diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/security.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 2734 |
1 files changed, 2630 insertions, 104 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index cf6cc576736f..d5ff7ff45b77 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Greg Kroah-Hartman <greg@kroah.com> * Copyright (C) 2001 Networks Associates Technology, Inc <ssmalley@nai.com> * Copyright (C) 2016 Mellanox Technologies + * Copyright (C) 2023 Microsoft Corporation <paul@paul-moore.com> */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LSM: " fmt @@ -41,7 +42,7 @@ * all security modules to use the same descriptions for auditing * purposes. */ -const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { +const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX + 1] = { [LOCKDOWN_NONE] = "none", [LOCKDOWN_MODULE_SIGNATURE] = "unsigned module loading", [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", @@ -74,20 +75,20 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; -struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __lsm_ro_after_init; +struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads __ro_after_init; static BLOCKING_NOTIFIER_HEAD(blocking_lsm_notifier_chain); static struct kmem_cache *lsm_file_cache; static struct kmem_cache *lsm_inode_cache; char *lsm_names; -static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init; +static struct lsm_blob_sizes blob_sizes __ro_after_init; /* Boot-time LSM user choice */ static __initdata const char *chosen_lsm_order; static __initdata const char *chosen_major_lsm; -static __initconst const char * const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; +static __initconst const char *const builtin_lsm_order = CONFIG_LSM; /* Ordered list of LSMs to initialize. */ static __initdata struct lsm_info **ordered_lsms; @@ -284,9 +285,9 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) bool found = false; for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { - if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE && - strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { - append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); + if (strcmp(lsm->name, name) == 0) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_MUTABLE) + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, origin); found = true; } } @@ -306,6 +307,12 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_parse(const char *order, const char *origin) } } + /* LSM_ORDER_LAST is always last. */ + for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { + if (lsm->order == LSM_ORDER_LAST) + append_ordered_lsm(lsm, " last"); + } + /* Disable all LSMs not in the ordered list. */ for (lsm = __start_lsm_info; lsm < __end_lsm_info; lsm++) { if (exists_ordered_lsm(lsm)) @@ -331,7 +338,8 @@ static void __init report_lsm_order(void) pr_info("initializing lsm="); /* Report each enabled LSM name, comma separated. */ - for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) + for (early = __start_early_lsm_info; + early < __end_early_lsm_info; early++) if (is_enabled(early)) pr_cont("%s%s", first++ == 0 ? "" : ",", early->name); for (lsm = ordered_lsms; *lsm; lsm++) @@ -346,7 +354,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void) struct lsm_info **lsm; ordered_lsms = kcalloc(LSM_COUNT + 1, sizeof(*ordered_lsms), - GFP_KERNEL); + GFP_KERNEL); if (chosen_lsm_order) { if (chosen_major_lsm) { @@ -419,9 +427,9 @@ int __init security_init(void) { struct lsm_info *lsm; - init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ?: " *unspecified*"); + init_debug("legacy security=%s\n", chosen_major_lsm ? : " *unspecified*"); init_debug(" CONFIG_LSM=%s\n", builtin_lsm_order); - init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ?: " *unspecified*"); + init_debug("boot arg lsm=%s\n", chosen_lsm_order ? : " *unspecified*"); /* * Append the names of the early LSM modules now that kmalloc() is @@ -509,7 +517,7 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result) * Each LSM has to register its hooks with the infrastructure. */ void __init security_add_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks, int count, - const char *lsm) + const char *lsm) { int i; @@ -778,57 +786,157 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb) /* Security operations */ +/** + * security_binder_set_context_mgr() - Check if becoming binder ctx mgr is ok + * @mgr: task credentials of current binder process + * + * Check whether @mgr is allowed to be the binder context manager. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr) { return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr); } +/** + * security_binder_transaction() - Check if a binder transaction is allowed + * @from: sending process + * @to: receiving process + * + * Check whether @from is allowed to invoke a binder transaction call to @to. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to); } +/** + * security_binder_transfer_binder() - Check if a binder transfer is allowed + * @from: sending process + * @to: receiving process + * + * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer a binder reference to @to. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to) { return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to); } +/** + * security_binder_transfer_file() - Check if a binder file xfer is allowed + * @from: sending process + * @to: receiving process + * @file: file being transferred + * + * Check whether @from is allowed to transfer @file to @to. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from, const struct cred *to, struct file *file) { return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file); } +/** + * security_ptrace_access_check() - Check if tracing is allowed + * @child: target process + * @mode: PTRACE_MODE flags + * + * Check permission before allowing the current process to trace the @child + * process. Security modules may also want to perform a process tracing check + * during an execve in the set_security or apply_creds hooks of tracing check + * during an execve in the bprm_set_creds hook of binprm_security_ops if the + * process is being traced and its security attributes would be changed by the + * execve. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) { return call_int_hook(ptrace_access_check, 0, child, mode); } +/** + * security_ptrace_traceme() - Check if tracing is allowed + * @parent: tracing process + * + * Check that the @parent process has sufficient permission to trace the + * current process before allowing the current process to present itself to the + * @parent process for tracing. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) { return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, 0, parent); } +/** + * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process + * @target: target process + * @effective: effective capability set + * @inheritable: inheritable capability set + * @permitted: permitted capability set + * + * Get the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the + * @target process. The hook may also perform permission checking to determine + * if the current process is allowed to see the capability sets of the @target + * process. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if the capability sets were successfully obtained. + */ int security_capget(struct task_struct *target, - kernel_cap_t *effective, - kernel_cap_t *inheritable, - kernel_cap_t *permitted) + kernel_cap_t *effective, + kernel_cap_t *inheritable, + kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return call_int_hook(capget, 0, target, - effective, inheritable, permitted); + effective, inheritable, permitted); } +/** + * security_capset() - Set the capability sets for a process + * @new: new credentials for the target process + * @old: current credentials of the target process + * @effective: effective capability set + * @inheritable: inheritable capability set + * @permitted: permitted capability set + * + * Set the @effective, @inheritable, and @permitted capability sets for the + * current process. + * + * Return: Returns 0 and update @new if permission is granted. + */ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted) { return call_int_hook(capset, 0, new, old, - effective, inheritable, permitted); + effective, inheritable, permitted); } +/** + * security_capable() - Check if a process has the necessary capability + * @cred: credentials to examine + * @ns: user namespace + * @cap: capability requested + * @opts: capability check options + * + * Check whether the @tsk process has the @cap capability in the indicated + * credentials. @cap contains the capability <include/linux/capability.h>. + * @opts contains options for the capable check <include/linux/security.h>. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if the capability is granted. + */ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, @@ -837,26 +945,78 @@ int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, return call_int_hook(capable, 0, cred, ns, cap, opts); } +/** + * security_quotactl() - Check if a quotactl() syscall is allowed for this fs + * @cmds: commands + * @type: type + * @id: id + * @sb: filesystem + * + * Check whether the quotactl syscall is allowed for this @sb. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) { return call_int_hook(quotactl, 0, cmds, type, id, sb); } +/** + * security_quota_on() - Check if QUOTAON is allowed for a dentry + * @dentry: dentry + * + * Check whether QUOTAON is allowed for @dentry. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) { return call_int_hook(quota_on, 0, dentry); } +/** + * security_syslog() - Check if accessing the kernel message ring is allowed + * @type: SYSLOG_ACTION_* type + * + * Check permission before accessing the kernel message ring or changing + * logging to the console. See the syslog(2) manual page for an explanation of + * the @type values. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_syslog(int type) { return call_int_hook(syslog, 0, type); } +/** + * security_settime64() - Check if changing the system time is allowed + * @ts: new time + * @tz: timezone + * + * Check permission to change the system time, struct timespec64 is defined in + * <include/linux/time64.h> and timezone is defined in <include/linux/time.h>. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) { return call_int_hook(settime, 0, ts, tz); } +/** + * security_vm_enough_memory_mm() - Check if allocating a new mem map is allowed + * @mm: mm struct + * @pages: number of pages + * + * Check permissions for allocating a new virtual mapping. If all LSMs return + * a positive value, __vm_enough_memory() will be called with cap_sys_admin + * set. If at least one LSM returns 0 or negative, __vm_enough_memory() will be + * called with cap_sys_admin cleared. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted by the LSM infrastructure to the + * caller. + */ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { struct security_hook_list *hp; @@ -880,16 +1040,61 @@ int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); } +/** + * security_bprm_creds_for_exec() - Prepare the credentials for exec() + * @bprm: binary program information + * + * If the setup in prepare_exec_creds did not setup @bprm->cred->security + * properly for executing @bprm->file, update the LSM's portion of + * @bprm->cred->security to be what commit_creds needs to install for the new + * program. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for + * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec + * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. @bprm + * contains the linux_binprm structure. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); } +/** + * security_bprm_creds_from_file() - Update linux_binprm creds based on file + * @bprm: binary program information + * @file: associated file + * + * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change privilege upon + * exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. This is called after + * finding the binary that will be executed without an interpreter. This + * ensures that the credentials will not be derived from a script that the + * binary will need to reopen, which when reopend may end up being a completely + * different file. This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for + * transitions between security domains). The hook must set @bprm->secureexec + * to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to request libc enable secure mode. The + * hook must add to @bprm->per_clear any personality flags that should be + * cleared from current->personality. @bprm contains the linux_binprm + * structure. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); } +/** + * security_bprm_check() - Mediate binary handler search + * @bprm: binary program information + * + * This hook mediates the point when a search for a binary handler will begin. + * It allows a check against the @bprm->cred->security value which was set in + * the preceding creds_for_exec call. The argv list and envp list are reliably + * available in @bprm. This hook may be called multiple times during a single + * execve. @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { int ret; @@ -900,21 +1105,67 @@ int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return ima_bprm_check(bprm); } +/** + * security_bprm_committing_creds() - Install creds for a process during exec() + * @bprm: binary program information + * + * Prepare to install the new security attributes of a process being + * transformed by an execve operation, based on the old credentials pointed to + * by @current->cred and the information set in @bprm->cred by the + * bprm_creds_for_exec hook. @bprm points to the linux_binprm structure. This + * hook is a good place to perform state changes on the process such as closing + * open file descriptors to which access will no longer be granted when the + * attributes are changed. This is called immediately before commit_creds(). + */ void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { call_void_hook(bprm_committing_creds, bprm); } +/** + * security_bprm_committed_creds() - Tidy up after cred install during exec() + * @bprm: binary program information + * + * Tidy up after the installation of the new security attributes of a process + * being transformed by an execve operation. The new credentials have, by this + * point, been set to @current->cred. @bprm points to the linux_binprm + * structure. This hook is a good place to perform state changes on the + * process such as clearing out non-inheritable signal state. This is called + * immediately after commit_creds(). + */ void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { call_void_hook(bprm_committed_creds, bprm); } +/** + * security_fs_context_dup() - Duplicate a fs_context LSM blob + * @fc: destination filesystem context + * @src_fc: source filesystem context + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to sc->security. This pointer is + * initialised to NULL by the caller. @fc indicates the new filesystem context. + * @src_fc indicates the original filesystem context. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on failure. + */ int security_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { return call_int_hook(fs_context_dup, 0, fc, src_fc); } +/** + * security_fs_context_parse_param() - Configure a filesystem context + * @fc: filesystem context + * @param: filesystem parameter + * + * Userspace provided a parameter to configure a superblock. The LSM can + * consume the parameter or return it to the caller for use elsewhere. + * + * Return: If the parameter is used by the LSM it should return 0, if it is + * returned to the caller -ENOPARAM is returned, otherwise a negative + * error code is returned. + */ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param) { @@ -933,6 +1184,16 @@ int security_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, return rc; } +/** + * security_sb_alloc() - Allocate a super_block LSM blob + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sb->s_security field. The + * s_security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is allocated. + * @sb contains the super_block structure to be modified. