1 files changed, 235 insertions, 33 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index 759b63572641..32c47de30344 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <net/bluetooth/bluetooth.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/hci_core.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/l2cap.h>
+#include <net/bluetooth/mgmt.h>
 #include <net/bluetooth/smp.h>
 #include <linux/crypto.h>
 #include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -181,30 +182,53 @@ static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 	if (!skb)
 		return;
 
-	hci_send_acl(conn->hcon, skb, 0);
+	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+	hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
 
-	mod_timer(&conn->security_timer, jiffies +
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer,
 					msecs_to_jiffies(SMP_TIMEOUT));
 }
 
+static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
+{
+	if (authreq & SMP_AUTH_MITM)
+		return BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	else
+		return BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+}
+
+static __u8 seclevel_to_authreq(__u8 sec_level)
+{
+	switch (sec_level) {
+	case BT_SECURITY_HIGH:
+		return SMP_AUTH_MITM | SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	case BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM:
+		return SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	default:
+		return SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	}
+}
+
 static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 				struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
 				struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp,
 				__u8 authreq)
 {
-	u8 dist_keys;
+	u8 dist_keys = 0;
 
-	dist_keys = 0;
 	if (test_bit(HCI_PAIRABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->flags)) {
 		dist_keys = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+	} else {
+		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 	}
 
 	if (rsp == NULL) {
 		req->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 		req->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 		req->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
-		req->init_key_dist = dist_keys;
+		req->init_key_dist = 0;
 		req->resp_key_dist = dist_keys;
 		req->auth_req = authreq;
 		return;
@@ -213,7 +237,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	rsp->io_capability = conn->hcon->io_capability;
 	rsp->oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 	rsp->max_key_size = SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
-	rsp->init_key_dist = req->init_key_dist & dist_keys;
+	rsp->init_key_dist = 0;
 	rsp->resp_key_dist = req->resp_key_dist & dist_keys;
 	rsp->auth_req = authreq;
 }
@@ -231,6 +255,107 @@ static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason, u8 send)
+{
+	if (send)
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
+								&reason);
+
+	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend);
+	mgmt_auth_failed(conn->hcon->hdev, conn->dst, reason);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+#define JUST_WORKS	0x00
+#define JUST_CFM	0x01
+#define REQ_PASSKEY	0x02
+#define CFM_PASSKEY	0x03
+#define REQ_OOB		0x04
+#define OVERLAP		0xFF
+
+static const u8 gen_method[5][5] = {
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, REQ_PASSKEY },
+	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, CFM_PASSKEY },
+	{ JUST_WORKS,  JUST_CFM,    JUST_WORKS,  JUST_WORKS, JUST_CFM    },
+	{ CFM_PASSKEY, CFM_PASSKEY, REQ_PASSKEY, JUST_WORKS, OVERLAP     },
+};
+
+static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
+						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
+{
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	u8 method;
+	u32 passkey = 0;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/* Initialize key for JUST WORKS */
+	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	BT_DBG("tk_request: auth:%d lcl:%d rem:%d", auth, local_io, remote_io);
+
+	/* If neither side wants MITM, use JUST WORKS */
+	/* If either side has unknown io_caps, use JUST WORKS */
+	/* Otherwise, look up method from the table */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_MITM) ||
+			local_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY ||
+			remote_io > SMP_IO_KEYBOARD_DISPLAY)
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+	else
+		method = gen_method[local_io][remote_io];
+
+	/* If not bonding, don't ask user to confirm a Zero TK */
+	if (!(auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) && method == JUST_CFM)
+		method = JUST_WORKS;
+
+	/* If Just Works, Continue with Zero TK */
+	if (method == JUST_WORKS) {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
+	if (method != JUST_CFM)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
+	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
+	 */
+	if (method == OVERLAP) {
+		if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+			method = CFM_PASSKEY;
+		else
+			method = REQ_PASSKEY;
+	}
+
+	/* Generate random passkey. Not valid until confirmed. */
+	if (method == CFM_PASSKEY) {
+		u8 key[16];
+
+		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+		get_random_bytes(&passkey, sizeof(passkey));
+		passkey %= 1000000;
+		put_unaligned_le32(passkey, key);
+		swap128(key, smp->tk);
+		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", passkey);
+	}
+
+	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
+
+	if (method == REQ_PASSKEY)
+		ret = mgmt_user_passkey_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst);
+	else
+		ret = mgmt_user_confirm_request(hcon->hdev, conn->dst,
+						cpu_to_le32(passkey), 0);
+
+	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
 {
 	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan, confirm);
@@ -263,14 +388,15 @@ static void confirm_work(struct work_struct *work)
 		goto error;
 	}
 
