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-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.c120
-rw-r--r--net/bluetooth/smp.h2
2 files changed, 84 insertions, 38 deletions
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index e76c963011e5..1201670afe38 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
#include "smp.h"
+#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code) set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
+#define SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, code) clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
+
#define SMP_TIMEOUT msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
#define AUTH_REQ_MASK 0x07
@@ -47,6 +50,7 @@ enum {
struct smp_chan {
struct l2cap_conn *conn;
struct delayed_work security_timer;
+ unsigned long allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
u8 preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
u8 prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
@@ -553,6 +557,11 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ if (conn->hcon->out)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+ else
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
return 0;
}
@@ -691,6 +700,20 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
}
}
+static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+ /* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
+ * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
+ * them in the correct order.
+ */
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
+ else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+ else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+}
+
static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
{
struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
@@ -704,8 +727,10 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
/* The responder sends its keys first */
- if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+ if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
+ smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
return;
+ }
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
@@ -790,8 +815,10 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
}
/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
- if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
+ smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
return;
+ }
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
smp_notify_keys(conn);
@@ -829,6 +856,8 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
smp->conn = conn;
chan->data = smp;
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
+
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
@@ -925,6 +954,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
(req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
+
smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
@@ -958,6 +989,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
/* Request setup of TK */
ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
@@ -983,6 +1015,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
+
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rsp));
req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
@@ -1040,13 +1074,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->pcnf))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
- if (conn->hcon->out)
+ if (conn->hcon->out) {
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
smp->prnd);
- else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
return smp_confirm(smp);
else
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
@@ -1064,6 +1104,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < sizeof(smp->rrnd))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
memcpy(smp->rrnd, skb->data, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->rrnd));
@@ -1122,7 +1164,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct smp_cmd_security_req *rp = (void *) skb->data;
struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
- struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
struct smp_chan *smp;
u8 sec_level;
@@ -1144,10 +1185,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
return 0;
- /* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
- if (chan->data)
- return 0;
-
smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
if (!smp)
return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -1165,6 +1202,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
return 0;
}
@@ -1227,10 +1265,12 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
} else {
struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
cp.auth_req = authreq;
smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
}
set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
@@ -1252,9 +1292,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
- /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
- if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
- return 0;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
@@ -1278,13 +1317,13 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
- /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
- if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
- return 0;
-
/* Mark the information as received */
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
@@ -1311,9 +1350,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
- /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
- if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
- return 0;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
@@ -1336,13 +1374,13 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
- /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
- if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
- return 0;
-
/* Mark the information as received */
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
+ if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+ SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
@@ -1392,13 +1430,11 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
- /* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
- if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN))
- return 0;
-
/* Mark the information as received */
smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
+ SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
hci_dev_lock(hdev);
@@ -1418,6 +1454,7 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+ struct smp_chan *smp;
__u8 code, reason;
int err = 0;
@@ -1437,18 +1474,19 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
code = skb->data[0];
skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
- /*
- * The SMP context must be initialized for all other PDUs except
- * pairing and security requests. If we get any other PDU when
- * not initialized simply disconnect (done if this function
- * returns an error).
+ smp = chan->data;
+
+ if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
+ goto drop;
+
+ if (smp && !test_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
+ goto drop;
+
+ /* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
+ * pairing request and security request.
*/
- if (code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ &&
- !chan->data) {
- BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code);
- err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
- goto done;
- }
+ if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
+ goto drop;
switch (code) {
case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
@@ -1510,6 +1548,12 @@ done:
}
return err;
+
+drop:
+ BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name,
+ code, &hcon->dst);
+ kfree_skb(skb);
+ return 0;
}
static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.h b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
index cf1094617c69..5240537efde3 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.h
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.h
@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ struct smp_cmd_security_req {
__u8 auth_req;
} __packed;
+#define SMP_CMD_MAX 0x0b
+
#define SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED 0x01
#define SMP_OOB_NOT_AVAIL 0x02
#define SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS 0x03
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-03 22:32:00 +0100