diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 299 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ibpkey.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ima.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 21 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/security.h | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/netnode.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/netport.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/conditional.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/policydb.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/xfrm.c | 2 |
19 files changed, 210 insertions, 216 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 4d2cd6b9f6fc..e9e959343de9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -210,10 +210,9 @@ static int selinux_lsm_notifier_avc_callback(u32 event) */ static void cred_init_security(void) { - struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; struct task_security_struct *tsec; - tsec = selinux_cred(cred); + tsec = selinux_cred(unrcu_pointer(current->real_cred)); tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; } @@ -340,17 +339,15 @@ static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) } struct selinux_mnt_opts { - const char *fscontext, *context, *rootcontext, *defcontext; + u32 fscontext_sid; + u32 context_sid; + u32 rootcontext_sid; + u32 defcontext_sid; }; static void selinux_free_mnt_opts(void *mnt_opts) { - struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; - kfree(opts->fscontext); - kfree(opts->context); - kfree(opts->rootcontext); - kfree(opts->defcontext); - kfree(opts); + kfree(mnt_opts); } enum { @@ -478,7 +475,7 @@ static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) static int sb_check_xattr_support(struct super_block *sb) { - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); u32 sid; @@ -597,18 +594,6 @@ static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, return 0; } -static int parse_sid(struct super_block *sb, const char *s, u32 *sid, - gfp_t gfp) -{ - int rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, - sid, gfp); - if (rc) - pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid" - "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", - s, sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); - return rc; -} - /* * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point * labeling information. @@ -671,41 +656,29 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, * than once with different security options. */ if (opts) { - if (opts->fscontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &fscontext_sid, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (opts->fscontext_sid) { + fscontext_sid = opts->fscontext_sid; if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, fscontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; } - if (opts->context) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &context_sid, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (opts->context_sid) { + context_sid = opts->context_sid; if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, context_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; } - if (opts->rootcontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &rootcontext_sid, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (opts->rootcontext_sid) { + rootcontext_sid = opts->rootcontext_sid; if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, rootcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; } - if (opts->defcontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &defcontext_sid, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - goto out; + if (opts->defcontext_sid) { + defcontext_sid = opts->defcontext_sid; if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, defcontext_sid)) goto out_double_mount; @@ -975,6 +948,8 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = *mnt_opts; bool is_alloc_opts = false; + u32 *dst_sid; + int rc; if (token == Opt_seclabel) /* eaten and completely ignored */ @@ -982,6 +957,11 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) if (!s) return -ENOMEM; + if (!selinux_initialized(&selinux_state)) { + pr_warn("SELinux: Unable to set superblock options before the security server is initialized\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (!opts) { opts = kzalloc(sizeof(*opts), GFP_KERNEL); if (!opts) @@ -992,28 +972,34 @@ static int selinux_add_opt(int token, const char *s, void **mnt_opts) switch (token) { case Opt_context: - if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) + if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid) goto err; - opts->context = s; + dst_sid = &opts->context_sid; break; case Opt_fscontext: - if (opts->fscontext) + if (opts->fscontext_sid) goto err; - opts->fscontext = s; + dst_sid = &opts->fscontext_sid; break; case Opt_rootcontext: - if (opts->rootcontext) + if (opts->rootcontext_sid) goto err; - opts->rootcontext = s; + dst_sid = &opts->rootcontext_sid; break; case Opt_defcontext: - if (opts->context || opts->defcontext) + if (opts->context_sid || opts->defcontext_sid) goto err; - opts->defcontext = s; + dst_sid = &opts->defcontext_sid; break; + default: + WARN_ON(1); + return -EINVAL; } - - return 0; + rc = security_context_str_to_sid(&selinux_state, s, dst_sid, GFP_KERNEL); + if (rc) + pr_warn("SELinux: security_context_str_to_sid (%s) failed with errno=%d\n", + s, rc); + return rc; err: if (is_alloc_opts) { @@ -2534,7 +2520,7 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (rc) { clear_itimer(); - spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); + spin_lock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock); if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending); flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending); @@ -2542,13 +2528,13 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); recalc_sigpending(); } - spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); + spin_unlock_irq(&unrcu_pointer(current->sighand)->siglock); } /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck * wait permission to the new task SID. */ read_lock(&tasklist_lock); - __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); + __wake_up_parent(current, unrcu_pointer(current->real_parent)); read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); } @@ -2646,9 +2632,7 @@ free_opt: static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; - struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; - u32 sid; - int rc; + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); /* * Superblock not initialized (i.e. no options) - reject if any @@ -2664,35 +2648,27 @@ static int selinux_sb_mnt_opts_compat(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) if (!opts) return (sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) ? 