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. + */ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) { int rc = lsm_superblock_alloc(sb); @@ -945,11 +1206,25 @@ int security_sb_alloc(struct super_block *sb) return rc; } +/** + * security_sb_delete() - Release super_block LSM associated objects + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * + * Release objects tied to a superblock (e.g. inodes). @sb contains the + * super_block structure being released. + */ void security_sb_delete(struct super_block *sb) { call_void_hook(sb_delete, sb); } +/** + * security_sb_free() - Free a super_block LSM blob + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * + * Deallocate and clear the sb->s_security field. @sb contains the super_block + * structure to be modified. + */ void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) { call_void_hook(sb_free_security, sb); @@ -957,6 +1232,12 @@ void security_sb_free(struct super_block *sb) sb->s_security = NULL; } +/** + * security_free_mnt_opts() - Free memory associated with mount options + * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options + * + * Free memory associated with @mnt_ops. + */ void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) { if (!*mnt_opts) @@ -966,12 +1247,31 @@ void security_free_mnt_opts(void **mnt_opts) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_free_mnt_opts); +/** + * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() - Consume LSM mount options + * @options: mount options + * @mnt_opts: LSM processed mount options + * + * Eat (scan @options) and save them in @mnt_opts. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(char *options, void **mnt_opts) { return call_int_hook(sb_eat_lsm_opts, 0, options, mnt_opts); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_eat_lsm_opts); +/** + * security_sb_mnt_opts_compat() - Check if new mount options are allowed + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * @mnt_opts: new mount options + * + * Determine if the new mount options in @mnt_opts are allowed given the + * existing mounted filesystem at @sb. @sb superblock being compared. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if options are compatible. + */ int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { @@ -979,6 +1279,16 @@ int security_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_mnt_opts_compat); +/** + * security_sb_remount() - Verify no incompatible mount changes during remount + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * @mnt_opts: (re)mount options + * + * Extracts security system specific mount options and verifies no changes are + * being made to those options. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { @@ -986,69 +1296,184 @@ int security_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_remount); +/** + * security_sb_kern_mount() - Check if a kernel mount is allowed + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * + * Mount this @sb if allowed by permissions. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb) { return call_int_hook(sb_kern_mount, 0, sb); } +/** + * security_sb_show_options() - Output the mount options for a superblock + * @m: output file + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * + * Show (print on @m) mount options for this @sb. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) { return call_int_hook(sb_show_options, 0, m, sb); } +/** + * security_sb_statfs() - Check if accessing fs stats is allowed + * @dentry: superblock handle + * + * Check permission before obtaining filesystem statistics for the @mnt + * mountpoint. @dentry is a handle on the superblock for the filesystem. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) { return call_int_hook(sb_statfs, 0, dentry); } +/** + * security_sb_mount() - Check permission for mounting a filesystem + * @dev_name: filesystem backing device + * @path: mount point + * @type: filesystem type + * @flags: mount flags + * @data: filesystem specific data + * + * Check permission before an object specified by @dev_name is mounted on the + * mount point named by @nd. For an ordinary mount, @dev_name identifies a + * device if the file system type requires a device. For a remount + * (@flags & MS_REMOUNT), @dev_name is irrelevant. For a loopback/bind mount + * (@flags & MS_BIND), @dev_name identifies the pathname of the object being + * mounted. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, - const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) { return call_int_hook(sb_mount, 0, dev_name, path, type, flags, data); } +/** + * security_sb_umount() - Check permission for unmounting a filesystem + * @mnt: mounted filesystem + * @flags: unmount flags + * + * Check permission before the @mnt file system is unmounted. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) { return call_int_hook(sb_umount, 0, mnt, flags); } -int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, const struct path *new_path) +/** + * security_sb_pivotroot() - Check permissions for pivoting the rootfs + * @old_path: new location for current rootfs + * @new_path: location of the new rootfs + * + * Check permission before pivoting the root filesystem. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) { return call_int_hook(sb_pivotroot, 0, old_path, new_path); } +/** + * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() - Set the mount options for a filesystem + * @sb: filesystem superblock + * @mnt_opts: binary mount options + * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) + * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) + * + * Set the security relevant mount options used for a superblock. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_sb_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, - void *mnt_opts, - unsigned long kern_flags, - unsigned long *set_kern_flags) + void *mnt_opts, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { return call_int_hook(sb_set_mnt_opts, - mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, - mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); + mnt_opts ? -EOPNOTSUPP : 0, sb, + mnt_opts, kern_flags, set_kern_flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_set_mnt_opts); +/** + * security_sb_clone_mnt_opts() - Duplicate superblock mount options + * @oldsb: source superblock + * @newsb: destination superblock + * @kern_flags: kernel flags (in) + * @set_kern_flags: kernel flags (out) + * + * Copy all security options from a given superblock to another. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, - struct super_block *newsb, - unsigned long kern_flags, - unsigned long *set_kern_flags) + struct super_block *newsb, + unsigned long kern_flags, + unsigned long *set_kern_flags) { return call_int_hook(sb_clone_mnt_opts, 0, oldsb, newsb, - kern_flags, set_kern_flags); + kern_flags, set_kern_flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sb_clone_mnt_opts); -int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, const struct path *to_path) +/** + * security_move_mount() - Check permissions for moving a mount + * @from_path: source mount point + * @to_path: destination mount point + * + * Check permission before a mount is moved. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_move_mount(const struct path *from_path, + const struct path *to_path) { return call_int_hook(move_mount, 0, from_path, to_path); } +/** + * security_path_notify() - Check if setting a watch is allowed + * @path: file path + * @mask: event mask + * @obj_type: file path type + * + * Check permissions before setting a watch on events as defined by @mask, on + * an object at @path, whose type is defined by @obj_type. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_notify(const struct path *path, u64 mask, - unsigned int obj_type) + unsigned int obj_type) { return call_int_hook(path_notify, 0, path, mask, obj_type); } +/** + * security_inode_alloc() - Allocate an inode LSM blob + * @inode: the inode + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to @inode->i_security. The + * i_security field is initialized to NULL when the inode structure is + * allocated. + * + * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. + */ int security_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode) { int rc = lsm_inode_alloc(inode); @@ -1069,6 +1494,12 @@ static void inode_free_by_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) kmem_cache_free(lsm_inode_cache, head); } +/** + * security_inode_free() - Free an inode's LSM blob + * @inode: the inode + * + * Deallocate the inode security structure and set @inode->i_security to NULL. + */ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) { integrity_inode_free(inode); @@ -1084,9 +1515,24 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode) */ if (inode->i_security) call_rcu((struct rcu_head *)inode->i_security, - inode_free_by_rcu); + inode_free_by_rcu); } +/** + * security_dentry_init_security() - Perform dentry initialization + * @dentry: the dentry to initialize + * @mode: mode used to determine resource type + * @name: name of the last path component + * @xattr_name: name of the security/LSM xattr + * @ctx: pointer to the resulting LSM context + * @ctxlen: length of @ctx + * + * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available since NFSv4 + * has no label backed by an EA anyway. It is important to note that + * @xattr_name does not need to be free'd by the caller, it is a static string. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, const struct qstr *name, const char **xattr_name, void **ctx, @@ -1098,7 +1544,8 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, /* * Only one module will provide a security context. */ - hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, list) { + hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.dentry_init_security, + list) { rc = hp->hook.dentry_init_security(dentry, mode, name, xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen); if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(dentry_init_security)) @@ -1108,15 +1555,51 @@ int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security); +/** + * security_dentry_create_files_as() - Perform dentry initialization + * @dentry: the dentry to initialize + * @mode: mode used to determine resource type + * @name: name of the last path component + * @old: creds to use for LSM context calculations + * @new: creds to modify + * + * Compute a context for a dentry as the inode is not yet available and set + * that context in passed in creds so that new files are created using that + * context. Context is calculated using the passed in creds and not the creds + * of the caller. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new) { return call_int_hook(dentry_create_files_as, 0, dentry, mode, - name, old, new); + name, old, new); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_create_files_as); +/** + * security_inode_init_security() - Initialize an inode's LSM context + * @inode: the inode + * @dir: parent directory + * @qstr: last component of the pathname + * @initxattrs: callback function to write xattrs + * @fs_data: filesystem specific data + * + * Obtain the security attribute name suffix and value to set on a newly + * created inode and set up the incore security field for the new inode. This + * hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation transaction and + * provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike the post_create/mkdir/... + * hooks called by the VFS. The hook function is expected to allocate the name + * and value via kmalloc, with the caller being responsible for calling kfree + * after using them. If the security module does not use security attributes + * or does not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode, then + * it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EOPNOTSUPP if no security attribute is + * needed, or -ENOMEM on memory allocation failure. + */ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data) @@ -1134,9 +1617,9 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs)); lsm_xattr = new_xattrs; ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr, - &lsm_xattr->name, - &lsm_xattr->value, - &lsm_xattr->value_len); + &lsm_xattr->name, + &lsm_xattr->value, + &lsm_xattr->value_len); if (ret) goto out; @@ -1152,6 +1635,18 @@ out: } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security); +/** + * security_inode_init_security_anon() - Initialize an anonymous inode + * @inode: the inode + * @name: the anonymous inode class + * @context_inode: an optional related inode + * + * Set up the incore security field for the new anonymous inode and return + * whether the inode creation is permitted by the security module or not. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, -EACCES if the security module denies the + * creation of this inode, or another -errno upon other errors. + */ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode) @@ -1160,20 +1655,21 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode, context_inode); } -int security_old_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, - const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name, - void **value, size_t *len) -{ - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; - return call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, - qstr, name, value, len); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_old_inode_init_security); - #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH -int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, - unsigned int dev) +/** + * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: new file + * @mode: new file mode + * @dev: device number + * + * Check permissions when creating a file. Note that this hook is called even + * if mknod operation is being done for a regular file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, unsigned int dev) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; @@ -1181,7 +1677,18 @@ int security_path_mknod(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mknod); -int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +/** + * security_path_mkdir() - Check if creating a new directory is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: new directory + * @mode: new directory mode + * + * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) return 0; @@ -1189,6 +1696,15 @@ int security_path_mkdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_mkdir); +/** + * security_path_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: directory to remove + * + * Check the permission to remove a directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) @@ -1196,6 +1712,15 @@ int security_path_rmdir(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) return call_int_hook(path_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); } +/** + * security_path_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: file + * + * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dir->dentry)))) @@ -1204,6 +1729,16 @@ int security_path_unlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_unlink); +/** + * security_path_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: symbolic link + * @old_name: file pathname + * + * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *old_name) { @@ -1212,6 +1747,16 @@ int security_path_symlink(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, return call_int_hook(path_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); } +/** + * security_path_link - Check if creating a hard link is allowed + * @old_dentry: existing file + * @new_dir: new parent directory + * @new_dentry: new link + * + * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) { @@ -1220,19 +1765,42 @@ int security_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, return call_int_hook(path_link, 0, old_dentry, new_dir, new_dentry); } +/** + * security_path_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed + * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file + * @old_dentry: the old file + * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file + * @new_dentry: the new file + * @flags: flags + * + * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_rename(const struct path *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, const struct path *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, unsigned int flags) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || - (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) + (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && + IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) return 0; return call_int_hook(path_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, new_dir, - new_dentry, flags); + new_dentry, flags); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_path_rename); +/** + * security_path_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed + * @path: file + * + * Check permission before truncating the file indicated by path. Note that + * truncation permissions may also be checked based on already opened files, + * using the security_file_truncate() hook. