params,
+static int zlib_decompress_setup(struct crypto_pcomp *tfm, const void *params,
unsigned int len)
{
struct zlib_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_pcomp_tfm(tfm));
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-02-04 15:57:41 +0100