1 : 0; - if (opts->fscontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT); - if (rc) - return 1; - if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) + if (opts->fscontext_sid) { + if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, + opts->fscontext_sid)) return 1; } - if (opts->context) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT); - if (rc) - return 1; - if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) + if (opts->context_sid) { + if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, + opts->context_sid)) return 1; } - if (opts->rootcontext) { + if (opts->rootcontext_sid) { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT); - if (rc) - return 1; - if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) + if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, + opts->rootcontext_sid)) return 1; } - if (opts->defcontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid, GFP_NOWAIT); - if (rc) - return 1; - if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) + if (opts->defcontext_sid) { + if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, + opts->defcontext_sid)) return 1; } return 0; @@ -2702,8 +2678,6 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) { struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts = mnt_opts; struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); - u32 sid; - int rc; if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) return 0; @@ -2711,34 +2685,26 @@ static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *mnt_opts) if (!opts) return 0; - if (opts->fscontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->fscontext, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) + if (opts->fscontext_sid) { + if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, + opts->fscontext_sid)) goto out_bad_option; } - if (opts->context) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->context, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) + if (opts->context_sid) { + if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, + opts->context_sid)) goto out_bad_option; } - if (opts->rootcontext) { + if (opts->rootcontext_sid) { struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; root_isec = backing_inode_security(sb->s_root); - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->rootcontext, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) + if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, + opts->rootcontext_sid)) goto out_bad_option; } - if (opts->defcontext) { - rc = parse_sid(sb, opts->defcontext, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); - if (rc) - return rc; - if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) + if (opts->defcontext_sid) { + if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, + opts->defcontext_sid)) goto out_bad_option; } return 0; @@ -2805,38 +2771,12 @@ static int selinux_fs_context_dup(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_context *src_fc) { const struct selinux_mnt_opts *src = src_fc->security; - struct selinux_mnt_opts *opts; if (!src) return 0; - fc->security = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_mnt_opts), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!fc->security) - return -ENOMEM; - - opts = fc->security; - - if (src->fscontext) { - opts->fscontext = kstrdup(src->fscontext, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!opts->fscontext) - return -ENOMEM; - } - if (src->context) { - opts->context = kstrdup(src->context, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!opts->context) - return -ENOMEM; - } - if (src->rootcontext) { - opts->rootcontext = kstrdup(src->rootcontext, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!opts->rootcontext) - return -ENOMEM; - } - if (src->defcontext) { - opts->defcontext = kstrdup(src->defcontext, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!opts->defcontext) - return -ENOMEM; - } - return 0; + fc->security = kmemdup(src, sizeof(*src), GFP_KERNEL); + return fc->security ? 0 : -ENOMEM; } static const struct fs_parameter_spec selinux_fs_parameters[] = { @@ -2859,10 +2799,9 @@ static int selinux_fs_context_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, return opt; rc = selinux_add_opt(opt, param->string, &fc->security); - if (!rc) { + if (!rc) param->string = NULL; - rc = 1; - } + return rc; } @@ -3344,8 +3283,6 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, isec->sid = newsid; isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; spin_unlock(&isec->lock); - - return; } static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) @@ -3744,6 +3681,12 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, CAP_OPT_NONE, true); break; + case FIOCLEX: + case FIONCLEX: + if (!selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec()) + error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); + break; + /* default case assumes that the command will go * to the file's ioctl() function. */ @@ -5298,37 +5241,38 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; } -/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT chunk. This happens when an incoming - * connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association - * already present). +/* + * Determines peer_secid for the asoc and updates socket's peer label + * if it's the first association on the socket. */ -static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, - struct sk_buff *skb) +static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; + u16 family = sk->sk_family; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; - u8 peerlbl_active; - u32 peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; - u32 conn_sid; - int err = 0; + int err; - if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) - return 0; + /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ + if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) + family = PF_INET; - peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); + if (selinux_peerlbl_enabled()) { + asoc->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; - if (peerlbl_active) { /* This will return peer_sid = SECSID_NULL if there are * no peer labels, see security_net_peersid_resolve(). */ - err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, asoc->base.sk->sk_family, - &peer_sid); + err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &asoc->peer_secid); if (err) return err; - if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) - peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + if (asoc->peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) + asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; + } else { + asoc->peer_secid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; } if (sksec->sctp_assoc_state == SCTP_ASSOC_UNSET) { @@ -5339,8 +5283,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, * then it is approved by policy and used as the primary * peer SID for getpeercon(3). */ - sksec->peer_sid = peer_sid; - } else if (sksec->peer_sid != peer_sid) { + sksec->peer_sid = asoc->peer_secid; + } else if (sksec->peer_sid != asoc->peer_secid) { /* Other association peer SIDs are checked to enforce * consistency among the peer SIDs. */ @@ -5348,11 +5292,32 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, ad.u.net = &net; ad.u.net->sk = asoc->base.sk; err = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, - sksec->peer_sid, peer_sid, sksec->sclass, - SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, &ad); + sksec->peer_sid, asoc->peer_secid, + sksec->sclass, SCTP_SOCKET__ASSOCIATION, + &ad); if (err) return err; } + return 0; +} + +/* Called whenever SCTP receives an INIT or COOKIE ECHO chunk. This + * happens on an incoming connect(2), sctp_connectx(3) or + * sctp_sendmsg(3) (with no association already present). + */ +static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + u32 conn_sid; + int err; + + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) + return 0; + + err = selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb); + if (err) + return err; /* Compute the MLS component for the connection and store * the information in asoc. This will be used by SCTP TCP type @@ -5360,17 +5325,36 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, * socket to be generated. selinux_sctp_sk_clone() will then * plug this into the new socket. */ - err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peer_sid, &conn_sid); + err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, asoc->peer_secid, &conn_sid); if (err) return err; asoc->secid = conn_sid; - asoc->peer_secid = peer_sid; /* Set any NetLabel labels including CIPSO/CALIPSO options. */ return selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(asoc, skb); } +/* Called when SCTP receives a COOKIE ACK chunk as the final + * response to an association request (initited by us). + */ +static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sk_buff *skb) +{ + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + + if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) + return 0; + + /* Inherit secid from the parent socket - this will be picked up + * by selinux_sctp_sk_clone() if the association gets peeled off + * into a new socket. + */ + asoc->secid = sksec->sid; + + return selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(asoc, skb); +} + /* Check if sctp IPv4/IPv6 addresses are valid for binding or connecting * based on their @optname. */ @@ -7191,6 +7175,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_request, selinux_sctp_assoc_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_sk_clone, selinux_sctp_sk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_bind_connect, selinux_sctp_bind_connect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sctp_assoc_established, selinux_sctp_assoc_established), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), diff --git a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c index 20b3b2243820..5839ca7bb9c7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ibpkey.c +++ b/security/selinux/ibpkey.c @@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ static void sel_ib_pkey_insert(struct sel_ib_pkey *pkey) tail = list_entry( rcu_dereference_protected( - sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list.prev, + list_tail_rcu(&sel_ib_pkey_hash[idx].list), lockdep_is_held(&sel_ib_pkey_lock)), struct sel_ib_pkey, list); list_del_rcu(&tail->list); diff --git a/security/selinux/ima.c b/security/selinux/ima.c index 727c4e43219d..a915b89d55b0 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ima.c +++ b/security/selinux/ima.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(struct selinux_state *state) buf_len = strlen("initialized=0;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=0;") + 1; len = strlen(on); - for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) buf_len += strlen(selinux_policycap_names[i]) + len; buf = kzalloc(buf_len, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static char *selinux_ima_collect_state(struct selinux_state *state) rc = strlcat(buf, checkreqprot_get(state) ? on : off, buf_len); WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); - for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; i++) { rc = strlcat(buf, selinux_policycap_names[i], buf_len); WARN_ON(rc >= buf_len); @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state) size_t policy_len; int rc = 0; - WARN_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&state->policy_mutex)); + lockdep_assert_held(&state->policy_mutex); state_str = selinux_ima_collect_state(state); if (!state_str) { @@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ void selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(struct selinux_state *state) */ void selinux_ima_measure_state(struct selinux_state *state) { - WARN_ON(mutex_is_locked(&state->policy_mutex)); + lockdep_assert_not_held(&state->policy_mutex); mutex_lock(&state->policy_mutex); selinux_ima_measure_state_locked(state); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h index 2ec038efbb03..2680aa21205c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h @@ -4,17 +4,18 @@ /* Policy capabilities */ enum { - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION, - POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS, - __POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX + POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER, + POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM, + POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS, + POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK, + POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL, + POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION, + POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS, + POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC, + __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX }; -#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1) +#define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1) -extern const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX]; +extern const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX]; #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h index b89289f092c9..100da7d043db 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h @@ -5,14 +5,15 @@ #include "policycap.h" /* Policy capability names */ -const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = { +const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = { "network_peer_controls", "open_perms", "extended_socket_class", "always_check_network", "cgroup_seclabel", "nnp_nosuid_transition", - "genfs_seclabel_symlinks" + "genfs_seclabel_symlinks", + "ioctl_skip_cloexec" }; #endif /* _SELINUX_POLICYCAP_NAMES_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index ac0ece01305a..ace4bd13e808 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ struct selinux_state { #endif bool checkreqprot; bool initialized; - bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX]; + bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX]; struct page *status_page; struct mutex status_lock; @@ -174,49 +174,56 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netpeer(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NETPEER]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETPEER]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_openperm(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_OPENPERM]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_OPENPERM]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_extsockclass(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_EXTSOCKCLASS]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_EXTSOCKCLASS]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_ALWAYSNETWORK]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_cgroupseclabel(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_CGROUPSECLABEL]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION]); } static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; - return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS]); +} + +static inline bool selinux_policycap_ioctl_skip_cloexec(void) +{ + struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; + + return READ_ONCE(state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_IOCTL_SKIP_CLOEXEC]); } struct selinux_policy_convert_data; @@ -254,8 +261,8 @@ struct av_decision { #define XPERMS_AUDITALLOW 2 #define XPERMS_DONTAUDIT 4 -#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) (perms[x >> 5] |= 1 << (x & 0x1f)) -#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & (perms[x >> 5] >> (x & 0x1f))) +#define security_xperm_set(perms, x) ((perms)[(x) >> 5] |= 1 << ((x) & 0x1f)) +#define security_xperm_test(perms, x) (1 & ((perms)[(x) >> 5] >> ((x) & 0x1f))) struct extended_perms_data { u32 p[8]; }; @@ -386,11 +393,11 @@ int security_get_allow_unknown(struct selinux_state *state); int security_fs_use(struct selinux_state *state, struct super_block *sb); int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, - const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, + const char *fstype, const char *path, u16 sclass, u32 *sid); int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, - const char *fstype, char *name, u16 sclass, + const char *fstype, const char *path, u16 sclass, u32 *sid); #ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL diff --git a/security/selinux/netnode.c b/security/selinux/netnode.c index 4a7d2ab5b960..0ac7df9a9367 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netnode.c +++ b/security/selinux/netnode.c @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family) switch (family) { case PF_INET: - idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(__be32 *)addr); + idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv4(*(const __be32 *)addr); break; case PF_INET6: idx = sel_netnode_hashfn_ipv6(addr); @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ static struct sel_netnode *sel_netnode_find(const void *addr, u16 family) if (node->nsec.family == family) switch (family) { case PF_INET: - if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(__be32 *)addr) + if (node->nsec.addr.ipv4 == *(const __be32 *)addr) return node; break; case PF_INET6: @@ -164,8 +164,9 @@ static void sel_netnode_insert(struct sel_netnode *node) if (sel_netnode_hash[idx].size == SEL_NETNODE_HASH_BKT_LIMIT) { struct sel_netnode *tail; tail = list_entry( - rcu_dereference_protected(sel_netnode_hash[idx].list.prev, - lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)), + rcu_dereference_protected( + list_tail_rcu(&sel_netnode_hash[idx].list), + lockdep_is_held(&sel_netnode_lock)), struct sel_netnode, list); list_del_rcu(&tail->list); kfree_rcu(tail, rcu); diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c index 9ba09d11c0f5..8eec6347cf01 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netport.c +++ b/security/selinux/netport.c @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ static void sel_netport_insert(struct sel_netport *port) struct sel_netport *tail; tail = list_entry( rcu_dereference_protected( - sel_netport_hash[idx].list.prev, + list_tail_rcu(&sel_netport_hash[idx].list), lockdep_is_held(&sel_netport_lock)), struct sel_netport, list); list_del_rcu(&tail->list); diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c index 94ea2a8b2bb7..d8ceee9e0d6f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c @@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = { RTM_GETNSID, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { RTM_NEWSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { RTM_GETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, + { RTM_SETSTATS, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { RTM_NEWCACHEREPORT, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, { RTM_NEWCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { RTM_DELCHAIN, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, @@ -91,6 +92,9 @@ static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] = { RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { RTM_DELNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, { RTM_GETNEXTHOPBUCKET, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, + { RTM_NEWTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { RTM_DELTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE }, + { RTM_GETTUNNEL, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ }, }; static const struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] = @@ -176,7 +180,7 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm) * structures at the top of this file with the new mappings * before updating the BUILD_BUG_ON() macro! */ - BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET + 3)); + BUILD_BUG_ON(RTM_MAX != (RTM_NEWTUNNEL + 3)); err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_route_perms, sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms)); break; diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c