diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 24 |
3 files changed, 26 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 0b4634515839..aa312472c7c5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none) #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index e76499b1ce78..1dd70dc68ffd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ err_out: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value * diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 250e52114230..251e7b4006f4 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -943,6 +943,30 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) fdput(f); } +/** + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data + * @event_name: event name for the record in the IMA measurement list + * @buf: pointer to buffer data + * @buf_len: length of buffer data (in bytes) + * @hash: measure buffer data hash + * + * Measure data critical to the integrity of the kernel into the IMA log + * and extend the pcr. Examples of critical data could be various data + * structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can + * impact the integrity of the system. + */ +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, size_t buf_len, + bool hash) +{ + if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) + return; + + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, + hash); +} + static int __init init_ima(void) { int error; |