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
 	swap128(res, cp.confirm_val);
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
 	return;
 
 error:
-	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), &reason);
-	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
 }
 
 static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
@@ -353,8 +479,7 @@ static void random_work(struct work_struct *work)
 	return;
 
 error:
-	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason), &reason);
-	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
 }
 
 static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
@@ -370,6 +495,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 	smp->conn = conn;
 	conn->smp_chan = smp;
+	conn->hcon->smp_conn = conn;
 
 	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
 
@@ -378,19 +504,73 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 
 void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
-	kfree(conn->smp_chan);
+	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend);
+
+	if (smp->tfm)
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm);
+
+	kfree(smp);
+	conn->smp_chan = NULL;
+	conn->hcon->smp_conn = NULL;
 	hci_conn_put(conn->hcon);
 }
 
+int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->smp_conn;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	u32 value;
+	u8 key[16];
+
+	BT_DBG("");
+
+	if (!conn)
+		return -ENOTCONN;
+
+	smp = conn->smp_chan;
+
+	switch (mgmt_op) {
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
+		value = le32_to_cpu(passkey);
+		memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
+		BT_DBG("PassKey: %d", value);
+		put_unaligned_le32(value, key);
+		swap128(key, smp->tk);
+		/* Fall Through */
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_REPLY:
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags);
+		break;
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
+	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
+		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED, 1);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED, 1);
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags))
+		queue_work(hcon->hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 key_size;
+	u8 auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	if (conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER)
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
 	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend))
 		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
 
@@ -400,19 +580,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
-	if (req->oob_flag)
-		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
+	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+	if (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)
+		auth = req->auth_req;
 
-	/* We didn't start the pairing, so no requirements */
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, req, &rsp, auth);
 
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	/* Just works */
-	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
-
 	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -422,6 +599,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
 
+	/* Request setup of TK */
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -430,11 +612,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
-	u8 key_size;
+	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
+	if (!(conn->hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER))
+		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
 
 	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
@@ -443,12 +628,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
-	if (rsp->oob_flag)
-		return SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL;
-
-	/* Just works */
-	memset(smp->tk, 0, sizeof(smp->tk));
-
 	ret = smp_rand(smp->prnd);
 	if (ret)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -456,6 +635,22 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
 
+	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
+			(rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+		auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
+
+	auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+
+	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability);
+	if (ret)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
+
+	/* Can't compose response until we have been confirmed */
+	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags))
+		return 0;
+
 	queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -477,8 +672,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		swap128(smp->prnd, random);
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(random),
 								random);
-	} else {
+	} else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->smp_flags)) {
 		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &smp->confirm);
+	} else {
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->smp_flags);
 	}
 
 	return 0;
@@ -531,7 +728,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	hcon->pending_sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
 
 	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn))
 		return 0;
@@ -558,6 +755,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	__u8 authreq;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
 
@@ -578,18 +776,22 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 sec_level)
 		return 0;
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
+	if (!smp)
+		return 1;
+
+	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
 	if (hcon->link_mode & HCI_LM_MASTER) {
 		struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 
-		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, SMP_AUTH_NONE);
+		build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, authreq);
 		smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	} else {
 		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
-		cp.auth_req = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+		cp.auth_req = authreq;
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 	}
 
@@ -618,7 +820,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
-	hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 1, conn->src, smp->smp_key_size,
+	hci_add_ltk(conn->hcon->hdev, 1, conn->dst, smp->smp_key_size,
 						rp->ediv, rp->rand, smp->tk);
 
 	smp_distribute_keys(conn, 1);
@@ -646,6 +848,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		break;
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
+		smp_failure(conn, skb->data[0], 0);
 		reason = 0;
 		err = -EPERM;
 		break;
@@ -691,8 +894,7 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 done:
 	if (reason)
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
-								&reason);
+		smp_failure(conn, reason, 1);
 
 	kfree_skb(skb);
 	return err;
@@ -781,7 +983,7 @@ int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 force)
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out || force) {
 		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->pend);
-		del_timer(&conn->security_timer);
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
 		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
 	}