diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/namei.c')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 56 |
1 files changed, 42 insertions, 14 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 5a9a6c3094da..54fc993e3027 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ * name indicated by the symlink. The old code always complained that the * name already exists, due to not following the symlink even if its target * is nonexistent. The new semantics affects also mknod() and link() when - * the name is a symlink pointing to a non-existant name. + * the name is a symlink pointing to a non-existent name. * * I don't know which semantics is the right one, since I have no access * to standards. But I found by trial that HP-UX 9.0 has the full "new" @@ -183,6 +183,9 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flag mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC; + if (current_user_ns() != inode_userns(inode)) + goto other_perms; + if (current_fsuid() == inode->i_uid) mode >>= 6; else { @@ -196,6 +199,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flag mode >>= 3; } +other_perms: /* * If the DACs are ok we don't need any capability check. */ @@ -237,7 +241,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags, * Executable DACs are overridable if at least one exec bit is set. */ if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || execute_ok(inode)) - if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) + if (ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE)) return 0; /* @@ -245,7 +249,7 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask, unsigned int flags, */ mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC; if (mask == MAY_READ || (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !(mask & MAY_WRITE))) - if (capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) + if (ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) return 0; return -EACCES; @@ -654,6 +658,7 @@ static inline int handle_reval_path(struct nameidata *nd) static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) { int ret; + struct user_namespace *ns = inode_userns(inode); if (inode->i_op->permission) { ret = inode->i_op->permission(inode, MAY_EXEC, flags); @@ -666,7 +671,8 @@ static inline int exec_permission(struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) if (ret == -ECHILD) return ret; - if (capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) + if (ns_capable(ns, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE) || + ns_capable(ns, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH)) goto ok; return ret; @@ -691,6 +697,7 @@ static __always_inline void set_root_rcu(struct nameidata *nd) do { seq = read_seqcount_begin(&fs->seq); nd->root = fs->root; + nd->seq = __read_seqcount_begin(&nd->root.dentry->d_seq); } while (read_seqcount_retry(&fs->seq, seq)); } } @@ -986,6 +993,12 @@ int follow_down_one(struct path *path) return 0; } +static inline bool managed_dentry_might_block(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + return (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_MANAGE_TRANSIT && + dentry->d_op->d_manage(dentry, true) < 0); +} + /* * Skip to top of mountpoint pile in rcuwalk mode. We abort the rcu-walk if we * meet a managed dentry and we're not walking to "..". True is returned to @@ -994,19 +1007,26 @@ int follow_down_one(struct path *path) static bool __follow_mount_rcu(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *path, struct inode **inode, bool reverse_transit) { - while (d_mountpoint(path->dentry)) { + for (;;) { struct vfsmount *mounted; - if (unlikely(path->dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_MANAGE_TRANSIT) && - !reverse_transit && - path->dentry->d_op->d_manage(path->dentry, true) < 0) + /* + * Don't forget we might have a non-mountpoint managed dentry + * that wants to block transit. + */ + *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; + if (!reverse_transit && + unlikely(managed_dentry_might_block(path->dentry))) return false; + + if (!d_mountpoint(path->dentry)) + break; + mounted = __lookup_mnt(path->mnt, path->dentry, 1); if (!mounted) break; path->mnt = mounted; path->dentry = mounted->mnt_root; nd->seq = read_seqcount_begin(&path->dentry->d_seq); - *inode = path->dentry->d_inode; } if (unlikely(path->dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_NEED_AUTOMOUNT)) @@ -1644,13 +1664,16 @@ static int path_lookupat(int dfd, const char *name, err = -ECHILD; } - if (!err) + if (!err) { err = handle_reval_path(nd); + if (err) + path_put(&nd->path); + } if (!err && nd->flags & LOOKUP_DIRECTORY) { if (!nd->inode->i_op->lookup) { path_put(&nd->path); - return -ENOTDIR; + err = -ENOTDIR; } } @@ -1842,11 +1865,15 @@ static inline int check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode) if (!(dir->i_mode & S_ISVTX)) return 0; + if (current_user_ns() != inode_userns(inode)) + goto other_userns; if (inode->i_uid == fsuid) return 0; if (dir->i_uid == fsuid) return 0; - return !capable(CAP_FOWNER); + +other_userns: + return !ns_capable(inode_userns(inode), CAP_FOWNER); } /* @@ -2026,7 +2053,7 @@ static int may_open(struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag) } /* O_NOATIME can only be set by the owner or superuser */ - if (flag & O_NOATIME && !is_owner_or_cap(inode)) + if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) return -EPERM; /* @@ -2440,7 +2467,8 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev) if (error) return error; - if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && !capable(CAP_MKNOD)) + if ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && + !ns_capable(inode_userns(dir), CAP_MKNOD)) return -EPERM; if (!dir->i_op->mknod) |