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-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/common.c2
-rw-r--r--mm/kasan/report.c40
2 files changed, 42 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index c15d8ae68c96..6aa51723b92b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ void *memset(void *addr, int c, size_t len)
return __memset(addr, c, len);
}
+#ifdef __HAVE_ARCH_MEMMOVE
#undef memmove
void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
{
@@ -118,6 +119,7 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
return __memmove(dest, src, len);
}
+#endif
#undef memcpy
void *memcpy(void *dest, const void *src, size_t len)
diff --git a/mm/kasan/report.c b/mm/kasan/report.c
index 621782100eaa..5ef9f24f566b 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/report.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/report.c
@@ -512,3 +512,43 @@ void __kasan_report(unsigned long addr, size_t size, bool is_write, unsigned lon
end_report(&flags);
}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
+/*
+ * With CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE, accesses to bogus pointers (outside the high
+ * canonical half of the address space) cause out-of-bounds shadow memory reads
+ * before the actual access. For addresses in the low canonical half of the
+ * address space, as well as most non-canonical addresses, that out-of-bounds
+ * shadow memory access lands in the non-canonical part of the address space.
+ * Help the user figure out what the original bogus pointer was.
+ */
+void kasan_non_canonical_hook(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ unsigned long orig_addr;
+ const char *bug_type;
+
+ if (addr < KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET)
+ return;
+
+ orig_addr = (addr - KASAN_SHADOW_OFFSET) << KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SHIFT;
+ /*
+ * For faults near the shadow address for NULL, we can be fairly certain
+ * that this is a KASAN shadow memory access.
+ * For faults that correspond to shadow for low canonical addresses, we
+ * can still be pretty sure - that shadow region is a fairly narrow
+ * chunk of the non-canonical address space.
+ * But faults that look like shadow for non-canonical addresses are a
+ * really large chunk of the address space. In that case, we still
+ * print the decoded address, but make it clear that this is not
+ * necessarily what's actually going on.
+ */
+ if (orig_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
+ bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
+ else if (orig_addr < TASK_SIZE)
+ bug_type = "probably user-memory-access";
+ else
+ bug_type = "maybe wild-memory-access";
+ pr_alert("KASAN: %s in range [0x%016lx-0x%016lx]\n", bug_type,
+ orig_addr, orig_addr + KASAN_SHADOW_MASK);
+}
+#endif