index e4cd7cb856f3..097c6d866ec4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c @@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ static int sel_make_policycap(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi) struct dentry *dentry = NULL; struct inode *inode = NULL; - for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX; iter++) { + for (iter = 0; iter <= POLICYDB_CAP_MAX; iter++) { if (iter < ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_policycap_names)) dentry = d_alloc_name(fsi->policycap_dir, selinux_policycap_names[iter]); @@ -2127,6 +2127,8 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) } ret = sel_make_avc_files(dentry); + if (ret) + goto err; dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "ss", &fsi->last_ino); if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index c97695ae508f..cfdae20792e1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static inline int avtab_hash(const struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask) static struct avtab_node* avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue, - struct avtab_node *prev, struct avtab_node *cur, + struct avtab_node *prev, const struct avtab_key *key, const struct avtab_datum *datum) { struct avtab_node *newnode; @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key, break; } - newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum); + newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum); if (!newnode) return -ENOMEM; @@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ struct avtab_node *avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, key->target_class < cur->key.target_class) break; } - return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum); + return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, key, datum); } struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, const struct avtab_key *key) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c index 2ec6e5cd25d9..e11219fdf9f7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c @@ -152,6 +152,8 @@ static void cond_list_destroy(struct policydb *p) for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++) cond_node_destroy(&p->cond_list[i]); kfree(p->cond_list); + p->cond_list = NULL; + p->cond_list_len = 0; } void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p) @@ -441,7 +443,6 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp) return 0; err: cond_list_destroy(p); - p->cond_list = NULL; return rc; } @@ -566,8 +567,6 @@ void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key, if (node->key.specified & AVTAB_ENABLED) services_compute_xperms_decision(xpermd, node); } - return; - } /* Determine whether additional permissions are granted by the conditional * av table, and if so, add them to the result diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 61fcbb8d0f88..abde349c8321 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -359,7 +359,6 @@ void ebitmap_destroy(struct ebitmap *e) e->highbit = 0; e->node = NULL; - return; } int ebitmap_read(struct ebitmap *e, void *fp) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 9eb2d0af2805..58eb822f11ee 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ static inline void ebitmap_node_clr_bit(struct ebitmap_node *n, } #define ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(e, n, bit) \ - for (bit = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &n); \ - bit < ebitmap_length(e); \ - bit = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &n, bit)) \ + for ((bit) = ebitmap_start_positive(e, &(n)); \ + (bit) < ebitmap_length(e); \ + (bit) = ebitmap_next_positive(e, &(n), bit)) \ int ebitmap_cmp(struct ebitmap *e1, struct ebitmap *e2); int ebitmap_cpy(struct ebitmap *dst, struct ebitmap *src); diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index 3f5fd124342c..99571b19d4a9 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -156,7 +156,6 @@ void mls_sid_to_context(struct policydb *p, } *scontext = scontextp; - return; } int mls_level_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct mls_level *l) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c index 0ae1b718194a..d036e1238e77 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c @@ -41,8 +41,6 @@ #include "mls.h" #include "services.h" -#define _DEBUG_HASHES - #ifdef DEBUG_HASHES static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = { "common prefixes", @@ -704,7 +702,7 @@ static void symtab_hash_eval(struct symtab *s) } #else -static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, char *hash_name) +static inline void hash_eval(struct hashtab *h, const char *hash_name) { } #endif diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index 8e92af7dd284..6901dc07680d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -529,8 +529,6 @@ out: /* release scontext/tcontext */ kfree(tcontext_name); kfree(scontext_name); - - return; } /* @@ -1452,7 +1450,7 @@ static int string_to_context_struct(struct policydb *pol, /* Parse the security context. */ rc = -EINVAL; - scontextp = (char *) scontext; + scontextp = scontext; /* Extract the user. */ p = scontextp; @@ -2875,7 +2873,7 @@ out_unlock: */ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *fstype, - char *path, + const char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { @@ -2928,7 +2926,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, */ int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, const char *fstype, - char *path, + const char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { @@ -2952,7 +2950,7 @@ int security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_state *state, int selinux_policy_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy, const char *fstype, - char *path, + const char *path, u16 orig_sclass, u32 *sid) { diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 293ec048af08..a54b8652bfb5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ struct sidtab_str_cache { char str[]; }; -#define index_to_sid(index) (index + SECINITSID_NUM + 1) -#define sid_to_index(sid) (sid - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1)) +#define index_to_sid(index) ((index) + SECINITSID_NUM + 1) +#define sid_to_index(sid) ((sid) - (SECINITSID_NUM + 1)) int sidtab_init(struct sidtab *s) { diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c index 90697317895f..c576832febc6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c +++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c @@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire(struct xfrm_state *x, int rc; struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx; char *ctx_str = NULL; - int str_len; + u32 str_len; if (!polsec) return 0; |