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) @@ -1240,6 +1808,17 @@ int security_path_truncate(const struct path *path) return call_int_hook(path_truncate, 0, path); } +/** + * security_path_chmod() - Check if changing the file's mode is allowed + * @path: file + * @mode: new mode + * + * Check for permission to change a mode of the file @path. The new mode is + * specified in @mode which is a bitmask of constants from + * <include/uapi/linux/stat.h>. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) @@ -1247,6 +1826,16 @@ int security_path_chmod(const struct path *path, umode_t mode) return call_int_hook(path_chmod, 0, path, mode); } +/** + * security_path_chown() - Check if changing the file's owner/group is allowed + * @path: file + * @uid: file owner + * @gid: file group + * + * Check for permission to change owner/group of a file or directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) @@ -1254,13 +1843,32 @@ int security_path_chown(const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid) return call_int_hook(path_chown, 0, path, uid, gid); } +/** + * security_path_chroot() - Check if changing the root directory is allowed + * @path: directory + * + * Check for permission to change root directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path) { return call_int_hook(path_chroot, 0, path); } -#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */ -int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) +/** + * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed + * @dir: the parent directory + * @dentry: the file being created + * @mode: requested file mode + * + * Check permission to create a regular file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; @@ -1268,14 +1876,33 @@ int security_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_create); +/** + * security_inode_link() - Check if creating a hard link is allowed + * @old_dentry: existing file + * @dir: new parent directory + * @new_dentry: new link + * + * Check permission before creating a new hard link to a file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, - struct dentry *new_dentry) + struct dentry *new_dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_link, 0, old_dentry, dir, new_dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_unlink() - Check if removing a hard link is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: file + * + * Check the permission to remove a hard link to a file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) @@ -1283,14 +1910,35 @@ int security_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) return call_int_hook(inode_unlink, 0, dir, dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_symlink() - Check if creating a symbolic link is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: symbolic link + * @old_name: existing filename + * + * Check the permission to create a symbolic link to a file. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, - const char *old_name) + const char *old_name) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_symlink, 0, dir, dentry, old_name); } +/** + * security_inode_mkdir() - Check if creation a new director is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: new directory + * @mode: new directory mode + * + * Check permissions to create a new directory in the existing directory + * associated with inode structure @dir. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) @@ -1299,6 +1947,15 @@ int security_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_mkdir); +/** + * security_inode_rmdir() - Check if removing a directory is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: directory to be removed + * + * Check the permission to remove a directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) @@ -1306,32 +1963,68 @@ int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) return call_int_hook(inode_rmdir, 0, dir, dentry); } -int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) +/** + * security_inode_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed + * @dir: parent directory + * @dentry: new file + * @mode: new file mode + * @dev: device number + * + * Check permissions when creating a special file (or a socket or a fifo file + * created via the mknod system call). Note that if mknod operation is being + * done for a regular file, then the create hook will be called and not this + * hook. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, + umode_t mode, dev_t dev) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dir))) return 0; return call_int_hook(inode_mknod, 0, dir, dentry, mode, dev); } +/** + * security_inode_rename() - Check if renaming a file is allowed + * @old_dir: parent directory of the old file + * @old_dentry: the old file + * @new_dir: parent directory of the new file + * @new_dentry: the new file + * @flags: flags + * + * Check for permission to rename a file or directory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, - struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, - unsigned int flags) + struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, + unsigned int flags) { - if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || - (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(old_dentry)) || + (d_is_positive(new_dentry) && + IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(new_dentry))))) return 0; if (flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) { int err = call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, new_dir, new_dentry, - old_dir, old_dentry); + old_dir, old_dentry); if (err) return err; } return call_int_hook(inode_rename, 0, old_dir, old_dentry, - new_dir, new_dentry); + new_dir, new_dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_readlink() - Check if reading a symbolic link is allowed + * @dentry: link + * + * Check the permission to read the symbolic link. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) @@ -1339,6 +2032,17 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) return call_int_hook(inode_readlink, 0, dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_follow_link() - Check if following a symbolic link is allowed + * @dentry: link dentry + * @inode: link inode + * @rcu: true if in RCU-walk mode + * + * Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname. If + * @rcu is true, @inode is not stable. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, bool rcu) { @@ -1347,6 +2051,20 @@ int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, return call_int_hook(inode_follow_link, 0, dentry, inode, rcu); } +/** + * security_inode_permission() - Check if accessing an inode is allowed + * @inode: inode + * @mask: access mask + * + * Check permission before accessing an inode. This hook is called by the + * existing Linux permission function, so a security module can use it to + * provide additional checking for existing Linux permission checks. Notice + * that this hook is called when a file is opened (as well as many other + * operations), whereas the file_security_ops permission hook is called when + * the actual read/write operations are performed. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) @@ -1354,6 +2072,19 @@ int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) return call_int_hook(inode_permission, 0, inode, mask); } +/** + * security_inode_setattr() - Check if setting file attributes is allowed + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @attr: new attributes + * + * Check permission before setting file attributes. Note that the kernel call + * to notify_change is performed from several locations, whenever file + * attributes change (such as when a file is truncated, chown/chmod operations, + * transferring disk quotas, etc). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { @@ -1368,6 +2099,14 @@ int security_inode_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_inode_setattr); +/** + * security_inode_getattr() - Check if getting file attributes is allowed + * @path: file + * + * Check permission before obtaining file attributes. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(path->dentry)))) @@ -1375,6 +2114,19 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) return call_int_hook(inode_getattr, 0, path); } +/** + * security_inode_setxattr() - Check if setting file xattrs is allowed + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @name: xattr name + * @value: xattr value + * @size: size of xattr value + * @flags: flags + * + * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) @@ -1400,6 +2152,18 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_setxattr(idmap, dentry, name, value, size); } +/** + * security_inode_set_acl() - Check if setting posix acls is allowed + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @acl_name: acl name + * @kacl: acl struct + * + * Check permission before setting posix acls, the posix acls in @kacl are + * identified by @acl_name. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name, struct posix_acl *kacl) @@ -1418,6 +2182,17 @@ int security_inode_set_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_set_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name, kacl); } +/** + * security_inode_get_acl() - Check if reading posix acls is allowed + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @acl_name: acl name + * + * Check permission before getting osix acls, the posix acls are identified by + * @acl_name. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) { @@ -1426,6 +2201,17 @@ int security_inode_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return call_int_hook(inode_get_acl, 0, idmap, dentry, acl_name); } +/** + * security_inode_remove_acl() - Check if removing a posix acl is allowed + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @acl_name: acl name + * + * Check permission before removing posix acls, the posix acls are identified + * by @acl_name. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *acl_name) { @@ -1442,6 +2228,16 @@ int security_inode_remove_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_remove_acl(idmap, dentry, acl_name); } +/** + * security_inode_post_setxattr() - Update the inode after a setxattr operation + * @dentry: file + * @name: xattr name + * @value: xattr value + * @size: xattr value size + * @flags: flags + * + * Update inode security field after successful setxattr operation. + */ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { @@ -1451,6 +2247,16 @@ void security_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, evm_inode_post_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size); } +/** + * security_inode_getxattr() - Check if xattr access is allowed + * @dentry: file + * @name: xattr name + * + * Check permission before obtaining the extended attributes identified by + * @name for @dentry. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) @@ -1458,6 +2264,15 @@ int security_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) return call_int_hook(inode_getxattr, 0, dentry, name); } +/** + * security_inode_listxattr() - Check if listing xattrs is allowed + * @dentry: file + * + * Check permission before obtaining the list of extended attribute names for + * @dentry. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) @@ -1465,6 +2280,17 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) return call_int_hook(inode_listxattr, 0, dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_removexattr() - Check if removing an xattr is allowed + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: file + * @name: xattr name + * + * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name + * for @dentry. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { @@ -1487,17 +2313,55 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, return evm_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); } +/** + * security_inode_need_killpriv() - Check if security_inode_killpriv() required + * @dentry: associated dentry + * + * Called when an inode has been changed to determine if + * security_inode_killpriv() should be called. + * + * Return: Return <0 on error to abort the inode change operation, return 0 if + * security_inode_killpriv() does not need to be called, return >0 if + * security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called. + */ int security_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { return call_int_hook(inode_need_killpriv, 0, dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_killpriv() - The setuid bit is removed, update LSM state + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @dentry: associated dentry + * + * The @dentry's setuid bit is being removed. Remove similar security labels. + * Called with the dentry->d_inode->i_mutex held. + * + * Return: Return 0 on success. If error is returned, then the operation + * causing setuid bit removal is failed. + */ int security_inode_killpriv(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry) { return call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, 0, idmap, dentry); } +/** + * security_inode_getsecurity() - Get the xattr security label of an inode + * @idmap: idmap of the mount + * @inode: inode + * @name: xattr name + * @buffer: security label buffer + * @alloc: allocation flag + * + * Retrieve a copy of the extended attribute representation of the security + * label associated with @name for @inode via @buffer. Note that @name is the + * remainder of the attribute name after the security prefix has been removed. + * @alloc is used to specify if the call should return a value via the buffer + * or just the value length. + * + * Return: Returns size of buffer on success. + */ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) @@ -1511,14 +2375,31 @@ int security_inode_getsecurity(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name. */ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) { - rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, alloc); + rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(idmap, inode, name, buffer, + alloc); if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity)) return rc; } return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_getsecurity); } -int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) +/** + * security_inode_setsecurity() - Set the xattr security label of an inode + * @inode: inode + * @name: xattr name + * @value: security label + * @size: length of security label + * @flags: flags + * + * Set the security label associated with @name for @inode from the extended + * attribute value @value. @size indicates the size of the @value in bytes. + * @flags may be XATTR_CREATE, XATTR_REPLACE, or 0. Note that @name is the + * remainder of the attribute name after the security. prefix has been removed. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success. + */ +int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, + const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { struct security_hook_list *hp; int rc; @@ -1530,14 +2411,28 @@ int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void */ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size, - flags); + flags); if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity)) return rc; } return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_setsecurity); } -int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) +/** + * security_inode_listsecurity() - List the xattr security label names + * @inode: inode + * @buffer: buffer + * @buffer_size: size of buffer + * + * Copy the extended attribute names for the security labels associated with + * @inode into @buffer. The maximum size of @buffer is specified by + * @buffer_size. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer + * required. + * + * Return: Returns number of bytes used/required on success. + */ +int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, + char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) { if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) return 0; @@ -1545,17 +2440,49 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_listsecurity); +/** + * security_inode_getsecid() - Get an inode's secid + * @inode: inode + * @secid: secid to return + * + * Get the secid associated with the node. In case of failure, @secid will be + * set to zero. + */ void security_inode_getsecid(struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) { call_void_hook(inode_getsecid, inode, secid); } +/** + * security_inode_copy_up() - Create new creds for an overlayfs copy-up op + * @src: union dentry of copy-up file + * @new: newly created creds + * + * A file is about to be copied up from lower layer to upper layer of overlay + * filesystem. Security module can prepare a set of new creds and modify as + * need be and return new creds. Caller will switch to new creds temporarily to + * create new file and release newly allocated creds. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success or a negative error code on error. + */ int security_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *src, struct cred **new) { return call_int_hook(inode_copy_up, 0, src, new); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up); +/** + * security_inode_copy_up_xattr() - Filter xattrs in an overlayfs copy-up op + * @name: xattr name + * + * Filter the xattrs being copied up when a unioned file is copied up from a + * lower layer to the union/overlay layer. The caller is responsible for + * reading and writing the xattrs, this hook is merely a filter. + * + * Return: Returns 0 to accept the xattr, 1 to discard the xattr, -EOPNOTSUPP + * if the security module does not know about attribute, or a negative + * error code to abort the copy up. + */ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) { struct security_hook_list *hp; @@ -1567,7 +2494,7 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) * any other error code incase of an error. */ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, - &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { + &security_hook_heads.inode_copy_up_xattr, list) { rc = hp->hook.inode_copy_up_xattr(name); if (rc != LSM_RET_DEFAULT(inode_copy_up_xattr)) return rc; @@ -1577,12 +2504,41 @@ int security_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_copy_up_xattr); +/** + * security_kernfs_init_security() - Init LSM context for a kernfs node + * @kn_dir: parent kernfs node + * @kn: the kernfs node to initialize + * + * Initialize the security context of a newly created kernfs node based on its + * own and its parent's attributes. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir, struct kernfs_node *kn) { return call_int_hook(kernfs_init_security, 0, kn_dir, kn); } +/** + * security_file_permission() - Check file permissions + * @file: file + * @mask: requested permissions + * + * Check file permissions before accessing an open file. This hook is called + * by various operations that read or write files. A security module can use + * this hook to perform additional checking on these operations, e.g. to + * revalidate permissions on use to support privilege bracketing or policy + * changes. Notice that this hook is used when the actual read/write + * operations are performed, whereas the inode_security_ops hook is called when + * a file is opened (as well as many other operations). Although this hook can + * be used to revalidate permissions for various system call operations that + * read or write files, it does not address the revalidation of permissions for + * memory-mapped files. Security modules must handle this separately if they + * need such revalidation. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) { int ret; @@ -1594,6 +2550,15 @@ int security_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) return fsnotify_perm(file, mask); } +/** + * security_file_alloc() - Allocate and init a file's LSM blob + * @file: the file + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the file->f_security field. The + * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. + * + * Return: Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) { int rc = lsm_file_alloc(file); @@ -1606,6 +2571,12 @@ int security_file_alloc(struct file *file) return rc; } +/** + * security_file_free() - Free a file's LSM blob + * @file: the file + * + * Deallocate and free any security structures stored in file->f_security. + */ void security_file_free(struct file *file) { void *blob; @@ -1619,6 +2590,19 @@ void security_file_free(struct file *file) } } +/** + * security_file_ioctl() - Check if an ioctl is allowed + * @file: associated file + * @cmd: ioctl cmd + * @arg: ioctl arguments + * + * Check permission for an ioctl operation on @file. Note that @arg sometimes + * represents a user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer + * value. When @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used + * by the security module. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { return call_int_hook(file_ioctl, 0, file, cmd, arg); @@ -1658,8 +2642,19 @@ static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot) return prot; } +/** + * security_mmap_file() - Check if mmap'ing a file is allowed + * @file: file + * @prot: protection applied by the kernel + * @flags: flags + * + * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g. if + * mapping anonymous memory. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, - unsigned long flags) + unsigned long flags) { unsigned long prot_adj = mmap_prot(file, prot); int ret; @@ -1670,13 +2665,31 @@ int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, return ima_file_mmap(file, prot, prot_adj, flags); } +/** + * security_mmap_addr() - Check if mmap'ing an address is allowed + * @addr: address + * + * Check permissions for a mmap operation at @addr. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) { return call_int_hook(mmap_addr, 0, addr); } +/** + * security_file_mprotect() - Check if changing memory protections is allowed + * @vma: memory region + * @reqprot: application requested protection + * @prot: protection applied by the kernel + * + * Check permissions before changing memory access permissions. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, - unsigned long prot) + unsigned long prot) { int ret; @@ -1686,32 +2699,97 @@ int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot, return ima_file_mprotect(vma, prot); } +/** + * security_file_lock() - Check if a file lock is allowed + * @file: file + * @cmd: lock operation (e.g. F_RDLCK, F_WRLCK) + * + * Check permission before performing file locking operations. Note the hook + * mediates both flock and fcntl style locks. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) { return call_int_hook(file_lock, 0, file, cmd); } +/** + * security_file_fcntl() - Check if fcntl() op is allowed + * @file: file + * @cmd: fnctl command + * @arg: command argument + * + * Check permission before allowing the file operation specified by @cmd from + * being performed on the file @file. Note that @arg sometimes represents a + * user space pointer; in other cases, it may be a simple integer value. When + * @arg represents a user space pointer, it should never be used by the + * security module. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg) { return call_int_hook(file_fcntl, 0, file, cmd, arg); } +/** + * security_file_set_fowner() - Set the file owner info in the LSM blob + * @file: the file + * + * Save owner security information (typically from current->security) in + * file->f_security for later use by the send_sigiotask hook. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success. + */ void security_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) { call_void_hook(file_set_fowner, file); } +/** + * security_file_send_sigiotask() - Check if sending SIGIO/SIGURG is allowed + * @tsk: target task + * @fown: signal sender + * @sig: signal to be sent, SIGIO is sent if 0 + * + * Check permission for the file owner @fown to send SIGIO or SIGURG to the + * process @tsk. Note that this hook is sometimes called from interrupt. Note + * that the fown_struct, @fown, is never outside the context of a struct file, + * so the file structure (and associated security information) can always be + * obtained: container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, - struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) + struct fown_struct *fown, int sig) { return call_int_hook(file_send_sigiotask, 0, tsk, fown, sig); } +/** + * security_file_receive() - Check is receiving a file via IPC is allowed + * @file: file being received + * + * This hook allows security modules to control the ability of a process to + * receive an open file descriptor via socket IPC. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_receive(struct file *file) { return call_int_hook(file_receive, 0, file); } +/** + * security_file_open() - Save open() time state for late use by the LSM + * @file: + * + * Save open-time permission checking state for later use upon file_permission, + * and recheck access if anything has changed since inode_permission. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_open(struct file *file) { int ret; @@ -1723,11 +2801,30 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file) return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN); } +/** + * security_file_truncate() - Check if truncating a file is allowed + * @file: file + * + * Check permission before truncating a file, i.e. using ftruncate. Note that + * truncation permission may also be checked based on the path, using the + * @path_truncate hook. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_file_truncate(struct file *file) { return call_int_hook(file_truncate, 0, file); } +/** + * security_task_alloc() - Allocate a task's LSM blob + * @task: the task + * @clone_flags: flags indicating what is being shared + * + * Handle allocation of task-related resources. + * + * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) { int rc = lsm_task_alloc(task); @@ -1740,6 +2837,13 @@ int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags) return rc; } +/** + * security_task_free() - Free a task's LSM blob and related resources + * @task: task + * + * Handle release of task-related resources. Note that this can be called from + * interrupt context. + */ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) { call_void_hook(task_free, task); @@ -1748,6 +2852,16 @@ void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task) task->security = NULL; } +/** + * security_cred_alloc_blank() - Allocate the min memory to allow cred_transfer + * @cred: credentials + * @gfp: gfp flags + * + * Only allocate sufficient memory and attach to @cred such that + * cred_transfer() will not get ENOMEM. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) { int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(cred, gfp); @@ -1761,6 +2875,12 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) return rc; } +/** + * security_cred_free() - Free the cred's LSM blob and associated resources + * @cred: credentials + * + * Deallocate and clear the cred->security field in a set of credentials. + */ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) { /* @@ -1776,6 +2896,16 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred) cred->security = NULL; } +/** + * security_prepare_creds() - Prepare a new set of credentials + * @new: new credentials + * @old: original credentials + * @gfp: gfp flags + * + * Prepare a new set of credentials by copying the data from the old set. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) { int rc = lsm_cred_alloc(new, gfp); @@ -1789,11 +2919,26 @@ int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp) return rc; } +/** + * security_transfer_creds() - Transfer creds + * @new: target credentials + * @old: original credentials + * + * Transfer data from original creds to new creds. + */ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { call_void_hook(cred_transfer, new, old); } +/** + * security_cred_getsecid() - Get the secid from a set of credentials + * @c: credentials + * @secid: secid value + * + * Retrieve the security identifier of the cred structure @c. In case of + * failure, @secid will be set to zero. + */ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; @@ -1801,16 +2946,46 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid); +/** + * security_kernel_act_as() - Set the kernel credentials to act as secid + * @new: credentials + * @secid: secid + * + * Set the credentials for a kernel service to act as (subjective context). + * The current task must be the one that nominated @secid. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if successful. + */ int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) { return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid); } +/** + * security_kernel_create_files_as() - Set file creation context using an inode + * @new: target credentials + * @inode: reference inode + * + * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to be the same as the + * objective context of the specified inode. The current task must be the one + * that nominated @inode. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if successful. + */ int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) { return call_int_hook(kernel_create_files_as, 0, new, inode); } +/** + * security_kernel_module_request() - Check is loading a module is allowed + * @kmod_name: module name + * + * Ability to trigger the kernel to automatically upcall to userspace for + * userspace to load a kernel module with the given name. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if successful. + */ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) { int ret; @@ -1821,6 +2996,16 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) return integrity_kernel_module_request(kmod_name); } +/** + * security_kernel_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace + * @file: file + * @id: file identifier + * @contents: trust if security_kernel_post_read_file() will be called + * + * Read a file specified by userspace. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { @@ -1833,6 +3018,19 @@ int security_kernel_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_read_file); +/** + * security_kernel_post_read_file() - Read a file specified by userspace + * @file: file + * @buf: file contents + * @size: size of file contents + * @id: file identifier + * + * Read a file specified by userspace. This must be paired with a prior call + * to security_kernel_read_file() call that indicated this hook would also be + * called, see security_kernel_read_file() for more information. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id) { @@ -1845,6 +3043,15 @@ int security_kernel_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_read_file); +/** + * security_kernel_load_data() - Load data provided by userspace + * @id: data identifier + * @contents: true if security_kernel_post_load_data() will be called + * + * Load data provided by userspace. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { int ret; @@ -1856,6 +3063,20 @@ int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_load_data); +/** + * security_kernel_post_load_data() - Load userspace data from a non-file source + * @buf: data + * @size: size of data + * @id: data identifier + * @description: text description of data, specific to the id value + * + * Load data provided by a non-file source (usually userspace buffer). This + * must be paired with a prior security_kernel_load_data() call that indicated + * this hook would also be called, see security_kernel_load_data() for more + * information. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_load_data_id id, char *description) @@ -1870,38 +3091,112 @@ int security_kernel_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(security_kernel_post_load_data); +/** + * security_task_fix_setuid() - Update LSM with new user id attributes + * @new: updated credentials + * @old: credentials being replaced + * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag values + * + * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the user identity + * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of + * the set*uid system calls invoked this hook. If @new is the set of + * credentials that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this + * rather than to @current->cred. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success. + */ int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) { return call_int_hook(task_fix_setuid, 0, new, old, flags); } +/** + * security_task_fix_setgid() - Update LSM with new group id attributes + * @new: updated credentials + * @old: credentials being replaced + * @flags: LSM_SETID_* flag value + * + * Update the module's state after setting one or more of the group identity + * attributes of the current process. The @flags parameter indicates which of + * the set*gid system calls invoked this hook. @new is the set of credentials + * that will be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to + * @current->cred. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success. + */ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, - int flags) + int flags) { return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgid, 0, new, old, flags); } +/** + * security_task_fix_setgroups() - Update LSM with new supplementary groups + * @new: updated credentials + * @old: credentials being replaced + * + * Update the module's state after setting the supplementary group identity + * attributes of the current process. @new is the set of credentials that will + * be installed. Modifications should be made to this rather than to + * @current->cred. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success. + */ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { return call_int_hook(task_fix_setgroups, 0, new, old); } +/** + * security_task_setpgid() - Check if setting the pgid is allowed + * @p: task being modified + * @pgid: new pgid + * + * Check permission before setting the process group identifier of the process + * @p to @pgid. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) { return call_int_hook(task_setpgid, 0, p, pgid); } +/** + * security_task_getpgid() - Check if getting the pgid is allowed + * @p: task + * + * Check permission before getting the process group identifier of the process + * @p. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) { return call_int_hook(task_getpgid, 0, p); } +/** + * security_task_getsid() - Check if getting the session id is allowed + * @p: task + * + * Check permission before getting the session identifier of the process @p. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) { return call_int_hook(task_getsid, 0, p); } +/** + * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid + * @secid: secid value + * + * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return + * it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + */ void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; @@ -1909,6 +3204,14 @@ void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj); +/** + * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid + * @p: target task + * @secid: secid value + * + * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and + * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero. + */ void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; @@ -1916,56 +3219,159 @@ void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj); +/** + * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed + * @p: target task + * @nice: nice value + * + * Check permission before setting the nice value of @p to @nice. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) { return call_int_hook(task_setnice, 0, p, nice); } +/** + * security_task_setioprio() - Check if setting a task's ioprio is allowed + * @p: target task + * @ioprio: ioprio value + * + * Check permission before setting the ioprio value of @p to @ioprio. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) { return call_int_hook(task_setioprio, 0, p, ioprio); } +/** + * security_task_getioprio() - Check if getting a task's ioprio is allowed + * @p: task + * + * Check permission before getting the ioprio value of @p. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) { return call_int_hook(task_getioprio, 0, p); } +/** + * security_task_prlimit() - Check if get/setting resources limits is allowed + * @cred: current task credentials + * @tcred: target task credentials + * @flags: LSM_PRLIMIT_* flag bits indicating a get/set/both + * + * Check permission before getting and/or setting the resource limits of + * another task. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_prlimit(const struct cred *cred, const struct cred *tcred, unsigned int flags) { return call_int_hook(task_prlimit, 0, cred, tcred, flags); } +/** + * security_task_setrlimit() - Check if setting a new rlimit value is allowed + * @p: target task's group leader + * @resource: resource whose limit is being set + * @new_rlim: new resource limit + * + * Check permission before setting the resource limits of process @p for + * @resource to @new_rlim. The old resource limit values can be examined by + * dereferencing (p->signal->rlim + resource). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, - struct rlimit *new_rlim) + struct rlimit *new_rlim) { return call_int_hook(task_setrlimit, 0, p, resource, new_rlim); } +/** + * security_task_setscheduler() - Check if setting sched policy/param is allowed + * @p: target task + * + * Check permission before setting scheduling policy and/or parameters of + * process @p. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return call_int_hook(task_setscheduler, 0, p); } +/** + * security_task_getscheduler() - Check if getting scheduling info is allowed + * @p: target task + * + * Check permission before obtaining scheduling information for process @p. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) { return call_int_hook(task_getscheduler, 0, p); } +/** + * security_task_movememory() - Check if moving memory is allowed + * @p: task + * + * Check permission before moving memory owned by process @p. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) { return call_int_hook(task_movememory, 0, p); } +/** + * security_task_kill() - Check if sending a signal is allowed + * @p: target process + * @info: signal information + * @sig: signal value + * @cred: credentials of the signal sender, NULL if @current + * + * Check permission before sending signal @sig to @p. @info can be NULL, the + * constant 1, or a pointer to a kernel_siginfo structure. If @info is 1 or + * SI_FROMKERNEL(info) is true, then the signal should be viewed as coming from + * the kernel and should typically be permitted. SIGIO signals are handled + * separately by the send_sigiotask hook in file_security_ops. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct kernel_siginfo *info, - int sig, const struct cred *cred) + int sig, const struct cred *cred) { return call_int_hook(task_kill, 0, p, info, sig, cred); } +/** + * security_task_prctl() - Check if a prctl op is allowed + * @option: operation + * @arg2: argument + * @arg3: argument + * @arg4: argument + * @arg5: argument + * + * Check permission before performing a process control operation on the + * current process. + * + * Return: Return -ENOSYS if no-one wanted to handle this op, any other value + * to cause prctl() to return immediately with that value. + */ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, - unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) { int thisrc; int rc = LSM_RET_DEFAULT(task_prctl); @@ -1982,27 +3388,69 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, return rc; } +/** + * security_task_to_inode() - Set the security attributes of a task's inode + * @p: task + * @inode: inode + * + * Set the security attributes for an inode based on an associated task's + * security attributes, e.g. for /proc/pid inodes. + */ void security_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode) { call_void_hook(task_to_inode, p, inode); } +/** + * security_create_user_ns() - Check if creating a new userns is allowed + * @cred: prepared creds + * + * Check permission prior to creating a new user namespace. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if successful, otherwise < 0 error code. + */ int security_create_user_ns(const struct cred *cred) { return call_int_hook(userns_create, 0, cred); } +/** + * security_ipc_permission() - Check if sysv ipc access is allowed + * @ipcp: ipc permission structure + * @flag: requested permissions + * + * Check permissions for access to IPC. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) { return call_int_hook(ipc_permission, 0, ipcp, flag); } +/** + * security_ipc_getsecid() - Get the sysv ipc object's secid + * @ipcp: ipc permission structure + * @secid: secid pointer + * + * Get the secid associated with the ipc object. In case of failure, @secid + * will be set to zero. + */ void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; call_void_hook(ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); } +/** + * security_msg_msg_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc message LSM blob + * @msg: message structure + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the msg->security field. The + * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. + * + * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) { int rc = lsm_msg_msg_alloc(msg); @@ -2015,6 +3463,12 @@ int security_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *msg) return rc; } +/** + * security_msg_msg_free() - Free a sysv ipc message LSM blob + * @msg: message structure + * + * Deallocate the security structure for this message. + */ void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) { call_void_hook(msg_msg_free_security, msg); @@ -2022,6 +3476,15 @@ void security_msg_msg_free(struct msg_msg *msg) msg->security = NULL; } +/** + * security_msg_queue_alloc() - Allocate a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob + * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to @msg. The security field is + * initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) { int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(msq); @@ -2034,6 +3497,12 @@ int security_msg_queue_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) return rc; } +/** + * security_msg_queue_free() - Free a sysv ipc msg queue LSM blob + * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure + * + * Deallocate security field @perm->security for the message queue. + */ void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) { call_void_hook(msg_queue_free_security, msq); @@ -2041,28 +3510,84 @@ void security_msg_queue_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq) msq->security = NULL; } +/** + * security_msg_queue_associate() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed + * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure + * @msqflg: operation flags + * + * Check permission when a message queue is requested through the msgget system + * call. This hook is only called when returning the message queue identifier + * for an existing message queue, not when a new message queue is created. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_msg_queue_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int msqflg) { return call_int_hook(msg_queue_associate, 0, msq, msqflg); } +/** + * security_msg_queue_msgctl() - Check if a msg queue operation is allowed + * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure + * @cmd: operation + * + * Check permission when a message control operation specified by @cmd is to be + * performed on the message queue with permissions. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_msg_queue_msgctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, int cmd) { return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgctl, 0, msq, cmd); } +/** + * security_msg_queue_msgsnd() - Check if sending a sysv ipc message is allowed + * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure + * @msg: message + * @msqflg: operation flags + * + * Check permission before a message, @msg, is enqueued on the message queue + * with permissions specified in @msq. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, - struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) + struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) { return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgsnd, 0, msq, msg, msqflg); } +/** + * security_msg_queue_msgrcv() - Check if receiving a sysv ipc msg is allowed + * @msq: sysv ipc permission structure + * @msg: message + * @target: target task + * @type: type of message requested + * @mode: operation flags + * + * Check permission before a message, @msg, is removed from the message queue. + * The @target task structure contains a pointer to the process that will be + * receiving the message (not equal to the current process when inline receives + * are being performed). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct kern_ipc_perm *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, - struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) + struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode) { return call_int_hook(msg_queue_msgrcv, 0, msq, msg, target, type, mode); } +/** + * security_shm_alloc() - Allocate a sysv shm LSM blob + * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @shp security field. The + * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) { int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(shp); @@ -2075,6 +3600,12 @@ int security_shm_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) return rc; } +/** + * security_shm_free() - Free a sysv shm LSM blob + * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure + * + * Deallocate the security structure @perm->security for the memory segment. + */ void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) { call_void_hook(shm_free_security, shp); @@ -2082,21 +3613,65 @@ void security_shm_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp) shp->security = NULL; } +/** + * security_shm_associate() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed + * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure + * @shmflg: operation flags + * + * Check permission when a shared memory region is requested through the shmget + * system call. This hook is only called when returning the shared memory + * region identifier for an existing region, not when a new shared memory + * region is created. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_shm_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int shmflg) { return call_int_hook(shm_associate, 0, shp, shmflg); } +/** + * security_shm_shmctl() - Check if a sysv shm operation is allowed + * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure + * @cmd: operation + * + * Check permission when a shared memory control operation specified by @cmd is + * to be performed on the shared memory region with permissions in @shp. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_shm_shmctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, int cmd) { return call_int_hook(shm_shmctl, 0, shp, cmd); } -int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) +/** + * security_shm_shmat() - Check if a sysv shm attach operation is allowed + * @shp: sysv ipc permission structure + * @shmaddr: address of memory region to attach + * @shmflg: operation flags + * + * Check permissions prior to allowing the shmat system call to attach the + * shared memory segment with permissions @shp to the data segment of the + * calling process. The attaching address is specified by @shmaddr. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_shm_shmat(struct kern_ipc_perm *shp, + char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) { return call_int_hook(shm_shmat, 0, shp, shmaddr, shmflg); } +/** + * security_sem_alloc() - Allocate a sysv semaphore LSM blob + * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the @sma security field. The + * security field is initialized to NULL when the structure is first created. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful and permission is granted. + */ int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) { int rc = lsm_ipc_alloc(sma); @@ -2109,6 +3684,12 @@ int security_sem_alloc(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) return rc; } +/** + * security_sem_free() - Free a sysv semaphore LSM blob + * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure + * + * Deallocate security structure @sma->security for the semaphore. + */ void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) { call_void_hook(sem_free_security, sma); @@ -2116,22 +3697,62 @@ void security_sem_free(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma) sma->security = NULL; } +/** + * security_sem_associate() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed + * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure + * @semflg: operation flags + * + * Check permission when a semaphore is requested through the semget system + * call. This hook is only called when returning the semaphore identifier for + * an existing semaphore, not when a new one must be created. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sem_associate(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int semflg) { return call_int_hook(sem_associate, 0, sma, semflg); } +/** + * security_sem_semctl() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed + * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure + * @cmd: operation + * + * Check permission when a semaphore operation specified by @cmd is to be + * performed on the semaphore. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sem_semctl(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, int cmd) { return call_int_hook(sem_semctl, 0, sma, cmd); } +/** + * security_sem_semop() - Check if a sysv semaphore operation is allowed + * @sma: sysv ipc permission structure + * @sops: operations to perform + * @nsops: number of operations + * @alter: flag indicating changes will be made + * + * Check permissions before performing operations on members of the semaphore + * set. If the @alter flag is nonzero, the semaphore set may be modified. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sem_semop(struct kern_ipc_perm *sma, struct sembuf *sops, - unsigned nsops, int alter) + unsigned nsops, int alter) { return call_int_hook(sem_semop, 0, sma, sops, nsops, alter); } +/** + * security_d_instantiate() - Populate an inode's LSM state based on a dentry + * @dentry: dentry + * @inode: inode + * + * Fill in @inode security information for a @dentry if allowed. + */ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) { if (unlikely(inode && IS_PRIVATE(inode))) @@ -2140,6 +3761,17 @@ void security_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_d_instantiate); +/** + * security_getprocattr() - Read an attribute for a task + * @p: the task + * @lsm: LSM name + * @name: attribute name + * @value: attribute value + * + * Read attribute @name for task @p and store it into @value if allowed. + * + * Return: Returns the length of @value on success, a negative value otherwise. + */ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, const char *name, char **value) { @@ -2153,6 +3785,18 @@ int security_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, const char *lsm, return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(getprocattr); } +/** + * security_setprocattr() - Set an attribute for a task + * @lsm: LSM name + * @name: attribute name + * @value: attribute value + * @size: attribute value size + * + * Write (set) the current task's attribute @name to @value, size @size if + * allowed. + * + * Return: Returns bytes written on success, a negative value otherwise. + */ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size) { @@ -2166,17 +3810,51 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, return LSM_RET_DEFAULT(setprocattr); } +/** + * security_netlink_send() - Save info and check if netlink sending is allowed + * @sk: sending socket + * @skb: netlink message + * + * Save security information for a netlink message so that permission checking + * can be performed when the message is processed. The security information + * can be saved using the eff_cap field of the netlink_skb_parms structure. + * Also may be used to provide fine grained control over message transmission. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if the information was successfully saved and message is + * allowed to be transmitted. + */ int security_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { return call_int_hook(netlink_send, 0, sk, skb); } +/** + * security_ismaclabel() - Check is the named attribute is a MAC label + * @name: full extended attribute name + * + * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name represents a MAC label. + * + * Return: Returns 1 if name is a MAC attribute otherwise returns 0. + */ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) { return call_int_hook(ismaclabel, 0, name); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ismaclabel); +/** + * security_secid_to_secctx() - Convert a secid to a secctx + * @secid: secid + * @secdata: secctx + * @seclen: secctx length + * + * Convert secid to security context. If @secdata is NULL the length of the + * result will be returned in @seclen, but no @secdata will be returned. This + * does mean that the length could change between calls to check the length and + * the next call which actually allocates and returns the @secdata. + * + * Return: Return 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) { struct security_hook_list *hp; @@ -2196,6 +3874,16 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secid_to_secctx); +/** + * security_secctx_to_secid() - Convert a secctx to a secid + * @secdata: secctx + * @seclen: length of secctx + * @secid: secid + * + * Convert security context to secid. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) { *secid = 0; @@ -2203,30 +3891,86 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secctx_to_secid); +/** + * security_release_secctx() - Free a secctx buffer + * @secdata: secctx + * @seclen: length of secctx + * + * Release the security context. + */ void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) { call_void_hook(release_secctx, secdata, seclen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_release_secctx); +/** + * security_inode_invalidate_secctx() - Invalidate an inode's security label + * @inode: inode + * + * Notify the security module that it must revalidate the security context of + * an inode. + */ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode) { call_void_hook(inode_invalidate_secctx, inode); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_invalidate_secctx); +/** + * security_inode_notifysecctx() - Nofify the LSM of an inode's security label + * @inode: inode + * @ctx: secctx + * @ctxlen: length of secctx + * + * Notify the security module of what the security context of an inode should + * be. Initializes the incore security context managed by the security module + * for this inode. Example usage: NFS client invokes this hook to initialize + * the security context in its incore inode to the value provided by the server + * for the file when the server returned the file's attributes to the client. + * Must be called with inode->i_mutex locked. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return call_int_hook(inode_notifysecctx, 0, inode, ctx, ctxlen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_notifysecctx); +/** + * security_inode_setsecctx() - Change the security label of an inode + * @dentry: inode + * @ctx: secctx + * @ctxlen: length of secctx + * + * Change the security context of an inode. Updates the incore security + * context managed by the security module and invokes the fs code as needed + * (via __vfs_setxattr_noperm) to update any backing xattrs that represent the + * context. Example usage: NFS server invokes this hook to change the security + * context in its incore inode and on the backing filesystem to a value + * provided by the client on a SETATTR operation. Must be called with + * inode->i_mutex locked. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) { return call_int_hook(inode_setsecctx, 0, dentry, ctx, ctxlen); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_setsecctx); +/** + * security_inode_getsecctx() - Get the security label of an inode + * @inode: inode + * @ctx: secctx + * @ctxlen: length of secctx + * + * On success, returns 0 and fills out @ctx and @ctxlen with the security + * context for the given @inode. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) { return call_int_hook(inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, ctx, ctxlen); @@ -2234,6 +3978,16 @@ int security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_getsecctx); #ifdef CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE +/** + * security_post_notification() - Check if a watch notification can be posted + * @w_cred: credentials of the task that set the watch + * @cred: credentials of the task which triggered the watch + * @n: the notification + * + * Check to see if a watch notification can be posted to a particular queue. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, const struct cred *cred, struct watch_notification *n) @@ -2243,106 +3997,336 @@ int security_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, #endif /* CONFIG_WATCH_QUEUE */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS +/** + * security_watch_key() - Check if a task is allowed to watch for key events + * @key: the key to watch + * + * Check to see if a process is allowed to watch for event notifications from + * a key or keyring. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_watch_key(struct key *key) { return call_int_hook(watch_key, 0, key); } -#endif +#endif /* CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK - -int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) +/** + * security_unix_stream_connect() - Check if a AF_UNIX stream is allowed + * @sock: originating sock + * @other: peer sock + * @newsk: new sock + * + * Check permissions before establishing a Unix domain stream connection + * between @sock and @other. + * + * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because + * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix + * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name + * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod + * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to + * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient + * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible + * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target + * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, + struct sock *newsk) { return call_int_hook(unix_stream_connect, 0, sock, other, newsk); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_stream_connect); +/** + * security_unix_may_send() - Check if AF_UNIX socket can send datagrams + * @sock: originating sock + * @other: peer sock + * + * Check permissions before connecting or sending datagrams from @sock to + * @other. + * + * The @unix_stream_connect and @unix_may_send hooks were necessary because + * Linux provides an alternative to the conventional file name space for Unix + * domain sockets. Whereas binding and connecting to sockets in the file name + * space is mediated by the typical file permissions (and caught by the mknod + * and permission hooks in inode_security_ops), binding and connecting to + * sockets in the abstract name space is completely unmediated. Sufficient + * control of Unix domain sockets in the abstract name space isn't possible + * using only the socket layer hooks, since we need to know the actual target + * socket, which is not looked up until we are inside the af_unix code. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { return call_int_hook(unix_may_send, 0, sock, other); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_may_send); +/** + * security_socket_create() - Check if creating a new socket is allowed + * @family: protocol family + * @type: communications type + * @protocol: requested protocol + * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested + * + * Check permissions prior to creating a new socket. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { return call_int_hook(socket_create, 0, family, type, protocol, kern); } +/** + * security_socket_post_create() - Initialize a newly created socket + * @sock: socket + * @family: protocol family + * @type: communications type + * @protocol: requested protocol + * @kern: set to 1 if a kernel socket is requested + * + * This hook allows a module to update or allocate a per-socket security + * structure. Note that the security field was not added directly to the socket + * structure, but rather, the socket security information is stored in the + * associated inode. Typically, the inode alloc_security hook will allocate + * and attach security information to SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security. This hook + * may be used to update the SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security field with additional + * information that wasn't available when the inode was allocated. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, int type, int protocol, int kern) { return call_int_hook(socket_post_create, 0, sock, family, type, - protocol, kern); + protocol, kern); } +/** + * security_socket_socketpair() - Check if creating a socketpair is allowed + * @socka: first socket + * @sockb: second socket + * + * Check permissions before creating a fresh pair of sockets. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted and the connection was + * established. + */ int security_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { return call_int_hook(socket_socketpair, 0, socka, sockb); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_socketpair); -int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +/** + * security_socket_bind() - Check if a socket bind operation is allowed + * @sock: socket + * @address: requested bind address + * @addrlen: length of address + * + * Check permission before socket protocol layer bind operation is performed + * and the socket @sock is bound to the address specified in the @address + * parameter. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { return call_int_hook(socket_bind, 0, sock, address, addrlen); } -int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) +/** + * security_socket_connect() - Check if a socket connect operation is allowed + * @sock: socket + * @address: address of remote connection point + * @addrlen: length of address + * + * Check permission before socket protocol layer connect operation attempts to + * connect socket @sock to a remote address, @address. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, + struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { return call_int_hook(socket_connect, 0, sock, address, addrlen); } +/** + * security_socket_listen() - Check if a socket is allowed to listen + * @sock: socket + * @backlog: connection queue size + * + * Check permission before socket protocol layer listen operation. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) { return call_int_hook(socket_listen, 0, sock, backlog); } +/** + * security_socket_accept() - Check if a socket is allowed to accept connections + * @sock: listening socket + * @newsock: newly creation connection socket + * + * Check permission before accepting a new connection. Note that the new + * socket, @newsock, has been created and some information copied to it, but + * the accept operation has not actually been performed. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) { return call_int_hook(socket_accept, 0, sock, newsock); } +/** + * security_socket_sendmsg() - Check is sending a message is allowed + * @sock: sending socket + * @msg: message to send + * @size: size of message + * + * Check permission before transmitting a message to another socket. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size) { return call_int_hook(socket_sendmsg, 0, sock, msg, size); } +/** + * security_socket_recvmsg() - Check if receiving a message is allowed + * @sock: receiving socket + * @msg: message to receive + * @size: size of message + * @flags: operational flags + * + * Check permission before receiving a message from a socket. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags) { return call_int_hook(socket_recvmsg, 0, sock, msg, size, flags); } +/** + * security_socket_getsockname() - Check if reading the socket addr is allowed + * @sock: socket + * + * Check permission before reading the local address (name) of the socket + * object. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) { return call_int_hook(socket_getsockname, 0, sock); } +/** + * security_socket_getpeername() - Check if reading the peer's addr is allowed + * @sock: socket + * + * Check permission before the remote address (name) of a socket object. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) { return call_int_hook(socket_getpeername, 0, sock); } +/** + * security_socket_getsockopt() - Check if reading a socket option is allowed + * @sock: socket + * @level: option's protocol level + * @optname: option name + * + * Check permissions before retrieving the options associated with socket + * @sock. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { return call_int_hook(socket_getsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); } +/** + * security_socket_setsockopt() - Check if setting a socket option is allowed + * @sock: socket + * @level: option's protocol level + * @optname: option name + * + * Check permissions before setting the options associated with socket @sock. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) { return call_int_hook(socket_setsockopt, 0, sock, level, optname); } +/** + * security_socket_shutdown() - Checks if shutting down the socket is allowed + * @sock: socket + * @how: flag indicating how sends and receives are handled + * + * Checks permission before all or part of a connection on the socket @sock is + * shut down. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) { return call_int_hook(socket_shutdown, 0, sock, how); } +/** + * security_sock_rcv_skb() - Check if an incoming network packet is allowed + * @sk: destination sock + * @skb: incoming packet + * + * Check permissions on incoming network packets. This hook is distinct from + * Netfilter's IP input hooks since it is the first time that the incoming + * sk_buff @skb has been associated with a particular socket, @sk. Must not + * sleep inside this hook because some callers hold spinlocks. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { return call_int_hook(socket_sock_rcv_skb, 0, sk, skb); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_rcv_skb); +/** + * security_socket_getpeersec_stream() - Get the remote peer label + * @sock: socket + * @optval: destination buffer + * @optlen: size of peer label copied into the buffer + * @len: maximum size of the destination buffer + * + * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state + * for unix or connected tcp sockets to userspace via getsockopt SO_GETPEERSEC. + * For tcp sockets this can be meaningful if the socket is associated with an + * ipsec SA. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if all is well, otherwise, typical getsockopt return + * values. + */ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, sockptr_t optlen, unsigned int len) { @@ -2350,23 +4334,62 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, sockptr_t optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) +/** + * security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() - Get the remote peer label + * @sock: socket + * @skb: datagram packet + * @secid: remote peer label secid + * + * This hook allows the security module to provide peer socket security state + * for udp sockets on a per-packet basis to userspace via getsockopt + * SO_GETPEERSEC. The application must first have indicated the IP_PASSSEC + * option via getsockopt. It can then retrieve the security state returned by + * this hook for a packet via the SCM_SECURITY ancillary message type. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, + struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { return call_int_hook(socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT, sock, skb, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram); +/** + * security_sk_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a sock's LSM blob + * @sk: sock + * @family: protocol family + * @priority: gfp flags + * + * Allocate and attach a security structure to the sk->sk_security field, which + * is used to copy security attributes between local stream sockets. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_sk_alloc(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { return call_int_hook(sk_alloc_security, 0, sk, family, priority); } +/** + * security_sk_free() - Free the sock's LSM blob + * @sk: sock + * + * Deallocate security structure. + */ void security_sk_free(struct sock *sk) { call_void_hook(sk_free_security, sk); } +/** + * security_sk_clone() - Clone a sock's LSM state + * @sk: original sock + * @newsk: target sock + * + * Clone/copy security structure. + */ void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { call_void_hook(sk_clone_security, sk, newsk); @@ -2379,6 +4402,13 @@ void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi_common *flic) } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow); +/** + * security_req_classify_flow() - Set a flow's secid based on request_sock + * @req: request_sock + * @flic: target flow + * + * Sets @flic's secid to @req's secid. + */ void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, struct flowi_common *flic) { @@ -2386,92 +4416,215 @@ void security_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_req_classify_flow); +/** + * security_sock_graft() - Reconcile LSM state when grafting a sock on a socket + * @sk: sock being grafted + * @parent: target parent socket + * + * Sets @parent's inode secid to @sk's secid and update @sk with any necessary + * LSM state from @parent. + */ void security_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { call_void_hook(sock_graft, sk, parent); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sock_graft); +/** + * security_inet_conn_request() - Set request_sock state using incoming connect + * @sk: parent listening sock + * @skb: incoming connection + * @req: new request_sock + * + * Initialize the @req LSM state based on @sk and the incoming connect in @skb. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, - struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) + struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { return call_int_hook(inet_conn_request, 0, sk, skb, req); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_request); +/** + * security_inet_csk_clone() - Set new sock LSM state based on request_sock + * @newsk: new sock + * @req: connection request_sock + * + * Set that LSM state of @sock using the LSM state from @req. + */ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, - const struct request_sock *req) + const struct request_sock *req) { call_void_hook(inet_csk_clone, newsk, req); } +/** + * security_inet_conn_established() - Update sock's LSM state with connection + * @sk: sock + * @skb: connection packet + * + * Update @sock's LSM state to represent a new connection from @skb. + */ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, - struct sk_buff *skb) + struct sk_buff *skb) { call_void_hook(inet_conn_established, sk, skb); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inet_conn_established); +/** + * security_secmark_relabel_packet() - Check if setting a secmark is allowed + * @secid: new secmark value + * + * Check if the process should be allowed to relabel packets to @secid. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 secid) { return call_int_hook(secmark_relabel_packet, 0, secid); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_relabel_packet); +/** + * security_secmark_refcount_inc() - Increment the secmark labeling rule count + * + * Tells the LSM to increment the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. + */ void security_secmark_refcount_inc(void) { call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_inc); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_inc); +/** + * security_secmark_refcount_dec() - Decrement the secmark labeling rule count + * + * Tells the LSM to decrement the number of secmark labeling rules loaded. + */ void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void) { call_void_hook(secmark_refcount_dec); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec); +/** + * security_tun_dev_alloc_security() - Allocate a LSM blob for a TUN device + * @security: pointer to the LSM blob + * + * This hook allows a module to allocate a security structure for a TUN device, + * returning the pointer in @security. + * + * Return: Returns a zero on success, negative values on failure. + */ int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) { return call_int_hook(tun_dev_alloc_security, 0, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security); +/** + * security_tun_dev_free_security() - Free a TUN device LSM blob + * @security: LSM blob + * + * This hook allows a module to free the security structure for a TUN device. + */ void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) { call_void_hook(tun_dev_free_security, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security); +/** + * security_tun_dev_create() - Check if creating a TUN device is allowed + * + * Check permissions prior to creating a new TUN device. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_tun_dev_create(void) { return call_int_hook(tun_dev_create, 0); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create); +/** + * security_tun_dev_attach_queue() - Check if attaching a TUN queue is allowed + * @security: TUN device LSM blob + * + * Check permissions prior to attaching to a TUN device queue. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach_queue, 0, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue); +/** + * security_tun_dev_attach() - Update TUN device LSM state on attach + * @sk: associated sock + * @security: TUN device LSM blob + * + * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated + * with the TUN device's sock structure. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { return call_int_hook(tun_dev_attach, 0, sk, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach); +/** + * security_tun_dev_open() - Update TUN device LSM state on open + * @security: TUN device LSM blob + * + * This hook can be used by the module to update any security state associated + * with the TUN device's security structure. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_tun_dev_open(void *security) { return call_int_hook(tun_dev_open, 0, security); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open); -int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) +/** + * security_sctp_assoc_request() - Update the LSM on a SCTP association req + * @asoc: SCTP association + * @skb: packet requesting the association + * + * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association INIT packet to the LSM. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ +int security_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sk_buff *skb) { return call_int_hook(sctp_assoc_request, 0, asoc, skb); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_request); +/** + * security_sctp_bind_connect() - Validate a list of addrs for a SCTP option + * @sk: socket + * @optname: SCTP option to validate + * @address: list of IP addresses to validate + * @addrlen: length of the address list + * + * Validiate permissions required for each address associated with sock @sk. + * Depending on @optname, the addresses will be treated as either a connect or + * bind service. The @addrlen is calculated on each IPv4 and IPv6 address using + * sizeof(struct sockaddr_in) or sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6). + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { @@ -2480,6 +4633,16 @@ int security_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_bind_connect); +/** + * security_sctp_sk_clone() - Clone a SCTP sock's LSM state + * @asoc: SCTP association + * @sk: original sock + * @newsk: target sock + * + * Called whenever a new socket is created by accept(2) (i.e. a TCP style + * socket) or when a socket is 'peeled off' e.g userspace calls + * sctp_peeloff(3). + */ void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { @@ -2487,6 +4650,16 @@ void security_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_sk_clone); +/** + * security_sctp_assoc_established() - Update LSM state when assoc established + * @asoc: SCTP association + * @skb: packet establishing the association + * + * Passes the @asoc and @chunk->skb of the association COOKIE_ACK packet to the + * security module. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) { @@ -2497,25 +4670,60 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sctp_assoc_established); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND - +/** + * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed + * @sec: LSM blob + * @subnet_prefix: subnet prefix of the port + * @pkey: IB pkey + * + * Check permission to access a pkey when modifing a QP. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey) { return call_int_hook(ib_pkey_access, 0, sec, subnet_prefix, pkey); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_pkey_access); -int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) +/** + * security_ib_endport_manage_subnet() - Check if SMPs traffic is allowed + * @sec: LSM blob + * @dev_name: IB device name + * @port_num: port number + * + * Check permissions to send and receive SMPs on a end port. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ +int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, + const char *dev_name, u8 port_num) { - return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, dev_name, port_num); + return call_int_hook(ib_endport_manage_subnet, 0, sec, + dev_name, port_num); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_endport_manage_subnet); +/** + * security_ib_alloc_security() - Allocate an Infiniband LSM blob + * @sec: LSM blob + * + * Allocate a security structure for Infiniband objects. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, non-zero on failure. + */ int security_ib_alloc_security(void **sec) { return call_int_hook(ib_alloc_security, 0, sec); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_alloc_security); +/** + * security_ib_free_security() - Free an Infiniband LSM blob + * @sec: LSM blob + * + * Deallocate an Infiniband security structure. + */ void security_ib_free_security(void *sec) { call_void_hook(ib_free_security, sec); @@ -2524,7 +4732,17 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_ib_free_security); #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM - +/** + * security_xfrm_policy_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm policy LSM blob + * @ctxp: xfrm security context being added to the SPD + * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace + * @gfp: gfp flags + * + * Allocate a security structure to the xp->security field; the security field + * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_policy is allocated. + * + * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. + */ int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx, gfp_t gfp) @@ -2533,23 +4751,58 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_alloc(struct xfrm_sec_ctx **ctxp, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_alloc); +/** + * security_xfrm_policy_clone() - Clone xfrm policy LSM state + * @old_ctx: xfrm security context + * @new_ctxp: target xfrm security context + * + * Allocate a security structure in new_ctxp that contains the information from + * the old_ctx structure. + * + * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. + */ int security_xfrm_policy_clone(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *old_ctx, - struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) + struct xfrm_sec_ctx **new_ctxp) { return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_clone_security, 0, old_ctx, new_ctxp); } +/** + * security_xfrm_policy_free() - Free a xfrm security context + * @ctx: xfrm security context + * + * Free LSM resources associated with @ctx. + */ void security_xfrm_policy_free(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { call_void_hook(xfrm_policy_free_security, ctx); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_policy_free); +/** + * security_xfrm_policy_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm policy is allowed + * @ctx: xfrm security context + * + * Authorize deletion of a SPD entry. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_xfrm_policy_delete(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx) { return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_delete_security, 0, ctx); } +/** + * security_xfrm_state_alloc() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob + * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD + * @sec_ctx: security label provided by userspace + * + * Allocate a security structure to the @x->security field; the security field + * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to + * correspond to @sec_ctx. + * + * Return: Return 0 if operation was successful. + */ int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx) { @@ -2557,28 +4810,76 @@ int security_xfrm_state_alloc(struct xfrm_state *x, } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_alloc); +/** + * security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire() - Allocate a xfrm state LSM blob + * @x: xfrm state being added to the SAD + * @polsec: associated policy's security context + * @secid: secid from the flow + * + * Allocate a security structure to the x->security field; the security field + * is initialized to NULL when the xfrm_state is allocated. Set the context to + * correspond to secid. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if operation was successful. + */ int security_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_sec_ctx *polsec, u32 secid) { return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, 0, x, polsec, secid); } +/** + * security_xfrm_state_delete() - Check if deleting a xfrm state is allowed + * @x: xfrm state + * + * Authorize deletion of x->security. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) { return call_int_hook(xfrm_state_delete_security, 0, x); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_xfrm_state_delete); +/** + * security_xfrm_state_free() - Free a xfrm state + * @x: xfrm state + * + * Deallocate x->security. + */ void security_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x) { call_void_hook(xfrm_state_free_security, x); } +/** + * security_xfrm_policy_lookup() - Check if using a xfrm policy is allowed + * @ctx: target xfrm security context + * @fl_secid: flow secid used to authorize access + * + * Check permission when a flow selects a xfrm_policy for processing XFRMs on a + * packet. The hook is called when selecting either a per-socket policy or a + * generic xfrm policy. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ESRCH otherwise, or -errno on + * other errors. + */ int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid) { return call_int_hook(xfrm_policy_lookup, 0, ctx, fl_secid); } +/** + * security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() - Check for a xfrm match + * @x: xfrm state to match + * @xp: xfrm policy to check for a match + * @flic: flow to check for a match. + * + * Check @xp and @flic for a match with @x. + * + * Return: Returns 1 if there is a match. + */ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi_common *flic) @@ -2596,13 +4897,22 @@ int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, * using the macro */ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, - list) { + list) { rc = hp->hook.xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, flic); break; } return rc; } +/** + * security_xfrm_decode_session() - Determine the xfrm secid for a packet + * @skb: xfrm packet + * @secid: secid + * + * Decode the packet in @skb and return the security label in @secid. + * + * Return: Return 0 if all xfrms used have the same secid. + */ int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) { return call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, secid, 1); @@ -2611,58 +4921,135 @@ int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi_common *flic) { int rc = call_int_hook(xfrm_decode_session, 0, skb, &flic->flowic_secid, - 0); + 0); BUG_ON(rc); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_skb_classify_flow); - #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM */ #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - +/** + * security_key_alloc() - Allocate and initialize a kernel key LSM blob + * @key: key + * @cred: credentials + * @flags: allocation flags + * + * Permit allocation of a key and assign security data. Note that key does not + * have a serial number assigned at this point. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. + */ int security_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { return call_int_hook(key_alloc, 0, key, cred, flags); } +/** + * security_key_free() - Free a kernel key LSM blob + * @key: key + * + * Notification of destruction; free security data. + */ void security_key_free(struct key *key) { call_void_hook(key_free, key); } +/** + * security_key_permission() - Check if a kernel key operation is allowed + * @key_ref: key reference + * @cred: credentials of actor requesting access + * @need_perm: requested permissions + * + * See whether a specific operational right is granted to a process on a key. + * + * Return: Return 0 if permission is granted, -ve error otherwise. + */ int security_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) { return call_int_hook(key_permission, 0, key_ref, cred, need_perm); } -int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) +/** + * security_key_getsecurity() - Get the key's security label + * @key: key + * @buffer: security label buffer + * + * Get a textual representation of the security context attached to a key for + * the purposes of honouring KEYCTL_GETSECURITY. This function allocates the + * storage for the NUL-terminated string and the caller should free it. + * + * Return: Returns the length of @buffer (including terminating NUL) or -ve if + * an error occurs. May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if + * there is no security label assigned to the key. + */ +int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **buffer) { - *_buffer = NULL; - return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, _buffer); + *buffer = NULL; + return call_int_hook(key_getsecurity, 0, key, buffer); } - #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT - +/** + * security_audit_rule_init() - Allocate and init an LSM audit rule struct + * @field: audit action + * @op: rule operator + * @rulestr: rule context + * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * + * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. + * + * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of + * an invalid rule. + */ int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) { return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); } +/** + * security_audit_rule_known() - Check if an audit rule contains LSM fields + * @krule: audit rule + * + * Specifies whether given @krule contains any fields related to the current + * LSM. + * + * Return: Returns 1 in case of relation found, 0 otherwise. + */ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule) { return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule); } +/** + * security_audit_rule_free() - Free an LSM audit rule struct + * @lsmrule: audit rule struct + * + * Deallocate the LSM audit rule structure previously allocated by + * audit_rule_init(). + */ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule); } +/** + * security_audit_rule_match() - Check if a label matches an audit rule + * @secid: security label + * @field: LSM audit field + * @op: matching operator + * @lsmrule: audit rule + * + * Determine if given @secid matches a rule previously approved by + * security_audit_rule_known(). + * + * Return: Returns 1 if secid matches the rule, 0 if it does not, -ERRNO on + * failure. + */ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) { return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, secid, field, op, lsmrule); @@ -2670,36 +5057,110 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule) #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +/** + * security_bpf() - Check if the bpf syscall operation is allowed + * @cmd: command + * @attr: bpf attribute + * @size: size + * + * Do a initial check for all bpf syscalls after the attribute is copied into + * the kernel. The actual security module can implement their own rules to + * check the specific cmd they need. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) { return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); } + +/** + * security_bpf_map() - Check if access to a bpf map is allowed + * @map: bpf map + * @fmode: mode + * + * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF + * maps. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) { return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); } + +/** + * security_bpf_prog() - Check if access to a bpf program is allowed + * @prog: bpf program + * + * Do a check when the kernel generates and returns a file descriptor for eBPF + * programs. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) { return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); } + +/** + * security_bpf_map_alloc() - Allocate a bpf map LSM blob + * @map: bpf map + * + * Initialize the security field inside bpf map. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) { return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); } + +/** + * security_bpf_prog_alloc() - Allocate a bpf program LSM blob + * @aux: bpf program aux info struct + * + * Initialize the security field inside bpf program. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); } + +/** + * security_bpf_map_free() - Free a bpf map's LSM blob + * @map: bpf map + * + * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf map. + */ void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) { call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); } + +/** + * security_bpf_prog_free() - Free a bpf program's LSM blob + * @aux: bpf program aux info struct + * + * Clean up the security information stored inside bpf prog. + */ void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) { call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); } #endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ +/** + * security_locked_down() - Check if a kernel feature is allowed + * @what: requested kernel feature + * + * Determine whether a kernel feature that potentially enables arbitrary code + * execution in kernel space should be permitted. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) { return call_int_hook(locked_down, 0, what); @@ -2707,26 +5168,65 @@ int security_locked_down(enum lockdown_reason what) EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_locked_down); #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS +/** + * security_perf_event_open() - Check if a perf event open is allowed + * @attr: perf event attribute + * @type: type of event + * + * Check whether the @type of perf_event_open syscall is allowed. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_perf_event_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr, int type) { return call_int_hook(perf_event_open, 0, attr, type); } +/** + * security_perf_event_alloc() - Allocate a perf event LSM blob + * @event: perf event + * + * Allocate and save perf_event security info. + * + * Return: Returns 0 on success, error on failure. + */ int security_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { return call_int_hook(perf_event_alloc, 0, event); } +/** + * security_perf_event_free() - Free a perf event LSM blob + * @event: perf event + * + * Release (free) perf_event security info. + */ void security_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) { call_void_hook(perf_event_free, event); } +/** + * security_perf_event_read() - Check if reading a perf event label is allowed + * @event: perf event + * + * Read perf_event security info if allowed. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { return call_int_hook(perf_event_read, 0, event); } +/** + * security_perf_event_write() - Check if writing a perf event label is allowed + * @event: perf event + * + * Write perf_event security info if allowed. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) { return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event); @@ -2734,15 +5234,41 @@ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) #endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */ #ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING +/** + * security_uring_override_creds() - Check if overriding creds is allowed + * @new: new credentials + * + * Check if the current task, executing an io_uring operation, is allowed to + * override it's credentials with @new. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new) { return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new); } +/** + * security_uring_sqpoll() - Check if IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL is allowed + * + * Check whether the current task is allowed to spawn a io_uring polling thread + * (IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL). + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_uring_sqpoll(void) { return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0); } + +/** + * security_uring_cmd() - Check if a io_uring passthrough command is allowed + * @ioucmd: command + * + * Check whether the file_operations uring_cmd is allowed to run. + * + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. + */ int security_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd) { return call_int_hook(uring_cmd, 0, ioucmd); |